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Abstract 
Intelligence changes as the nature of war changes. From the late 1870s, the 
United States military, as part of a broader reform process, began learning about 
intelligence in part from experience but more importantly by observing the practices 
of the great powers of Europe. The period of American involvement in World War I 
saw a rapid acceleration of this development, with the United States continuing to 
learn from the United Kingdom and France. The war also saw intelligence spreading 
into fields that it had seldom if ever entered in the American experience. During the 
nineteen months of American belligerency American intelligence agencies, notably 
the War Department's Military Intelligence Division and the Navy Department's 
Office of Naval Intelligence expanded greatly. In addition, the services started to 
adopt high technology tools such as aerial photography and signals intelligence. 
These new tools required the admission into the military departments and services of 
esoteric specialists who did not fit previous military stereotypes. The war also 
occasioned a vast expansion of domestic surveillance and intelligence, a result of the 
idea that the World War was a struggle not only of militaries but of entire societies. 
Espionage, too, grew in extent and sophistication and the moral stigma associated 
with it began to erode. Overseas, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France 
grew its own large intelligence staff. All of these measures allowed General John J. 
Pershing, the AEF's commander, as well has other American leaders to be better 
informed than they had ever been during previous wars. 
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Introduction 
'To each epoch-its own wars', Lenin wrote in the margin of his copy of 
Clausewitz. I In this, if little else, he was correct. It is now axiomatic that new 
economic or societal structures, cultural changes, and new technologies all lead to 
new forms of war. Less attended to, however, is the fact that new forms of war lead 
to new forms of intelligence. Though World War I had some similarities to wars that 
had preceded it, notably the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War, the 
feeling at the time was that it was an utterly new type of war and indeed there is much 
justification for that feeling. Scholars have already pointed out the role of the Great 
War in reshaping the intelligence practices of the belligerents. One scholar-
practitioner has observed that 'total war needed total intelligence; foreign military 
power had corne to depend on factors of industrial capacity, demography and morale 
which fell outside the analysis of normal military and naval intelligence,.2 By the 
same token, as another scholar has observed, those countries which played only 
marginal roles in the war lacked the motivation and the insight necessary to reform 
their intelligence services.3 However, hitherto virtually all the scholarly attention 
given to this subject has involved assessment of the intelligence services of 
belligerents other than the United States. 
This dissertation, then, will discuss how the United States expanded and 
shaped its intelligence organizations and ideas to fit the new circumstances of World 
War 1. It will demonstrate that World War I saw America's invention of modem 
intelligence. Of course, 'invention' does not mean that the Americans were the first to 
1 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War, (Oxford, 
2001), p. 504. 
2 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in War and Peace, (Cambridge, 1996), p. 25. 
3 Ken Kotani, Japanese Intelligence in World War II, (New York, 2009), pp. 8, 99. 
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invent intelligence. (The old joke, of course, is that intelligence is the second oldest 
professionl As newcomers to this activity, the Americans both could and did profit 
from the experience of others. Much of this work will therefore describe how and 
what the Americans learned from the Germans, the French, and the British. However, 
its central purpose is to demonstrate that the United States invented modem 
intelligence for itself, to analyse how it did so, and to show what Americans thought 
their invention was. The primary contention of this dissertation, then, will be that the 
World War I period and the years immediately preceding it have a strong and hitherto 
unrecognized claim to having given birth to modem American intelligence. 
Merely by looking at the amount of history published about the various topics 
it is easy to discern the emphasis that intelligence historians have placed on World 
War II and the early Cold War at the expense of earlier periods. Countless volumes 
about American intelligence during World War II and the early Cold War fill1ibrary 
shelves while one has to search hard for anything written on intelligence during the 
Great War. The dichotomy grows even sharper when one visits an American 
bookstore.s A recent bibliographical work on World War I discusses work done on 
the intelligence activities of most of the major combatants but almost entirely neglects 
American intelligence, mentioning only a journal article about the American 
4 More seriously, intelligence is, indced, an ancient endeavour. Rosemary Sheldon has made 
her career as a historian of intelligence in the classical world. See, for instance, her 
Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods, But VerifY, (London, 2005) and 
Operation Messiah: St. Paul, Roman Intelligence, and the Birth a/Christianity, (Portland, 
2008). Ralph D. Sawyer's, The Tao a/Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in 
Traditional China, (Boulder, 1998), is an encyclopaedic consideration of the topic in ancient 
China. Primary source works from the ancient world that contain serious discussions of 
intelligence include Sun Tzu's Art a/War and Kautilya's Arthashastra, a text on politics and 
statecraft in India that is often compared to Machiavelli's The Prince. 
S J. Ransom Clark, a former senior CIA official turncd academic, maintains a remarkably 
thorough and discerning bibliography of intelligence literature: 
http://intellit.muskingum.edulmaintoc.html. The World War II section of the bibliography is 
at http://intellit.muskingum.edulwwii_folder/wwiitoc.html. The majority of the rest of the 
site is devoted to Cold War intelligence. 
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Expeditionary Force's propaganda operations and another on American collection 
operations against Japan from 1915 to 1935.6 The lion's share of what has been 
written about the World War I period deals with the domestic surveillance operations 
conducted by the Army and Navy and the use of the intelligence agencies to oppress 
out groups.7 The standard published history of War Department intelligence to 1941 
is an official history and is indispensable for its organizational information but largely 
devoid of interpretive content. 8 In the 1970s, Marc Powe wrote a fine master's thesis, 
later published, on the War Department's intelligence structures from 1885-1918.9 
Jeffrey Dorwart has written an outstanding thin volume about the ONI covering its 
establishment through World War I and emphasizing its reformist pedigree. His 
second volume covered the period 1919 to 1945 and emphasized ONI's involvement 
in domestic intelligence. lo The only other general history of ONI covering the period 
in question that has come out in the nearly thirty years since Dorwart's books were 
published is a bland official history. I I 
With regard to particular collection disciplines or operations, Terrence 
Finnegan recently published an exemplary book comparing the aerial reconnaissance 
6 Robin Higham with Dennis E. Showalter, cds., Researching World War I: A Handbook, 
(Westport, 2003). 
7 For examples, see Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980, (New Haven, 
1991) and Roy Talbert, Jr., Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917-
1941, (Jackson, 1991). Joseph W. Bendersky, The "Jewish Threat": Anti-Semitic Politics of 
the U.S. Army, (New York, 2000), especially Chapters 1 and 2. See also Wray R. Johnson, 
'Black American Radicalism and the First World War: The Secret Files of the Military 
Intelligence Division', Armed Forces & Society, 26: 1, (Fall, 1999), pp. 27-54. Robert C. 
Cottrell, 'Roger Nash Baldwin, the National Civil Liberties Bureau, and Intelligence during 
World War 1', Historian, 60: 1, (Fall, 1997), pp. 87-106. 
8 Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army 
General Staff: 1775-1941, (Frederick, 1986). There is some useful material in the similarly 
non-interpretive John Patrick Finnegan, Military Intelligence, (Washington, 1998). 
9 Marc B. Powe, The Emergence of the War Department Intelligence Agency, 1885-1918, 
(Manhatten, 1975). 
10 Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First 
Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918, (Annapolis, 1979) and ConjlictofDuty: The U.S. Navy's 
Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945, (Annapolis, 1983). 
II Wyman H. Packard, A Century of us Naval Intelligence, (Washington, 1996). 
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practices of the British, French and Americans during the war. 12 Some fifty years ago 
Sam Frank wrote a fine dissertation on American aerial 'observation' during the 
war. 13 David Kahn's massive The Codebreakers devotes parts of two chapters to 
American signals intelligence (Sigint) during the war.I4 A few other scholars, most of 
them officials of the National Security Agency, have written articles about tactical 
intelligence operations, particularly in the realm of Sigint, during World War LIS 
There has been significant coverage of the State Department's human intelligence 
activities, but only one book, Rhodri Jeffreys Jones' American Espionage: From 
Secret Service to CIA, takes a Washington-centric approach, and it is marred 
throughout by an explicit tendency to portray intelligence activities as intrinsically 
sinister. 16 The rest, of varying quality, concentrates on operations in Russia or those 
mounted by particular individuals. 17 Charles Harris and Louis Sadler have written an 
12 Terrance J. Finnegan, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic 
Interpretation on the Western Front-World War I, (Washington, 2006). 
13 Sam Hager Frank, 'American Air Service Observation in World War I' , (unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, University of Florida), 1961. 
14 David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, (New Yark, 1996), chapters 
11 and 12. 
15 All of the following articles from NSA were obtained through the Freedom ofInformation 
Act: [name redacted], 'The Origination and Evolution of Radio Traffic Analysis: The World 
War I Era', Cryptologic Quarterly, 6:1, (1987), pp. 21-40. William. F. Friedman, 'A Brief 
History of U.S. Cryptologic Operations 1917-1920', Cryptologic Spectrum, 6:2, (Spring, 
1976), pp. 9-15. [redacted], 'COMINT and COMSEC: The Tactics of 1914-1918', 
Cryptologic Spectrum, Summer, 1972, pp. 5-9. [redacted] 'COMINT and COM SEC: The 
Tactics of 1914-1918-Part II', Cryptologic Spectrum, Fall, 1972, pp. 8-11. [redacted], 'The 
Many Lives of Herbert O. Yardley', Cryptologic Spectrum, 11:4 (Fall, 1981), pp. 5-29. For 
an article on this topic (apparently) not by an NSA veteran, see William A. Morgan, 'Invasion 
on the Ether: Radio Intelligence at the Battle of St. Mihiel, September 1918', Military Affairs, 
Vol. 51, No.2 (Apr., 1987), pp. 57-61. 
16 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA, (New York, 
1977). 
17 Richard B. Spence, 'The Tragic Fate of Kalamatiano: America's Man in Moscow', 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 12:3, (1999), 346-374. Klaus 
Schwabe, 'U.S. Secret War Diplomacy, Intelligence, and the Coming of the German 
Revolution in 1918: The Role of Vice Consul James McNally', Diplomatic History, 16:2 
(1992), 175-200. John F. Chalkley, Zach Lamar Cobb: EI Paso Collector of Customs and 
Intelligence During the Mexican Revolution, J 9 J 3-J 9 J 8, (El Paso, 1998). David A. Langbart, 
'''Spare No Expense": The Department of State and the Search for Information about 
Bolshevik Russia, November 1917 -September 1918', Intelligence and National Security, 4:2, 
x 
illuminating book about an archaeologist commissioned into ONI and sent to find 
(nonexistent) German submarine bases in Central America. 18 John Votaw has penned 
a useful dissertation on American military attaches 1885-1919.19 Finally, Jim Beach 
has written an excellent article on US-British intelligence liaison during the war. 20 
As sparse as that literature is, historians of intelligence have paid more 
attention to World War I than historians of World War I have paid to intelligence. 
Indeed, intelligence scarcely appears in the standards histories of the war. For 
instance, Marc Ferro's The Great War 1914-1918 does not discuss the topic, though it 
does contain a very useful discussion of the breadth of the war from the trenches to 
propaganda to economics, the rich context within which modern intelligence came to 
operate.21 John Keegan's The First World War, contains several short discussions of 
intelligence matters, but none refers to the United States.22 The works of Stevenson 
and Strachan deal even less with intelligence.23 Edward M. Coffman's, The War to 
End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War J, makes only 
glancing reference to the topic and contains no discussions of intelligence itself.24 
The word 'intelligence' does not appear in the index of Paul G. Halpern's 
(1989),316-334. David A. Langbart, 'Five Months in Petro grad in 1918: Robert W. Imbrie 
and the US Search for Information in Russia', Studies in Intelligence, 52: 1 (March 2008), 
Web Supplement, https:/ Iwww .cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligcnce/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-l/pdf-files/(U)%20Langbart-Petrograd-
Web%20Supplement.pdf, accessed 4 May 2008. David Scott Foglesong, 'America's Secret 
War Against Bolshevism: United States Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920', 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), April 1991. 
18 Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, The Archaeologist Was a Spy: Sylvanus G. 
Morley and the Office of Naval Intelligence, (Albuquerque, 2003). 
19 John F. Votaw, United States Military Attaches, 1885-1919: The American Army Matures 
in the International Arena, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Temple University), April, 
1991. 
20 Jim Beach, 'Origins of the Special Intelligence Relationship? Anglo-American Intelligence 
Cooperation', Intelligence and National Security, 22:2, (2007), pp. 229-249. 
21 Marc Ferro, The Great War 1914-1918, (Boston, 1973). 
22 John Keegan, The First World War, (New York, 1999). 
23 David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First World War, (New York, 2004). 
Hew Strachan, The First World War, (New York, 2006). 
24 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in 
World War /, (Lexington, 1998). 
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authoritative A Naval History of World War 1.25 William N. Still's massive Crisis at 
Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters During World War 1 contains an 
excellent discussion ofthe friction between Admiral Sims' staff and ONI. It then 
promptly drops the subject.26 Nor yet do 'war and society' works, such as Jennifer 
Keene's Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America, devote any 
appreciable attention to it.27 
Considering the scope of American involvement in World War I and the 
extent of its intelligence activities, this is not a great amount of literature. This is 
regrettable because by the end of the World War I, while not a leader in intelligence, 
the United States was - as will be demonstrated - a respectable player in the field. 
In discussing the growth and development of American intelligence during the 
war, this dissertation will not always adhere to a strictly chronological analysis of the 
nineteen months that the United States was a belligerent. Rather, the presentation will 
compare pre-war American ideas or practices with those in place on 11 November 
1918. The intention here is to try to describe the ideas held by large numbers of 
Americans (albeit a small minority of the number of people in uniform or Federal 
service) on multiple continents, and also try to describe the coalescence of these 
people into a self-identified distinct professional community. However, ideas do not 
manoeuvre with the chronological crispness of military forces. We can pinpoint 
precisely the day, even the minute, when the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) 
launched the St. Mihiel Offensive. It is altogether a different matter to pinpoint when, 
for example, technology became central to the American understanding of 
intelligence or when American intelligence personnel became believers in all-source 
25 Paul G. Halpern's A Naval History of World War I, (Annapolis, 1994). 
26 William N. Still Jr., Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World, 
(Gainesville, 2006). 
27 Jennifer Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America, (Baltimore, 
2001). 
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analysis. Ideas usually change, even when they are in rapid flux, over comparatively 
long periods of time. Probing too deeply inside the chronology of a nineteen month 
period that saw dizzying, enthusiastic, and untidy change would require making 
unwarranted assumptions about causality, not to mention introducing confusing and 
ultimately meaningless names, dates, and details. 
This work focuses on the World War I period and devotes some attention to 
the thirty years preceding it. However, the United States did have some experience 
with intelligence even before that time. In fact, over the course of American history, 
intelligence has undergone multiple periods of mass extinction. General George 
Washington was an enthusiastic and capable practitioner of intelligence during the 
Revolutionary period, but nothing continued of this through the subsequent decades as 
the US Army and Navy shrank and the country largely avoided contact with Europe.28 
Several decades later, some of the military commanders fighting for the United States 
and the Confederate States thought seriously about intelligence and developed 
capabilities in this direction during the Civil War (1861-1865). However, these 
concepts, and the ad hoc structures that instantiated them evaporated with the radical 
demobilization that followed the Confederate surrender at Appomattox. Two decades 
later, however, as a part of the reforms that eventually swept the U.S. Army and 
Navy, both services created intelligence offices that would endure. First came the 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882, followed in 1885 by what eventually 
became known as the War Department's Military Intelligence Division (MID).29 
28 For an overview, see United States Central Intelligence Agency History Staff, Intelligence 
in the War of Independence, (Washington, 2007), https:llwww.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications!books-and-monographs/intelligence/index.html. See 
also, John A. Nagy, Invisible Ink: Spycraft of the American Revolution, (Yardley, 2009). 
29 Though it had various names at various times, I shall refer to it as the MID throughout this 
work. 
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Of course, the services had long had the concept of intelligence support for 
commanders in the field or at sea and there were well-established literatures about and 
procedures for scouting, searching, and screening. ONI and the MID, however, were 
novel. Indeed, they were both symptoms of and active proponents of modernization. 
Their raison d'efre was, in large part, the realization that in order to develop 
appropriate plans for mobilization and war and to ensure the procurement of modern 
weaponry, it was necessary to study foreign militaries and the terrain on which 
American forces might fight. These services gained the requisite information-about 
the mobilization capacities ofthe various nations, the latest European naval 
technology, etc.-mostly through overt measures: the legal work of military attaches, 
the scouring of professional journals, and the like. (The use of clandestine measures 
was a loathsome aberration confined almost exclusively to wartime.) Back in 
Washington, a tiny cadre of intelligence officers consigned this information to file 
cards, the most advanced information technology of the time, against the day when it 
might prove useful. 
It was the fate of ONI and the MID that they should be created not long before 
the perceived nature of war radically changed. This change manifested itself in World 
War I, which the United States joined in 1917. An intelligence system optimized for 
wars similar to the U.S. Civil War or the Franco-Prussian War in which relatively 
small earthbound armies roamed relatively large theatres (or the naval equivalent of 
these) seeking each other out, would not do in the Great War. Now enormous armies 
spent every minute in contact along a generally static front while aircraft flew the 
skies above. Furthermore, the war was conducted not merely by destroying the 
enemy's military forces, but also by attacking the enemy's economy and industry, his 
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morale, and the political bonds that held ally to ally and held multi ethnic empires 
together. Intelligence had to change to stay relevant. 
American intelligence had to evolve very quickly because it was in the war 
such a short period of time and in serious combat even a much shorter time. The 
country declared war in April, 1917 and General John J. Pershing and the nucleus of 
his staff, including its intelligence component, arrived in Europe in June, 1917. The 
first American division, however, did not enter the front line trenches until January, 
1918. This gave the AEF's intelligence personnel, almost all of them new to the 
discipline, several months to learn and prepare. Naval intelligence personnel had to 
spring into action rather sooner, doing counterintelligence work in and around the 
French ports which were receiving an ever-increasing number of troopships carrying 
doughboys. Even by January, however, AEF intelligence was scarcely ready for the 
'Big Show'. Fortunately, for most of the next several months, the AEF experienced 
static warfare as it continued to grow and mature. Not until May 1918 when it 
became involved in repelling the spring German offensive did it face a more fluid 
situation. The AEF took a major part in stopping and then reversing these German 
gains, but by the second half of July, the situation was again largely static. Though 
Pershing's General Headquarters (GHQ) had existed from the time he came to France, 
the US First Army with its own staff and intelligence component was only established 
on 10 August and only assumed command of a sector on 30 August 1918. On 12 
September, it mounted the first American offensive, the St. Mihiel Offensive, which 
crushed a long-standing German salient. On 26 September, shortly after the 
successful conclusion of the first offensive, the AEF launched its second and last, the 
Meuse-Argonne offensive. This effort, which in its waning days saw the 
establishment of the U.S. Second Army, lasted until the 11 November armistice. 
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This dissertation will examine the evolution of American military intelligence 
from the late nineteenth century until the end of the First World War. Chapter 1 will 
discuss the development of American thinking about intelligence between the 1880s, 
when it was reborn, and the outbreak of World War I. It will be shown that once the 
military services decided, as part of their reform efforts, that intelligence services 
were necessary, they tended to mirror the ideas and practices of France, Prussia and 
Britain, sometimes by imitation, sometimes through parallel development. These 
ideas were the topic of substantial debate in the military journals of the time. Chapter 
2 describes the reinvention of intelligence by technology that took place with the 
invention of the aeroplane and continued with the flourishing of signals intelligence. 
An emphasis on technology is in the very genes of American thinking about 
intelligence. The development of overhead reconnaissance (primarily imagery 
intelligence) and signals intelligence forced the militaries to bring into their ranks 
specialists and intellectuals who would never previously have been found in uniform. 
Aerial photography and signals intelligence also brought in staggering amounts of 
data and immediately put the opposing forces into an offence-defence relationship 
analogous to that armour/anti-armour or airpower/air defence dialectics. Both 
information overload and this dialectic contributed to the bloating of military staffs. 
Chapter 3 looks toward home and assesses attitudes toward and ideas about 
counterintelligence there. World War I was a total war of entire national systems in a 
way that no war before it had been and this placed unprecedented demands on 
intelligence systems. Belligerents thought that their adversaries could affect every 
aspect of the all-encompassing military system by means of spies, saboteurs, and 
propagandists. This threat demanded a response. Soon the military services, in 
cooperation with civilian organs of government, found themselves monitoring not 
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only the actions but the ideas of alien and citizen alike throughout the length and 
breadth of the country. Of course, individual opinions varied, but broadly speaking 
the officer corps flung itself enthusiastically into this work during the war, but 
immediately tried to distance itself from such matters once the war was over. In this 
latter endeavour it was to have only modest success. 
Chapter 4 will look at clandestine operations, spying itself. Before World War 
I, the U.S. government most often used spies for their ability to observe military 
forces or infrastructure. Indeed, during the Civil War, 'spy' and 'scout' were 
interchangeable terms.30 In short, spies were usually thought of as reconnaissance 
assets. The term 'secret service' was similarly muddled in its meaning, applying to 
espionage and even counterespionage but also to investigative work, especially 
criminal investigation.3) The armed services seldom recruited spies as penetration 
agents to steal secrets from inside a government bureaucracy. This changed during 
the total war which was World War I as the services, even the State Department, 
started deploying more and more spies, often to collect information that would have 
seemed of scant interest to commanders and statesmen in previous wars. The State 
Department also began to deploy clandestine agents to gather military information in 
such places as revolutionary Russia, Switzerland, and the Mexican border. It also 
joined forces with the War Department to deploy a network of Czechoslovak agents 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, before World War I, spying, it was 
generally agreed, was an odious endeavour, tolerable only during wartime and under 
carefully circumscribed circumstances. World War I saw the beginning of the erosion 
of that idea. 
30 William B. Feis, Grant's Secret Service, (Lincoln, 2002), p. 3. 
31 Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in 
the Civil War, (Boston, 1996), p. 8. 
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Furthermore, the war saw the development of a new concept of geography in 
the mind of intelligence officers, at least those responsible for espionage. Instead of 
being built around the notion of physical geography, rivers, coasts, mountains, defiles, 
trench lines, etc., it was built around the question of access. How could the 
intelligence organizations insert a collector, a spy, into an area of interest and 
maintain two-way communication with him? The important factors were likely to be 
the existence or non-existence of diplomatic relations among countries, the 
sympathies of civilian populations on either side of the border, the degree of cross-
border business or labour flows, the nature of the censorship regimes on the post and 
telegraphs and other such factors which were only tenuously related to physical 
geography. 
Chapter 5 will look, then, at how intelligence supported the military 
commanders, with an emphasis on senior ground commanders. The American 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF) that deployed to Europe in 1917 modelled its intelligence 
staff on the British organization, but many of the field manuals and pamphlets on 
intelligence topics that the AEF disseminated to the troops were translations of French 
publications. Speaking with regard to counter-espionage and security functions in 
France, the US Naval Attache found that it was best to study the 'French System' and 
then 'reinforce' it. 32 British and French instructors taught American intelligence 
personnel in many places. In short, Britain and France were the midwives to this 
conceptual birth a full generation before the British purportedly nursed the OSS. The 
intelligence staffs provided two particular types of support to their senior 
commanders. The first was providing the information needed to make decisions. The 
second involved securing the rear area of enemy forces, much as the United States 
32 R. H. Jackson to Director of Naval Intelligence, n.d., NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, E-9-a, 
I0670-C. 
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itself had to be kept secure from spies, saboteurs, and propagandists. The war also 
saw the first stirrings of a capability for the United States to conduct what are today 
called 'covert action' or 'covert influence' operations. 
The work will close with a short final chapter describing how wartime 
developments launched the United States intelligence efforts into the immediate post-
war years. 
A few other remarks are in order. First, with the exception of short section in 
the final chapter this work does not attempt to assess the extent to which intelligence 
actually affected national policy or decisions by military commanders. There are two 
interlocking reasons for this. The focus here is on what intelligence was and how it 
was done. Given the paucity of studies of American intelligence during World War I, 
this seemed a logical place to start. The influence or utility of intelligence is a 
separate and only tenuously related question. Furthermore, attempting seriously to 
assess the influence of intelligence on decision-making would be a work in itself, 
probably much lengthier than this one. The reason for this is simple: decision-making 
is an opaque psychological process. The mere fact that an intelligence report was 
produced does not mean that it had influence. As a result, historians approaching this 
problem must go through the voluminous files of the commander in search of needles 
in a haystack which usually will only show that an intelligence report got near the 
commander, not that it influenced him. Furthermore, the same historian will also 
have to go through the intelligence files looking for tasking memos or marginal 
notations by the senior commander scrawled on returned reports. 
The influence of secrecy makes judgments about effectiveness even more 
problematic. Richard Aldrich has famously cautioned against viewing intelligence 
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archives as 'analogues ofreality,.33 It is far from clear that commanders' files should 
be any more analogous to reality when intelligence matters are concerned. Further 
complicating the situation is the fact that because of secrecy, intelligence matters 
often (perhaps usually) do not appear in commander's memoirs even when they 
actually were important for decision-making. For an example, one need only note the 
fact that the Ultra secret was not revealed until 1973 by which time most of the senior 
commanders of World War II were dead. 
Secondly, a word about sources might also be helpful. This dissertation uses a 
broad range of archival sources, contemporaneous journal articles, more recent 
secondary sources and, of course, memoirs. However, the use of memoirs has been 
carefully circumscribed. Relatively free use has been made of the memoirs of non-
intelligence personnel and of intelligence personnel involved in relatively 
unglamorous endeavors, but memoirs written by 'spies' have generally been avoided. 
Civil War espionage literature and World War II espionage literature are filled with 
exaggerations and fabrications. 34 It seemed likely that World War I espionage 
literature would suffer from the same defects; the few such works that I dipped into 
did not fill me with confidence. The one such work that is used, the autobiography of 
Emmanuel Victor Voska, is backed up by archival sources and the writings of others 
including his contemporaries.35 That said, I have been unable to avoid depending 
upon Voska's account for certain details. 
33 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, 
(New York, 2001), p. 6. 
34 On the Civil War, see Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, pp. 2-3. On World War II, see 
Nigel West, Counterfeit Spies: Genuine or Bogus? An Astonishing Investigation into Secret 
Agents of the Second World War, (London, 1998). 
35 Emanuel Victor Voska and Will Irwin, Spy and Counterspy, (London, 1941). There is one 
biography of Emanuel Voska, unfortunately, it is written in Czech: Ivan Broz, Masarkykiiv 
Vyzvedac, (Prague, 2004). 
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Thirdly, this work contains more than the usual number of quotations from the 
participants. This has been a conscious choice. Ultimately, this work tries to describe 
the thoughts and beliefs of a group of people. It seemed not merely presumptuous 
but, in fact, actually counterproductive to gag these people assuming that I could 
speak for them better than they could for themselves. Of course, I would like to think 
that my words-the inferences I drew about what was going on in the heads of 
intelligence personnel of the time-are sound and persuasive. However, I wished to 
provide another, perhaps more osmotic, way of getting my points across: by letting 
the protagonists speak for themselves. 
XXI 
Note on Agencies and Organizations 
Though this history does not focus on the development of bureaucracies most 
of the action it recounts took place within bureaucracies. Thus, a brief overview of 
organizational issues may be a useful aid to what follows. During World War I, the 
United States had several sizeable intelligence organizations. The War Department 
(and its Army), the Department of the Navy, and the Department of State were the 
three most important players on the intelligence stage, though a wide variety of other 
agencies, most notably the Bureau of Investigation, played supporting roles. Though 
the State Department played an important, if largely informal, central role in 
coordinating much of the intelligence effort, by far the lion's share of intelligence 
personnel were attached to the War Department or Army, be it in the Military 
Intelligence Division stateside or in the AEF. 
War Department 
In the months before America's entry into the war, Major Ralph Van Deman 
in the War College Division had been agitating for the creation of a War Department 
intelligence organization, the previous one having been effectively abolished a few 
years earlier as an unintended consequence of the Root Reforms. In early May 1917, 
a month into America's war, when the War Department finally established the 
'Military Intelligence Section' in the War College Division, it placed Van Deman in 
charge. He held this position for approximately a year, earning the moniker 'Father of 
American Military Intelligence' .36 The organization went through various names in 
the course of the war, eventually becoming the Military Intelligence Division of the 
36 After the war, Van Deman oversaw security for the American delegation at the Versailles 
peace talks. He then returned briefly to the MID in a largely advisory capacity. He later 
commanded a regiment, a brigade and, finally, as a Major General, the 3rd Infantry Division. 
After retirement, he ran an investigative service, seeking out subversives. During World War 
II he briefly did some consultative work for the War Department. 
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General Staff, boasting 1159 civilians and 282 military personnel shortly after the war 
ended.37 
By the end of the war, the MID was divided into two branches: 'Positive 
Branch' and 'Negative Branch' .38 (See Figure 1.) The primary business of the former 
was to gather and assess information concerning the enemy and the outside world. 
The primary business of the latter was counterintelligence: finding out and thwarting 
the plans and operations of the enemy's spies, saboteurs, and propagandists and, 
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Figure 1 MID Organization 
Within the Positive Branch (See Figure 2.), MI-2, the 'Foreign Intelligence' 
section, with its Combat, Economic, Political, Psychological and Monograph 
subsections, did most of the analysis and assessment. (John Foster Dulles headed the 
Economic Subsection for a time.) The Combat Subsection also came to be 
37 Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, pp. 110-111. 
38 For outlines of the functions of the Positive and Negative Branches, see Bidwell, History of 
the Military Intelligence Division, Chapters IV and V, respectively. 
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responsible for maintaining situation maps and also an order of battle of the American 
Expeditionary Force, not to mention other similar tasks that might, more properly, 
have gone to the Adjutant General. The Psychological Subsection, in fact, did both 
analysis and some actual propaganda and counter-propaganda work. 
MI-5 was the 'Military Attache' section, the office in charge of administering 
the work of attaches, the MID's primary intelligence collectors abroad. MI-8, under 
the famous Major Herbert O. Yardley, was publicly described as the 'Cable and 
Telegraph' section, but in fact, was the 'Code and Cipher' section, responsible for 
protecting War Department communications and breaking into adversary 
communications, both written and electronic. Though these were the key sections of 
the Positive Branch, only MI-2 was firmly and unambiguously focused on 'positive 
intelligence' . 
Positive Branch 
MI-2 MI-5 MI-8 
Foreign Attaches Code and Cipher Intelligence 
Combat I- Economic Code and Cipher Shorthand Attack 
Political Psychologic Secret Inks Instruction 
Monograph Code I- Communications Compilation 
Figure 2 Selected organizations of MID's Positive Branch. 
XXIV 
To grapple more directly with counterintelligence, the MID gathered several 
sections into a new 'Negative Branch' in late August 1918. (See Figure 3.) Its most 
important sections were MI-3, 'Counter-Espionage in the Military Service'; MI-4 
'Counter-Espionage Among the Civilian Population'; and MI-lO, 'Censorship'. 
(Despite its name, MI-I0 also collected signals intelligence, as we shall see.) The 
Plant Protection Service, while not formally a part of the MID, was co-located with 
MI-3. Also working closely with MI-3 was the 250,OOO-strong American Protective 
League (APL), the largest of several voluntary association of patriotic Americans that 
busily looked for spies.39 The MID also had offices devoted almost exclusively to 
negative intelligence in each of the military 'departments' into which the country was 






the Military Service 
MI-4 
Counter·Espionage 









L Radio Intelligence 
Service 
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Figure 3 Selected organizations of MID's Negative Branch. 
39 The standard history of the APL is Joan M. Jensen, The Price a/Vigilance, (Chicago, 
1968). 
40 For discussions of the departmental and local offices respectively, see 'History of the 
Military Intelligence Division', 21 July 1919, pp. 1485-1559 and pp. 1560-1638, NARA, RG 
319, Entry 'Historical Studies ofG-2 Components, 1918-159', boxes 21, 21A, 22. Hereafter, 
MID History. 
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While the MID's organization was not finnly set until the last few months of 
the war, Pershing's AEF approached the problem in a more organized fashion. His 
inner core of staff hashed out their general organizational system on the ship that took 
them to Europe in the spring of 1917. They based their system on the Napoleonic 
staff system, under which the intelligence section would be known as G-2. The 
leadership ofG-2 fell to Brigadier General (as he eventually became) Dennis Nolan. 
Most closely corresponding to the MID's Positive Intelligence Branch was G-
2-A, under Colonel Arthur Conger. The core of the section was G-2-A-I, the 'Battle 
Order' subsection. Using every scrap of infonnation available, including the reports 
from the observation of trains by agents behind enemy lines, it assessed Gennan 
strength. G-2-A-3, 'Enemy Works' received all aerial photographs and was 
responsible for assessing enemy intentions based on their trenching activities and 
other similar phenomena. G-2-A-6, the section with which Nolan was most 
impressed did 'radio intelligence' collection. G-2-A-7 was responsible for tracking 
enemy air deployments and technical developments. It also administered the 'Branch 
Intelligence Officers' deployed down to lower-echelon aviation units. 
G-2-B was the repository for both the espionage and counterespionage 
sections and its officers were largely drawn from Reserve officers who had lived or 
studied abroad. Nevertheless, Nolan found that 'plots and counterplots' were but a 
'minor part' of the overall work of the G_2.41 G-2-C and G-2-D were responsible for 
topography and censorship, respectively. 
41 Dennis Nolan typescript, pp. 178, 185-186, Dennis Nolan Papers, Box 2, Folder 'Second 
Draft of His Proposed History of World War 1', United States Army Military History 
Institute, Carlisle, P A. . Hereafter Nolan, 'History', and USAMHI. 
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Figure 4 Selected AEF G-2 organizations as of November 1918. 
The Navy 
Though the Office ofNavallntelligence (aNI) existed when the U entered 
the war, it never grew as large as the MID. Indeed, a of July 1918, aNI's central 
office consisted of only some 92 officers plus others in support under Captain Roger 
Welles. aNI wa divided into eight sections as of May 1918. (See Figure 5.) (A 
reorganization later in 1918 expanded the number of sections, but kept aNI's 
structure broadly imilar.) Section A was the heart of aNI. It provided guidance to 
the Naval attaches abroad and managed clandestine foreign collection. Mo t 
importantly, it also conducted a variety of dome tic counterintelligence functions , 
notably overseeing the work of naval intelligence office around the country. Much 
like the War Department with its 'department the Navy, during thi s period, divided 
the United State into 15 naval ' di tricts each ubdivided into ection . Each di trict 
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had an 'aide for infonnation' who reported to ONI. Each section had an 'aide for 
infonnation' who reported to the district aide. In some major ports the section aides 
had very large staffs. This system was devoted almost completely to 
counterintelligence, industrial security and related security measures.42 Back in 
Washington, Sections C and D were devoted primarily to analysis and dissemination 
and other sections perfonned support functions. 
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Figure 5 Organization of ONI as of May 1918. 
42 'Office of Naval Intelligence, Division of Operations, Navy Department', 25 May 1918, 
NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, E-9-a, Register 10670A. For other descriptions of ON I 
organization slightly later in 1918, see. Packard, A Century 0/ u.s. Naval Intelligence, p. 331. 
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Figure 6 ONI Section A as of May, 1918. 
The State Department 
The State Department, which got into the intelligence field in 1915, was the 
closest thing to a central interagency coordinator of intelligence that existed in the US 
government. In theory, the direction within the department came from the Office of 
the Counselor, the number two man in the Department. The Counselor was Frank 
Polk, but he left most of the intelligence work to his subordinate, Leland Harrison and 
the 'Bureau of Secret Intelligence'. 
Harrison, a 'mysterious and secretive man', a 'human sphinx', was deeply 
interested in espionage and he worked well with Ralph Van Deman in the War 
Department.43 Under his tutelage, the State Department acquired intercepted 
telegrams, many of which it sent to Van Deman's people. It also coordinated a small 
array of Foreign Service and Consular Officers and agents of the Justice Department's 
43 Herbert o. Yardley, The American Black Chamber, (New York, 1981), 
p. 108. 
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Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and other organizations who did clandestine 
human intelligence collection on both political and military questions in such places 
as Switzerland, revolutionary Russia, and the Mexican border area. Much of the 
intelligence from these operations made its way back to the MID and ONI both of 
which, in exchange, shared a good deal of their own materials with the Department. 
The State Department was also deeply involved in intelligence liaison with 
several governments. By far the closest such relationship was with Britain. The 
diplomat Edward Bell, assigned to the Embassy in London, developed finn ties with 
Admiral Hall's Naval Intelligence Division (NID) and other British intelligence 
agencies. While Hall shared relevant selections of his naval SIGINT with the US 
Navy, it was Bell, perhaps alone among American officials, who was truly in his 
confidence. With Bell he shared the results of his valuable diplomatic signals 
intelligence efforts. Bell, in tum, shared telegrams intercepted or clandestinely 
acquired by the Americans, with the NID. 
1 
Chapter 1 
To the Eve of War 
Just as we are superior to Europe in commercial organization, 
continental Europe is superior to us in military organization, and we 
cannot do better than to study the most advanced of our rivals as in 
commercial affairs they study us; we need not basely imitate, but we 
must change and progress with the age and be satisfied with only the 
best. 
-Captain T. Bentley Mott, U.S. Army, 1903 1 
Modem American intelligence gestated during the nearly forty years between 
the early 1880s and 1917 when the country entered World War I. The process began 
slowly as an integral part of the reform movement that swept the Army and Navy in 
the early 1880s then gained speed from there, though not without the occasional 
setback. Then 1917 and 1918 saw breathtakingly rapid developments and maturation 
of intelligence as we know it. It is true that during the American Civil War both sides 
had developed intelligence organizations and mounted intelligence operations. 
However, all were ad hoc and lacking intellectual grounding. Thus, after the war 
when there was a massive demobilization of even the victorious Union, military 
intelligence vanished without a trace.2 However, by 1917, when the United States 
entered World War I, the country had already started to grapple with some of the 
structural issues on which modem intelligence attended: it had created intelligence 
offices in the Navy and War Departments (though the latter was temporarily abolished 
in 1906, its influence remained); it had dispatched naval and military attaches to 
numerous capitals; and it had created a general staff in the War Department and was 
I T. Bentley Matt, 'The Organization and Functions of a Bureau of Military Intelligence', 
Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 32: 122 (1903), p. 194. 
Hereafter JMSI. 
2 On Civil War intelligence see William B. Feis, Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War 
from Belmont to Appomattox, (Lincoln, 2002) and Edwin C. Fishel" The Secret War for the 
Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War, (Boston, 1996). 
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on the cusp of doing the same in the Navy Department. Moreover, at the conceptual 
level, it had already produced its first serious work on intelligence, Arthur Wagner's 
Service of Security and Information; it had already been faced with the problem of 
security measures on the part of foreign governments, not to mention creating them 
itself; and largely without meaning to, it had created a small cadre of officers, such as 
Ralph Van Deman, who had real experience 'doing' intelligence. Finally, in doing all 
of these things, the United States had consciously drawn on European experience, 
much as it would continue to do during World War I itself. 
After the Civil War, much of American society became seized of an ideology 
sometimes called 'business pacifism', which held that war was evil not only because 
it involved killing but also because it was destructive of wealth. Many Americans 
believed that peacetime militaries were parasitic. In the American mind social 
Darwinism meant the survival of the economically 'fittest', that is to say the most 
efficient producers. Business, most notably the railroad industry, thrived. Given this, 
American society had no intention ofletting slip the dogs of war, except perhaps 
against uncooperative Indians - best to concentrate on progress and prosperity and 
leave such retrograde habits to Europeans. 3 American society thus looked with 
contempt upon the armed services. This disdain was persistent. Just months before 
the Spanish-American War in 1898, an officer of the Military Information Division, 
which had been ordered to establish a War Department museum, explained the many 
3 Ronald 1. Barr, The Progressive Army: US Army Command and Administration, 1870-1914, 
(New York, 1998), p. 3. Samuel P. Huntington invented the term 'business pacifism'. See 
his The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o/Civil-Military Relations, 
(Cambridge, 1957), pp. 222-24. 
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difficulties inherent in carrying out this order by reference to the fact that 'the people 
of the United States have no interest in warlike matters,.4 
This lack of interest showed in the state of America's armed forces. During 
the late nineteenth century, the U.S. Army was a small force in which officer 
advancement was slow and based on seniority rather than merit. This resulted in a 
steadily aging officer corps which had little interest in innovation. The 'Commanding 
General' had nominal charge of the forces in the field, but no staff to help him with 
this task. Actually, there was little need for a senior general when the Army was so 
small and operated primarily in penny-packets against the Indians in the Great Plains. 
At one point, General William T. Sherman, the Commanding General (1869-1883), 
left the country on a trip to Europe for 10 months but the Army continued operating in 
his absence just as it had in his presence. For two years (1874-1876) Sherman even 
moved his headquarters to St. Louis, far from the Secretary of War and the President 
in Washington. The office was so irrelevant that its near total isolation, even in an era 
of primitive communications, from the seat of government mattered little. 
-
Most Army units spent the post-Civil War years on the frontiers, alternately 
fighting Indians and staving off boredom far from the vital political and social centres. 
One general described the army as a fire brigade which sat around the firehouse 
playing checkers because it had no fires to fight. In fact, the prospect of a war against 
a European-style military seemed so remote that the very purpose of an army came 
into question within its own ranks. Some reform-minded officers even argued that the 
Army's primary function should be to serve as a national police force suppressing 
labour unrest and inculcating American values into immigrants. 
4 Reichmann, 'Notes on the Military Information Division', n.d. [1898], National Archives 
and Records Administration, College Park, MD, RG 165, MI024, File 639/5. Hereafter 
NARA. 
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The real power was vested in the Secretary of War and the bureau chiefs in 
Washington who presided over a system oriented on the bureaucratic needs of a 
peacetime army. The staff officers in the bureaus had fought hard to get their 
comfortable positions which came with virtually life tenure. Needless to say, the 
concerns of the line officers hundreds or thousands of miles away, soon receded from 
their minds. Neither the Secretary of War nor the Commanding General had a staff to 
do war planning, not that anyone thought a serious war was likely to happen. Of 
course, the bureau system had no procedures for mobilization or transitioning to a 
wartime army. Theodore Roosevelt reported afterwards that when he tried to 
organize a volunteer regiment of cavalry to go to Spain during the chaotic 
mobilization period of 1898, he had a terrible time getting horses and wagons from 
one of the bureau chiefs. Eventually the old general's resistance crumbled and he 
relented, sinking back in his chair with the words, 'Oh dear! I had this bureau running 
in such great shape and along came a war'!s 
The Navy's situation was similar. After the Civil War, it shrank drastically 
and its leaders eschewed progress, at one point even trying to eliminate the use of the 
steam engine. A mere fifteen years after the end of the Civil War, a standard British 
reference work did not rate the U.S. Navy in the top twenty navies of the world, 
judging it the inferior of the Peruvian, Portuguese, Greek, and Egyptian navies, 
among others. With the United States concentrating on consolidating its grip on the 
North American continent, and with war something that, according to many leading 
S Barr, The Progressive Army, pp. 4-7. T. R. Brereton, Educating the U.S. Army: Arthur L. 
Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905, (Lincoln, 2000), pp. 10-11. Roosevelt is quoted in Edward 
M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 5. 
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social thinkers, would no longer blight the lives of Americans, there seemed little 
need for a Navy or for serious war planning.6 
Much like the War Department, the Navy Department was split into eight 
constantly feuding bureaus each of which jealously guarded its prerogatives against 
the others at the expense of the common good and each of which busily lobbied 
Congress. When the Navy finally began sending attaches abroad, the attache in 
London, by now exposed to foreign practice, observed that 'no such example of 
defective administrative organization exists in any country as that. . .in ours ... Our 
. , 7 
system IS no system . 
Both services were profoundly anti-intellectual and, when late in the century a 
new generation of officers started to rebel against this tendency, they came in for 
severe criticism from their elders and even some of their own cohorts. The chief of 
the Navy's Bureau of Navigation sniffed to Alfred Thayer Mahan that 'it is not the 
business of naval officers to write books' and a cavalry officer writing in 1895 was 
alarmed that his colleagues were reading too much despite the clear fact that army 
officers should be men of action, not bookworms. Had not Sir Francis Bacon warned 
that, 'too much time spent in studies is sloth,?8 
Throughout the late nineteenth century, when it did ponder the conduct of war 
and the issues attendant thereon, American society and political elites generally 
reflected Jacksonian attitudes, disdainful of military skills and military 
professionalism, but enthusiastically, embracing maximalist war aims.9 To many in 
the officer corps, the resultant emphasis on mass mobilization followed by total 
6 Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy 1775-1991, (New 
York, 1991), pp. 216-226. 241. 
7 Chadwick quoted in Paolo E. Coletta. The American Naval Heritage in Brief, 2nd cd .• 
(Washington, 1980), p. 182. 
8 Howarth, To Shining Sea, p. 237. Matthew F. Steele, 'Military Reading; Its Use and Abuse', 
Journal of the United States Cavalry Association, 8:29. (1895), p. 94-95. Hereafter JUSCA. 
9 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 265. 
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victory looked like national conceit, confidence unwarranted by America's actual 
abilities or the administrative capabilities of the War and Navy Departments. 
Moreover, it was particularly inapplicable to the realities of naval power. One officer 
who had this realization was a young ensign named T. B. M. Mason. Posted in 1869 
to the flagship of the European Station, he was appalled to discover not only that the 
Navy was backward in naval construction and technology but that it was also ignorant 
with regard to European naval developments. Mason became a tireless voice for 
reform, soaking up ideas from Europe; France's willingness to detail its best naval 
officers to an 'intelligence bureau furnishing material for general improvement' 
particularly impressed him. Thirteen years later he became the Navy's first Chief of 
11· 10 Inte Igence. 
In this environment, a small group of officers began considering the problems 
of national defence in a structured fashion. One of their core tenets was that wars 
could not be fought successfully without serious preparation. This meant everything 
from equipping the forces in peacetime with modem weapons, to ensuring the 
existence of an educated officer corps versed in the latest aspects of military art and 
science. Such an officer corps was necessary to understand the strengths and abilities 
of a likely enemy in order to prepare credible war plans to mobilize a sufficient 
number of Americans. 
This was the beginning of the professionalization of the American military 
which brought about the re-emergence of intelligence from its post-Civil War 
oblivion. A leading scholar attributes the beginning of profess iona liz at ion to Generals 
10 J. M. Ellicott, 'Theodorus Bailey Meyers [sic] Mason: Founder of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence', Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, 78:3, (March 1952),265-267. 
Hereafter USNIP. Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of 
America's First Intelligence Agency. 1865-1914, (Annapolis, 1979), pp. 13. 
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Sherman and Emory Upton and to Admiral Stephen B. Luce. II Although Luce 
eventually rose to head the Naval War College, he played little direct role in the 
creation of American intelligence. However, one critical idea that was crucial to the 
professionalization of the armed forces generally and thus to intelligence specifically 
occurred to him first. As a Lieutenant Commander, Luce met Sherman in January 
1865 at Savannah and had an epiphany. 
After hearing General Sherman's clear exposition of the military 
situation, the scales seem to have fallen from my eyes .. .It dawned 
upon me that there were certain fundamental principles underlying 
military operations which it were well to look into; principles of 
general application whether the operations were conducted on land or 
at sea. 12 
After the war, Luce and Upton became friends, bouncing ideas about military 
reform back and forth. Others followed their lead as multiple generations of 
intertwining intellectual influences tied together the ideas of the two services. Before 
long, it became commonplace in professional writings for Army officers to refer to 
naval precedents and for Navy officers to refer to principles of land warfare. 13 
The reform movement certainly had its sceptics. 14 Nevertheless, Luce, Upton 
and the growing body of reformers were onto an important and persistent idea: that 
ground and naval operations shared underlying theory and that the two officer corps 
could learn from each other. In 1901, thirty-six years after Luce listened to Sherman, 
Navy Lieutenant John Ellicott wrote an article about intelligence for Proceedings of 
the United States Naval Institute, which contained a passage that Luce himself could 
have written. 
11 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 230. 
12 Quoted in ibid, pp. 236-237. 
13 For examples of such cross-service reference references, see Nelson Miles in The 
American-Spanish War: A History by the War Leaders, (Norwich, 1899), p. 514 and Yates 
Stirling, Fundamentals of Naval Service (Philadelphia, 1917), p. 104. 
14 The anti-intellectual contingent of the officer corps aside, there were some thoughtful 
critiques. See, for example, the discussion in Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. 
Bullard and Officership in the United States Army 1881-1925, (Westport, 1975), p. 157. 
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The United States has led the world in the study of the art of naval 
warfare, and this study brings out clearly the analogy of methods on 
sea to those on land. Von Moltke has shown that preliminary 
reconnaissance is one of the greatest sureties of success in land 
campaigns. Let us who follow the sea be no longer blind to the lesson 
which this, by analogy, teaches, but let us get away among the first on 
the road to preparation in this important field. IS 
In short then, intelligence emerged from its post-Civil War oblivion as a result of a 
much larger professionalization of the American military. 
Ellicott's words reveal one of the intellectual wellsprings for the 
professionalization movement as it thought about reform and modernization: 
European militaries. One of those who believed that the U.S. Army had much to learn 
from foreign practice was Sherman. In 1875, he sent Upton, then a forward-thinking 
instructor at West Point, to study the major militaries from Japan to Europe. Made a 
brevet major general for the purpose, Upton was met with open doors everywhere. 
Upon return he reported to the Adjutant General what he had observed and made 
numerous recommendations for reform. These appeared in 1878 as The Armies of 
Asia and Europe. 16 
Upton became the first American to call seriously for an intelligence service in 
the War Department, but this recommendation was not high on his list of priorities. 
In his letter of transmittal to the Adjutant General he laid out seven recommendations; 
none related to intelligence. However, toward the end of his report Upton put forward 
a proposal for an intelligence service. This could be a modest affair he believed. One 
or two officers would oversee this 'statistical section' (echoing French nomenclature) 
which would 'be charged with the collection of information and statistics relating to 
15 John M. Ellicott, 'Naval Reconnaissance in Time of Pc ace', USNIP, 27:3, (1901), pp. 576-
77. 
16 Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official Reports on the Armies 
of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England 
Accompanied by Letters Descriptive of a Journey from Japan to the Caucasus, (New York, 
1878). 
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all foreign armies, but especially ... Mexico, Canada, and Cuba'. With such 
information in hand, Upton thought, the Commanding General of the Army would 
know 'the exact military resources of our neighbours, upon which calculations could 
be based as to the number of troops required for any given campaign' . 17 
After the publication of The Armies of Asia and Europe, the Army sent several 
officers overseas to collect information 'of value to the military service of the United 
States'. However, the Navy was first to create a formal organization devoted to 
information gathering, in large measure because President Chester A. Arthur had 
helped set the stage by encouraging a program for naval modernization. IS The world 
of business greatly inspired naval officers of the day, particularly the fact that railroad 
managers collected masses of information from which they planned for the future. 
The Navy started to adopt some of these methods. The author of the March 1882 
order which created ONI was a railroad man, Commodore John Walker. Walker had 
worked for two different railroads before moving to the Department ofthe Navy in 
19 August 1881. 
In his fundamental instructions to T. B. M Mason, the new 'chief of 
intelligence', the Secretary of the Navy directed the collection of fourteen categories 
of naval intelligence and the sharing of this information with the Naval Institute-a 
recently created professional organization of reform-minded officers-to educate and 
inform the entire officer corps. Young officers were to be encouraged to collect 
intelligence and write professionally. The directive, finally, called for the creation of 
a 'corps of correspondents, in the persons of naval attaches to our foreign legations'. 
17 Ibid, Europe, pp. 330-331. 
18 Marc B. Powe, The Emergence of the War Department Intelligence Agency. 1885-1918, 
(Manhattan, 1975), pp. 14. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence. p. 12. 
19 Robert G. Angevine, 'The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1892: A 
Technological Perspective', Journal of Military History, 62:2 (1998), p. 297-298. 
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Despite this auspicious beginning, the first crop of officers at the Office of 
Naval Intelligence (ONI) was not chosen from among the Navy's most capable. One 
exception was Ensign Charles C. Rogers, already an established refonnist. In 1883, 
Mason, who was beginning to be concerned about the apathy that had greeted ONI's 
creation, urged Rogers to write an article for Proceedings enunciating a concept and 
philosophy for naval intelligence. In complying, Rogers acknowledged his debt to the 
writings of Anny and foreign thinkers, including Emory Upton; General Paul 
Bronsart von Schellendorf, the Gennan Minister of War; Major C. B. Brackenbury, of 
the British Anny; and retired Captain 1. C. R. Colomb of the Royal Marines.20 
Rogers held that because the Anny and Navy were small and weak and because the 
United States possessed minimal coastal defences, it was vitally important to fight 
intelligently and be prepared with infonnation, particularly given that war was 
becoming more complicated, costly, and swifter in its unfolding. Closely 
paraphrasing Brackenbury, the British artillery officer who soon became head of 
British military intelligence, Rogers wrote, 'the naval authorities of Europe have also 
realized that there is no occult means by which neglect in peace can be atoned for in 
war. Most properly do they assert, as truer of navies than of annies, that if the 
required infonnation be not ready it cannot be suddenly obtained' .21 
20 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, pp. 13-16. Charles C. Rogers, 'Naval 
Intelligence', USNIP, 9:5 (1883), p. 659. Aside from Upton's Armies of Asia and Europe, 
Rogers cited Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, (London, 1880); C. 
B. Brackenbury, 'The Intelligence Duties of the Staff Abroad and at Home', Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institute, 19:80 (1875),243-267; and Colomb's, Defence of Great and 
Greater Britain (London, 1880) and 'Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in 
War', Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, 25: 112 (1881), pp. 553-590. See Thomas 
G. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, 1870-1914: The Development ofa Modern 
Intelligence Organization (London, 1984), pp. 67-68 and 78-100 for discussions of Colomb 
and Brackenbury, respectively. 
21 Rogers, 'Naval Intelligence', pp. 660, 673,677. Compare C. B. Brackenbury, 'The 
Intelligence Duties', Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, 19 (1875), p. 244. 
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Given this, Rogers saw two fundamental tasks for ONI: first, the 'collection, 
sifting and arrangement' (Brackenbury's precise phrasing) of information relevant to 
peacetime preparations for war, and second, the dissemination of such information 
throughout the force. 22 This information would directly help in preparing war plans 
and other activities and would also indirectly help by enhancing the expertise of every 
navalofficer.23 Moreover, in a comment that would prove its worth during World 
War I and which again closely paralleled Brackenbury's words, Rogers suggested that 
'much good and no harm' would come from cooperation with the War, State, and 
Treasury Departments 'all of which must be consulted in time ofhostilities'.24 
Rogers' article also laid out a lengthy list of topics on which ONI should 
collect intelligence. These included foreign naval administration, policies, forces, 
weapons, infrastructure, tactics, ship movements, and personnel; port defences; the 
locations of submarine cables so that they could be cut, tapped, or protected; 
American and foreign laws governing trade; the likely influence of wars on 
international trade and commerce; foreign armies, especially their artillery 
developments; and naval history. Rogers further thought that ONI should collect 
information regarding the U.S. Coast Guard and Naval Reserve.25 
In this pre-general staff era, the term 'intelligence' had not yet taken on its 
connotation of watching the outside world and still overlapped significantly with staff 
planning functions. Indeed, the actual requirements for ONI to collect domestic 
information were broader than Rogers stated. They included American engineering 
and manufacturing resources, 'clothing', and even 'all details of the United States 
22 Rogers, 'Naval Intelligence', pp. 659-660. Compare Brackenbury, 'The Intelligence Duties 
of the Staff Abroad', p. 242. 
23 Ibid, p. 661. 
24 Ibid, p. 690. Compare Brackenbury, 'The Intelligence Duties', p. 265. 
25 Ibid, p. 680-689. 
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Army,.26 Rogers and his colleagues were not contemplating counter-intelligence 
operations among American forces. Rather, they believed that to plan properly the 
Navy must examine its own potential reinforcements and, for that matter, the whole 
governmental context within which the Navy would operate. Nonetheless, the most 
important information would come from abroad, collected both by officers who 
happened to be abroad and attaches at American diplomatic facilities. 27 
As the high-tech service of its day and dependent on ships that took 
considerable time to build, the Navy relied little on mobilization. Instead it had to be 
ready to fight a come-as-you-are war. This meant that in its first decade ONI 
concentrated diligently on collecting technological intelligence: information about 
guns, armour, electrical systems, shipboard communications, and the like, serving the 
Navy's desire to catch up with world standards. The Secretary of the Navy also put 
ONI in charge of the Navy's technical library, which served as a service-wide 
resource-in essence as an intelligence-dissemination mechanism in its own right. 
Mason's successor as Chieflntelligence Officer, Lieutenant Raymond Perry 
Rodgers, came to the position in the opening days of President Grover Cleveland's 
first administration in 1885. Rodgers quickly formed a partnership with the new 
Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, who had reformist inclinations and 
believed that 'our true policy is to borrow the ideas of our neighbours so far as they 
are thought to be in advance of ours'. Whitney was interested in intelligence work 
and demanded a regular flow of intelligence materials. He was especially interested 
in the blueprints of new warships which ONI agents were acquiring from leading 
26 A. P. Niblack, The History and Aims o/the Office o/NavalIntelligence, (Washington, 
1920), p. 4. 
27 Rogers, 'Naval Intelligence,' p. 690-691. 
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European firms. 28 Rodgers and Whitney enjoyed the best sort of endorsement for this 
work: the president's. Cleveland had been appalled at the pathetic condition in which 
he had found the Navy and at how little the money spent on reform had thus far really 
bought. In his first annual message to Congress, the President stated that 'we must 
have a [Navy] Department organized for [shipbuilding] supplied with all the talent 
and ingenuity our country affords, prepared to take advantage of the experience of 
other nations, systematized so that all efforts shall unite and lead in one direction'. 
Consonant with this desire, he told Congress that he fully supported the detailing 
abroad of Army and Navy officers as attaches.29 
In its reconstruction, the Navy specifically tried to make up for its lack of 
experience by 'systematic acquisition as to naval progress abroad', especially from 
Britain. This was particularly important as foreign navies were making 'rapid strides' 
during the l880s. Such was the Navy's demand for information and its lack of 
understanding of the time and effort required even for overt intelligence collection in 
the field that attaches believed that the Navy was requiring them to report on 
'everything'. Despite such demands, ONI was largely successful during the late 
1880s and early 1890s. At a time when the best formula for the construction of 
battleships remained a question of considerable debate, ONI helped keep the US Navy 
abreast of foreign thinking on this and other topics. It also provided information 
necessary for the United States to develop the industrial base required for modern 
. 30 
naval constructIOn. 
28 Angevine, 'Rise and Fall', pp. 291-312. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence. p. 23-
24. 
29 Grover Cleveland, 'First Annual Message [to the Congress]', December 8,1885 in James 
D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 11, 
(New York, 1897), pp. 4936 and 4923. 
30 United States Department of the Navy, Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 1889, 
(Washington, 1890), p. 7. See Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence. pp. 33-36 and 39-40 
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Ironically, given its success, by 1892 ONI was a demoralized organization in 
decline; its officers were looking for other billets while many shipboard intelligence 
officers simply stopped sending in reports. One generally agreed reason for the 
decline lies in the increase in security measures on the part of European governments 
and militaries. As early as 1886, Navy Lieutenant S. A. Stanton reported with regard 
to his just-completed tour as Naval Attache in Italy that 'the latest-and therefore the 
most desirable-developments in naval progress are guarded with considerable 
reserve; and, in fact, a principle seems often to be made of secrecy, even in relation to 
things which are pretty well known to all the world' .31 These measures had resulted 
from an increasing appreciation among the leading powers of the importance of 
military technology to their countries and also in part from a series of small espionage 
flaps, that started not long after ONI's creation and proliferated over time. 
One such flap arose in France. In 1892, the U.S. Military Attache there, 
Captain Henry Borup, managed to purchase plans for the fortress at Toulon. The 
French then prosecuted the miscreant who had sold them to him. Borup, however, 
stupidly claimed public credit for the operation. The American Minister in Paris, 
appalled by Borup's actions, thought it 'perfectly useless for us to possess plans of 
seaboard fortresses in France; for even if war were possible, we have not a fleet to 
cross 3000 miles of ocean and attack a French city'. He promptly expelled the officer 
and followed this action with a private letter to the Secretary of State arguing that it 
was unwise to send abroad officers who are 'young and zealous but who cannot find 
for discussions of the collection of technology and weapons information by naval attaches in 
the late 1880s and early 1990's. Angevine, 'Rise and Fall', p. 312. 
31 Angevine, 'RiseandFall',p.310. 
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out what they want without adopting improper means'. The incident made the French 
more close-mouthed with the U.S. Naval Attache as wel1.32 
In the following years, there were more scandals and flaps in France that made 
the operating environment ever more difficult. Not all of these incidents involved 
Americans. By far the most infamous was the Dreyfus affair which sent an innocent 
French officer to Devil's Island in 1894 on charges of spying for Germany. U.S. 
Army officer T. Bentley Mott arrived as attache in Paris in 1900 and found it still 
reeling from l'affaire. He found that the French intelligence chief 'lived in dread of 
some new echo of the Dreyfus scandal' and so wanted 'to see as little as possible of 
foreign attaches', France's security personnel followed the members of the attache 
corps around town, and its army had also excluded most foreign observers from its 
fall manoeuvres for several years.33 Nonetheless, France was but a high profile 
example; the troubles were widespread and lasting. For instance, in 1889 Britain 
enacted its first Official Secrets Act which criminalized much of what had previously 
been polite discussion among professionals. 
The Army soon followed the Navy's lead and created its own intelligence 
organization. In 1885 the Adjutant General, Brigadier General Richard C. Drum, 
established a 'Division of Military Information' within the 'Military Reservations 
Branch' of the 'Miscellaneous Branch' of his office. This division was to collect 
'military data on our own and foreign services which would be available for the use of 
the War Department and the Army at large'. It soon sent out letters to other War 
Department organizations and commanders in the field asking them to forward 
32 Dorwart, The Office o/Naval Intelligence, p. 44-48. Angevine, 'Rise and Fall', pp. 309-
310. See Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, p. 88-92 for a discussion ofthe security 
environment in Europe during this period and its effects on British intelligence operations. 
Brian Tyrone Crumley, 'The Naval Attache System of the United States, 1882-1914', 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University), May 2002, p. 63. Alfred Vagts 
The Military Attache (Princeton, 1967), p. 223. ' 
33 Thomas Bentley Mott, Twenty Years as an Attache (New York, 1979), pp. 86, 114. 
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information they thought might be useful. This would particularly include reports 
from officers' hunting and fishing trips in border areas and information on natural 
resources and transportation infrastructure in the United States and neighbouring 
countries. In 1887, the Division also asked commanders of several northern frontier 
posts to organize reconnaissance trips into Canada to obtain mapping data. Much as 
ONI had done, it began to collect information on National Guard and militia units. 34 
Previously, the Army and Navy had often sent observers abroad under the title of 
'military attaches' but these had been temporary assignments and the attaches 
returned at the end of their special duty, for example, when the war they had observed 
ended.35 In late 1888, however, with the support of President Cleveland, who was 
eager to learn from foreign countries, the War Department persuaded Congress to 
pass an appropriation 'for the pay of a clerk attendant on the collection and 
classification of military information from abroad'. The War Department interpreted 
this as authorizing the establishment of a regularized system of military attaches 
operating at the State Department's embassies and legations abroad and regarding the 
ministers (ambassadors) as their 'superior officers'. These attaches were to use their 
official contacts, the newspapers, the bookstores and libraries to inform the War 
Department of important military or technical developments of interest. Under this 
new system, only the Secretary of War, the Commanding General of the Army, and 
the heads of the various War Department bureaus had the authority to request 
information from the attaches. The Secretary of War also determined that the 
34 Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army 
General Staff: 1775-1941, (Frederick, 1986), pp. 52-53. Powe, The Emergence of the War 
Department, p. 16-17. For a discussion of MID and ONI reconnaissance in Canada, see 
Robert G. Angevine, 'Mapping the Northern Frontier: Canada and the Origins of the US 
Army's Military Information Division, 1885-1898', Intelligence and National Security, 16:3, 
(2001), pp. 121-145. 
3S Maureen Patricia O'Connor, 'In the Eye ofthe Beholder: Western Military Observers from 
Buena Vista to Plevna', (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University), 1996, pp. 
424-425. 
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information collected would be treated confidential unless he decided otherwise and 
that only that same list of senior officials would have access to MID's information. 
The first attaches went to London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, the 
capitals of the leading military powers. 
These activities created such a flood of valuable information that the Secretary 
of War in 1889 authorized the establishment of a Military Information Division 
(MID) directly under the Adjutant General instead of buried within the 
'Miscellaneous Branch'. Despite this organizational promotion, the MID remained a 
small organization, consisting of a captain and four civilians, occupying one room in 
B 'ld' 36 the State-War-Navy Ul mg. 
While the bread and butter work of ONI in its first years was bringing the 
Navy abreast of the technological level of foreign navies, the work of the MID in its 
early years remained less focused and dealt to a greater degree with domestic affairs. 
As the 1890s began, the War Department began to consider the seemingly outlandish 
possibility that a future war might require a national mobilization. Were this to 
happen, the War Department would have to depend heavily on the various state 
militias and national guards. Accordingly, the Secretary of War wanted to 'bring the 
National Guard into better accord with this Department, and through it with the 
regular Army; to increase its numbers, [and] to improve its efficiency,.37 Moreover, 
he thought that if the War Department were to manifest interest in the National 
Guards, the state authorities might be motivated to improve them. 
36 Robert O. Kirkland, Observing our Hermanos de Armas: U.S. Military Attaches in 
Guatemala, Cuba, and Bolivia, 1950-1964 (New York, 2003), p. 14. Bidwell, History of the 
Military Intelligence Division, p. 53-54. On Navy observers, see Angevine, 'Rise and Fall', 
~. 295. 
7 United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War, Volume 1, (Washington, 
1892), pp. 7-8. 
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At this time there was no general staff in the United States, so Adjutant 
General Drum assigned the task of gathering information about the states' national 
guards or militias to the MID, which was already responsible for compiling maps of 
the country and which was used to handling large amounts of data. In 1891, he sent a 
memorandum to the adjutant generals of the various states asking them to keep the 
MID apprised of the militias' 'strength, equipment availability ... for service in case of 
a sudden demand'. The following spring the division reorganized to accommodate 
this new stream of data and ensure its 'scientific arrangement'. Based on this 
information from the states and the maps in its possession, the MID would now be 
responsible for holding 'carefully formulated' contingency plans against the 
·b·l· f 38 pOSSl 1 lty 0 a war. 
Small as it was, the MID thrived. It used the most modem information 
management system available at the time: the card catalogue. By the time the 
Secretary of War submitted his annual report to Congress in 1894, the MID's card 
catalogue of data had grown from 4000 cards the year before to 30,000 cards. The 
division had also published its first three major reports: the first on Hawaii, the 
second, 'The Organization of the German Army', and the third 'The Organized 
Militia of the United States'. The last was based on reports about the annual 
encampments of thirty-three state national guards during the 1893 season and a 
similar report was expected to be published documenting the Guards' progress in 
1894.39 
MID and ONI helped push along bureaucratic reform, technological progress, 
and war planning. They also contributed to the intellectual development of their 
38 powe, The Emergence of the War Department, p. 18. 
39 Secretary of War, Report of the Secretary of War, Vol. 1, (Washington, 1894), p. 181. 
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respective services.40 ONI had led the way, serving from its earliest days as a source 
of professional information for officers. In 1884, for example, it published a book on 
modem European naval tactics.41 Probably the most important avenue along which 
ONI sought the betterment of the officer corps, however, was the Naval Institute and 
its journal Proceedings. In fact, T. B. M. Mason had been Secretary of the Institute 
before becoming Chief Intelligence Officer. Proceedings ran an annual essay contest 
and the prize-winning essayists routinely thanked ONI for providing them with data. 
Moreover, two thirds of the first prizewinners between 1882 and 1900 were ONI 
officers, their themes almost always being modernization of the Navy's various 
endeavours.42 The MID served a similar modernizing function. The Army-related 
journals also published articles by Americans engaged in intelligence work, as well as 
foreign articles translated into English by intelligence personnel. Furthermore, one of 
the components of the MID for much of the late nineteenth century was its 'Progress' 
or 'Progress in Military Arts' Section which laboured to ensure that the Army 
benefited from advances abroad.43 
Such was the state of service intelligence by the mid-l 890s. The intelligence 
services were both results of military reform and engines of it in their own right. 
Their emphasis was on the enemy's gross military power (the size of force he could 
mobilize, the number of ships he could put to sea, the technology of his weapons) as 
well as on the comparable indices of American military power. The purpose of 
having this information was to enable to the proper training and equipping of the 
forces and the preparation of national war plans. Because of the lack of service 
40 O'Connor, 'In the Eye of the Beholder', p. 467fn. 
41 Commander William Bainbridge-Hoff, Examples. Conclusions. and Maxims of Modern 
Naval Tactics, (Washington, 1884). 
42 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence. pp. 9, 19. 
43 The functions of the Progress Section are described in Reichmann, to the Secretary of War, 
14 September [1897?], NARA, RG 165, M1024, File 639/5. 
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general staffs, the intelligence function was not sharply differentiated from other staff 
functions. The 'intelligence' of the intelligence officer had yet to be teased apart from 
the 'information' of the staff officer. 
Though institutionalized intelligence offices in Washington were an 
innovation, American military forces in the field or at sea had, of course, always had 
forces and tactics for finding the enemy and understanding his disposition. This was 
an endeavour in which MID and ONI could scarcely help, given the state of 
technology in the late nineteenth century. So, if the emblem of Upton ian service 
intelligence was the military bureaucrat consigning facts and figures to file cards, the 
emblem of combat intelligence was the cavalryman on patrol or the Navy captain 
commanding his ship as it sought out the enemy fleet. 
The man who provided intellectual grounding to American reconnaissance 
operations in the context of intelligence was an infantryman, Arthur L. Wagner, 
whose modest record at West Point belied his brilliance. The young Wagner gained 
combat experience against the Sioux, Nez Perce, and Ute Indians before securing a 
position on the faculty of the Infantry and Cavalry School at Ft. Leavenworth in 
1886.44 This was scarcely a prestigious job; the school was universally known as the 
'Kindergarten' due to its poor curriculum and teaching standards not to mention the 
appalling quality of the students; shirkers, troublemakers and 'artful dodgers' whom 
regimental commanders were more than happy to send away.45 
Wagner had no intention of accepting the status quo at Leavenworth. He and 
the commandant, Colonel Alexander McCook, envisioned a vibrant, demanding and 
modem school teaching motivated students both in the classroom and in the field, 'a 
44 Brereton, Educating the U.S. Army, p. 5. Timothy K. Nenninger. The Leavenworth Schools 
and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States 
Army, 1881-1918, (Westport, CT, 1978), pp. 37-39. 
45 Brereton, Educating the U.s. Army, pp. 15-16. 
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valuable war college'. Wagner's teaching duties soon led him to think about how to 
apply the lessons of military history to present-day operations. He came to believe 
that the school's curriculum devoted too much attention to European military 
experience and he criticized 'Prusso-maniacs' who thought that Prussia's wars against 
Denmark, Austria, and France supplied all the tactical lessons anyone could want. By 
the same token, he maintained that the Army paid too little attention to American 
experience, particularly the Civil War. In 1888 he applied for leave to travel to 
Europe to test his various ideas. His request was granted and he spent six months in 
Europe visiting old battlefields, observing the Prussian army and visiting the 
Kriegsakademie in Berlin.46 On returning he wrote his first book, The Campaign of 
Koniggriitz (1889), in which he argued that Europeans failed to recognize that key 
aspects of what was now cutting edge military thought on that continent had actually 
appeared during the American Civil War. Nevertheless, he was quite respectful of the 
accomplishments of the Prussians, and extolled the virtues of Prussian drill in an 
article he wrote for the Journal of the United States Cavalry Association in 1889. 
This article led in 1891 to important changes in the Army's Infantry Drill 
R I · 47 egu atlOns. 
These regulations brought about some embarrassment in the classrooms at Ft. 
Leavenworth because there was no written theory underpinning them, so McCook 
ordered Wagner to fill this gap. Wagner soon produced two books, the relatively 
practical Service of Security and Information, published in 1893, and the rather more 
theoretical Organization and Tactics, published the next year. The Infantry and 
Cavalry School immediately adopted both as textbooks and they remained in the 
curriculum for a decade and a half. (Modestly revised editions of The Service of 
46 Ibid, pp. 17-22. 
47 Ibid, Army, pp. 35-37,39. 
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Security and In/ormation came out in 1896 and 1903.) 48 The War Department also 
approved them for use in instructing National Guard troops and students in far-flung 
posts studied Wagner's work on intelligence, and a 1907 handbook for non-
commissioned officers was largely based on it.49 
Like Upton's book, The Service o/Security and In/ormation was truly 
seminal. Unlike Upton's work, however, it was entirely devoted to intelligence, the 
first such American book. There was another difference, of course. Upton wanted to 
see the creation of an intelligence office filled with officers analyzing facts and 
figures. Wagner did support a 'bureau of military intelligence at the headquarters of 
the Army' that could provide information about the 'geography, topography, and 
resources of the theatre of operations', but he was. more interested in how to find the 
enemy and attack him from an advantageous position.50 
In this regard Wagner's book was like two important European works: French 
General Jules-Louis Lewal's Tactiques des Renseignements (Intelligence Tactics) and 
General Sir Gamet Wolseley's The Soldier's Pocket-Book/or Field Service. SI 
Wagner cited both in his bibliography. Wolseley devoted only slightly more than two 
pages to broad topics of intelligence but his influence on Wagner is unmistakable. 
Wolse1ey held that the efforts of the Foreign Office notwithstanding, during wartime 
the main intelligence burden must fall on the military commander. Aside from 
48 Arthur L. Wagner, The Service of Security and Information, (Kansas City, 1893). The book 
went through new editions in 1896 and 1903, but the differences among these were minor. 
Except as specifically noted, I draw on the 1903 edition. 
49 The future Lieutenant General Robert Bullard studied it at Fort Stanton, New Mexico. 
Millett, The General, p. 77,39-4. E. K. Massee, Practical Instruction in Security and 
Information of Non-Commissioned Officer of Infantry, 2nd ed., (Kansas City, 1907). 
50 Wagner, The Service of Security and Information, p. 16-18. In arguing for a 'bureau of 
military intelligence', Wagner referred to Bronsart Von Schellendorfs work which was 
available in an 1880 English translation done by Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-
General's Department of the War Office: Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the 
General Staff, (London, 1880). 
51 Jules Louis Lewal, Tactiques des Renseignements, (2 vols. Paris, 1881, 1883). Sir Gamet 1. 
Wolseley, The Soldier's Pocket-Bookfor Field Service, 2nd ed., (London, 1871). 
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reconnaissance operations, the means of collecting intelligence included the 
questioning of prisoners, deserters and locals, as well as intercepting letters, tapping 
telegraph wires and spies. Wolseley pointed out that a 'telegraph operator can, with a 
small pocket instrument, tap the wires anywhere, and learn the messages passing 
along them' and he indicated the implications of this fact for espionage. In fact, 
Wolseley was blunt in telling the English military commander to get over his qualms 
about spying and warned that he who in wartime eschews spying upon these grounds, 
'had better sheathe his sword for ever'. Spies, of course, were also a threat to the 
English force, but a cunning commander could take advantage of the spies who were 
likely to be in or near his own forces or of 'those newly-invented curses to armies-I 
mean newspaper correspondents' by using them to pass false information to the 
52 
enemy. 
Lewal was probably the most sophisticated writer on intelligence of the 
nineteenth century and he exercised the greatest influence on Wagner's thinking on 
the subject. 53 He was an early advocate of intelligence, having written an article on 
the topic in 1860. He was the first head of the Bureau de Reconnaissance et de 
Statistique, the first specialized intelligence organization in France, created in 1871. 
In 1881-1883, he published Tactique des Renseignement, as part of his massive series, 
Etudes de Guerre. Lewal started his work by alleging that while everyone paid lip 
service to intelligence, nobody paid sufficient attention to it or actually bothered to 
study it. 54 He believed that it was of supreme importance to establish an intelligence 
service and handle it well. Developing at length the same idea that Upton had 
52 Wo!se!ey, The Soldier's Pocket-Book, p. 81-82. Wolseley used newspaper reporters in 
precisely such a way in his 1873-74 campaigns in Ashanti land. See Byron Farwell, Queen 
Victoria's Little Wars (New York, 1985), p. 195. 
53 Herve Coutau-Begarie gists Lewal's work in 'Le Renseignement dan la Pensee Militaire 
Fran(aise', www.stratisc.orgistrat_073_aHCBdoc.html. Except as otherwise noted my 
discussion of Lewal draws on that article. 
54 Lewal, Tactiques, Vol. 1, p. 1. 
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enunciated in scant paragraphs, Lewal expounded on the need for national-level 
strategic intelligence, which he termed 'statistics'. This involved reconnoitring the 
enemy, terrain, resources, and the inhabitants of the theatre of operations.55 Lewal 
thought that in peacetime intelligence would be obtained by 'statistics' and in wartime 
by reconnaissance, the focus of the book. In fact, he devoted some 700 pages to 
reconnaissance and only about 100 pages to 'statistics', espionage, and allied topics. 
Wagner owed a great intellectual debt to Lewal and other lesser European 
writers. Like Lewal, Wagner devoted the bulk of his book to tactical reconnaissance 
and scouting and only a relatively small portion-one chapter in this case-to 
intelligence more broadly understood. Where Lewal's work was voluminous and 
pedantic, however, Wagner's was a small format book written in an accessible style 
and done in some 200 pages sprinkled with maps. Chapter 7 treated espionage, 
counter-espionage and the significance of newspapers to intelligence. 
Wagner's book discussed in an organized fashion, and with reference to the 
European thinking on the subject, several issues that would be important to American 
intelligence during World War I, including the morality of espionage; issues relating 
to communication cables, both as sources of intelligence in their own right as means 
of exfiltrating data collected by spies; the importance of using neutral countries to 
enable intelligence operations behind enemy lines; disinformation; and the importance 
of newspapers to intelligence officers. As insightful as he was, however, Wagner's 
mind was still in the nineteenth century. He had in mind small armies in big 
countries, searching for each other and each other's flanks. Like all his colleagues, he 
was unable to imagine an enormous war in which a continuous front line would 
stretch hundreds of miles, separating armies numbering in the millions. Nor yet could 
55 Ibid, p. 11. 
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he imagine that belligerents would use resources other than their combat forces to 
prosecute a war. 
For Wagner the inseparable nature of security and information was the most 
important topic in intelligence, this presaged the conceptual unity of 
counterintelligence and intelligence that would become such an important topic 
during World War 1. Information was important because it helped the battlefield 
commander guard against surprise. In particular, intelligence relieved an army of the 
requirement to keep constantly on alert which would 'ruin it by physical hardship'. 
The commander who had information about the enemy's location, movements, and 
strength, would be able to take the appropriate security measures at the appropriate 
times.56 
Wagner bowed in the direction of Clausewitz, admitting that the information 
available to a commander would always be incomplete and inferential. Nonetheless, 
he was fundamentally optimistic in his assessment of the availability and utility of 
information. In fact, he thought that other things being equal, the commander with 
the best 'secret service' would be victorious. 57 Wagner's arguments on spies were 
quite similar to those of Lewal. Both men held that while cavalry was important to 
reconnaissance, it was not enough and must be augmented through the interrogation 
oflocal civilians, prisoners of war, and deserters.58 Wagner and Lewal both had 
moral qualms about espionage, but felt that these must be subordinated to military 
56 Wagner, The Service of Security and Information, p. 16. 
57 Ibid, p. 181. 
58 Ibid, pp. 16-18, 190-91. Lewal, Tactiques, Vol. 1, pp. 89-94. At this time, 'spies' were 
most often recruited for their ability to observe military forces or infrastructure. During the 
Civil War, in fact, the terms 'scout' and 'spy' were interchangeable and this continued 
afterwards. See Feis, Grant's Secret Service, p. 3. Spies were seldom recruited as 
penetration agents to steal secrets from inside a government bureaucracy. In short, spies were 
usually thought of as reconnaissance assets. Though there were individual exceptions, this 
remained broadly true for American espionage until World War I when American practice 
shifted substantially in the direct of present usage. 
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necessity. Wagner thought that officers who spied were often 'men of the most 
exalted character and distinguished courage' but other spies 'deserve[d] all the 
I .. l' 59 obloquy so free y cast upon spIes In genera . 
Wagner was aware that the slow speed of communications at the time sharply 
circumscribed the utility of spies to a battlefield commander. This meant that spies 
were most useful 'during the concentration of armies on the theatre of operations, and 
during the investment of fortified places' .60 On the other hand, closely paraphrasing 
Wolseley, he observed that spies could tap telegraph lines 'with a small pocket 
instrument' and thereby gain valuable information. 'This information can then be 
forwarded to the army by means of mobile spies, or under disguise through neutral 
territory'. Officers or other trusted personnel could be posted in neutral countries to 
receive this sort of information and transmit it immediately to the army's 
61 headquarters. 
In discussing disinformation Wagner advocated the use of the otherwise 
dangerous 'double spies', spies who work for both sides, to transmit false information 
to the enemy. Nevertheless, he warned that it was important to ensure that the officer 
giving the false information to the 'double spy' knew the true plan so as not to 
'unwittingly give true information and [thereby] cause incalculable mischief. 62 
Newspapers were also a potential tool for disinformation. But, Wagner also quoted 
von Schellendorf again to the effect that' complete and unfettered freedom of the 
59 Wagner, The Service o/Security and Information, p. 180-181. Lewal, Tactiques, Vol. 1, 
pp.95-124. Coutau-Begarie. 
60 Ibid, p. 181. 
61 Compare Wagner, The Service o/Security and Information, p. 187-188 to Wolseley, The 
Soldier's Pocket-Book, p. 81-82. 
62 Wagner, The Service o/Security and Information, p. 184. "Double spies" in Wagner's use 
are free-lancers selling to both sides. They are different from "double agents," a more 
modem term referring to someone who pretends to spy for one side but, in fact, serves the 
interests of the other side. 
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press is incompatible with a state of war'. An army must, therefore, designate a 
censor because: 
With the increasing means of gathering and transmitting news, and 
with the constantly growing popular demand for late and complete 
information, the trouble created in military operations by the 
mischievous energy of newspaper reporters will, more than ever, 
justify the characterization of such correspondents as the 'plague of 
. ,63 
modem armies . 
Though it sometimes reads like a pastiche of Lewal and Wolseley's works, 
The Service of Security and Information was a major contribution to American 
military literature and, along with Organization and Tactics, it cemented Wagner's 
reputation as one of the country's leading military intellects and an influential force 
for progress and reform. The officer corps gave a warm reception to The Service of 
Security and Information in its various editions. Looking back at Wagner's career, a 
reviewer in the Journal of the Military Service Institution wrote in 1904: 
We think there will not be and we know there should not be a single 
dissenting voice in the whole United States Army to the following 
statement, viz.: that no officer (nor any dozen officers for that matter) 
has done as much as [Wagner] has in both word and deed, in book and 
on the maneuver field, to encourage study, research and efficiency in 
64 
our army. 
Ironically given Wagner's debt to Lewal and Wolseley, some reviewers 
emphasized the American military's growing independence from European thinking. 
'American military methods and ideas of to-day, as evinced in discussion, papers, 
essays and periodicals are aggressive and independent; we have finally cast off alien 
tutelage and it has left no trace', read a review of the first edition. A few years later a 
reviewer of the 1896 edition lauded the fact that America now had its own textbook 
on the subject and so was no longer dependent on British works or 'continental' 
works in translation. Now, he wrote, Americans were 'on an equal footing with other 
63 Ibid, p. 190-192. Compare Wolseley, The Soldier's Pocket-Book, p. 82. 
64 Anon., 'Strategy',JMSI, 35:130 (1904), p. 137. 
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armies'. The 'value of the work', this reviewer continued, 'is shown by the rapidity 
with which a knowledge of its subject matter has been disseminated through the army 
and the national guard since its appearance. It ... well deserves to be the textbook 
officially adopted for the examination of officers for promotion'. Not only did 
officers praise the book on its own terms, but some also praised it for its contribution 
to 'progress'. Hugh Scott, a West Point classmate of Wagner's, who was Army Chief 
of Staff when the United States entered World War I, thought that the book's 
publication, meant that 'a new era dawned for the army ... that was to progress until it 
found us, at the outbreak of the World War, with our officers the best instructed of 
. hId' 65 any army In t e wor . 
* * • 
War is the acid test of a military, and in the Spanish-American War of 1898 
the American military came up wanting. Among many other shortcomings, the war 
demonstrated that despite the intellectual strides made by the Army and Navy in 
thinking about intelligence, there was an enormous gap between even the primitive 
theory and practice both in Washington and in the field. Though Upton's call for a 
national intelligence capability was twenty years in the past, and ONI and the MID 
had existed for some 15 years, both turned in mediocre performances at best. The 
failings were not only on the side of the intelligence producers, however. The MID in 
particular confronted resistance from senior leaders, who occasionally were hostile to 
intelligence-sometimes on moral grounds-and at best were uninterested in 
65 W. A. Kobbe, 'The Service of Security and Infonnation', Journal of the United States 
Artillery, 3:1, (1894), p. 162. Hereafter JUSA. This is a review of the 1893 edition of 
Wagner's book. Anon., 'The Service of Security and Infonnation', JUSA, 7:2 (1897), p. 261. 
This is a review of the 1896 edition of Wagner's book. Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of 
a Soldier, (New York, 1928), p. 145. 
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intelligence information provided by outsiders. 66 Only for the Signal Corps was the 
war a real triumph. (See Chapter 2.) 
The Spanish-American War also highlighted the extent to which, in this pre-
general staff era, the U.S. military had not distinguished intelligence functions from 
other staff functions. These additional duties constituted a crushing drain on the MID 
which at the outset numbered only six or seven officers with a few civilian aids. On 
29 March 1898, Secretary Russell A. Alger appointed Wagner to a two-man Army-
Navy strategy board to prepare operational plans for the impending war. The Navy 
had long since decided what it would do in case of a war with Spain and codified its 
views in a war plan written under ONI's direction. The Army, however, had not 
considered the question. So Wagner found himself responsible for coming up with a 
plan, which he did without any appreciable help from the Secretary or the Army's 
Commanding General. As if that were not enough of a drain on the MID, because of 
its knowledge of the militias and national guards it found itself responsible for 
drafting an Army order of battle and mobilization schedule as well as handling a 
myriad of personnel matters.67 
As preparations for the invasion of Cuba moved forward both the MID and 
ONI almost went out of business. All the officers of the MID except one lieutenant 
were ordered back to their regiments to prepare for combat duty. (At least one 
military attache also returned to his regiment.) Every single ONI officer volunteered 
for sea duty and all were accepted. They were replaced by two retired officers, one of 
whom did triple duty also as Superintendent of the Coast Signal Service and Chief of 
66 Powe, The Emergence of the War Department, p. 3l. 
67 Ralph H. Van Deman, The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H Van Deman, USA 
ret., 1865-1952: Father ofU.S. Military Intelligence, Ralph E. Weber, ed., (Wilmington, 
1988), pp. 4-6. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, p. 56-57. Brereton, Educating the 
U.S. Army, p. 69-70, 73-74. 
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the US Auxiliary Naval Forces.68 At the time, service-level intelligence agencies 
were able to offer so little, and their consumers were not particularly interested in 
having their product, so nobody seemed to mind. 
The Navy nonnally operated in accordance with the general feeling of the time 
that espionage was best left to wartime. However, ONI had done some preparatory 
work on the Spanish anned forces. For instance, presumably using open means, Navy 
Lieutenant Raymond Rodgers, the attache in Spain, sent back insightful reports in 
1896 about the state of the Spanish Navy. He assessed that the Spanish were not very 
capable but would put up a spirited fight. Furthermore, the Navy leadership was 
issuing intelligence requirements to its attaches in Europe, in particular asking them 
about Spanish coal supplies. Unfortunately, during the crisis with Spain the Navy 
also burdened attaches with urgent duties pertaining to procurement. 
A number of naval attaches in Europe provided infonnation about Spain but 
the main action was in London. A key player was Lieutenant William Sims who 
during World War I would be Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe. In 
April 1898, as war with Spain was breaking out, Sims, who had been serving in Paris 
and st. Petersburg-'I don't like this work' he had written to his family-assumed the 
duties of attache in London. There he temporarily relieved the regular naval attache, 
Lieutenant John Colwell, who was buckling under the strain of the work. Colwell did 
not leave, however and the two officers soon found themselves at personal 
loggerheads, both recruiting clandestine agents to report on Spain. Straight away, 
Sims recruited an Italian and paid him $300 per month to report on the movements of 
the Spanish fleet, but only for the duration of the war. In early May this agent 
68 Van Deman, The Final Memoranda, p. 7. John F. Votaw, United States Military Attaches, 
1885-1919: The American Army Matures in the International Arena, (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Temple University), April, 1991, pp. 76-77. Wyman H. Packard, A Century of 
US Naval Intelligence, (Washington, 1996), pp. 330-331. 
31 
reported that a Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera had sailed to the Cape Verde 
Islands bound ultimately for the West Indies or the United States. Sims also recruited 
a fonner Swedish anny officer who reported from Port Said, Egypt, and an 
impoverished French baron and retired naval officer who reported from Madrid. 
On 24 May, Sims reported that he could pass disinformation to the Spanish 
Ambassador to France through an agent he had recruiting while serving in Paris. The 
Navy took him up on the suggestion and a week later the Navy Secretary Long 
directed Sims to pass the story that the Anny and Navy were deadlocked over where 
to land in Cuba and that American operations were at a standstill pending the 
resolution of this dispute. In early June Sims was also able to provide reporting on 
the poor maintenance conditions and lack of coal which were keeping large portions 
ofthe Spanish navy on the eastern side of the Atlantic. 
For his part, Colwell hired an agent at the preposterous rate of $2500 per 
month and dispatched him to Spain in April. One of his agents-possibly the same 
one-was 'wounded' in early May. On May 12, Colwell reported that another of his 
agents in Spain had vanished. With the enormous amounts of money he was 
spending, Colwell had no difficulty recruiting replacements. Offering $1000 a month, 
he even managed to acquire an agent in the Spanish embassy in London. All told, 
Colwell spent about $27,000 buying intelligence during the war, but the Navy 
Department seemed to think it had gotten a good deal. Even after Cervera's fleet was 
eventually neutralized, Sims and Colwell continued providing reporting on the 
activities of the rest of the Spanish Navy. After the Spanish forces were decisively 
defeated, the Navy's clandestine sources in Spain provided political reporting on 
Spain, especially relating to war-termination issues.69 
69 Crumley, 'The Naval Attache System', p. 90-91,111-133. 
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The work of the attaches notwithstanding, from an intelligence perspective, 
the war was not a stellar success for the Navy. aNI's greatest shortcoming was its 
failure to appreciate the true weakness of the Spanish Navy, let alone convey this 
message to the Navy's leaders. Major General Nelson Miles, the Commanding 
General of the Army, acidly remarked in 1899: 
The Navy of Spain, as well as her Army, having been engaged in 
active war for years, was naturally supposed to be prepared for 
immediate action, and therefore capable of the greater effectiveness at 
the commencement of the contest; and our authorities, as the event 
proved, were unduly cautious in ordering aggressive movements. This 
was very natural under the circumstances; but had they fully 
comprehended the enemy's weakness, notwithstanding the 
appearances, as well as the excellent state of discipline of the forces 
manning our Navy, the obvious movement, whether for aggressive or 
defensive operations was an immediate seizure of Puerto Rico.70 
When the Navy did sail on Puerto Rico, the bill came due for aNI's failure to 
do proper 'preliminary reconnaissance' of this island in America's backyard. Admiral 
William Sampson was forced to attack the batteries protecting San Juan in order to 
determine their strength, risking seven warships and costing one American sailor his 
life. aNI came up short in the Philippines, as well, where it was unable to provide 
any information to support Admiral George Dewey in his operations against the 
Spanish fleet there. In the event, Dewey had to depend on the US Consul at Manila 
for information about the Spanish fleet and the defences at Manila. The consul was 
happy to help, but utterly lacked military or naval training. 71 
The intelligence activities of the MID, which since June 1897 had been under 
the leadership of Arthur Wagner, attracted much less attention from senior Army and 
War Department officials than aNI did from its superiors. For some time, however, 
70 Nelson A. Miles, 'The Work of the Army as a Whole', in The American-Spanish War: A 
History by the War Leaders, (Norwich, 1899), pp. 516. 
71 Ellicott, 'Naval Reconnaissance in Time of Peace', p. 577-579. Charles Stuart Kennedy, 
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the MID had been preparing for a war in the Caribbean. In 1893, Captain George 
Scriven (who served as Chief Signal Officer, 1913-1917), submitted a report on the 
geography, infrastructure, public opinion and military forces in Cuba. An emigre 
organization, the 'Cuban Nationalist Junta' in New York, was also quite forthcoming 
in providing information to the War Department. Combined with other information 
that Wagner's men ferreted out, they provided much of the content of a June 1898 
pamphlet entitled 'Military Notes on Cuba' that was widely disseminated within the 
Army.72 In 1897, Captain Tasker Bliss, the Military Attache in Spain also reported 
accurately on Spanish troop strength in Cuba.73 In 1897 the MID started compiling an 
order of battle from Spanish forces in Cuba, drawing on reportage in Spanish 
newspapers of the insurgency on the is1and.74 
Despite its needs for intelligence, the Army's senior leadership was not 
entirely comfortable with the moral implications of an intelligence service. In July 
1897 the Navy sent a spy in disguise and under alias to survey Cuban topography and 
fortifications and Wagner wanted the Army to do the same, but the Adjutant General 
forbade the move on the grounds that it would be unethical. Wagner's appeals, which 
pointed out the inadequacies of the information coming from State Department's 
Consul in Havana, were in vain. 
On 16 February 1898, the American battleship Maine blew up under 
mysterious circumstances while visiting Havana harbour. Americans assumed that 
the Spanish were behind the explosion and the two countries spiralled toward war 
72 United States, War Department, Military Notes on Cuba, (Washington, 1898). There was a 
1909 edition of Military Notes on Cuba, as well. 
73 Bidwell, History a/the Military Intelligence Division, p. 60-61. 
74 More than a decade later, the Military lnfonnation Committee (as the MID had then 
become) remained proud of this product. Michael J. Lenihan, 'Military Intelligence', lecture 
'before the officers of the Summer Conference of the Naval War College, 1909', pp. 17-18; 
Navy Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI, RG 8, Box 86 Folder 8, 
Hereafter NHC. 
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which Congress declared on 25 April 1898. This led the MID to step up its 
preparations for war and the War Department's restrictions on its operations eased 
somewhat. Wagner was able to arrange for the dispatch of two officers to the 
Caribbean to gather the information he had wanted to acquire the previous summer. 
These two men, First Lieutenants A. S. Rowan and Henry Whitney, left Washington 
during the twilight period after President McKinley asked Congress for permission to 
go to war but before the declaration of war actually passed Congress. 
Whitney went to Puerto Rico, travelling in disguise. Rowan went to Cuba to 
gather information on the Spanish forces there. lie never actually saw a Spanish 
soldier but he became famous for carrying the 'message to Garcia', the Cuban 
insurgent leader. In fact, apparently there was no particular message to Garcia other 
than a plea for information, but Rowan did carry back a message from Garcia, which 
after the American landings led to a face-to-face meeting between the insurgent and 
Major General William Shafter, the American commander in Cuba. At this meeting 
Garcia passed a great deal of important information to Shafter, particularly about the 
defences around Santiago which Shafter would soon attack. As a consequence, 
Rowan became a national hero. In 1915, he even became the subject ofa feature film 
directed by D. W. Griffith. Certainly, Rowan was skilled at self-promotion, but to a 
great extent Army pushed him to the fore, eager to draw public attention away from 
its shortcomings. Nonetheless, the Army remained privately ambivalent for years 
about their hero and the moral issues associated with the actions that had made him 
75 famous. 
75 Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America. 1775-1980 (New Haven CT, 1991), pp. 58-
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Another aspect of this episode illustrates the immature nature of the 
relationship between the Army and the MID. While the Navy engaged in a dialogue 
with its attaches in Europe and issued intelligence requirements to them, the Army did 
nothing similar. Wagner had anticipated that the War Department might need 
information from the Caribbean, so he dispatched Whitney and Rowan of his own 
accord. Neither Commanding General Miles nor Secretary of War Russell Alger 
thought of asking for such information.76 
Despite their efforts, MID's work did not make much of an impression on the 
Army. The Army's senior leadership, not entirely comfortable with an intelligence 
agency which engaged in morally questionable activities and which dared to speak 
truth to power, constrained not only MID's operations but also its analysis. Among 
the products that the MID prepared after the declaration of war was a paper about the 
susceptibility of 'northern troops' to yellow fever, a serious menace in Cuba. In a 
planning meeting chaired by the President, Wagner referred to the findings of this 
paper to explain why, despite the wishes of Secretary Alger, an immediate invasion of 
Cuba was ill advised. Alger was not amused and according to MID lore told Wagner 
b d · 77 that he would never e promote agam. 
The paper on yellow fever and the 'Military Notes on Cuba' may have been 
triumphs, but the MID's overall wartime work on Cuba was far from perfect and 
ultimately, the commanders on the ground made virtually no use of what MID did 
have to offer. For example, MID produced a large map of Cuba, but never considered 
that such a rugged island might merit a topographical map. Writing shortly after the 
war, General Shafter, commander of American forces in Cuba, said he had made 
Cross. See Bidwell, History a/the Military Intelligence Division, p. 61. Jensen, Army 
Surveillance in America, p. 66-71. 
76 Powe, The Emergence a/the War Department, p. 30-31. 
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extensive efforts to understand the terrain, weather, and other conditions in Cuba. 
The MID did not figure at all in his recollection. Instead, he pointed to the Journal of 
the Siege of Havana, which described the experience of the English in Cuba in 1762, 
and his meeting with General Garcia and two other Cuban natives as important 
sources of information. In 1900 Shafter told a Presidential commission that he had 
not been given enough information about Cuba. Alger did not mention Wagner at all 
in his memoir of the war and referred to the Military Information Division only 
The situation was comparably bad for both services at the level of combat or 
tactical intelligence. Though the Navy understood well that the search for the enemy 
is a major and necessary component of naval warfare, it was unable to find the 
Spanish fleet in the Atlantic Ocean. This was not ONI's failing; the office had no 
relevant collection means, though in a feckless effort, they did send two ensigns and 
two yachts to Europe with orders to shadow the Spanish.79 For its part, though the 
Army was an enthusiastic user of cavalry in both its reconnaissance and combat roles, 
when the time came to invade Cuba General Shafter rejected the suggestion that he 
have an intelligence officer-Wagner was the nominee-on his staff. Wagner got his 
revenge later when the Commanding General of the Army, Nelson Miles, asked him 
to write a report on the Army's performance in Cuba. The book took Shafter to task, 
not least for the inadequacies of his reconnaissance and intelligence operations.so 
78 Van Deman, The Final Memoranda, p. 7. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence 
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80 Arthur L. Wagner, Report of the Santiago Campaign, 1898 (Kansas City, 1908), pp. 140-
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The Spanish-American War made it clear to Americans that the country would 
no longer be insular and isolated. As one naval officer put it 'our neglect of naval 
reconnaissance has not yet resulted seriously, because, until now, we have been an 
isolated power'. That time had passed, however, and the Navy (but his prescription 
could equally well have applied to the Army) must 'hasten to repair the neglect of 
more than a century' and learn in a 'comprehensive, systematic way ... how best to 
. . b d th ' 81 carry war mto countnes eyon e seas . 
The decision to occupy the Philippines in the course of the Spanish-American 
War may have been particularly ill advised. As the Army pulled together its 
occupation force, MID scrambled to find any information it could about the islands. 
One 'confidential' MID report was merely an article from the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. MID passed on other reports that were 'known to contain inaccuracies', 
but advised that 'they can be readily amended as American reports are received'. 82 
The US soon found itself fighting a colonial war in its new possession. Officially the 
brutal Philippine War lasted from 1899 to 1902, but low-level violence simmered 
along for another decade. 
A number of intelligence failures marked America's military involvement in 
the Philippine Islands. The intelligence sources of the American commander, Major 
General Elwell Otis, were primarily upper class Manila residents who wanted to 
ingratiate themselves with the Americans. Their information allowed Otis to report to 
President McKinley with delusional sincerity that for the good of the Filipinos, the US 
should annex the islands to quell the rising unrest. The annexation led to an uprising. 
After it started, Otis ordered the creation ofa 'Bureau oflnsurgent Records' (BIR) to 
81 Ellicott, 'Naval Reconnaissance in Time of Peace', p. 563-564. 
82 Brian McAllister Linn, 'Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 
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translate captured documents, but the Bureau did not really make a mark on 
operations. In fact, Arthur Wagner commented that the Anny spent much of the war 
acting like 'a blind giant'. It was able 'to completely smash' any Filipino force with 
which it came to grips, but getting any infonnation about the guerrillas was 'almost 
impossible', not helped by the fact that the guerrillas terrorized and often murdered 
Filipinos suspected of cooperating with the Americans. 
Nonetheless, A~erican ingenuity and the 'can-do' spirit found a way and by 
1900 numerous officers had come up with their own local solutions. Some officers 
fonned reconnaissance units that roamed the countryside raiding and gathering 
intelligence. Others relied on paid infonnants. Still others concentrated on 
interrogations of prisoners. By 1900 many of these efforts were paying off and were 
sufficiently productive that they could be combined with the efforts of adjacent 
American units or units could assist each other in their investigations. On occasion, 
subordinates successfully induced their superiors to compel the cooperation of other 
units, for example in manhunts.83 
It was this vigorous, bottom-up innovation, and a few impressive analytic 
reports resulting from it, that finally caused the senior military leadership to pay 
attention to and invigorate the BIR. In mid-1900 General Otis left and his 
replacement was a veteran of the MID in Washington, Major General Arthur 
MacArthur. MacArthur cemented the centralization of intelligence activities in the 
BIR, which he reorganized and renamed the Division of Military Infonnation (DMI) 
under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Dickman, a fonner subordinate of Wagner at Ft. 
Leavenworth.84 MacArthur ordered Dickman to ensure that important intelligence got 
83 Ibid, pp. 90-99. 
84 Dickman later wrote the 1904 edition of the Army's Field Service Regulations. During 
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to the provinces where it could be used to inform operations. He further ordered his 
forces to destroy the system by which the enemy moved supplies and information. 
One particularly important innovation under Dickman was a card file of 
intelligence information. Local American commanders were obliged to prepare cards 
on guerrilla leaders, civilian officials, priests, and other important Philippine 
personages in their area of operations. These card files allowed the ready 
transmission of detailed local knowledge from a unit to its replacement. Furthermore, 
each Army post sent copies of these cards up their chain of command. If the higher 
headquarters amended the cards based on information they held, they would send a 
copy back down the chain. Finally, a copy of each card went to the central DMI.85 In 
the event, not all officers cooperated, and guerrilla resistance effectively collapsed 
before the scheme could be fully implemented. Nonetheless, this was an important 
step in establishing the dominance of the central DMI-a task which it was never 
fully completed-and it was a brilliant use of the best information management 
processes of the day. 
Though the Army had done many things well in the Philippine War, the war 
was controversial because many Americans opposed the acquisition of an overseas 
empire. Americans were equally uncomfortable with subjugating a foreign people 
who longed for freedom. The war was also controversial because of the various 
inevitable failures and shortcomings and, worse, because of the use of unpalatable 
methods by some American soldiers such as the administration of a torture called the 
'water cure'. Because of the various controversies, the Army did not publish its 
official account of the war, nor did it disseminate outside the Philippines a potentially 
very important pamphlet on counterinsurgency written by one of its successful 
85 Linn, 'Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict', p. 100-101. 
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generals. Arthur Wagner took note of the lessons in the Philippines, of course, and 
made some modest amendments to the next edition of The Service of Security and 
Information in 1903 and a few other officers wrote articles for the professional 
journals. By and large, however, the memories of veterans who had been there were 
the most important repositories of the lessons of the Philippine War.86 
... ... ... 
From the beginning of the reform movement, the concepts of intelligence, war 
planning and general staffs were closely interrelated. When it came to preparing for 
war, the reformers realized that the improvisational ways of the past were no longer 
satisfactory. However, despite the technical merits of a general staff-most evident to 
line officers, less so to officers of the departmental bureaus--opposition was strong. 
Americans immediately thought of the 'Prussian General Staff, an institution which, 
it seemed to them, had some decidedly undesirable qualities: this dangerous 'military 
clique' was 'preponderantly aristocratic', and wielded 'considerable (and harmful) 
influence on foreign policy,.87 Given this opposition, if the Army and Navy were to 
have general staffs, the reformers would have to approach the problem indirectly. 
Perhaps, some reformers thought, an intelligence office could give birth to a 
general staff. In the early 1890s, a retired Army engineer, Major George Wheeler 
predicted just that. In a confidential report for the War Department on European 
'intelligence departments and general staffs, he wrote that 'in continental Europe, the 
organized General Staff has preceded the full development of the Intelligence Branch, 
while in Great Britain and the United States, doubtless, the General Staff will have to 
86 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 
1860-1941, (Washington, 1998), pp. 138-39 and 146fn65. 
87 Peter Daniel Skirbunt, 'Prologue to Reform: The 'Germanization' of the United States 
Army, 1865-1898', (unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University), 1983, pp. 
156-158. 
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be evolved from the latter'. 88 Others thought that the road to a general staff might lie 
through a war college. In the end, both predictions came true to some degree. 
As before, the Navy moved before the Army. The reform movement that 
engendered ONI in 1882, also brought the creation in 1884 of the Naval War College, 
the first president of which was Stephen Luce, who hoped to use it to back the Navy 
into creating a general staff. In the 1890s the college's curriculum included lectures 
on foreign administrative techniques and the school undertook studies of the British 
Admiralty and the German General Staff. However, by mid-decade, the hopes of 
Luce and his allies were clearly coming to naught, so Luce decided that the faculty 
and students could work together to develop notional plans responsive to potential 
situations of interest. The College then sent summaries of these plans to ONI in 
Washington where they would be on file against the possibility that the Secretary 
might need them. In the years immediately preceding the Spanish-American War, 
and under the urgings of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, ONI 
also experimented with writing war plans of its own, focusing on Spain and Japan.89 
As the Spanish-American war was breaking out in 1898, the Secretary of the 
Navy created the Naval War Board to which he named the Chief Intelligence Officer, 
the head of the Bureau of Navigation, and a Captain Albert Barker who was on 
'special duty' with the Department, having recently returned from command of a 
battleship. Barker also was the Navy representative to the newly created two-man 
Army-Navy Board, the Army representative to which was Arthur Wagner, the head of 
88 George N. Wheeler, 'Notes on Military Intelligence Departments and General Staff with [?] 
Brief Account of the Intelligence Branch of the British War Office', [1891 ?], NARA, RG 
165, M1025, File MIC 639/. Wheeler's bibliography cites, among others, von Schellendorf, 
Upton, Jomini, Brackenbury, Colomb, Charles Rogers' article in USNIP, and the Annual 0/ 
the Office a/Naval Intelligence. 
89 Hattendorf, John B., B. Mitchell Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars: 
The Centennial History a/the u.s. Naval War College, (Newport, 1984), pp. 43-46. Dorwart, 
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the MID. Together, as we have seen, these two boards planned the war, and spurred 
in part by alanning intelligence dispatched by the attache in Madrid, urged the 
President to order a surprise attack on Spanish forces. 9o 
Two and three-man ad hoc boards were scarcely a satisfactory substitute for a 
real general staff, however. Accordingly, in 1900, the Secretary of the Navy created 
the General Board of the Navy, which initially consisted of Admiral Dewey, the most 
senior admiral and hero of Manila Bay; the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; the 
Chief Intelligence Officer and his assistant; the President of the Naval War College 
and his assistant; and three other officers of at least Lieutenant Commander rank. 
Unfortunately, the change was more cosmetic than real. The General Board had no 
legislative sanction and only advisory authority; the real power continued to reside in 
the bureaus. Nonetheless, ONI found itself working primarily for the General Board 
and the Naval War College and hardly at all for the Bureau of Navigation, the 
authority to which it fonnally reported.91 
The War Department was slower to create a War College. In the War 
Department, the refonnist Secretary, Elihu Root, who was influenced in part by the 
writings of Emory Upton, in 1901 pushed through the creation of the Anny War 
College. Like Luce in the Navy before him, Root intended his college to be a proto-
general staff until Congress could be cajoled into creating a real general staff. In 1903 
this finally happened. The new law replaced the largely useless position of the 
Commanding General with new position of the Chief of Staff. Under the new system, 
the 'First Division' of the General Staff dealt with administrative matters, the 
'Second Division' was the MID, and the 'Third Division' handled advanced military 
90 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence. p. 61. Brereton, Educating the U.S. Army, p. 69-
70. 
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education, notably the new War College, but also war plans, joint Army-Navy 
operations, military doctrine, harbour defence and 'new developments'. Brigadier 
General Tasker Bliss, the President of the War College, interpreted the word 'college' 
in this case as meaning 'collegiums', and he thought it should be the Army's planning 
agency. Moreover, in early 1904 Arthur Wagner was assigned to be the deputy head 
of the new War College and then was promptly given the concurrent assignment of 
chief of the Third Division, which soon became known as the 'War College 
D· .. ,92 IVlslon . 
Both services now had intelligence offices, war colleges and the War 
Department had a General Staff. Furthermore, in 1902 the MID and ONI had agreed 
to share information collected by one that would be of interest to the other. The 
conditions seemed ripe for progress on a joint planning system. In fact, even as the 
War Department's General Staff was coming into being, the two services agreed to 
the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Board under Admiral Dewey. This 
body took up the matter of war planning for the Secretaries of War and the Navy. 
Within a few years the system of joint planning was facilitated by the Navy's 
adoption of the Army's method of assessing military problems, the 'estimate of the 
. . ,93 
situatIOn. 
Retrogression was soon to follow, however. During the protracted 
bureaucratic shuffling that followed the creation of the War Department's General 
Staff, the question soon came up of co-locating and then even consolidating the 
Second (MID) Division with the Third (War College) Division which, after all, was 
the greatest user of its services. The MID itself fought a merger tooth and nail, its 
92 Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning/or Global War, 1934-1940 
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chief arguing in 1906 that the division should be protected because 'in all countries' 
intelligence 'is believed to be one of, ifnot the most, important function ofa General 
Staff .94 This was a losing battle, however, and in 1908 the Chief of Staff ordered the 
two divisions collocated and almost immediately the MID, whose chief was, perhaps 
not coincidentally, junior to the head of the War College Division, lost its independent 
existence. In theory, the MID's functions became the responsibility of a newly 
formed 'Military Information Committee' (MIC). This committee, however, 
consisted of every officer assigned to the War College and they were all too busy to 
pay any attention to such matters. In 1911 when the defence of the Panama canal 
became a topic of concern, both the Naval War College and the War Department 
studied the matter. When the Secretary of War named a group within his department 
to study the problem, the Military Information Committee was not even mentioned.95 
The outer appendages of Army intelligence were still vigorous, but the core was 
sclerotic. 
The Navy had yet to create a General Staff of its own. In 1909, Secretary of 
the Navy George Meyer tried to create a partial substitute, a system of four 'aids'-
for operations, materiel, personnel, and inspections-to advise him and liaise with the 
appropriate bureaus, but the real power still remained with the bureaus. In 1910, as 
the Department was undergoing further reorganization, Captain Templin Potts took 
over as head of ONI and became the first head of ONI to hold the new title of 
'Director of Naval Intelligence' (DNI), rather than 'Chieflntelligence Officer'. 
pursuant to this reorganisation, ONI was placed under the Aid for Operations, along 
with the War College and the General Board, which for some years had been the 
94 William D. Beach to Secretary, General Staff, 'Army War College Work', 2 June 1906, 
NARA, RG 165, M1024, 639/26. (Emphasis in original.) 
95 Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, pp. 76-77, 81-85. 
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primary users ofONI's material. The General Board was to designate countries 
against which war plans would be developed. ONI would then provide information 
on the potential enemy and the War College would write the plan itself. Finally, the 
General Board would review the plan and forward it to ONI where it would be kept 
on file for updating. With the new setup, the Navy soon wrote war plans for 
Nicaragua, Mexico, Japan (the first iteration of the famous War Plan Orange) and 
Germany (War Plan Black).96 
Captain (later Rear Admiral) Bradley Fiske, found less to this process than 
met the eye when he became head of the war plans section of the General Board at the 
end of 1910. Not only did the war plans he found in the file not meet his 
preconceived notions of what a true (i.e. German) war plan should be, but he realized 
he did not have the education necessary to write a good one. Casting about for help, 
he found that 'the man who came the closest to knowing about things of that kind was 
Captain Potts' of ON I. The intelligence officers of ON I were the ones with the 
broadest perspective on strategy and the world. The alternatives, after all, were the 
bureaucrats entrenched in their bureau fiefdoms concerned with Washington politics 
and line officers who commanded ships in a navy which had tactics for ships 'but did 
fl ., 97 not have eet tactIcs . 
Not everyone agreed with Fiske that the war planning process should be 
improved. When Woodrow Wilson moved into the White House in 1913, he ordered 
an end to all such planning and forbid the Joint Army and Navy Board from 
meeting.98 In the fall of 1915, the Baltimore Sun reported that the Army's War 
College Division was making plans for a possible war with Germany (they were 
96 Coletta, The American Naval Heritage in Brief, p. 217. Dorwart, The Office of Naval 
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actually running a war game), and the President threatened to fire every officer on the 
War Department General Staff. The following summer Wilson found out that the 
War College Division was still running war games. He called his Secretary of War, 
Newton Baker, onto the carpet over the matter. Baker, though a pacifist at heart, 
defended the practice by posing a hypothetical question to the President. 'Suppose we 
had a war with France. Then a war is fought with France on paper, and the paper 
folded up and put away'. Unimpressed, the President replied, 'that seems to me a 
very dangerous occupation. I think you had better stop it'. Afterwards, Baker 
discreetly instructed the Acting Army Chief of Staff General Tasker Bliss to tell the 
War College to continue 'but to be on guard against their receiving any publicity' .99 
For its part, the Navy had no run-ins like this with the President and its planners 
continued to meet, but they did little actual planning. Wilson's obstinate opposition 
to war planning left ONI with little to do other than accumulate and file information 
in the hopes that someday it would be of use to somebody. 100 
A frustrated Bradley Fiske watched these developments, and in 1915, by 
which time he had ascended to the position of Aid for Operations, he acted to bring 
about change. In 1913 Wilson had appointed as his Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels. The lawyer and former newspaper man was busily turning the Navy 
Department upside down, making himself increasingly unpopular with decisions great 
and small such as banishing alcohol from ships and rejecting suggestions that he 
position the fleet to defend against possible Japanese action in the Pacific. Though 
many of Daniels' decisions were sound, the overall result, Dudley Knox of ON I 
thought, was 'utter disorganization, incomprehensible inertia and inefficiency, and 
99 Elaine T. Wade, 'Ralph A. Hayes: Private Secretary in the Newton D. Baker 
Administration of the War Department During World War 1', (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Georgia State University), 200 I, pp. 61-64. 
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rank insubordination and disloyalty'. Motivated in part by their reformist tendencies 
and probably also by their animus toward Secretary Daniels, a coalition of officers 
headed by Fiske, but including also the DNI and Knox, started agitating for the 
creation of a Naval general staff. When Daniels opposed the initiative, dismissing it 
as a 'plan to Prussianize the American Navy', the insurgents went behind his back to 
Congress which in 1915 passed legislation requiring the creation of the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).IOI 
Both services now had their own general staff and (when it was allowed to 
meet) they also had the Joint Army and Navy Board, as a formal venue within which 
to plan. The basic system was quite successful and remained in place until the eve of 
I~ h· ·h dO h . World War II. T IS progress notwlt stan mg, owever, as war raged m Europe, 
the Army had no central intelligence office worthy of the name and the restrictions 
imposed by President Wilson, impeded ONI's ability to do anything useful. 
Despite the troubles besetting the home offices, military attaches did continue 
to serve abroad in an atmosphere of benign (i.e. funded) neglect. In February 1914, 
however, the Chief of the War College Division proposed the withdrawal of military 
attaches from Spain, Italy, Austria, and Belgium and questioned the need for attaches 
in Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey. He further suggested that should the US Army 
actually go to war, five more attaches, four of them posted to Europe, should be 
withdrawn and sent to troop units. Despite this proposal, when the World War broke 
out the United States had 30 attaches abroad (23 military and seven naval) the same 
101 Ibid, pp. 97-98. 
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number as Russia and more than every other country in the world. 103 However, this 
tremendous effort bought the United States very little. 
An official history of Army intelligence suggests that the beginning of the 
World War in 1914 occasioned a renewal of the attache system, but this is only partly 
true. There was no more talk of bringing attaches home, their funding was increased, 
and observers were attached to the French, German, Austrian, and Japanese armies. I04 
But this did not mean that Army was particularly interested in what the attaches had 
to say. The real problem was that the Army leadership simply did not value 
intelligence. Chief of Staff General Hugh Scott, who held the position from 
November 1914 to September 1917, was the locus of the problem. He was 
unfailingly loyal to his civilian superiors, but this did not necessarily ensure that they 
held a high opinion of him. President Taft described him as having 'wood to the 
middle of the head' but in fact he had an impressive knowledge oflndian sign 
languages and an abiding interest in packsaddles. lOS In short, Scott was still 
intellectually in the old Army of the frontier. 
Scott held an opinion of the established intelligence structures that rested 
somewhere between indifference and hostility, though he felt comfortable making ad 
hoc arrangements to satisfy intelligence requirements. When in September 1915 
newspapers reported that the Japanese might encroach on American interests in the 
Pacific, he feared being accused of whipping up a war scare in an effort to benefit the 
Army. He thought that the necessary investigation required a level of discretion that 
could not be obtained through existing channels. Accordingly, he sought and received 
permission from the Secretary of War to tum to outsiders. It is not clear who he used 
103 Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, p. 92. Vagts, The Military Attache, 
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and surviving War Department records say nothing about what spy network may have 
resulted from this request. Similarly, in 1916 when alarming reports came in of 
Japanese-Mexican plotting and possible nefarious plans by nationals of those 
countries resident in the United States, Scott arranged a special 'secret service' fund 
for General Frederick Funston (a famous veteran of the Philippines War) at Ft. Sam 
Houston, despite the fact that Funston's chief of staff was on record saying that the 
fears of Japanese and Mexicans were overblown. The money arrived anyway and, 
perhaps predictably, bought many alarming reports, some of which began to leak. 
Secretary Baker soon intervened and shut the program down. 106 
In the fall of 1916, William Lassiter, newly appointed to be Military Attache 
to the United Kingdom, had occasion to experience Scott's utter lack of interest in 
established intelligence arrangements. When Lassiter arrived in Scott's office: 
[The Chief] showed surprise at my appearance, and I explained that 1 
had been ordered to London, and had transited by way of Washington 
to find out what the War Department had in mind about the war and 
what sort of information I was particularly expected to gather. The 
General looked at me for a moment and then launched into a 
description of a row going on between him and ... the Judge Advocate 
General. 1 tried several times to get him to talk about the matter which 
interested me, but without avail. The next morning 1 returned to the 
quest. As I seemed to be insistent, he looked at me intently, and said 
'Oh, you want a letter of instruction'. 1 explained that what I would 
like was an informal statement. .. to serve as a guide in collecting 
information abroad. It appears that he had nothing special to confide 
to me, but he had the War College send me the next day one of those 
disquisitions that plagues the life out of Major A or Captain B ... to 
h . 107 produce at S ort notIce. 
Once he got to London, Lassiter found himself mostly cut off from 
Washington. After the US declared war, a particular matter of intelligence policy 
arose on which Lassiter wanted guidance. He wrote in his diary: 'I will cable to 
106 Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, pp. 123-124, 128-129. 
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Washington on the subject and probably get no reply. No change in that respect' .108 
Lassiter's experience was the norm; Sherman Miles, who had been an attache in 
Russia and then became head of the post-war Branch of MID that administered the 
attache system, stated that during this period: 
There was a complete lack of system. The conduct of affairs of the 
Military Attaches was almost non-existent. You could not, for the life 
of you, find out whether your reports were, in substance and form, 
what the War Department wanted. Sometimes they would answer 
your letters and say that, if you did not hear from them, it was all 
. h 109 ng t. 
One officer did rise up to protest this lack of a system. This was Major Ralph 
Van Deman, soon to become known as the 'father of American military intelligence'. 
He been a student of Arthur Wagner's at Fort Leavenworth and then served under 
Wagner in the MID. Subsequently, he did intelligence work in the Philippines under 
Dickman. When Van Deman came to the War College Division in early 1915, he was 
appalled at what he found. No officers were doing intelligence work in Washington 
and most of what was being done in the field was self-directed. Moreover, most 
reports coming in from abroad were, at best, read by the members of the War College 
Division before being filed. In 1916 he discovered a large pile of un filed reports from 
General Pershing who was leading a punitive expedition in Mexico. l1O Van Deman 
soon began bombarding his superiors with lengthy memoranda urging change. He 
quickly convinced the Chief of the War College Division, Brigadier General M. M. 
Macomb who wrote to Scott in June 1916 that an impending reorganization of the 
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War Department would provide the perfect opportunity to re-establish a separate 
'military information' organization within the General Staff, in consideration of the 
'vital need .. .in modem war for the collection, classification, and distribution' of 
. 11' 111 mte Igence. 
Not long thereafter Joseph E. Kuhn replaced Macomb. Van Deman soon 
convinced him, as well. In early 1917 Kuhn reported to Scott that the War College 
Division was not circulating intelligence collected by the attaches in Europe among 
the officer corps and that the Division was not resourced or organized to do anything 
about this. Scott was still not to be budged. He pointed out that much of the 
information coming in from Europe was confidential and maintaining that the costs of 
disseminating such information were too high. When Kuhn subsequently tried to 
arrange for the publication in military journals of information acquired overseas on 
trench warfare and troop training, the Adjutant General quashed the idea on the 
grounds of illegality.112 Another topic on which attaches and observers were busily 
reporting was the organization of Britain's military intelligence endeavours. I 13 
During the early twentieth century, the US Navy took its place as one of the 
great navies of the world, but ONI-though surviving, unlike the MID-was entering 
a lengthy period of decline which would take it right to World War I. ONI's 
problems were manifold, rooted in changing international circumstances and in 
leadership. 
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To begin with, ONI found itself spending more effort on what had previously 
been at best a secondary mission: protecting American information. This work came 
at the cost of collecting or analyzing foreign information. In the previous century, 
foreign attaches had been relatively restrained, but now ONI had to fend off their 
numerous intrusive inquiries and actual physical intrusions into restricted areas. In 
1906, ONI even hired Secret Service agents of the Treasury Department to spy on 
Japanese at shipbuilding plants and coastal artillery batteries in Massachusetts and 
New Jersey. There were other concerns about security and secrecy, as well. ONI 
worried that the Navy's code was inadequate and arranged for the development of a 
new one. This emphasis on protecting information lapped over into the domestic 
realm. ONI even rejected requests from the Naval Institute for photographs of ships 
on the grounds that they were confidential. Approval was required from the Secretary 
of the Navy or his assistant to release ONI information to individual Navy officers. 1 14 
ONI further found that the collection of information was becoming more 
difficult. ONI's means of collection were becoming outmoded as foreign navies 
increasingly cast the same blanket of secrecy over their forces and industries that the 
US Navy was throwing over its own. The attaches, the traditional backbone ofONI's 
collection system, were becoming insufficient, though they continued to do some 
useful work. As a result, open source materials began to provide a growing fraction 
of the information that ONI collected. I IS The office struggled to adapt to new 
methods of collection of information that was not publicly available. In fact, by 1913 
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ONI had all but abandoned the attache system as an important source of data, relying 
increasingly on special agents working overseas under cover, often as 'language 
attaches'. The future Admiral Chester Nimitz was One of these officers, gathering 
information in Belgium on U-boat engines. Similarly, when Mexico came to the fore 
as a target of intelligence interest, particularly in the wake of a report in 1911 that the 
Japanese were negotiating with the Mexican government to gain a naval base in Baja 
California, the Navy dispatched officers on special missions to Mexico. 
The political peccadilloes of the Presidents were also problem for aNI. 
William Howard Taft had pursued a policy of 'Dollar Diplomacy' which entailed the 
aggressive, and within the Navy quite unpopular, use of attaches to win naval 
construction contracts. Wilson ended this in 1913, but as we have seen, he was 
hostile to war planning, ONI's main raison d'efre as the Navy moved towards a sound 
planning capability. ONI also found itself at loggerheads with Wilson's generally 
unpopular Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels. Not only was aNI essentially 
insubordinate when in 1915 it went behind Daniels' back to help Congress pass the 
general staff legislation, but it also clashed with him over the extent of the Japanese 
threat, about which Daniels appeared unconcerned. 116 
ONI morale and effectiveness were at rock bottom when Captain James 
Harrison Oliver took over as DNI in January 1914. He had served on one of those ad 
hoc intelligence missions that were increasingly eroding the attaches' position and as 
a young man he had attended lectures given by Emory Upton. Oliver was a 
committed reformer and he brought several officers of similar persuasion into ONI 
and then backed them as they promulgated their ideas. In particular, he set 
subordinates Dudley Knox and John Russell to work On reorganizing ONI in 
116 Dorwart, The Office a/Naval Intelligence, pp. 90-95, 100-101. 
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accordance with the latest principles of scientific management. Knox and Russell 
also suggested changes to the collection system that entailed closer cooperation with 
other agencies of government. Finally, they laid out a plan for a 'war information 
service' which would involve increased cooperation with other government agencies 
and the suggested the use of businessmen, journalists and other civilians as 
intelligence collectors. I 17 
When war broke out in Europe, ONI was, thanks to Daniels, able to post five 
additional attaches abroad, though the State Department disapproved a plan to put 
observers on foreign warships. These arrangements were only of modest importance, 
however, until May 7, 1915 when a German U-boat sank the liner Lusitania en route 
from New York to Liverpool. President Wilson modified his views and began to 
welcome increased military preparedness and Daniels moved quickly to exploit the 
situation. The Navy drafted a mobilization plan for a war in the Atlantic and the 
planners ordered aNI to start gathering intelligence on the 'strength and movement of 
enemy's forces' and to plan a 'complete system of secret service and cipher codes'. 
Accordingly, DNI started to establish both counterintelligence operations at home and 
to implement Knox and Russell's plans for a 'war information service'. Oliver had 
seemingly unrealistic notions about the level of effort that would be needed. He 
thought that he could handle the surge with just a handful of retirees and volunteers as 
ONI had done during the Spanish-American War. IIS Actually, until war broke out 
Oliver was correct because through the end of 1916 Daniels severely restricted aNI's 
ability to spend money on collection operations. For aNI, World War I had started, 
but only haltingly. 
117 Ibid, pp. 89,96-97. Packard, A Century of u.s. Naval Intelligence, pp. 40-41. Charles H. 
Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, The Archaeologist Was a Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the 
Office of Naval Intelligence, (Albuquerque, 2003), pp. 27-28. 
118 Dorwart, The Office ofNavallntelligence, pp. 100-102,105. 
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* * * 
In the run-up to America's entry into World War I ONI was at best holding its 
bureaucratic own and MID had gone out of existence. However, intellectually 
speaking, American intelligence had come a long way from the post-Civil War 
doldrums, largely as the result of motivated individuals, not the vision of senior 
leaders. In particular, during the 1890s Arthur Wagner had identified many 
intelligence issues which would loom large during World War I. In fact, American 
ideas on the topic in 1917 were comparable to those of the European powers when 
they entered the war in 1914, in part because they were drawn heavily from European 
thought. 119 The notion that the central intelligence office of a service would gather 
and assess information about potential enemies from open sources and attaches and 
now even clandestine sources was every bit as current in the US as in Europe, even if 
the Army's system for doing it was virtually non-existent. It was generally agreed 
that this information was a 'vital need' in wartime and that it should feed directly into 
the deliberations of the general staff. Like the Europeans, ONI (and as we shall see 
the Signal Corps), had realized that the defensive and offensive components of 
intelligence were inextricably linked and that the other side must be denied 
information, not only at the tactical level as Wagner had suggested, but also at the 
service or national level. Furthermore, the services both believed that United States 
territory itself was a legitimate venue for their inquiries, though the full implications 
of this were yet to be seen. 
119 For a summary of the state of British intelligence in 1914, see the first parts of chapters 2-4 
in Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence 
Community, (New York, 1987). For the French, see Douglas Porch, The French Secret 
Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War, (New York, 1995), chapter 4. For the 
Germans, see Markus Pohlmann, 'German Intelligence at War, 1914-1918', Journal of 
Intelligence History, 5:2 (2005), pp. 24-54. 
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Furthermore, of course, the Americans bowed to no nation in the development 
of their thinking about cavalry and other forms of battlefield reconnaissance, Shafter's 
unimpressive performance in 1898 notwithstanding. As we shall see, however, when 
World War I started there were two emerging issues of intelligence, one with major 
potential for combat intelligence, the other with implications both for combat 
intelligence and service intelligence. Technology was bringing new dimensions to 




Technology Reinvents Intelligence 
Every new invention in war brings its counter-invention. To new guns 
and ammunition are opposed new methods of fortification and 
improvements in armor plate. To every move there is a counter-move. 
In the old days military men attempted to hear what was said back of 
the enemy's lines with the aid of scouts and spies and the capture of 
messengers or messages. For the more modern means of 
communication, new methods of listening had to be devised. 
-John Manly, MI-8, 1927[?]1 
Over the centuries, technological innovations had often contributed directly to 
the ability of military forces to deal out death. As World War I loomed, however, 
reconnaissance or intelligence personnel had yet to benefit in any substantial way 
from these advances. By and large they still used the same basic tools available to 
Sun Tzu: eyeball, horse, and pen, the marginal help from the telescope and the 
tethered balloon notwithstanding.2 Thus, it is not surprising that before 1914 
American officers seldom considered technology and intelligence collection together. 
Nor is it surprising that combat arms officers felt comfortable acting as 'intelligence 
officers' and performed creditably in that role. Arthur Wagner, for instance, the 
author of the pre-war American text on intelligence, was the author of the leading text 
on operations. Frederick Funston, renowned for his intelligence exploits in the 
Philippines War, was an operational commander as well and went on to senior 
1 John Manly, 'Supplementary IS' and 3rd Parts', pp 3-4, , Marshall Foundation Library, 
Lexington, VA Friedman Papers, Item 811. Hereafter ML. This is from a series of 
unpublished articles that Manly wrote for Colliers magazine in approximately 1927. 
2 For a brief discussion of skepticism about the utility of tethered balloons during the Russo-
Japanese War, see Sam Hager Frank, American Air Service Observation in World War [, 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Florida), August, 1961, pp. 21-22. Frank 
describes the inauspicious use ofthe balloon in the Spanish-American war on pp. 73-74. 
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commands on the Mexican border.3 Not only were these ersatz intelligence officers 
using old familiar tools, but these tools were bringing in small and easily manageable 
amounts of information. 
The military of the 1890s had not been noted for its receptivity to the 
application of advanced technology to intelligence operations. The key proponent of 
technological progress was the Army's Signal Corps. This was a small group of men 
with scientific expertise and an insurgent mentality. An 1890 law had stripped them 
of their highest profile mission as the weather service for the Federal Government but 
this had not bothered their energetic leader, Chief Signal Officer (CSO) Brigadier 
General A. W. Greely. He was a man with a self-described 'native aptitude' for 
ciphers and an interest in aviation and he led the Corps with a progressive outlook and 
a great ambition. He found that ensuring the survival of his corps required 'constant 
warfare'. In particular, he went to war against MID. The 1890 law gave the Signal 
Corps 'the duty of collecting and transmitting information for the Army'. For a time, 
Greely brandished this legislation in a bid to take over military intelligence. He 
argued that the Signal Corps' 'young energetic officers' were practiced in the 
handling and transmission of intelligence and could readily accomplish its collection 
and classification. Some of this information would necessarily be kept confidential, 
but' a system of regular distribution of such information as is not confidential should 
be inaugurated'. The distribution of this information to the officer corps and the 
establishment of a War Department professional lending library modelled on the 
Boston Public Library, could allow the officers to 'keep abreast of modem thought 
and research in their specialties'. The fact that ONI was ahead of the Army in 
information management was not lost on the Signal Corps, either. Signal Captain 
3 Funston recounts his exploits in the Philippines in Frederick Funston, Memories a/Two 
Wars, (New York, 1911). 
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Scriven, a future CSO, wrote a memo in 1893 on the importance of card catalogues in 
'classifying' information from abroad pointing out their vital necessity 'if we are to 
hold our own in military affairs, not only against foreign governments, but against the 
Navy whose admirable intelligence Office is well known'. 4 In the end, however, not 
only did Greely lose the fight to take over military intelligence, but he was obliged 
constantly to fight the 'tenacity and extreme conservatism of the ranking officers of 
the army in opposing any new methods of service-the cavalry experts, for instance, 
discredited any way of conveying military information save by a mounted 
, 5 
messenger. 
Despite the opposition it faced, the Signal Corps remained healthy under 
Greely, even with only eight officers and fifty enlisted men doing 'essentially 
scientific' work including all the Army's 'electrical work', telegraphic censorship, 
and aeronautics.6 In fact, the Signal Corps was one of the few bright spots in the 
performance of American intelligence during the Spanish-American War. When war 
broke, out President McKinley ordered it to institute censorship on all telegraphic 
cables going abroad from the United States as well as telegraph lines in Florida and 
foreign-owned cables in Cuba. This the Corps did, assisted by Western Union. It also 
prohibited all telegrams in Spanish to and from Spain, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Haiti, 
4 Memo A. W. Greely, 'Remarks', 12 January 1892, NARA, RG 165, M1024, File 639/2; 
Untitled document (from the Signal Corps), 5 May 1894, File 639/2; both NARA RG 165, 
M 1 024, File 639/2. Captain George P. Scriven, 'A General Statement of a Method of 
Classification of Military Information Suitable to the Use of a Card Index and to the System 
of Classification by Countries', 26 January 1893, NARA, RG 165, MI024, File 639. 
5 Rebecca Robbins Raines, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the US Army 
Signal Corps, (Honolulu, 2005), p. 81. Major General A. W. Greely, Reminiscences of 
Adventure and Service: A Record of Sixty-Five Years, (New York, 1927), p. 152. For 
Greely's interest in aviation see Frank, American Air Service Observation, p. 73. 
6 Howard A. Giddings, Exploits of the Signal Corps in the War with Spain (Kansas City, 
1900), pp. 10, 15. 
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Jamaica, and St. Thomas as well as telegrams in cipher except for those of neutral 
diplomats.7 
The Signal Corps and the Navy both believed that Spain should not be allowed 
to communicate with Cuba. The feeling in both was that one might 'as well allow the 
daily landing of arms, food, and reinforcements for the enemy as to allow him 
constant and undisturbed cable communication,.8 Accordingly, when war came with 
Spain, the Signal Corps attempted to cut the cables connecting the island to the 
outside world at Santiago de Cuba while the Navy attempted to cut the cables off 
Cienfuegos and elsewhere along the Cuban coast. The intent was to make the Spanish 
forces unable to 'to make their necessities and condition known' to Spain itself. The 
American forces never completely isolated Cuba telegraphically; one cable left uncut 
had a terminus in Key West. Cutting the other cables may have forced more traffic 
onto this cable. Thus, the measures to isolate the island may have helped with 
intelligence collection, because censorship measures imposed on this cable (and, 
indeed, other cables) proved not just a prophylactic measure but a valuable source of 
intelligence whether other communications were forced onto it or not. 9 
7 Raines, Getting the Message Through, p. 89.Giddings, Exploits, p. 115. 
8 Giddings, Exploits, p. 23. For a similar comment from Rear Admiral G. E. Belknap in 1897 
in the context of a possible war with Britain, see G. E. Belknap, 'Some Aspects of Naval 
Administration in War, With Its Attendant Belongings of Peace', USNIP, 24:2, (1898), pp. 
263-300. 
The Navy had long envisioned the possibility of cutting submarine cables. As early as 1883, 
Ensign Charles Rogers had written that naval intelligence should know the locations of 
foreign submarine cables in order that they might be cut or tapped in wartime. International 
law had even allowed the cutting of cables in wartime since at least 1884. Rogers, p. 684. 
William Sampson, 'The Atlantic Fleet in the Spanish War', in Charles D. Sigsbee, et aI, The 
United States Navy in the Spanish-American War of 1898 (n.p., 1899), p. 912. Commander 
C. H. Stockton, 'Submarine Telegraph Cables in Time of War', USNIP, 24:3, (1898), pp. 
451-452. 
9 For the Navy's efforts, see Evelyn M. Cherpak, 'Cable Cutting at Cienfuegos', USNIP, 
February, 113:2 (1987), pp. 119-122; and Sampson, 'The Atlantic Fleet', p. 912. For the 
Signal Corps' work see Raines, Getting the Message Through, p. 90; Giddings, Exploits, pp. 
23-36; United States Army Signal School, Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps (1860-1928), 
(Ft. Monmouth, 1929), pp. 43-44. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, p. 
62. 
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The big combat intelligence problem during the Spanish-American War was 
the location of the Spanish fleet which had slipped right past the patrolling US Navy 
ships in the Atlantic. 10 The US Army was massing in Florida preparing to sail to 
Cuba, but if Admiral Cervera's Spanish fleet intercepted the troop transports, the 
result would be disastrous. Nearly as bad, the Spaniards might appear off the East 
Coast and shell American cities. 
The Signal Corps, not ONI or the MID, found Cervera's fleet through a clever 
combination of technical means and human intelligence. A Colonel Allen, the censor 
in charge of the submarine cable at Key West, had managed to recruit an employee of 
the cable company in Havana. On 18 May 1898 Cervera's fleet sailed into the 
harbour at Santiago de Cuba. Cervera immediately cabled news of his arrival to 
Madrid but the message went on a Cuban cable via Havana where Allen's agent 
learned of it. (The irony that the U.S. was trying to cut cables to prevent the 
transmission of precisely this sort of message in which the Spanish fleet so 
conveniently made its 'necessities and condition known' to Madrid never seems to 
have occurred to the American forces.) Within an hour the agent informed Colonel 
Allen in Key West. Allen immediately sent word to the President and the Secretary of 
Navy. Greely, aware ofthe information's provenance, assured the nation's leaders 
that it was reliable. Unfortunately, the idea that sound naval information would come 
through such unorthodox channels was so revolutionary that President McKinley, 
reflecting the general scepticism of the nation's leadership, asked for confirmation 
from another source. Within a day the Signal Corps' censor in New York provided 
confirmation. 
10 Giddings, Exploits, pp. 37-38. 
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The Secretary of the Navy was convinced, and at once ordered a blockade of 
Santiago. Still skeptical, however, the Navy itself dragged its feet for 10 days before 
carrying out the order, though Allen's source sent daily updates about the status of the 
Spanish fleet. Meanwhile, on 3 June, the Naval Attache in London, Williams Sims, 
cabled to the United States that an agent he had recruited had told him that the 
Spanish fleet was now at Santiago with their hulls and engines needing overhaul. 
This was a triumph for human intelligence and for Sims as an attache, but the 
technology of the Signal Corps had proved its superiority even if the Navy was 
reluctant to admit it.!! 
Despite the occasional victory such as that, new technology embedded itself in 
the military and in the intelligence business only slowly. In the decade directly 
preceding America's entry into the Great War, military journals occasionally ran 
articles on intelligence, sometimes reprinting works from foreign journals. These 
articles indicated that many officers still thought about intelligence and 
reconnaissance in ways more reminiscent of the Franco-Prussian War or the wars on 
the Great Plains than of modern realities. Infantry Journal's decision to publish a 
two-part translation of a French work entitled 'The Service of Information: A 
Practical Study' starting in the July-August 1914 issue illustrates this point.!2 The 
editors evidently believed that it would be a good use of paper and ink to publish an 
article that quoted Lewal saying that 'the spy reveals himself by ... his great 
\I Ibid, pp. 38-40,46. Greely, Reminiscences of Adventure and Service, pp. 181-183. The 
Secretary of War, with whom Greely had a dispute, appears not to have been in the know. 
Greely did not share confidential information with him. Crumley, The Naval Attache System. 
pp. 125-126. Interestingly, Sims had some experience tapping cables himself. In a letter 
home in early 1898 he claimed to have tapped 'an underground wire' in St. Petersburg Russia 
'with excellent results'. He expected that the Russian government would be very unhappy if 
it found out. Nothing further is known of this incident. Crumley, The Naval Attache System. 
pp. 118-119. 
12 J. Raoult de Rudeval, (French), 'The Service ofInformation: A Practical Study', Infantry 
Journal, 11: 1, (July-August, 1914), pp. 88-114; and 11:2 (September-October, 1914), pp. 
264-288. Hereafter /J. 
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politeness ... his calculated self-effacement, his habit of looking at or hearing things 
without appearing to do so';\3 which discussed the danger of the enemy disguising 
his soldiers as peasants for the purpose of espionage; 14 and which mentioned cavalry 
but not the aeroplane and signalling with fires and smoke, but not by radio or 
telephone. ls 
World War I, however, saw rapid and revolutionary changes in American 
intelligence. A leading reason for this was technological change. A small cadre of 
technophilic officers brought technology to the fore, in the process doing much to 
create modem-day bureaucratized intelligence staffs populated by professional 
technical experts. In what one scholar has aptly called an 'analog revolution', 16 aerial 
photography and signals intelligence were about to provide unprecedented amounts of 
information in staggering detail to intelligence personnel, swamping the card files, 
attache reports, and terse reports from cavalry officers which had previously 
characterized the intelligence business. 17 
The increased availability of intelligence led to a disproportionate increase in 
the size of military staffs. One prominent historian and strategist has argued that the 
logic of war (effectiveness) and the logic of technology (efficiency) are at odds. IS 
During the World War I era, efficiency was the order of the day in the United States. 
13lbid, 'The Service oflnfonnation', p. 105. Wagner copied this phrase without citing 
Lewal. See Wagner, p. 189. 
14 lbid, p. 111. 
15lbid, p. 269 
16 Michael Warner, 'Building a Theory oflntelligence Systems', in Gregory F. Treverton and 
Wilhelm Agrell, eds., National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects 
(New York, 2009), p. 33. 
17 'Naval Intelligence; Foreign Intelligence "Supply and Demand"; "Combat Intelligence''', 
extracts from Monthly In/ormation Bulletin. Office o/Naval Intelligence, 1931; File UNV, 
RG8, NHC. Walter C. Sweeney, Military Intelligence: A New Weapon in War, (New York: 
1924), pp. 1-2. 
18 Van Creveld, Technology and War, (New York: 1989), pp. 316-319. For an application of 
this argument to radio and its implications, see John Ferris, 'The British Army, Signals and 
Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-1942', Intelligence and National Security,S :2, (1990), 
pp. 256-260. 
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The late 1880s to the early 1920 saw the country swept by efficiency experts who 
studied industrial and bureaucratic processes in order to 'scientifically' optimize 
them, wringing out 'wasted motion', maximizing profit, and contributing, they 
thought, to the moral betterment of the nation. 19 This efficiency craze might be said 
to have exploited predictability to optimize performance.2o So, for example, Henry 
Ford's assembly line could be highly efficient because it was possible to predict in 
advance precisely how the machinery and parts would act and the workers on the line 
could be trained to act nearly as automatons. 
Similarly, it was easy to imagine how one might efficiently deliver firepower 
from a million man army. In fact, in the years running up to World War I, many 
technology enthusiasts imagined such schemes. Of course, it would tum out that the 
simplest thing was difficult. During this period, the most discussed technological tool 
was the aeroplane. In the opinion of some, it promised to make the entire battlefield 
visible to the commander and show him the precise location of the enemy's forces. 
These enthusiasts thought that a commander would soon have such a comprehensive 
view of the battlefield that command could depend less upon intuition or genius and 
become more a matter of doing the self-evidently right thing, the efficient thing. At 
the same time, the unfolding revolution in telecommunications was creating 
unprecedented opportunities for a commander to know where his own forces were and 
to fine-tune their actions. The words of future Chief Signal Officer George Scriven 
that the sound which most interested Japanese general Kuroki Tamemoto during the 
1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War was not that of combat, but rather the 'click ofthe 
telegraph instrument which left nothing to the doubt of vision, but told him exactly 
19 For an excellent discussion of these ideas, see Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: 
Scientific Management in the Progressive Era 1890-1920, (Chicago, 1964). 
20 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War, pp. 316-319. 
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what each unit was doing', were typical of the mood of the small band of technology 
enthusiasts in the military during this period.21 
However, the steel, glass, and rubber in Henry Ford's factories did not try to 
prevent themselves from being made into cars by wrecking the machinery and killing 
and maiming the workers. This is precisely what happens with the objects upon 
which an Army acts. These objects are the opponent and 'given an opponent who is 
capable of learning, a very real danger exists that an action will not succeed twice 
because it has succeeded once' .22 The efficiency experts may have been partially 
successful in creating a civilian work force of happy automatons, but the military 
force that operated in a repetitive, mechanical, efficient fashion, whether at the level 
of the individual or at the level of the army or fleet, was going to find itself decisively 
and brutally defeated in short order. An entry in the notebook of a student at the 
AEF's intelligence school hinted at this very lesson. 'Remember when [the enemy] 
does something with success once, he is sure to repeat. Watch it'. 23 
The utility of aircraft and modem telecommunications threatened to give a 
decisive advantage to the side using them. No opponent would allow this situation to 
obtain unchallenged; he would fight back in all domains. In the air, he would try to 
down reconnaissance planes. In the ether and on the cables, he would encrypt his 
signals and hide them. He would also use the jujitsu of signals intelligence. As 
helpful as electronic telecommunications were in arraying and controlling one's 
military or political assets, the results of one's plan falling into the enemy's hands-
and such was the risk every time a message was sent over the wires or broadcast into 
21 George P. Scriven, The Transmission of Militmy Information, (Governors Island, 1908), p. 
11. Scriven is quoting Frederick W. Palmer from a 1905 paper the latter read before the 
Military Service Institution. 
22 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War, (New York: 1989), pp. 316-319. 
23 Notebook entry, nd [summer, 1918], Marshall Library, Lexington, VA, Robert J. Fischer 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Hereafter ML. 
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the ether--could be genuinely catastrophic. For the first time in history, the use by 
combat forces of an efficient new technology could be counterproductive. Two great 
armies were now, in essence, sending their secret orders directly to each other. Codes 
and ciphers had been around for centuries, but as Pershing's intelligence officer put it, 
the 'importance of breaking the secret communication system of the enemy was 
multiplied many times by the use of a new weapon - wireless telegraphy' .24 
Each of these methods-air defences, communications security, and signals 
intelligence-required the opponent to procure more materiel, more staff, and more 
information. A mirror logic forced each side to do what the other was doing. Soon 
both sides had reconnaissance aircraft and fighter aircraft to protect them and bomber 
aircraft to (among other things) attack the enemy's air forces. They also had 
intelligence, maintenance, and training infrastructures behind each of these. Soon 
both sides had not only signal units but code compilation units, monitors of friendly 
communications, and signals intelligence units and the various infrastructures 
necessary to support them. Staffs, information, and the complexity of modem 
military operations ballooned on all sides. 
A century earlier, Clausewitz had emphasized the limits of the knowable. lie 
wrote that 'all information and assumptions are open to doubt' and that new 
information usually increased uncertainty. Given this fact, the military genius had to 
be capable of the coup d'oeil, the 'inward eye', the ability to quickly understand the 
situation.25 Certainly, this was not the only period during which the discourse 
emphasized the limitations of the knowable. At other times, however, discourse has 
emphasized the great and growing possibilities of knowing. Among the technophiles, 
24 Nolan 'History', p. 118. 
2S Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard trans. (Princeton, 1976), pp. 
102,117-118. 
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the pre-World War I period, was such a period. In the view of some, the aeroplane 
promised to make the entire battlefield visible to the commander and show him the 
precise location of the enemy's forces. At the same time, the unfolding revolution in 
telecommunications (the telegraph, the telephone and the tum of the century radio) 
was creating unprecedented opportunities for a commander to know where his own 
forces were and to control them. The application of progressive thinking was turning 
art into science in civilian factories and offices. Why should it not do the same in the 
military?26 
Clausewitz was well known in America, but only imperfectly understood.27 
Nevertheless, Americans did pay lip service to his views on the subject. For instance, 
Wagner, whose books were still in use, drew on Clausewitz's work in preparing The 
Service of Security and Information, and some passages in it evoke the Prussian, such 
as the observation that 'knowledge of the enemy's movements and objects is 
generally incomplete and usually inferential,.28 In 1913, the Navy's Lieutenant 
Commander W. S. Pye, cited Clausewitz explicitly in making the same point. 29 
All this notwithstanding, these officers and others such as Chief Signal Officer 
Greely, typically chose to emphasize those aspects ofClausewitz's work that 
26 Samuel Haber has noted that the advocates of scientific business management during the 
Progressive era frequently used analogies to the human body, machines, and the military. 
However, the analogies sometimes flowed the opposite direction. Note, for instance, the title 
of a book written by one of the Navy's leading intellectuals during the time, Bradley A. Fiske, 
The Navy as a Fighting Machine, (New York, 1916). 
27 Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception ofClausewitz in Britain and 
America. 1815-1945, (New York, 1994). 
28 Wagner, Service o/Security and Information, p. 16. 
29 W. S. Pye, 'Intelligence Service in Peace and War', 1913, NHC, Record Group 8, XING, 
Accession # 1913-186. For a similar point made by an Argentinean whose work was reprinted 
in the US, see R. E. Goubat, 'Cavalry Exploration in Co-operation with the Aeroplane', 
Technical Conferences [at] the Army Signal School 1911-12, Conference No.2, p. 4, 
Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Hereafter CARL. 
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underscored the importance of intelligence. 30 Pye, clearly a devoted reader of 
Wagner's works, for instance, turned Clausewitz on his head maintaining that 
'uncertainty with regard to the enemy's forces and probable course of action 
constitutes one of the chief impediments in the formulation of a plan of campaign'. 
Given these realities, Pye held, it is important to make an 'estimate of the situation' 
and then to stick confidently with the resulting plan until substantiated evidence 
shows that the plan is no longer appropriate. 'Absence of information', he counsels, 
'is best personified as a little devil who constantly whispers in one's ear, "You better 
change your plan'''. In other words, for Clausewitz, the temptation to make bad 
decisions lay in too much (inevitably false) information, whereas for Pye that 
temptation resided in too little information. In fact, the 'failure to alter a plan upon 
adequate information', he wrote, 'is only one step better than changing it upon 
insufficient information'. Moreover, accurate timely information 'bestows the power 
of initiative, which, if properly used, may be the decisive factor in the campaign. 
Victory or defeat often rests upon the veracity and opportuneness of the information 
. d,31 
receIve . 
It seemed that no longer would an 'inward eye' be necessary. In essence, the 
technophiles thought that technology now promised to provide a much more powerful 
outward eye that could see the enemy's forces and divine his very intentions. 
Especially due to the aeroplane, a commander would soon be able to see the 
30 A. W. Greely, Chief Signal Officer, 'Lines ofInformation. Their Development and Their 
Value to Strategy and Tactics,' JMSI, 36:134, (March-April, 1905), p. 225. W. S. Pye, 
'Intelligence Service in Peace and War', 1913, Naval War College, NHC, Record Group 8, 
XING, Accession #1913-186, p. 1. For a balanced discussion ofClausewitz' views on 
intelligence, see David Kahn, 'Clausewitz and Intelligence', in Michael 1. Handel (ed.), 
Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, (London, 1986), pp. 117-126. 
31 W. S. Pye, The Service o/Information and Security, (Washington, 1916), pp. 6-7. 
Emphasis in origina\. In title, form, and content, this book is quite like Wagner's. Portions of 
this book were lectures that Pye gave at the Naval War College. See W.S.,Pye, 'The Service 
of Security', 27 July 1914, NHC, RG 14. 
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battlefield with sufficient certainty that command could depend less upon intuition or 
genius and become more a matter of doing the self-evidently right thing, given the 
arrangement of the various pieces on the chessboard. 
Indeed, the very utility of aircraft and modem telecommunications created 
grave vulnerabilities. Obviously, if aircraft could make the enemy's forces readily 
visible to friendly commanders, then presumably the enemy commanders could derive 
a comparable benefit from their use. In the realm of communications, for the first 
time in history, the use by combat forces of an efficient new technology could be 
counterproductive.32 As helpful as electronic telecommunications were in arraying 
and controlling one's military or political assets, the results of one's plan falling into 
the enemy's hands-and such was the risk every time a message was sent over the 
wires or broadcast into the ether-could be genuinely catastrophic. 
* * * 
During the pre-war era, military journals devoted a great deal of space to the 
implications of the new-fangled aeroplane. Pilots typically argued for combat roles 
for aircraft, but they were a small, junior group of officers who tended to die young. 33 
Instead, most discussion focused on the aeroplane's potential for reconnaissance or 
'observation' .34 Some officers had an expansive view of this potential and while they 
32 John Manly, 'Supplementary I st and 3 arts', pp 3-4, ML, Friedman Papers, Item 811. 
33 Herbert A. Johnson, Wingless Eagle: u.s. Army Aviation Through World War I, (Chapel 
Hill, 2001), pp. 67, 73. 
34 For foreign contributions to the American debate, see, e.g., R. A. Campbell, 'Aeroplanes 
with Cavalry', JUSCA, 22:86, (September, 1911), pp. 311-314, reprinted from the April, 1911 
issue of the British Cavalry Journal; Captain Niemann, 'Airships and Cavalry in the 
Reconnaissance Service', JUSCA, 22:89, (March, 1912), pp. 873-877, reprinted from the 
Kavalleristische Monatshefte of January, 1912; R. E. Goubat, 'Cavalry Exploration in Co-
operation with the Aeroplane', Technical Conferences [at] the Army Signal School 1911-12, 
Conference No.2, pp. 3-10, CARL, reprinted from Revista Militar, August, 1911; H. S. 
Massy, 'Aircraft in War',JMSI, 55:190, (July-August, 1914), pp. 133-149, the text ofa 
lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, reprinted from The Journal of the Royal 
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admitted a continued role for cavalry, they thought that branch would soon be 
decidedly secondary in importance. Not surprisingly, the head of the Signal Corps 
enunciated one of the most grandiose visions. In 1915, Brigadier General George 
Scriven wrote that the 'air craft' had: 
altered ... the theory and application of grand tactics. It now appears 
that the actual game of war is played openly with cards laid on the 
table, and opportunity no longer is given for inference as to concealed 
movements or for surprises, perhaps not even for the exercise of the 
high military quality of anticipation of the unseen movements of the 
adversary ... The possibility of brilliant and unexpected blows by 
enterprising commanders has been largely eliminated from modem 
operations of war by the information supplied by the aviators. It is 
proved that the modem air craft lays open to the field of mental view 
the whole visible area of the immediate theater of war ... The air craft 
sees and indicates the larger operations of war and points out to the 
slowly moving men on the ground not only the object to be attacked or 
defended, but to reconnaissance troops, especially the cavalry, the 
objective to be sought, the localities to be searched, and the character 
of information to be obtained.35 
Others thought along similar lines. Lieutenant llap Arnold, future leader of 
US Army Air Forces in World War II, predicted in 1913 that turning movements 
could now only rarely be successful, and that enemy movements would 'appear like 
the movements in a map problem'. 36 A student at Fort Leavenworth foresaw in 1915 
that 'aerial reconnaissance would permit of the discovery of all hostile 
movements ... Within a few hours a commanding general would expect to have air 
reports of any enemy within a radius of eighty miles'. This, he thought, would place a 
premium on superior generalship, 'celerity' of movement, and concealment. 37 
Another officer was concerned that the military would let down its guard against 
Artillery. All of these officers supported the contention that aircraft and cavalry could 
complement each other in the reconnaissance role. 
3S George P. Scriven, The Service of Information United States Army, (Washington, 1915), p. 
21. 
36 Henry H. Arnold, 'Air Craft and War', IJ, 10:2 (1913), p. 226. 
37 H. L. Landers, 'Critique on the Strategical and Tactical Uses of Balloons and Aeroplanes', 
in European War of 1914-1915: Papers Preparedfor Conference in Historical Research, 
April 7, 1915, by Members of the Staff Class, Department of Military Art, Army Service 
Schools, 1915, pp. 54-55, CARL. 
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journalists, given that the aeroplane now meant that 'secrecy of movement can no 
longer be maintained and strategic surprises are no more possible' .38 
Most officers thought that cavalry would still be necessary and, for its part, the 
cavalry community felt only slightly threatened, even perhaps seeing advantages in 
aircraft. One cavalry officer expressed the hope that observation aircraft might free 
the cavalry to 'throw caution to the winds and without let or hindrance gallop to 
points of advantage' there to engage in combat. 39 A British officer, whose work was 
reprinted in an American journal, pointed to the need for cavalry to do reconnaissance 
during inclement weather and at night. Still better, he thought, the cavalry would be 
increasingly available for offensive action.4o 
The British officer represented a set of officers who emphasized the 
cooperation of the aeroplane with other means of collection. They maintained that 
though there would always be gaps and uncertainties in the information derived from 
any single source or means of collection, these could be reduced by using 
complementary or redundant means. As early as 1906, one officer had a primitive 
form of this idea, suggesting that cavalry and 'spies' could usefully interact.41 As the 
aeroplane matured, these officers tended to believe that aircraft would complement 
the cavalry and 'broaden the field of operations for cavalry' because cavalry 'will still 
be required to confirm and develop the information obtained in a general way by the 
38 Frank Geere, 'The Press in Time of War', JMSI, 56: 193, (1915), pp. 12. For similar views 
from a British officer published in an American journal, see W. A. de C. King, 'Aerial 
Reconnaissance, Its Possible Effect on Strategy and Tactics', JMSI, 53: 186, (Nov-Dec 1913), 
p.p. 450-455. 
9 David L. Roscoe, 'The Effect of Aeroplanes Upon Cavalry Tactics', Technical Conferences 
[at} the Army Signal Schoo.11911-12, ~onference No.1, p. 13, CARL. 
40 De C. King, p. 451, 'Aenal Reconnaissance', p. 455. 
41 Charles D. Rhodes, 'The Duties of Cavalry Preceding a General Engagement, as Developed 
by Two Recent Wars', JMSI, 38:141, (May-June, 1906), p. 407. 
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aeroplane observer'.42 Colonel John Wisser, a fonner attache in Berlin, put it most 
clearly in 1910. 
Both methods and means of reconnaissance have their respective 
advantages and disadvantages, and our annies need both. 
Reconnaissance from an air-machine is dependent primarily on being 
able to see; consequently, this means of reconnaissance is out of action 
every day from evening to dawn, and at other times in fog or in very 
cloudy weather. On bright, clear days the air-machines have 
considerable advantage over the cavalry in that they can make 
accurate, connected observations and render prompt reports, but the 
more detailed but slower reports of cavalry, which can work by night 
as well as by day, in foggy or cloudy weather, by hearing as well as by 
seeing, disconnected although they may be, are still of as vital 
importance as ever.43 [Emphasis in original.] 
The question soon arose of how to prevent the enemy from using this new tool 
against one's own forces. An officer in the Indian Flying Corps was reported in the 
United States in 1914 to suggest that the very possibility oflosing air superiority and 
thus one's eyes in the sky argued for the maintenance of cavalry as a backup 
reconnaissance force. 44 Lieutenant Benjamin Foulois, who would later twice be 
Pershing's Chief of Air Service, predicted that in future war there would be a battle 
for air superiority which would probably be dispositive of the war itself because the 
victor would 'have no difficulty in watching every movement and disposition of the 
. , 45 
opposmg troops . 
These issues intruded on official doctrine in 1915 when the Anny undertook 
an ambitious project to prepare a 'Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the 
United States', grappling with the organization, size, equipping and numerous other 
42 [Anonymous], 'Aeroplanes in War', JUSCA, 21 :81, (November 1910), p. 570. See also 
Massy, 'Aircraft in War', p. 142. 
43 John P. Wisser, 'The Tactical and Strategical Use of Dirigible Balloons and Aeroplanes', 
JUSCA, 21:81, (November, 1910), p. 422. 
44 H. S. Massy, 'Aircraft in War', JMSI, 55:190, (July-August, 1914), pp. 142, reprinted from 
The Journal o/the Royal Artillery. A lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution by 
Colonel Massy attributes these views to a Captain Seaton Massy who purportedly had 
enunciated them some eighteen months earlier. 
45 B. D. Foulois, 'Military Aviation and Aeronautics', IJ, 9:3, (1912-1913), p. 318. 
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issues of the Army and pointing out where new legislation was needed. Reflecting 
the discussion in the journals and what little they knew about the ongoing war in 
Europe, the study's authors wrote that all 'strategical reconnaissance is now carried 
on by aircraft'. Furthermore, 'it is often said that due to the use of aeroplanes 
surprises are no longer possible. Generally speaking, this is so, provided both sides 
are equally well equipped with machines and weather conditions are favorable. If, 
however, complete 'command of the air' is obtained by one side, the chances of 
surprising the enemy are greater than they have ever been before', 46 
These confident assertions notwithstanding, the War Department as an 
institution knew little of how the Europeans were using aircraft. Colonel Samuel 
Reber, head of the Signal Corps' Aviation Section lamely testified before Congress in 
December 1914 about whether the Army was in touch with developments in aviation, 
saying 'I think we are-as far as it is possible to say we are keeping abreast of 
conditions that we do not know anything about' ,47 To the man charged after the 
Armistice with compiling the history of Army aviation's wartime efforts, looking 
back on that time, it appeared that the service had entered the war with information 
" , t b I' 48 about aVIatIOn so meagre as 0 e use ess . 
Certainly, once the war broke out in Europe in 1914, information became 
harder to get as belligerents clamped down even further on security.49 Nevertheless, 
the reporting of the military attaches and military observers might have kept the Army 
well informed on this rapidly developing topic, but it did not apparently because the 
46 United States, War Department, War College Division, 'Military Aviation', supplement to 
The Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, November, 1915, pp. 1, 6, 8, 
NARA RG 165, M1024, File WCD 9311-1, 
47 Arthur Sweetser, The American Air Service: A Record of Its Problems. Its Difficulties. Its 
Failures. and Its Final Achievements, (New York: 1919), p. 26. 
48 Quoted in I. B. Holley, Jr. Ideas and Weapons, (Washington: 1983), p. 37. 
49 Sweetser, The American Air Service, p. 35. 
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Signal Corps closed its ears to it.5o Though the Anny's senior leadership generally 
discouraged the dissemination and exploitation of intelligence from abroad and the 
War College Division seldom disseminated what was collected, in this case, the War 
College diligently forwarded attache reports on aviation to the Chief Signal Officer 
both before the war and after the outbreak of hostilities. 51 Between 1909 and 1914, 
military attaches in Europe provided significant reporting on developments both in the 
design and use of aircraft. Other useful reporting came in during the war. 52 
Actual American experience in 1916 made a very modest contribution to 
American understanding of aerial reconnaissance. When, in the spring of that year, 
Brigadier General John 1. Pershing led a punitive expedition into Mexico to capture 
the bandit Pancho Villa, he requested aircraft to help him with reconnaissance and 
communications. However, the squadron of eight aircraft that he received under the 
command of Major Benjamin Foulois proved to be oflittle use for these tasks. 
Mechanical and navigational problems made it a major undertaking even to deploy 
the planes from the United States to meet up with Pershing's forces which were 
already in Mexico. Worse yet, on the first day of active operations, one of the aircraft 
crashed. Hap Arnold recalled that the climate was so arid 'that we spent most of our 
time trying to keep the planes from drying out and falling to pieces'. A few 
reconnaissance missions were successful, and one found an enemy camp, allowing the 
Americans to conduct a successful cavalry raid. Exactly a month after entering 
Mexico, however, the last operational aircraft crashed while on a photoreconnaissance 
mission. Pershing's cavalry had to pick up the slack. Pershing himself, however, was 
50 Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, p. 93. 
51 NARA RG 165, MI024, File 5770 for files on French aviation (and other topics) before and 
during the war. See also file 6382 (Russia), 6552 (Germany and the Netherlands), and 7031 
(Britain). 
52 For example, W. A. Castle, 'Report on Visit to the Somme Front', 21 September 1916, 
NARA RG 319, M I 024, File 5353-9. Castle was an observer with the British Expeditionary 
Force. 
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undaunted. The report he filed after the expedition was over carefully enunciated all 
the handicaps under which his aviators had had to operate in this their first time out. 
Nevertheless, he rendered 'unstint[ing] praise' to the aviators for their 'most 
exceptional service' and their 'many important reconnaissances' and quoted and 
endorsed a paragraph from Foulois' report to him that 'the knowledge gained ... should 
result in more rapid and efficient development of the aviation service'. 53 
Before World War I, American officers thought that the most important use of 
aviation would be reconnaissance. This turned out to be the case. Despite the 
adulation (and attention from girls) that was heaped on pursuit (fighter) pilots, most 
wartime aviators agreed that the raison d'etre for aviation was to gather information 
about the enemy. 'Observation is without doubt the most important of all Air Service 
specialities', thought the chief of the Training Section in the Air Service of the AEF's 
rear area. 54 Though, over time, bombing might grow more important, for the nonce, 
'aerial combat, purely as an expression of military power, is absurd', wrote one 
observer in a book commissioned by the War Department after the war.55 Even Eddie 
Rickenbacker, America's leading ace, thought that all applications of air power other 
S3 Johnson, Wingless Eagle, pp. 162-168. Bidwell, History a/the Military Intelligence 
Division, p. 95. 'Report by Major General John J. Pershing, Commanding, of the Punitive 
Expedition', 10 October 1916, pp. 44-45 and 86-91, CARL. 
S4 Chief, Training Section, HQ S.O.S., Office of the Chief of Air Service to Chief of Air 
Service, AEF, 26 December 1918, NARA RG 120, M990, Gorrell's History of the American 
Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919, Series A, Volume 15. Hereafter Gorrell 
History. 
ss Harold E. Porter, Aerial Observation, (New York, 1921), pp. 33, 38. See also Daniel P. 
Morse, Jr., The History o/the 50th Aero Squadron, (Nashville, 1990), pp. 11-12,17. This 
history was originally privately printed in 1920. See also Theodore Macfarlane Knappen, 
Wings 0/ War: An Account o/the Important Contribution a/the United States to Aircraft 
Invention, Engineering, Development and Production during the World War, (New York: G. 
P. Putnam's Sons, 1920), p. 199, (quoting Brereton); Elmer Haslett, preface to Porter, Aerial, 
np. See also Stephen Noyes, to Air Service Commander, First Army, 23 December 23, 1918, 
Gorrell History, Series A, Volume 15, 
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than observation were 'trivial' compared with the 'vast importance' of knowing 
where the enemy was and 'looking before you leap' .56 
However, the pre-war techno-enthusiasts failed to take adequate account of 
enemy countermeasures against observation aircraft. Van Creveld's comment about 
the tension between technology and war applied to aerial observation. In principle it 
was possible to see the battlefield with unprecedented fidelity. However, both sides 
found themselves locking into a cycle of measure and countermeasure, required to 
make huge investments in order to be able to see the enemy while remaining unseen 
themselves. On the offensive side, they built and supplied enormous fleets of 
observation planes and trained pilots and observers to fly in them. They bought 
cameras, built photo labs, and recruited and trained photo interpreters. On the 
defensive side, they built and supplied a vast fleet of pursuit planes and trained pilots 
to fly them. They camouflaged their emplacements (in the US Army, this led to the 
creation of a Camouflage Corps) and accepted the inefficiencies of moving troops at 
night and assembling them for attacks under cover in forests. 57 The belligerents even 
had to create components of their intelligence staffs to follow developments in the 
enemy's air forces, locating new air fields, assessing aircraft production, and building 
card indexes of prominent enemy pilots. 
The relatively quiet months before the St. Mihiel offensive started on 12 
September were an auspicious time for the AEF to develop an understanding of the 
observation airplane and the camera as weapons of war. In the field, observation 
aviation boiled down to three fundamental missions.58 The first two exemplified the 
lack of differentiation at the time between 'intelligence' as information about the 
56 Eddie Rickenbacker, Fighting the Flying Circus, (New York, 1919), p. 128. 
57 Porter, Aerial Observation, p. 110. 
58 For a similar typology, see Frank, American Air Service Observation, pp. 57-62. 
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enemy and 'intelligence' as whatever information would be helpful to one's 
commander. The first was the infantry contact patrol to identify the forward edge of 
friendly troops for the benefit of friendly commanders and artillery units. The second 
was adjusting friendly artillery fire, artillery 'reg/age'. The third was reconnaissance 
and scouting: mapping the enemy's defences, finding his artillery batteries and 
headquarters, identifying increased concentrations of men, weapons or logistics that 
might indicate an impending attack. It was sometimes possible to see enemy soldiers 
on aerial photographs. More easy to see as well as more revealing were the enemy's 
tools (artillery, trucks, etc.) and the marks that he made upon the ground (trenches, 
beaten paths, etc.). As a French officer told an Army War College audience in August 
1917, 'a hostile attack, or a projected retreat, are written in advance on the field' .59 
The proponents of aerial reconnaissance learned that it could provide nine-tenths of 
the information 'upon which an army now acts' .60 
Tactical reconnaissance missions usually entailed the use of the eyeball while 
strategic reconnaissance at greater depth more often involved the use of cameras 
which were high technology tools in their own right at the time. As early as 1912, 
Foulois had foreseen aerial photography and the placing of radios in planes and 
Pershing'S short-lived squadron in Mexico had actually taken aerial photographs.61 
However, the virtues of aerial photography were not evident to the General Staff, 
even in the early months of American involvement in the war. Given the size of the 
war, the number of aircraft the Americans intended to fly and the size of the force 
they intended to deploy, many cameras, much photographic equipment and many 
59 Captain de la Grange, 'Employment of Aircraft in War,' War Department, Bulletin of the 
Intelligence Section. Training Department. 1 :3,8 January 1918, p. 5, NARA RG 120, Entry 
129, Box 6215, Folder' Air Service AEF, Bulletins of the Information Section, Nos. 1-130'. 
60 AEF France, Office Chief of Air Service, 'Aerial Observation', Bulletin of the Information 
Section, Air Service. AEF, 3: 104,17 April 1918, p. 2, NARA, RG 120 Entry 129, Box 6215, 
Folder "Air Service AEF, Bulletins of the Information Section, Nos. 1-130" 
61 B. D. Foulois, 'Military Aviation and Aeronautics', IJ, 9:3 (Nov-Dec, 1912), pp. 314-332. 
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trained photo interpreters would have been necessary. All this required planning and 
infrastructure, but four months into American involvement in the war, neither the 
General Staff nor the Signal Corps had taken action to bring about an aerial 
62 photography effort. 
During the summer of 1917, a newly commissioned officer named James 
Barnes took it on himself to energize the War Department on the issue. He borrowed 
all the MID's files on the topic, finding them unread. These reports convinced him 
that the Army was making a grave mistake ignoring photography. It was clear to him 
that the aircraft-mounted cameras 'under trained direction', backed by 'special, 
trained laboratory forces', which could 'quickly, accurately and scientifically' process 
the information and communicate it to commanders, amounted to a new weapon of 
war. By making himself a 'pest', he convinced the Signal Corps to create a 
Photographic Division. Soon the British sent a Major Campbell to train this new 
office. Barnes then he set about proselytizing the General Staff. He arranged for 
Campbell to provide a lecture to it. Only about a dozen, mostly junior, staff officers 
came, but despite Campbell's almost impenetrable accent, they were mesmerized. A 
few days later Campbell repeated the lecture to a packed house including senior 
officers. The General Staff was amazed at the potential of aerial reconnaissance and 
'the ball had been started rolling,.63 In November, Barnes shipped out for France with 
1 . 64 Fou OlS. 
62 James Barnes, From Then Till Now: Anecdotal Portraits and Transcript Pages from 
Memory's Tablets, (New York, 1934), pp. 475-76. 
63 Barnes, From Then, pp. 479-481. 
64 Gorrell History, Series G, Volume 1, 'History of the Photographic Section. Manual for 
photographic officers. History of the photographic section in the Zone of Advance' ,p. 10. 
79 
Aerial photography seemed to promise 'absolute precision' while minimizing 
the human element.65 Even 'the best thousand' observers 'couldn't compete for a 
moment. .. against the camera lens' because the latter had 'no personal imagination, no 
nerves, no prejudices' .66 An example was the ability to locate enemy artillery 
batteries. Infonnation from prisoners on this topic was 'extremely erratic and often 
wholly false' while infonnation from a human observer in an airplane could be good 
to within 250 meters. New techniques such as flash and sound-ranging were 
somewhat better, but only photographs were 'very accurate,.67 An intelligence officer 
visiting his French counterparts even got the impression that 'infonnation of the 
battlefront from other sources was considered unreliable unless it could be verified by 
h h ,68 P otograp s . 
Photographs did not take themselves however. Specialized cameras and 
trained 'observers' who were also the eyes of an aircraft on non-photographic 
missions were also necessary. Soon the Army established a training school at Fort 
Sill for aerial observers, though one student described it as teaching 'practically 
nothing of real help' .69 The graduates of Fort Sill did further training at Amanty in 
France, where a training school was established in January 1918. Graduates of this 
course flew with French units until American observation squadrons started arriving 
in France in April, 1918. Eventually the AEF had forty-five aero squadrons and 
twenty-one photographic sections in theatre.7o Of course, the photo-interpreters 
65 N. N. Golovine, 'Cavalry Reconnaissance', Cavalry Journal, 31: 127 (April, 1922), p. 185. 
Hereafter CJ. 
66 Porter, pp. 166-167. 
67 'Inclosures to the Report of the Chief of Artillery, American E. F., Part V. Artillery 
Information Service', 10 May 1919, NARA RG 120, Entry, 129, Box 5954, Folder '38 
Artillery Information', 
68 Finnegan, Shooting, p. 178. 
69 Frank, American Air Service Observation, p. Ill. 
70 Elmer Haslett, Luck on the Wing: Thirteen Stories of a Sky Spy, (New York, 1920), pp. xi-
xii. Terrance J. Finnegan, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and 
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needed their own school, and the AEF soon established one at Langres, also the home 
of the intelligence schoo1.71 
Despite its advantages which were evident to aviators and intelligence 
personnel, however, the AEF never used photography 'as fully or as intelligently' as it 
might have. There was a shortage of trained photo-interpreters, an unclear delineation 
of photographic duties between the Air Service and the G-2 and, perhaps most 
importantly, a 'lack of knowledge in the army at large as to the value of photography 
d . ,72 an Its uses. 
Whether ground officers realized it or not, photography offered scientific 
precision. Nevertheless, photography was not the be-all and end-all of aerial 
reconnaissance. There was a trade-off between precision of information and the 
timeliness with which it could be in the hands of commanders. Photographs, of 
course, could show precisely what the enemy's disposition was in specific places, but 
in order to make this happen, the plane had to land and the plates had to be rushed to a 
lab and developed. Then a trained photographic interpreter had to look at them and 
communicate his findings to commanders. For some applications, such as planning 
future offensives, such a slow process was acceptable. Often it was not, especially 
when American forces started their rapid advance toward the very end of the war. In 
late October 1918, for instance, the 'information officer' of an artillery brigade, while 
conceding the potential utility of aerial photography of the 'area covered by the 
divisional artillery', lamented the fact that by the time the prints had made their way 
through official channels, American troops were invariably occupying the ground 
Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front-World War I, (Washington, 2006), pp. 
114-115. 
71 ChiefG-2-A to AC ofS G-2, GHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA RG 120, Entry 74, Box 
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they showed.73 When more urgent information was required, typically in tactical 
reconnaissance, observers would write down what they had seen them, put these notes 
in small canisters, and drop them onto friendly command postS. 74 
One of the principal arguments for the retention of cavalry in the 
reconnaissance role had been that only it could operate at night. This turned out not 
to be true. Human observers in aircraft proved to be effective at night locating lights 
and fires. When intelligence personnel combined their observations with daytime 
aerial photographs, the enemy's secrets seemed to be laid bare. T. Bentley Mott, 
Pershing's liaison in Foch's headquarters, memoed to Nolan late on 7 July 1918 that 
the French G-2 had put together an 'atlas' derived from a methodical plan of day and 
night reconnaissance that clearly showed the movement toward Allied lines of a large 
German force. Each page of this atlas showed 24 hours of coverage. 'It may as well 
be said at once', Mott wrote, 'that during the day time no abnormal activity has 
anywhere at any time been observed'. Rather, the outlines of the German movement 
could be discerned by plotting over time the leading and trailing edges of an 
advancing wave of bivouac fires and abnormally lit and active railways stations.75 
Eight days later the Germans launched what became the Second Battle of the Marne. 
The AEF's intelligence school was soon teaching the importance oflooking for lights 
. h 76 III t e rear area. 
The extensive aerial reconnaissance effort led to a substantial influx of data. 
During about seven months of observation flights, the AEF took 18,000 photographs 
73 Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 13. G. T. Lindstrom, to Chief of Air Service, 3rd Corps, 
'Report on Liaison with 5th Division', October 20, 1918, 
74 Predictably, this practice led to angry memos about the observers' poor handwriting. See 
for instance, Gorrell History, Series, C, Volume 12, N. A. Hall, ,to CO 50th Aero Squadron, 
14 September 1918. 
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Papers, Box 1, Folder 'Memoranda 1918', USMA. 
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of enemy positions during the war (though this was far fewer than the more than the 
500,000 that the British took).77 Technicians might have to make many tens of prints 
of an interesting photograph and the cartographers made use of photographs, as well. 
A bureaucracy was necessary to handle all these photographs, as well as the 
numerous other issues attendant on aerial intelligence. A critical advance was the 
establishment of the 'Branch Intelligence Officer' (BID) system, although, in the 
event, the amount of data collected soon exceeded the ability of this system to process 
and disseminate it.78 In October 1917 the 0-2 came to the idea of detailing 
representatives within the squadrons in the field. The Air Service argued that the 
intelligence function within squadrons rightfully belonged to them, but in March 
1918, consultations with the British, who were thought to have the best air 
intelligence organization, convinced both parties that the function should be 0-2's. 
This led to the creation of 0-2-A-7, the Office of Air Intelligence. This office 
oversaw the training and work of the BIOs whom it began sending out in May. Each 
observation and bombing squadron got a BID as did, eventually, the G-2 in every 
Army and Corps and their Army and Corps 'Observation Groups' .79 
The BID was a conduit for extracting intelligence from the squadrons and 
groups and sending it up the chain. Not only did the BIOs debrief observers, but also 
77 James J. Hudson, Hostile Skies: A Combat History of the American Air Service in World 
War I, (Syracuse, 1968), p. 299. Porter, Aerial Observation, pp. 174-175fn. 
78 Finnegan, Shooting, p. 229. 
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the primary responsibility for photographic interpretation fell on them, a task in which 
draftsmen and sometimes even the observers themselves aided them. 80 The BIOs also 
provided intelligence to the fliers, for instance by putting up maps in the observers' 
room showing enemy air defences, searchlights, and other significant objects. 
Nevertheless, it turned out that the effective BIO had to be technically skilled and 
have a winning personality, because the benefits of the BID's presence did not 
immediately impress the flying personnel. The BIO was not a flyer, after all, and he 
often seemed incapable of asking intelligent questions.8l In short, the BIOs were 
outsiders who had to make themselves effective by diligent work and sometimes sheer 
. f l' 82 dIllt 0 persona lty. 
The camera may have been a purely dispassionate observer, but its output was 
Delphic, requiring interpretation by humans. Though Dennis Nolan wrote airily after 
the war about the ease of detecting an impending enemy attack by means of aerial 
photography, this comment glossed over the very difficult interpretation task the BIOs 
faced. 83 Interpretation required all sorts of unusual types of people. The ground 
looked quite different in black and white from above than it did in colour from ground 
level, but the implications of this were disputed.84 Shadows were the key to many 
problems, but some people thought that the photo-interpreter had to know them 'as a 
scientist' not an artist would.85 The officer in charge of the Photographic Section of 
80 Finnegan, Shooting, p. 225. 
81 Gorrell History, Series A, Volume 15, F. P. Lahm to Chief of Air Service, AEF, 6 January 
1919. 
82 'Report of Air Order of Battle Section Office of Air Intelligence, GHQ American E. F., 
Suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligence Work for Air Service Report,' n.d., RG 120 Entry 
113, BoX 5772, Folder 'Suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligence Work for Air Service Report'. 
83 Dennis Nolan Papers, Box 3, Folders 'Comments on John J. Pershings "My Experiences in 
the World War"', p. 357, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. 
Hereafter Nolan, 'Comments'. 
84 For a discussion of the art and science of photographic interpretation during this period, see 
Finnegan, Shooting, pp. 133-152. 
85 Porter, Aerial Observation, p. 184. 
84 
the Intelligence School at Langres disagreed. He thought that the best photo 
interpreters were men with artistic training, because they had the 'quick intelligence, 
the temperament and knowledge of the effect of light and shadow,.86 One American 
thought that photographic interpretation required a 'peculiar mind-the type of mind 
that would work out chess problems' or crossword puzzles.87 Another officer found it 
'meticulous and keen work', that was particularly easy for people with the 'racial 
characteristics' of the French but that might be harder for Americans. 88 Some form of 
this perception may have influenced the decision to adopt for American use the 
h h· . . 89 French manual on p otograp IC mterpretatlOn. 
The 'science' of aerial observation was 'progressive' and an officer's 
'efficiency [would] become markedly impaired should he ... fail to keep posted on the 
newest developments of the subject' or allow his skills to atrophy through lack of 
practice.90 Nowhere was this more true than in the field of photographic 
interpretation, all the more so because the enemy did many things to confound the 
interpreter. The most difficult challenge was camouflage. This was a topic with 'no 
history and little literature', but now there was a fierce 'battle between the camera and 
the camouflage' .91 Barnes likened it to a poker game with aces up the sleeve. 
Camouflage netting was a problem, but then it was discovered that filters on cameras 
revealed the difference between natural and artificial foliage. Then, knowing that 
camouflage could be detected, the two sides started building fake ammunition dumps 
86 J. H. Wheat, 'Lecture Delivered to the Officers [ of the] Military Intelligence Division' , 21 
April, 1920, NARA RG 165, Entry 65, File 10560-328/179, , 
87 Barnes, From Then, p. 494. 
88 Gorrell History, Series A, Volume 15, blind memo, HQ, Air Service, SOS, AEF, Office of 
the Chief of Air Service, Photographic Section, 'Aerial Photography', 26 December 1918. 
89 This was US Army, Division of Military Aeronautics, Study and Exploitation of Aerial 
Photographs, translated by from the French, (Washington, July, 1918). 
90 Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 12: HQ Air Service Army Group, AEF, Operations 
Bulletin No.2, 'Instruction of Observers and Pilots of Observation Squadrons', n.d. 
91 Powell, Army Behind the Army, p. 82. 
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and the like and camouflaging them to divert the photo interpreters' attention. 
Meanwhile, the real dump might be hidden in the cellars of a wrecked building or dug 
under a railway bed.92 Planes could be kept inside hangars when an air build-up was 
underway. Dummy planes could be put outside in clear view when no build-up was 
intended.93 Photo-interpreters learned that snow, grass, and even dirt changed their 
appearance after people walked on them. This provided a way of finding objects of 
interest: follow the paths to the target. The Americans then discovered that a certain 
type of earth-coloured matting used as women's apparel in Madagascar looked from 
above like a well-worn path in the dirt. The Camouflage Corps bought 10,000 miles 
of the stuff and laid a maze of fake paths to waste the time and divert the attention of 
h · 94 German p oto-mterpreters. 
The information that the BIOs managed to wrest from the Germans went up to 
G-2-A-7 in Pershing's headquarters where analysts combined it with other sources of 
information, such as technical information obtained through the examination of 
crashed German aircraft, and data derived from liaison with British and French air 
intelligence. In September 1918, tired of inadequate reports on the interrogation of 
German pilots coming back from laymen, the office took over that function. It 
published the daily 'Summary of Air Information', which reported on friendly and 
enemy air activity, enemy air order of battle and force dispositions, enemy airfields 
and technical information. G-2-A-7 was further responsible for estimating German 
aircraft production and understanding its aircraft logistics.95 
92 Barnes, From Then, p. 495. 
93 Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 12: Fred W. Clark, to CO First Observation Group, 1 
Sept 1918. 
94 porter, Aerial Observation, (New York, 1921), p. 215. 
95 'Report of Air Order of Battle Section Office of Air Intelligence, GHQ American E. F., 
Suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligence Work for Air Service Report', n.d., NARA, RG 120 
Entry 113, Box 5772, Folder 'Suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligence Work for Air Service 
Report'. 
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G-2-A-7 also played an important role in bombing. The G-2 (at the Army 
level, after the First Army stood up) selected potential targets in cooperation with the 
Air Service operations officer. Then G-2-A-7 developed maps and photographs of the 
targets for passage to the bomber squadrons.96 In selecting targets they looked out to 
the full 'practicable radius' of bombers. This radius was not just what Allied aircraft 
could reach at the time. Rather, the office added 50 percent depth to allow for the 
development of new aircraft and an additional depth to account for probable advances 
of the front line. It also spread to either side to accommodate possible lateral shifts of 
American forces. 97 G-2-A-7 borrowed many of these target folders from the British. 
However, these contained scant information on why the target was worthy of 
bombing. It was determined that American flyers were more likely to perform well if 
they were privy to this sort of information, so in the run-up to the St. Mihiel offensive, 
G-2-A-7 modified the British target folder format to add it. 98 
With the time rapidly approaching for the first American offensive and the 
science of aerial reconnaissance evolving rapidly, and with American aerial force 
structure expanding equally rapidly, the Air Service was concerned that few officers 
knew the observation business well. They decided to concentrate the few experts in a 
place where they could benefit all concerned. Accordingly, in late August, the First 
Army's Air Service (under Brigadier General Billy Mitchell) established an 
'Observation Wing' and put Major Lewis H. Brereton in command. The wing's 
primary function was to instruct and inspect the army's various observation groups 
96 'Report of Air Order of Battle Section Office of Air Intelligence, GHQ American E. F., 
suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligence Work for Air Service Report,' n.d., NARA, RG 120 
Entry 113 Box 5772, Folder 'Suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligence Work for Air Service 
Report'. 
97 Gorrell History, Series M, Volume 2, 'Report of Technical Section G2-A7 GHQ American 
E.F.', n.d. 
98 'Report of Bomb Target Section, Office of Air Intelligence, General Headquarters, Amer. 
E.F.', n.d., NARA, RG 120, Entry 113, Box 5773, Folder 'Report of Bomb Target Section, 
Office of Air Intelligence, General Headquarters, Amer. E.F.'. 
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and squadrons and photographic sections and to develop and promulgate to them new 
f d · ·lb ·99 ways 0 con uctmg aena 0 servation. 
The Americans kicked off their first offensive on 12 September 1918, quickly 
crushing the St. Mihiel salient, a victory only somewhat devalued by the fact that the 
Germans there were already in the midst of a retreat to more defensible positions. A 
week later, the AEF launched its even more ambitious Meuse-Argonne Offensive 
which lasted until the Armistice on 11 November. Much greater movement and 
manoeuvre characterized both of these offensives than had been the case for most of 
the war to date. 
With increased manoeuvre came differences in the business of aerial 
reconnaissance. It was found that while observation aircraft in a quiet sector could 
often provide their own protection, this was not true in an active sector where pursuit 
units must be brought in. This made the execution of reconnaissance operations more 
complicated. IOO There were dramatic changes in the immediate tactical support of 
frontline units. In a development that signified the death of cavalry, in literally the 
last few days of the war the Air Service developed the idea of 'cavalry 
reconnaissance' patrols. Low-flying airplanes would observe the terrain immediately 
in front of American infantry, looking for enemy positions that were likely to retard 
the American advance. They would drop word of these to American troops or simply 
machine gun the enemy themselves. 101 
99 Maurer Maurer, ed., The US. Air Service in World War I, Volume J: The Final Report and 
a Tactical History (Washington, 1978), p. 237. For examples of the wing promulgating 
guidance downward see Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 7, documents such as HQ Corps 
Observation Wing to Chiefs of Air Service of I, IV, V Corps, August 31, 1918; and HQ Corps 
Observation Wing, "Note on Observers Reports and Dropped Messages", September 1, 1918. 
100 F. P. Lahm, to c.A.S., AEF, 17 August, 1918, Benjamin Foulois Papers, Box 9, Folder 11, 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Hereafter LOC. 
101 Frank, American Air Service Observation, pp. 359-360. See also Gorrell History, Series 
C, Volume 13, John C. Sharrick to K. P. Littauer, Chief of Air Service, 3rd Corps; Howard T. 
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There were further changes. Artillery reglage against fixed targets became 
less relevant as there were fewer fixed targets on which to fire. On the other hand, the 
problem of 'fleeting' or 'fugitive' targets came to the fore and the Air Service devoted 
a great deal of attention to means of spotting these targets and then quickly passing 
the data to artillery batteries assigned to fire on them. 102 In theory, each division 
attempted to keep an observation aircraft equipped with a radio flying over its zone of 
attack in 'continual' radio communication with the division command post and 
designated artillery units. 103 However, observers never made themselves fully 
comfortable with this exotic piece of gear. Even in the final weeks of the war, some 
observers still preferred to drop messages even when a perfectly good radio was on 
104 board. 
With regard to aerial reconnaissance at greater depth, though during static 
warfare enemy units moved primarily at night, during the war of movement they often 
d · h d k' . . \05 had to move unng t e ay, rna mg reconnaIssance easIer. Unfortunately, even 
during the counteroffensive on the Marne in July 1918, movement was sometimes so 
rapid that that it was impossible to photograph the entire area in front of friendly 
forces. The staff could only direct photographic missions to critical areas. The AEF 
also found that while they could learn aspects of the enemy's organization from 
Douglas, 'Operations Order for November 4th, 1918',3 November 1918. In addition, Maurer 
Maurer, Vol. I, p. 254. 
102 Porter, p. 155. 
103 'Air Service Anny Corps 1 st Corps Obser. Group,' n.d. [1919?]. Gorrell's Air Service 
History, Series C, Volume 12. pp. 5 and 10. RG 120 NARA. 
104 Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 12, Office of the Chief of Air Service, HQ 1 st Army 
Corps, AEF, 'Operations Order No. 16',3 Oct 1918; and Fred E. D'Amour, 'Memorandum to 
Observers', n.d .. See also Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 13, HQ Third Corps 
Observation Group, Operations Department, 'Operations Memorandum,' 10 October 1918. 
Maurer Maurer, The U.s. Air Service in World War I, Volume 1, p. 254. 
105 Frank, American Air Service Observation, p. 304. 
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photographic reconnaissance during static warfare, this was scarcely possible during 
106 the war of movement. 
Furthermore, during mobile warfare the situation on the ground changed so 
rapidly that timely transmission of intelligence was much more important than during 
static warfare. In IV Corps, the G-2, Joseph Stilwell, decreed that a dedicated 
telephone line would connect his shop to the BID at the Corps Observation Group so 
that he could most rapidly exploit the intelligence that flowed in. \07 On the other 
hand, after the war, another school of thought held that the Air Service should report 
its information directly to the G-3 during times of rapid operations and not have to 
filter it through the G-2. \08 
Through much of 1918 the AEF had struggled to find an efficient method of 
providing the necessary photographic coverage. Into the summer, the system was 
largely one of 'individual reconnaissance' applied in a 'more or less haphazard' 
fashion. Given the cost and danger inherent in aerial photography this was a poor use 
of resources. So, by mid-July, the Photographic Section began to argue for a more 
systematic approach that would allow a sector to be 'entirely and systematically 
covered at frequent intervals' .109 Though the AEF made great strides, this turned out 
to be easier said than done. Not only did manoeuvre make such efforts problematic, 
but also the weather did not cooperate during the AEF's great offensives. 
One of the key pre-war arguments against the utility of aircraft had been that 
they would be unable to conduct reconnaissance during bad weather, in contrast to the 
106 Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 15, GHQ AEF, 'Notes on Recent Operations: Air 
Service', March 1919, p. 56. 
107 Unsigned memo from N Corps G-2, to Chief of Staff, 7 September 1918, Stilwell Papers, 
Box 8, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA. Hereafter HIA. 
108 Gorrell History, Series A, Volume 15, F. P. Lahm, to Chief of Air Service AEF, 6 January 
1919. 
109 Gorrell History, Series G, Volume 1, Memo for the from Captain R. J. Steichen to Chief of 
the Air Service, 12 July 1918. pp. 193-194. 
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cavalry. This turned out to be only partly true. Particularly during the Meuse-
Argonne offensive, the squadrons, pressed by the corps intelligence staffs, would 
launch photographic reconnaissance missions against the highest priority targets even 
when it seemed unlikely that the weather over the target would be favourable, so 
valuable had photographic intelligence become. I 10 However, it turned out that non-
photographic visual reconnaissance could be done in all weather conditions save 
downpours and low fog. III During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the Air Service 
kept observation aircraft in the air in front of friendly forces constantly as long as the 
weather permitted. The Air Service boasted that it was able to keep the enemy 
1 d '11' 112 'constant y un er survel ance. 
* * * 
Before the war, there was less discussion of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in 
the professional literature than there was of aircraft. Wagner's brief note that spies 
could use a pocket instrument to tap telegraph cables was about as sophisticated a 
level as such discussion reached. I 13 There was correspondingly little tangible 
preparation in the Army or Navy to conduct SIGINT operations, though some ad hoc 
operations took place. The US may have tapped some Spanish cables out of Cuba 
during the Spanish-American War and in 1898 the Naval Attache in St. Petersburg, 
William Sims, who later commanded US naval forces in Europe during World War I, 
claimed in a letter home to have tapped 'an underground wire' in St. Petersburg 
Russia 'with excellent results' .114 Not surprisingly, codebreaking received 
110 Frank, American Air Service Observation, pp. 352-353. 
111 Maurer Maurer, The US. Air Service in World War I, Volume J, p. 243. 
112 Gorrell History, Series C, Volume 12, 'Air Service Army Corps 1st Corps Obser. Group', 
n.d. [1919?]. Maurer Maurer, The us. Air Service in World War I, Volume J, p. 252. 
113 Wagner, Service a/Security and Information, p. 188. 
114 Crumley, The Naval Attache System, pp. 118-119. 
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comparably little attention, although in 1901 Frederick Funston famously deciphered 
a captured letter to Filipino guerrilla leader, Aguinaldo. It requires a close reading of 
his account to discern that this feat had nothing to do with his subsequent capture of 
A . ld 115 guma o. 
Even the outbreak of war in Europe did little to change this. In 1916, the 
Army internally published a useful but rather nai"ve small book on solving military 
ciphers by infantry officer Parker Hitt, a cipher enthusiast. Cipher work, Hitt warned, 
was not for someone who expected results at once. Rather, it required 'concentration 
and quiet' for long hours. To his credit, he recognized that because the enemy might 
use the same cipher on widely separated parts of the 'zone of operations', each Field 
Army should have a single cipher office in its headquarters intelligence section. 
Nevertheless, Hitt's vision was far too modest, suggesting a lack of knowledge of 
what was transpiring in Europe. 'One radio receiver' with a 'small antenna' and three 
operators would suffice to provide the office with material to work on, he thought. 
Assuming the enemy was not 'exceedingly vigilant' and did not 'change keys and 
methods frequently', 'in a few days', this office would be able to read all enciphered 
intercepts 'with practically no delay'. Unfortunately, the Germans were already 
proving 'exceedingly vigilant' and the book's focus on ciphers did not match the 
German Army's tendency to rely on codes at the tactical level. 116 
Starting in 1916, when it acquired enciphered materials (usually dealing with 
Mexico), the War Department would send these documents to those few people who 
knew something about codes and ciphers with requests that they send the solutions 
back as soon as possible. These included Hitt~ Joseph Mauborgne, a signal officer; 
115 Funston, Memories of Two Wars, pp. 389-390. 
116 Parker Hitt, Manualfor the Solution of Military Ciphers, (Fort Leavenworth, 1918), pp. 2-
3. For the inadequacy ofHitt's book, see Moorman, 'Wireless Intelligence', 13 February 
1920, NARA, RG165, Entry 65, 10560-328/168. 
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and a professor of English at the University of Chicago named John Manly.117 The 
War Department received additional cryptanalytic help from an eccentric millionaire 
named George Fabyan who had established the 'Riverbank Laboratories' not far from 
Chicago and staffed it with a small team of people to investigate the theory that 
Francis Bacon had written Shakespeare's works. I IS The foremost mind on Fabyan's 
staff belong to William Friedman who was to playa major role in American 
intelligence history. I 19 Fabyan even employed a retired sergeant to drill his 
employees. 120 In March 1917, as America edged towards war, he offered his 
laboratory's resources to the US Government. Soon the War Department was routing 
documents collected by itself, the State, Justice, and Navy Departments to the 
121 laboratory. 
Clearly, such ad hoc measures were unsatisfactory. So Major Ralph Van 
Deman, the head of the MID, cast about the Army and found three officers reasonably 
conversant with code and cipher work. These were Hitt, Mauborgne, and Frank 
Moorman of the Coast Artillery Corps. None was available, however. 122 The answer 
presented himself in the form of a volunteer, Herbert O. Yardley, a State Department 
117 For examples of correspondence with Hitt, Mauborgne, and Manly, see NARA RG 165, 
Entry 65, File 10020. Manly's papers are at the University of Chicago. Additional Manly 
papers are in the William Friedman papers at the Marshall Foundation, Lexington, VA. 
During the war Mauborgne, working with AT&T invented the only literally unbreakable 
cipher system, the 'one-time pad'. 
IlS For a discussion from a literary perspective of the origin of the Baconian Theory and its 
ultimate implications for cryptology, see Henry Veggian, Mercury of the Waves: Modern 
Cryptology and Us. Literature, (unpublished doctroal dissertation, University of Pittsburgh), 
2005, pp. xiv-xv and 78-91 
119 Years later Friedman achieved fame by overseeing the breaking of Japan's PURPLE code 
before World War II. Frank Rowlett and his immediate associates however, did the actual 
cryptanalytic work. 
120 Fabyan to Van Deman, 20 April 1917, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10020-2. 
121 See David Kahn, Reader of Gentlemen 's Mail: Herbert 0. Yardley and the Birth of 
American Codebreaking, (New Haven: 2004), pp. 22-27 for an account of the Riverbank 
Laboratories. 
122 MID History, p. 474. 
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code clerk, who received a lieutenancy in July 1917. 123 Van Deman put the young 
man in charge ofMI-8, a new code and cipher shop, where he proved himself a quick 
study and an able administrator. For its part, the US Navy made a brief foray into 
signals intelligence, but found the field too difficult. The hapless officer in charge 
spent some months in early 1918 trying to read a large collection of coded German 
messages as cipher messages, 'naturally an unremunerative work', the poor man 
recalled afterwards. 124 Before long, ONI assigned an officer to work with MI-8 and 
otherwise abandoned the field. Thereafter, it would pass its intercepted messages to 
J:'. d . 125 MID lor ecryptlOn. 
Slowly, MI-8 grew in size and capability. Among other people, it hired John 
Manly, who became Yardley's right-hand man, and the former helped bring two other 
Chicago faculty and two former Chicago graduate students (one who had studied 
under him) into the organization. 126 By May 1918, the War and State Departments 
stopped sending intercepts to Riverbank, ostensibly over concern about Fabyan's 
excessive enthusiasm for publicizing (and sharing with the Japanese) sensitive 
information, but really because they no longer needed Fabyan's services. 127 
MI-8 received enciphered materials from a variety of sources. The AEF in 
France forwarded to it diplomatic and other enemy signals, both collected by its 
intelligence organizations and passed to it by the Allies, that did not appear to be of 
123 See Kahn, Reader o/Gentlemen 's Mail, pp. 20-21 and 28-31 for an account of Yardley's 
commissioning and his early steps to establish MI-8. 
124 H. E. Burt, 'A Summary of the Organization, Activities, and Achievements of the Code 
and Cipher Section of [the] Military Intelligence Division', November 1918, NARA, RG 38, 
Entry 98, File F-6-d, 1 1466-C. 
125 For examples, see Naval Communication Service to MIS War College in January, 
February, 1918 in NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, Files 10531-137/26, 10531-163/3, 10531-169/2. 
Some regular reports from ONI's liaison officer to MI-8 are in NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, File 
F -6-d 11466-C. 
126 Kahn, Reader o/Gentlemen 's Mail, p. 30. 
127 Ibid, p. 27. On the secrecy dispute, see several documents filed under NARA, RG 165, 
Entry 6510020-192, NARA RG 165, Entry 65 
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immediate relevance to the fight in France. It also received signals from the Navy, 
from the State Department, especially acquired by the department's intelligence 
liaison officer in London, Edward Bell, who had a remarkably close relationship with 
Admiral Hall and his Naval Intelligence Division, Britain's SIGINT powerhouse. It 
also got 'unbelievably great' amounts of ciphered materials from the censorship of 
international mail (most of it relating to 'clandestine love making') and from the 
Navy's censorship of cables. Law enforcement and concerned citizens also sent in an 
'enormous' number of 'aimless and meaningless scribbles' found in telephone booths 
that were 'sufficiently unintelligible' that they looked like spy cOdeS. 128 
Finally, the War Department itself operated a highly clandestine Radio 
Intelligence Service that mostly collected communications emanating from Mexico. 
Buried within MI-l 0, which was otherwise responsible for censorship, this 
organization started operating in late February 1918 and operated mobile 'radio 
tractors' along the Mexican border and two clandestine stations, one in Mexico 
itself-some evidence suggests it was at the US Embassy-and another in Houlton, 
Maine. The latter pulled down long-haul German messages, particularly between 
Berlin and the German embassy in Madrid. 129 During the last year of the war and the 
128 John Manly, 'IX', p. 3 and 'XI', pp. 1-2, Friedman Papers, Item 811, ML. 
129 Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, p. 199. Kahn, Reader of 
Gentlemen's Mail, p. 39. A brief oral history with an intercept operator from a radio tractor 
unit is at Egolf, Richard Egolf, Radio Intelligence on the Mexican Border, World War I: A 
Personal View, (n.1., n.d.), 
http://www.nsa.gov/about!cryptologic_heritage/center_ crypt_ history/publications/radio _intel 
mexican_border.shtml. Campbell to MID, 12 June 1918, NARA, RG 165 Entry 65,10531-
372/2 mentions a receiving station in the US Embassy in Mexico. American Embassy Mexico 
Military Attache, '4th Supplement Work and Activities of the Military Intelligence Branch 
from June 22 to June 29,1918', NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-717 says 'the radio 
intelligence officer stationed in Mexico City as Military Attache has reported for duty, and is 
engaged in installing his apparatus'." '5 th Supplement...June 30-July 6, 1918', at the same 
location similarly notes 'the radio officer in Mexico City has reported the system employed in 
many of the Radio Stations. There were One Hundred messages intercepted during the week 
and turned over to the Military Attache, who in tum forwarded them to this office'. The 
'office' in question may have been MI-l. 'Weekly Supplement...for the Week Ending August 
17, 1918' says 'the radio sub-section received ... from Radio Officer in Mexico City 168 
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subsequent six months, MI-8 decrypted 10,735 electronic and written messages in 
numerous systems. 130 Not infrequently, MI-8 was able to do the decryption because 
the State Department or other components of the MID had acquired the relevant code 
book for them. These might be obscure commercial codes or purpose-made 
government codes. 131 Sometimes these other organizations clandestinely acquired 
coded messages which made their way to MI-S. For instance, both former President 
Alfredo Gonzalez Flores of Costa Rica and Miguel R. Avila\32, an exiled former 
private secretary of Mexican President Venustiano Carranza de la Garza, turned over 
cryptographic materials from their respective countries to the US Government. 133 
Besides MI-8, the other locus of cryptanalytic effort was in the AEF. When 
Pershing arrived in Britain in June 1917, his small staff included only two officers to 
do intelligence: Dennis Nolan, who would become his G-2 and Arthur Conger, who 
became the head ofG-2-A, the 'positive intelligence' component ofG-2. A round of 
visits to French and British intelligence organizations impressed on Nolan the 
importance of an 'intense and unremitting' signals intelligence effort and moved him 
to establish G-2-A-6, the Radio Intelligence Section at the end of July. 134 Unable to 
intercepted messages in Spanish, code, and English and information of value in regard to 
Chapultepee and unknown station "JE'''. 
13°Churchill to Chief of Staff, 'Permanent Organization for Code and Cipher Investigation and 
Attack', 16 May 1919, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10994-20. 
131 Commercial codes were sold to provide a modicum of privacy to commercial telegraphic 
communications and, often more importantly, a substantial compression of the message. 
Compression made the telegrams much less expensive to send. 
132 It is not clear if this is the same Miguel R. Avila who a decade later sold sensational but 
forged documents about anti-American activities by the Mexican government to one of 
William Randolph Hearst's reporters. See Ferdinand Lundberg, Imperial Hearst: A Social 
Biography, (Westport, 1970), pp. 284-285. 
133 'Special Employee' to C.E. Breniman, Esq., Special Agent in Charge, San Antonio, 
Texas' no date but entered into the War Department files 28[?] March 1918, NARA, RG 165, 
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342/5. Nicholas Biddle to Chief, MID, 28 May 1918, 10531-342/6. 
134 Nolan, 'History', p. 119, USAMHI. 
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get Hitt or Mauborgne to head the office, he took Frank Moorman, which was why 
the latter was unavailable when Van Deman started looking shortly thereafter. \35 
Moorman and the nascent G-2-A-6 spent their first three months in 
consultation with the Allies and the Signal Corps, which would do the actual 
interception work. 136 In the fall of 1917, the AEF opened the first of what became 
five intercept stations.137 Soon a fire hose of data opened, the likes of which had 
never before been seen by an American military staff. In their roughly one year of 
operation, the five intercept stations pulled 72,688 German messages out of the air, 
some 200 per day.138 This did not count the stations set up to intercept long-range 
German transmissions. 139 Nor did it count intercepts given to the AEF's G-2 by the 
French and British allies. The head of the French military cryptologic bureau 
estimated that the French intercepted some 100 million words during the course of the 
war, though how much of that they passed to the Americans is unknown. 140 Even if 
only a tiny fraction of that data made its way to the Americans, it would have been a 
substantial amount of data in itself and American and French forces did enter into a 
variety of arrangements for the exchange of raw intercepts. 141 Nor did this total count 
the intercept stations operated by the divisions, or the data from the four intercept 
stations supporting the 'Security Service', a component ofG-2-A-6 that monitored 
135 Nolan, 'History', pp. 120-121, USAMHI. 
136 'Final Report of the Radio Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, 
American Expeditionary Forces, 1918-1919' p. 15, NARA, RG 457, Entry 9002, Box 12. 
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Section, General Staff General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, (Washington: 
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141 See RG 120, Entry 105, Box 5767, Folder 'Correspondence - Capt. Hitchings File 520'. 
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American communications for purposes of communications security.142 Finally, it did 
not include the data coming from the "listening stations," which monitored German 
(and, for security purposes, American) telephone communications when the front was 
sufficiently stable, and whose operations seemed to one officer, not in the signals or 
d . h b' t' h' 1 ' 143 code an CIP er us mess, 0 verge on t e mlracu ous . 
This flood of data was greater than G-2-A-6 could handle. In principle, 
Moorman's men might have tried to break into all German codes, but this would have 
been a slow process and the Germans would have changed codes faster than they 
could be broken. Instead, at any given time Moorman concentrated his manpower on 
a few German codes hoping to break into them quickly and thus extract intelligence 
data before it got too old to be tactically useful. 144 
The tension between war and technology certainly manifested itself for the 
military application of the radio. 145 The efficient way for a commander in the AEF to 
promulgate an order was to transmit it en clair by radio. This, however, must often 
mean the thwarting of that order by the enemy, if the British estimate that the 
Germans intercepted 75 percent of everything transmitted was at all correct. 146 The 
effective way entailed a cumbersome encrypting of the order for transmission and 
then decrypting at the other end. This introduced delays and required the training and 
maintenance of numerous code clerks who might otherwise be in the infantry, or not 
142 'Final Report RIS', p. 30. Kahn gives the number of Security Service intercept stations as 
four. Codebreakers, p. 331. 
143 See Ernest H. Himichs, Listening In: Intercepting German Trench Communications in 
World War I, (Shippensburg, 1996) for the memoirs of a participant in these intercept 
operations. 'Final Report, RIS', p. 33. Edward Alexander Powell, The Army Behind the 
Army, (New York, 1919), p. 16. 
144'Final Report, RIS', p. 7. 
J4S For an enunciation of essentially this argument in a British context, see John Ferris, 'The 
British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-1942', Intelligence and 
National Security, 5:2, (1990), pp. 256-257. 
146 See, ego 'American Three Letter Code, Survey by General Staff, B.E.F., Section 
Intelligence E (c)', June 30,1918, NARA RG 120, Entry 105, Box 5763, Folder 'US Codes-
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even on the government payroll. It also required a staff to compile and regularly 
replace code books. Of course, the Germans were potentially subject to the same 
inefficiencies, but in order to inflict these inefficiencies on them (and thereby also 
gain valuable intelligence), the Americans and their allies had to train and maintain 
large cryptanalytic staffs, as well. 
Scholars have observed that during World War I civilian experts influenced 
and modernized the business practices of the Army.147 Similar effects manifested 
themselves with the influx of intelligence personnel which affected both the practices 
and culture of the Army. By November 1917, G-2-A-6, flooded with intercepts, 
started a frantic manhunt for personnel. Eventually, the unit grew to 72 people. 148 
However, men were needed the likes of whom had seldom before graced an army in 
the field. Code and cipher work required special people with unusual, even eccentric 
abilities and inclinations. Back in Washington, Yardley felt that ideally men would 
have 'cipher brains', but where were such men to be found?149 In Europe, Moorman's 
consultation with the British and others led him to hypothesize that, while preferably 
one would find men who had experience working with codes and ciphers, men of any 
age would be adequate if they had 'spent their lives studying hieroglyphics, cuneiform 
characters and the like'. The idea was to get men 'familiar with the workings of the 
human mind and capable of long hours of close thinking even when no results are 
obtained'. The British further advised that advanced age should not be an 
impediment.15o Moorman also thought that the ability to think independently, not 
then a traditional military skill, was essential. He was surprised at how difficult it was 
147 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America, (Baltimore, 
2001), p. 31. 
148 Nolan 'History', pp. 122-123. Kahn, The Codebreakers, p. 333. 
149 Yardley, American Black Chamber, p. 69. 
150 Moorman, 'Notes on Personnel Required by Radio Intelligence Service, A.E.F.', no date 
[1917], NARA, RG 120, Entry 105, Box 5765, unlabelled folder. 
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to find men capable of' actually thinking without a guardian' . 151 Poor eyesight was 
also no impediment and at least one woman was recommended for service in G-2-A-
6, although it did not act on the recommendation. 152 
Actual hiring practices reflected the British advice. Yardley hired, among 
others, a scholar of Chaucer, a professor of Latin whose usual work was identifying 
sources of error in medieval manuscripts, a classicist, and an authority on Hittite. 153 
The AEF's finds included two lawyers, a reporter, a music critic, a polyglot architect, 
a chess expert, and an amateur archaeologist. It even found two men with prior 
experience working with codes, one of them William Friedman-himself originally 
trained as a geneticist-who topped off the triumph of professional staffs over 
patriotic civilian enthusiasts by escaping Shakespeare and Bacon and shipping out for 
154 France. 
Yardley found that even in the comfort of Washington some cryptologists 
could not stand the nervous strain of the painstaking code and cipher work.IS5 Not 
surprisingly, then, in France, Moorman soon realized that: 
The real code man, the one making original solutions, has a difficult 
task. He must fix his mind absolutely on the work in hand. Ifhis feet 
are cold, ifhe is hungry or thirsty or ill, if the office is noisy, if the 
light is bad, ifhe is wondering what became of his bedding roll during 
lSI 'Final Report RIS', p. 15. 
152 Churchill to Fabyan, 28 June 1918, NARA RG 165, Entry 65, 1 0020-175( 13).; also 
Fabyan to Van Deman 22 March 1918, 10020-174(1). Powell to Nolan, 25 Feb 1918, J. 
Rives Childs Collection, Randolph Macon College Library Special Collections, Ashland, VA, 
Box 'WWI Papers V.I.'. Hereafter RMC. 
153 Kahn, The Reader of Gentlemen 's Mail, pp. 29-30. 
154 Kahn, The Codebreakers, p. 333. For similar discussions from the immediate post-war 
period of the speci~1 types .ofpeople nece~sa~.r0r code and ciph~r ,",:ork and their rarity in the 
Army, see Churchill to Chief of Staff Subject Permanent Orgamzahon for Code and Cipher 
Investigation and Attack," May 16 1919, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, Box 3862, 10994-20; 
and Frank Moorman, to DMI, 2 December 1920, NARA RG 165, Entry 65. This document 
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the last move or what kind of a billet he will get after the next one, his 
work is certain to suffer.156 
Given these considerations, the cryptologists should not be too close to the 
front lines. On the other hand, they should not be too far in the rear as then it would 
take too long to get raw intercepts. A place was found for them at General 
Headquarters intelligence section where, in the words of another, the 'quiet 
atmosphere remind[s] one of the work of an office in time of peace' .157 
The code and cipher men required special treatment in other ways, as well. 
The finicky eccentrics of G-2-A-6 found that the translations services offered in G-2 
were not adequate. They had to translate captured German documents dealing with 
codes and communications themselves, because only they had the necessary 
combination of the linguistic and technical knowledge. 158 They even required their 
own code to communicate about their work. 159 
The investment in G-2-A-6 paid off. The Germans liked using radio and it 
proved a valuable source of intelligence. Communications intelligence played an 
important role in helping tactical commanders in France to understand their 
adversaries' intentions and force dispositions. Occasionally intercepted signals would 
provide political or strategic information of use to commanders in France. More 
often, such intercepts benefited leaders in Washington, and MI-8 usually processed 
the Gennan signals thought most likely to contain such information. Nolan found that 
signals intelligence was much more valuable and much more "interesting" than 
156 Frank Moonnan to Chief, G-2-A, 'Jan 2 1919, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, 
Folder 'Report ofG.2-A'. 
157 Nolan 'History', p. 122. N. N. Golovine, 'Cavalry Reconnaissance', CJ, 31 :127 (April, 
1922), p. 184. 
158 Frank Moonnan to Chief, G-2-A, Jan 21919, NARA RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 
'Report ofG.2-A'. 
159 'Special Code for Use Between Second Section (G-2,A-6), First Anny Headquarters and 
Second Section (G-2,A-6), General Staff, n.d., NARA, RG 120, Entry 105, Box 6699, Folder 
'Administrative Duplicates' . 
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espionage work. 160 He discovered, for instance, that as many as two thirds of the 
identifications made by the British and French of German divisions on the other side 
ofthe trenches were owed to signals intelligence. 161 Some staff officers outside the 
G-2 came to value the SIGINT take above all others. 162 
At lower levels, the Germans primarily used codes and decryptions of these 
provided warning of raids, impending barrages, and other useful information. 163 At 
higher levels, the Germans tended to use ciphers. They used the famous ADFGX 
cipher, for instance, to communicate between corps and their divisions. The few keys 
that the Allies, mostly the French, were able to recover provided valuable information 
about German intentions and movements during the Second Battle of the Marne. The 
'Fuer God' cipher, sent from the German radio station at Nauen, near Berlin, was 
found to contain communications to a detachment of the German General Staffs 
Political Section which was trying to foment anti-Allied feelings among the Arabs of 
North Africa. 164 In 1918, the German high command began to use a variant of the 
ADFGX cipher to communicate with elements in Constantinople, Ukraine, the 
Caucasus, and the Balkans. A key recovered by the Americans allowed the 
decryption of a message providing advance knowledge of the German withdrawal 
from Romania. Within two days the decrypt was in the hands of the Supreme War 
Council, the group of British, French, American, and Italian senior military 
representatives formed in 1917 to oversee war strategy. 165 
160 Nolan, 'History', p. 118. 
161 Ibid, p. 119. 
162 See Lee West Sellers, untitled typescript, J. Rives Childs Collection, box 'WWI Papers V. 
1', RMC, for one sueh testimonial. 
163 For examples see 'Final Report, RIS', p, 20, 
164 The Americans called this the 'Fuer God' cipher because all the messages they intercepted 
were addressed to a German unit with the call sign 'GOD', The Allies knew this cipher more 
formally under the name 'Wilhelm', 
165 For an extensive discussion of the content and the cryptographic details of the attacks on 
these various cipher systems, see J. Rives Childs, 'The History and Principles, of German 
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Decrypted messages could be popular with old-line officers, though these 
officers often wondered why G-2-A-6 wasted so much time decrypting worthless 
messages, but G-2-A-6, going to new heights of military abstraction, could glean 
more than this from German messages. 166 Goniometry, or 'direction-finding', as it is 
now known, was a useful source of information, too, given that radios were typically 
associated with German headquarters. The Americans learned that tracking the 
location ofthese stations could give clues about enemy's force lay-down and 
intentions. 167 Goniometrists also took note of enemy call signs and which radios 
transmitted to which other radios and in what volume over time. 168 Such information, 
they found, could help determine the organization of the German forces and give 
clues as to impending attacks. 169 To an outside officer writing after the war, this kind 
of intellectual feat exceeded even those of Sherlock Holmes. 170 
The extraction of this information, however, entailed great intellectual effort 
and a never-ending struggle with the Germans. Just as there is a dynamic relationship 
between air forces and air defenders, and between tanks and anti-tank forces, these 
relationships tilting to the advantage of one then to another, so too there has long been 
a relationship between the cryptographer and the cryptanalyst. Manly observed in this 
context that 'every new invention in war brings its counter-invention' .171 During 
World War I, the balance between the two tipped crazily back and forth in a 
Military Ciphers, 1914-1918', Paris, 1919 in J. Rives Childs Collection, Box 'WWI Papers V. 
5', unlabelled folder, RMC. 
166 Moorman, 'Lecture delivered to the Officers of the Military Intelligence Division, General 
Staff, 13 February 1920, NARA, RG 457 Entry 9032, Box 1, Document 17. 
167 'Final Report, RIS', p. 32. ChiefG-2-A to AC ofS G-2, GHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA 
RG 120, Entry 74 Box 6199, Folder "Report ofG.2-A." 
168 Though it was not then recognized as a separate discipline, today this is known as 'traffic 
analysis'. 
169 [redacted], 'The Origination and Evolution of Radio Traffic Analysis: The World War I 
Era', Crypto!ogic Quarterly, 6:1, (1987), pp. 21-40. This document was obtained from the 
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171 John Manly, 'Supplementary to 1st 3 arts', Friedman Papers, Item 811, ML. 
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remarkable tight cycle. In general, the challenge of extracting content information 
from German signals became greater and greater as the war went on, and it was only 
through strenuous intellectual effort that the Americans and their Allies stayed in the 
game. 
Three factors determined the security, and the longevity of the security, of a 
cryptosystem: the intrinsic qualities of the system; the amount of encrypted text 
available to the enemy; and the extent of operator error. l72 The Germans seemed 
remarkably disciplined in their use of codes and ciphers. They eventually began 
changing call signs every day, eschewing any kind of observable system in their 
application. They also started using lateral communications across unit boundaries, 
complicating efforts to determine their command structure, though the real network 
usually 'showed up clearly' during very active periods. Equally troublesome, the 
Germans progressively restricted their use of the radio. In 1918, they began to use 
low-power transmitters and directional antennas. They even discussed the idea of 
using deceptive communications, though it is not clear that they ever did so. As a 
result of all these factors, G-2-A-6 found that the 'by the end of the war very little 
could be done in the way of solving their code messages' .173 
During World War I, the United States sometimes faced the dilemma of 
whether it was better to intercept an enemy's communications to one's own benefit, 
but, in the process, allow the enemy to continue his own operations, or to stop the 
enemy from communicating entirely, thus foregoing any intelligence advantage but 
172 William F. Friedman, 'The Use of Codes and Ciphers in the World War and Lessons to Be 
Learned Therefrom' , in War Department, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Articles on 
Cryptography and Cryptanalysis Reprinted/rom The Signal Corps Bulletin. (Washington: 
GPO, 1942), p. 195. For a similar formulation see Lee West Sellers, untitled typescript, n.d., 
J. Rives Childs Collection, Box "Box: WWI Papers, V. 1', RMC. 
173 G-2-A-6, 'Report on the Liaison Service and the Liaison Intelligence Service of the 
German Army', n.d., NARA, RG 120, Entry 105, Box 6700, Folder 'Report on the Liaison 
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impeding the enemy's operations. It arose primarily in the context of strategic, 
. . . I d " 174 dIplomatIc, or esplOnage-re ate commUnIcatIons. 
The United States had faced this problem before in the context of signal 
intelligence's close cousin, telegram censorship. However, American officials had 
not then realized that there was a dilemma. During the Spanish-American War, the 
Signal Corps reviewed outbound telegrams. Messages of 'treasonable character' they 
mined for data and then destroyed. 175 They did this seemingly without pondering the 
fact that they might have alerted the enemy to the fact of interception and thus 
motivated him to engage in deception. 
However, during World War I, the Americans were conscious that they faced 
a dilemma. This time intelligence intruded directly on operations. In London, Ned 
Bell came down firmly on the side of reading the enemy's communications. 
'Personally, I have always considered', he wrote in the context of mail censorship, 
'that it made no difference what the enemy said or did if one was in a position to 
know it oneself. In fact, the more freely they are able to communicate the better 
provided you can find out what they say' .176 
Thus, when in early 1918 Bell was (erroneously) informed that Admiral Sims, 
the U.S. naval commander in Europe, had requested that the State Department make 
the Spanish government shut down the German radio station in Madrid, he cabled 
back in alarm that the Department should 'discreetly take such steps as may be 
necessary to prevent the occurrence of any such catastrophe'. 177 Precisely those 
communications were of great value to Hall's Naval Intelligence Division. 'You 
174 For a brief discussion of this topic with regard to the major belligerents, see [redacted], 
'Comint and Comsec: The Tactics of 1914-1918-Part II', Crypt%gic Spectrum, Fall, 1972, 
pp. 10-11, obtained from the National Security Agency through the Freedom ofInformation 
Act. 
175 Giddings, Exploits, p. 116. 
176 Bell to Harrison, 20 June 1918, NARA, RG 59, Entry 350, Box 5, File 121. 
177 London Cable 8705,16 February 1918, NARA, RG 59, Entry 350, Box 4, Folder 103. 
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realize, of course ... that the thought of the Madrid source being blown upon always 
causes more or less of a ba1100n ascension in these parts from which I am not, 
perhaps, wholly immune," he wrote to Washington by way of explanation a few 
weeks later when the matter had been sorted out. 178 
A few months later the issue arose again when a conference on 31 May 1918 
of Army and Navy officers met in the office of the Director of Naval Communications 
to discuss the powerful German radio station at Nauen which was thought to be 
transmitting to clandestine German agents in the Western Hemisphere. They raised 
the question of whether it was better to jam the Nauen broadcasts or copy the 
messages and hope to break the cipher. The question was complicated by the fact that 
the MID had thus far been unable to break the cipher, but on the other hand if the US 
started jamming the signals the Germans might retaliate by jamming AEF radios in 
France. The conference recommended that these questions be taken up at a 
forthcoming meeting of the Inter-A11ied Radio Commission in Paris. Leland 
Harrison, the State Department's intelligence coordinator; Yardley; and, in London, 
Admiral Hall; all agreed that Nauen should not be jammed. The proper arrangements 
were soon made behind the scenes. I 79 
178 Bell to Harrison, 6 March 1918, NARA, RG 59, Entry 350, Box 4, Folder 103. It is well 
known that the British NID shared intercepts from the Berlin-Madrid communications link 
with Ned Bell. Less well known is the fact that the French shared similar information with 
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Washington. The difference was that the French refused to tell him how the data was 
acquired, even when the Attache brought a specific request for that information from the 
American Chief of Naval Operations. 'History of the Office of the United States Naval 
Attache, American Embassy, Paris, France, during the period embraced by the participation 
of the United States in the War of 1914-1918, pp. 197-199, 'FDR Papers as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920', Box 2, Folder 'Official files, Navy Department: Attaches 
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Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. Hereafter 'History of Naval Attachc, Paris' 
andFDRL. 
179 London 450,20 July 1918; State 349, 24 July 1918; 'Report of a Conference Between 
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31 May 1918; all in NARA, RG 59, Entry 350, Box 5, File 117. See also Jonathan Winkler, 
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Before the US entered the war, W.S. Pye had written that in combat 'the 
advantage given to a force by early accurate information makes manifest the necessity 
of denying information to the enemy' and, in a broader sense, the hunt for spies 
during every war was a validation of the same idea. IRo However, during this period 
the United States Army, Navy, and State Department had not matched this theory to 
their cryptographic practices which, in fact, were lamentable. Despite the fact that 
foreign countries were known to have Black Chambers, the US Government gave 
little consideration to the fact that this meant that their communications might not be 
private, and there was scant respect for the need to have good codes and ciphers. The 
State Department seemed perpetually to be losing code books. The Spanish were 
reported to have a copy of the Department's main code before the Spanish-American 
War, but the Department did not change the code. The Germans once even returned 
to the US Consulate in Leipzig a code book they had found. When the US and the 
Ottoman Empire severed relations in 1917, the Department gave the Swedes there a 
copy of its 'Blue Code' for safekeeping and then continued using that code on cables 
181 to Stockholm. 
The War Department was little better. Yardley was appalled when in 1917 a 
veteran of the 'old Army' (Friedman alleged that it was George O. Squier, former 
attache in London and future Chief Signal Officer) scoffed at the cumbersome modem 
cryptographic procedures. The veteran explained that a simple superencipherment, 
merely adding the number 1898 to all the code groups (which the Spanish probably 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University), May, 2004, p. 175. 'Book I. 
Supplements of the Work and Activities of Military Intelligence Division Containing First 
Supplement for Week ending Aug 31, 1918','M.1. 8, Codes, Ciphers, and Secret Writing', p. 
2, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-717. 
180 W. S. Pye, 'Intelligence Service in Peace and War', 1913, p. 4, RG 8, XING, Accession # 
1913-186, NHC. 
181 David Paull Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy, 
(Cambridge, 2003), pp. 171-172. 
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knew already), had been sufficient in his day.182 While this may have been an 
extreme case, the general lack of interest in communication security was not 
uncommon. The Department had consciously developed its 1899 code to emphasize 
economy, not security. It developed no new code at all between 1906 and 1915 and 
the new one in 1915 was quite weak. The US Army did have two crypto systems for 
low-level traffic when WWI broke out. One was based on principles known since 
1500. The other was a system copied from the British who had used it for many years 
before the war. 183 Yardley's concern was well-founded. The Army had never made 
communications security a priority. Not long after MI-8 was organized in 
Washington, it learned that the Germans had 'copies' of the 1915 code book and were 
able to read the cables being sent back by Pershing and General Tasker Bliss, the 
American representative on the Supreme War Council. MI-8 set to work compiling a 
new and better one. This was completed in July 1918 but another element of the 
Army almost immediately misused it in such a way that a new one had to be prepared, 
a task which was not completed until after the Armistice. 184 During the war itself, 
even the MID field offices in the United States were lax in their protection of War 
d 185 Department co es. 
Wartime files abound with warnings and complaints of poor American 
cryptographic practices from signal intelligence personnel who knew precisely the 
advantages to be gained by breaking into an adversary's crypto systems. John Manly, 
for instance, complained to Leland Harrison in mid-1918 that the representative of the 
Committee for Public Information (CPI) in Petro grad was using an egregiously 
182 Yardley, American Black Chamber, p. 17. For Friedman's handwritten comment, see the 
hand annotated copy of American Black Chamber, p. 42 in the William Friedman Papers at 
the Marshall Foundation. 
183 Wayne G. Barker, ed., The History o/Codes and Ciphers in the United States Prior to 
World War I, (Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press), 1978, pp. 118-133. 
184 MID History, p. 479. 
185 Buck to Dunn, 4 February 1919, NARA RG 165, Entry 65,10560-152/89. 
108 
insecure cipher system, perhaps under the influence of a recent ill-informed article in 
Scientific American about the unbreakable nature of the system. He pleaded with 
Harrison to prevent such 'criminal' negligence from going on with future overseas 
missions.186 On another occasion, MI-8 deciphered two mysterious messages sent to 
them by the State Department that that turned out to be from CPI agents in Russia. 
One had been enciphered with the keyword 'blackbread', the other with 'cabbage 
soup,.187 In late November, 1918 Bell 'beg[ged]' Harrison to see that a new secure 
code was developed for the use of the American delegation to the Peace Conference 
and particularly for the use of the President in his travels. This was so necessary, Bell 
thought, because 'no code which we now have is worth the powder to blow it up' .188 
Up to this time, the intelligence officer had always stood in a subordinate 
relationship to the operator. At most, the intelligence officer offered advice to the 
operator as to what should be done. During World War I, however, the technological 
advances in the intelligence business began eroding that subordinate relationship. The 
code and cipher men began to dictate to the operators how they could issue orders and 
what they should be allowed to communicate over cables and through the airwaves. 
Unfortunately, modern cryptographic technology did not accommodate itself 
to the realities of human users. Rather, the humans had to accommodate themselves 
to the exacting requirements of the technology. A failure by a communicator to adapt 
his behaviour to the technology's demands would result in a garbled message ifhe 
were lucky. If he were unlucky, it would lead to the compromise of an entire system 
186 [Manly] to Harrison, 8 July 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10531-347/5. The article in 
Scientific American may have been Otto Holstein, 'A New Cipher', Scientific American 
Supplement, 14 April 1917, p. 235.i 
187 'Book I. Supplements of the Work and Activities of Military Intelligence Division 
Containing First Supplement for Week Ending Aug 31, 1918' ,'M.1. 8, Codes, Ciphers, and 
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and the deaths of friendly troops. G-2-A-6 was particularly aware of the finicky 
requirements ofthe technology because, according to one estimate, 75 percent of their 
success in breaking enemy code and cipher messages depended on the German 
operators making mistakes. 189 Even a radio or telegraph operator who followed all 
the rules precisely might still be identified by the personal quirks of his own technique 
if he did not tum himself into a living automaton. 190 
The first efforts at a cryptographic system for use in the front lines produced 
two sets of relatively simple code books the output of which was to be 
superenciphered. This superencipherment proved impractical for troops at the front 
and oflimited utility. So, a specially-formed Code Compilation Section (which 
reported to the Chief of Signals, not the G-2) took on the task. It produced a series of 
high-quality trench codes, an average of three per month for the last five months of 
the war. Whenever one code was compromised, G-2-A-6 would oversee its 
immediate replacement which took only about two days.191 To ensure their 
soundness, the AEF would submit codes to the British for a security evaluation. 192 
The code and cipher men had little trouble convincing the senior staff of the 
necessity of strict rules and regular replacement of code books. The French had 
already convinced Nolan of the necessity of good communication security, pointing 
out how the Russians had not heeded French warnings about the inadequacies of their 
IR9 Moorman to Conger, 21 March 1918. NARA, RG 120, Entry 105, Box 5761, Folder 
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codes. He concluded that 'when it is realized that our knowledge of the subject of 
codes and ciphers when we entered the war in 1917 was at least no better than that of 
the Russians in 1914, the very great importance of this subject to our Army becomes 
self-evident' .193 Notified of transgressions of the security rules, the AEF's Adjutant 
General wrote blistering memos. One to General Hunter Liggett, for instance, 
complained about 'criminal carelessness' in the use of codes by the First Army and 
demanded a 'rigid investigation' followed by courts martial of the officers who had 
furnished information of vital importance to the enemy' .194 Such memos had little 
effect, however, and seldom was anyone brought to account, leading Moorman in a fit 
of frustration to fantasize about hanging a few of the offenders pour encourager les 
autres. 195 So two days before the Armistice, alarmed by the continuing leakage of 
accurate data to the Germans, Moorman recommended the assignment to each 
division, corps, and army, of an officer to enforce uniformity of procedure. 196 
Nevertheless, the constant warnings that the enemy was always listening had 
some effect on some line officers. America's first use of Native American 'code 
talkers' was an ad hoc effort by line officers in the 36th Division who were convinced 
that the Germans were eavesdropping on every word they communicated. When in 
late October 1918, a dangerous tactical situation particularly required secure 
communications, clever officers pressed Choctaw soldiers into service in the radio 
197 
room. 
193 Nolan, 'History', p. 120. 
194 Adjutant General AEF to Commanding Generalist Army, 17 September 1919, NARA, 
RG 120, Entry 105, Box 5762, Folder 'Preparation of Codes and Ciphers File 240'. 
195 Kahn, The Codebreakers, pp. 331-332. 
196 Moorman to Nolan, 31 October and 9 November 1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 105, Box 
5762, Folder 'Preparation of Codes and Ciphers File 240'. 
197 Scattered evidence suggests that this innovation may have occurred elsewhere in the AEF. 
The Marine Corps and, to a much lesser extent, the Army, made major use of this technique 
during World War II. William C. Meadows, The Comanche Code-Talkers a/World War 11, 
(Austin, 2002), pp. 16-32. 
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* * * 
The implications for intelligence of the 'analog revolution' were profound. 
During World War I, modem realities-not least the need to cope with the 
vulnerabilities created by aerial reconnaissance and modem telecommunications and 
to inflict the corresponding vulnerabilities on the enemy-forced an increase of staffs 
and complexity within the Army. It became clear that intelligence was a peculiar 
discipline with its own finicky requirements and that its emerging high-technology 
sub-fields of aerial photography and 'code and cipher work' were fields unto 
themselves. If the essence of a modem bureaucracy is the creation of exclusive sub-
fiefdoms within the overarching bureaucracy, then this was what came to pass in the 
AEF staff. Nolan observed that each division of the general staff acted like it was in a 
'watertight compartment' oblivious to what was going on elsewhere. This tendency, 
he thought, was particularly strong in the G_2.198 The esoteric technical experts who 
came into intelligence during World War I contributed heavily to this separation. 
Technology, aerial reconnaissance and signals intelligence had led intelligence 
to penetrate the length and breadth of the AEF. G-2-A-6 had quickly realized that its 
work must be especially secret, yet its officers had also realized that they had to 
insinuate themselves into much of the work of the staff, the fighting forces, and even 
the allied staffs in all sorts of ways that were far removed from actual code and cipher 
breaking. The field had become so important, so broad, and also so deep, that, as one 
scholar has observed, the chiefs of the cryptanalytic offices of the period spent little if 
any time doing actual solutions themselves but instead were managers and 
. 199 
executIves. 
198 Nolan, 'History', p. 334. 
199 Kahn, The Codebreakers, pp. 348-349. For a discussion of the realization that code and 
cipher work must be more secret than other intelligence work, see Moorman, 'Lecture 
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In the case of aerial reconnaissance, its immediate applicability was usually to 
tactical commanders, so the task of immediate exploitation was pushed forward into 
the front-line units where the BIO's, once schooled in the fundamentals of 
photographic interpretation, came to know intimately their part of the battlefield. 
Nevertheless, aerial reconnaissance could have strategic implications as well, 
betraying the enemy's preparations for major offensives and indicating where the 
blows would fall. Thus, it was important to transmit the data up the hierarchy to G-2-
A-7. Signals intelligence was different. An enciphered message collected at one end 
of the front was likely to be in the same cipher system as one collected at the other 
end of the front. Therefore it only made sense to concentrate the code and cipher men 
at the highest levels of the staff. 
In 1917, the Americans were behind the best standards of the European 
powers when it came to the practice of intelligence. They had to catch up quickly if 
they were to contribute to the Allied effort and avoid being ruthlessly exploited by the 
Germans. This they were able to do. By the end of the war they did not have the 
leading technical intelligence capability in the world, but they were competitive with 
the leaders. In part, this is due to the fact that some Americans had done much 
thinking about intelligence and its implications (even though the military had 
implemented little ofthis thinking). It helped that this thinking had drawn heavily on 
European work. Thus, the Americans were thinking along similar lines as the 
Europeans. However, it is also due in part to the fact that two of the most important 
tools of the intelligence officer in World War I existed, ifat all, in extremely 
embryonic form in 1914. The Europeans in 1914 could scarcely be expected to have 
facility in them as they were new technologies. So it was easy for the US to follow 
delivered to the Officers of the Military Intelligence Division, General Stafr, 13 February 
1920, NARA, RG 457 Yardley Papers Entry 9032, Box 1, Document 17, NARA. 
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closely in the European wake. It is perhaps fortunate that the United States awoke 
from its military slumber in the earliest days of the technological revolution of the 
early twentieth century when it was relatively easy to catch up. 
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Chapter 3 
A New Kind of War: Intelligence at Home 
Counter Espionage, as conducted by the ... MID, was predicated upon 
the necessity a/maintaining thorough and continuous cover a/the 
whole country, in both the civilian population and the military 
establishment. 
-MID Official History, 19191 
Another driver of intelligence change was the expanding nature of warfare 
itself. The Great War was a total war of entire national systems to an extent that no 
war before it had been and this placed unprecedented demands on intelligence 
systems. Belligerents now thought that their adversaries could affect every aspect of 
the modem all-encompassing military system by means of spies, saboteurs, and 
propagandists. The enemy might bring about dissension, revolution, the violent 
overthrow of the American government, or even, as one officer fretted, a limitation of 
armaments.2 Defeatism and pernicious propaganda loomed large in the worries of the 
armed services. Some officers thought that the development of propaganda as both an 
offensive and a defensive weapon was fully comparable to the development of the 
aeroplane.3 Others thought the problem even more dramatic. General Pershing, for 
instance, attributed the crushing Italian defeat at Caporetto in the fall of 1917 to 
socialist propaganda. Concerned lest such a catastrophe befall his forces, he urgently 
wired the War Department recommending that MID engage in positive domestic 
1 MID History, p. 87. 
2 C. H. Mason, 'The Doctrine and Practice of General Staff Intelligence', lecture delivered at 
the General Staff College, Washington, 230ctober 1919, Leroy Yarborough Papers, Box 2, 
Folder 'MI Division, US Army General Staff, History, Work and Activities, Organization and 
Function', USAMHI. 
3 'Conference of US Military Attaches at the Hague 16-19 July, 1919, inclusive', RG 8, 
Accession 1991-372, XINA, NHC. 
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propaganda as well as counter-propaganda efforts and encourage similar efforts by 
other government agencies and public figures such as preachers.4 
Pershing found a ready audience in Washington where there were rampant 
concerns about espionage, subversion, and sabotage in the continental United States. 
Indeed, the classified 1919 official history of the MID observed that the war: 
was not fought by the military forces alone. There were economic, 
psychologic [sic], social, political, and even literary forces engaged, 
and it was essential, in order to defeat the enemy, to understand fully 
the strength of each .. .It was equally necessary that we throw every 
possible safeguard about our own preparations for war and discourage 
enemy agents who in one way or another attempted to lower our 
morale, damage our industries, or debauch our soldiers. We had to 
look to the foe within as well as to the foe without.5 
It was a 'truism' that 'war is carried on not only with military but also with 
economic weapons', the MID's manual for military attaches noted in December 
1918.6 Elsewhere the MID opined in the sort oflanguage that would soon come from 
the mouths of strategic bombing enthusiasts that 
as the success of armies depends more and more on the scale on which 
their preparation, equipment and reinforcement are conducted at home, so 
the enemy in seeking to destroy the base of the army, attacks the army at 
that distant point by the grand strategy ofpropaganda .... The propagandist 
threatens to cut [an army] off from its base, to stop the flow of 
reinforcements, supplies, ammunition, equipment, food, comforts, and 
above all, to weaken the moral support that sustains the troops in the 
hardships and cruelties of war far from home.7 
4 Nolan, 'Comments', p. 137. Perhaps inspired by concerns similar to those of Pershing in the 
wake of the battle of Caporetto, Infantry Journal after the war published an article by the head 
of the Bureau of Investigation,: William J. Bums, 'Combating Propaganda', Infantry Journal, 
20:6, (June, 1922), pp. 599-603. 
5 MID History, p. 3. For a similar statement of purpose from the Director of Naval 
Intelligence at the time, see Roger Welles, quoted in A.P. Niblack, The History and Aims of 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, (Washington, 1920), p. 16, RG 8, Box 71, Folder 3, NHC. 
6 'Manual for the Military Attaches,', December 1918, Section II, 'Appendix to Section II, 
Part 2', NARA, RG 165, Entry 65 10560-993. 
7 Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, General Staff, Propaganda in its Military 
and Legal Aspects, (Washington, n.d. [1918]). pp. 2-3. 
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Both the Army and the Navy agreed that saboteurs had to be kept away from 
vital defence industrial facilities. s With subversion on the march and German-
Americans forming a large percentage of the American population, the services for 
the first time decided that they needed a bureaucratized process to ensure the loyalty 
and reliability of their officers, men, and civilian employees. All this required an 
extensive bureaucracy, devoted to 'negative intelligence'. In addition, even as the 
war was under way, the US Government evinced substantial concern over domestic 
manifestations of Bolshevism and similar radicalism. Given the Bolshevik revolution 
of 1917 and the strength of the International Workers of the World in the United 
States, the threat did not seem to be one to be taken lightly. 
In short, then, during World War I, the Army and Navy involved themselves 
directly and deeply in domestic surveillance, counterintelligence, counterespionage 
and counter-sabotage to a degree unique in American history. The contrast with 
previous American experience was stark. During the Spanish-American War, the 
Secret Service, part of the Treasury Department, had stepped into the breach of 
domestic security and counterintelligence on its own initiative.9 After a few early 
successes however, President William McKinley transferred this responsibility to the 
War Department. 10 However, the Department had neither the personnel nor the 
inclination to carry out the function and refused to use Army officers as investigators, 
so it subcontracted the work right back to the Secret Service. II In the course of the 
war, the Secret Service received a great number of tips from the general public, most 
of them, according to the head of the Service, based on 'trifling suspicion'. In most 
cases its operatives merely found that some American had been 'injudicious in their 
8 See MID History, pp. 1129-1161 for a discussion of the MID's plant protection efforts. 
9 John E. Wilkie, 'The Secret Service in the War', in The American-Spanish War, pp. 423-
425. 
10 Wilkie, The American-Spanish War, pp. 426-428, 430-436. 
11 Jensen, Army Surveillance in America. p. 79. 
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conversation, or ... too outspoken in their friendship for Spain'. These cases it 
dropped. Only when individuals expressed an intention to act against the United 
States should the occasion arise did the Government act. Usually a mere warning that 
the government was watching was sufficient to resolve the issue. 12 
While the Secret Service handled approximately 1000 cases during the entire 
Spanish-American war, by the time World War I ended, ONI alone was handling 
15,000 domestic cases a week. \3 Why this dramatic shift? Historians have probably 
focused more attention on domestic security than on any other American intelligence 
issue of that era. However, their studies have not brought to bear the full set of 
approaches available to historians of intelligence. As a result, explanations to date for 
the flourishing of domestic intelligence remain unsatisfyingly thin. 
There are three predominant approaches to intelligence history. Some 
scholars focus on intelligence as a tool of foreign and defence policy, others attend to 
its role in domestic security, while still others study the role of intelligence services in 
the system of state oppression. 14 Though many scholars have written about the 
changes and expansion in American intelligence during the war, the lion's share of 
their work has dealt with domestic surveillance and approached the question from the 
second and third perspectives. IS Typically these authors are centrally concerned with 
12 Wilkie, The American-Spanish War, p. 429. 
13 Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, pp. 117. 
14 Len Scott and Peter Jackson, 'The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice', 
Intelligence and National Security, 19:2, (Summer 2004), p. 141. 
15 For examples, see Theodore Komweibel, Jr., Investigate Everything: Federal Efforts to 
Compel Black Loyalty during World War I (Bloomington, 2002); Joan M. Jensen, Army 
Surveillance in America, 1775-1980 (New Haven, 1991); and Roy Talbert, Jr., Negative 
Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917-1941 (Jackson, 1991). Charles H. 
McCormick, Seeing Reds: Federal Surveillance of Radicals in the Pittsburgh Mill District, 
1917-1921 (Pittsburgh, 1997). Further, see Joseph W. Bendersky, The "Jewish Threat": 
Anti-Semitic Politics of the U.S. Army (New York, 2000), especially Chapters 1 and 2 and 
Mark Ellis, Race, War and Surveillance: African Americans the United States Government 
during World War I (Bloomington, 2001), especially Chapters 4 and 5. See also Wray R. 
Johnson, 'Black American Radicalism and the First World War: The Secret Files of the 
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civil liberties and the threat that the American military or intelligence services pose(d) 
to them. Their works often examine these questions of civil liberties through lenses 
such as labour history, the history of leftist radicalism, of African-Americans, or of 
Jews. Their standard narrative describes domestic surveillance by the intelligence 
services, particularly those of the military, as an effort by racist, reactionary and 
ruling classes to oppress the little man. 
There is much to be said for this body of work. Both MID and ONI sought out 
upper class officers who were unlikely to be particularly sympathetic to the 
marginalized portions of American society. General Marlborough Churchill, who 
succeeded Colonel Ralph Van Deman as head of the MID, noted that in putting 
together an organization to do 'counter-spy' work, Van Deman had consciously 
recruited almost exclusively from 'the class which, for want of a better term, may be 
called the "best citizens of the community"'. This decidedly did not include private 
detectives (not an upper-class profession) because they had 'low ethical standards'. 
'It is difficult to describe a "best citizen"', Churchill admitted, 'but if we think of him 
as a man of standing in any given community who has much to lose if he "goes 
wrong"; who stands for law and order and good government, and who puts the 
interests of the country above political or personal interest, we shall have a fair 
picture' .16 ONI brought a similar class of people to bear in its counterintelligence 
work, some of them golf or tennis buddies of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin 
I 17 Rooseve t. 
Military Intelligence Division', Armed Forces & Society, 26: 1, (Fall 1999), p. 27-54; and 
Robert C. Cottrell, 'Roger Nash Baldwin, the National Civil Liberties Bureau, and 
Intelligence During World War 1', Historian, 60: 1 (Fall 1997), p. 87-106. 
16 M. Churchill, 'The Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff, 4 
September 1919, p. 2, File 57-35, Army War College Curriculum Archives, USAMHI. For a 
similar view on detectives see, Martin, 'Selection of Operatives' , 7 November 1918, 10560-
328/130, NARA RG 165, Entry 65. 
17 Dorwart, Office o/Naval Intelligence or DNI? (City. Year) pp. 108-112. 
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The people who worked in the New York offices of the MID and ONI 
exemplified this approach. The MID chief in the New York office was a deputy New 
York City police commissioner, Nicholas Biddle, a Harvard man from a family of 
bankers. In 1916, ONI looked to a civilian, Spencer Eddy, also a Harvard man, to set 
up their office in New York City. Eddy found office space on Wall Street which he 
leased 'naturally at my own expense'. One member of Eddy's unit was Ralph 
Pulitzer, the newspaper magnate and son of the man who established the Pulitzer 
P · 18 nze. 
As sound as they may be, however, these class- and race-centric assessments 
of military domestic intelligence typically give short shrift to the actual military 
context of the military's actions. In particular, scholars seldom seek any deep 
understanding of the military's beliefs about how domestic surveillance fitted within 
the context of the broad field of 'negative intelligence' (today's 'counterintelligence') 
nor how that field related to warfare generally or contributed to the defeat of the 
enemy. They merely lament the application against dissident Americans of a tool 
properly meant to combat foreign agents. In truth, however, most intelligence officers 
saw foreign agents and dissident Americans as merely different coins in the same 
system of military currency. 
Accordingly, this chapter assesses the expansion of American intelligence into 
the counterintelligence realm specifically in the context of modern war. The increase 
in domestic surveillance was a result of a particular understanding of how modern war 
worked and, in fact, the military did not merely engage in such activities among the 
civilian population at home, but also abroad in their own forces and even within 
18 Hunnewell, Hollis H., History and Anecdotes of the New York Branch of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, (New York, n.d.), n.p. See also entries for Biddle, Eddy, and Pulitzer in 
Frederick S. Mead, ed., Harvard's Military Record in the World War (Boston, 1921). 
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France to the extent possible. Of course, it is not coincidental that when the military 
turned its gaze to the continental United States, unpopular social and political groups 
suffered, but oppressing those groups was not itself the point of domestic surveillance. 
Beyond the military implications already mentioned, the importance of 
tracking down the enemy's spies and agents, be they foreign intelligence officers or 
dissident Americans, also followed from the understanding that in war, 'knowledge is 
power' .19 This theme showed up repeatedly in American military writings before 
World War 1. Information made a military more formidable in battle, so the lack of 
communications could be more serious to a navy than' inferiority in ships'. 20 Good 
intelligence could help compensate for the inadequacy of America's coastal 
defences. 21 Arthur Wagner had maintained that the 'commander will be victorious 
who has the best secret service' .22 Given the importance of information, it was 
. d . h 23 imperatIve to eny It to t e enemy. 
Denying information to the adversary seemed to be a particularly important 
task when facing the Germans. An unrealistic respect for German intelligence 
capabilities was built into the very genetic material of American military intelligence. 
Wagner had complained about the 'Prusso-Maniacs' who idolized everything about 
Prussian military science. Prusso-mania led to an unrealistic view of what the 
prussians could do in the field of intelligence. In 1896, for instance, the head of the 
MID lauded the 'perfection of the intelligence bureau of Germany' which 
19 John M. Ellicott, USN, 'Naval Reconnaissance in Time of Peace', Proceedings of the 
United States Naval Institute, 27:3, (1901), p. 579. George P. Scriven, The Transmission of 
Military Information, (Governors Island, 1908), p. 13. 
20 George Owen Squier, "The Influence of Submarine Cables Upon Military and Naval 
Supremacy", Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, 26:4, (December, 1900), p. 
602. 
21 Charles C. Rogers, USN, 'Naval Intelligence', Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, 9:27 
(1883), p. 677. 
22 Wagner, The Service of Security and Information, pp. 181. 
23 Howard A. Giddings, Exploits of the (Kansas City, 1900). 
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immediately took note of 'each and every change and important movement 
throughout the world affecting the military and political status of all organized 
governments,.24 Such views conditioned American expectations about the extent of 
the German espionage effort in the US. For instance, initially it was an obj ect of faith 
that the Prussian spymaster Wilhelm Stieber had deployed enormous numbers of 
spies, including some thirty thousand or more on French territory during the Franco-
Prussian War, so it only made sense to look for the same phenomenon in the U.S. and 
in the French rear area after the AEF deployed.25 ONI carefully retained a copy of a 
1901 report from the Military Attache in Paris which reported that: 
There exists in the Naval Intelligence Office in Berlin a book entitled 
'Coast Defence Book - United States' .... The book consists of 
navigating coast charts of every harbor or place of military interest on 
the coast; the location of each battery and its armament, of dock yards, 
arsenals, etc., is clearly marked on them in red ink, with such brief 
notes as to the best means of attack, local conditions, etc., as a man of 
war would find it useful to have ... In most cases, sketches and 
photographs and often more minute descriptions are attached to the 
chart so that the commander could recognize by eye the thing whose 
location was shown on his map ... This book [is] about 30 x 40 inches 
large and 15 or 20 inches thick .... Each ship which might be sent to our 
coasts thus has all ready the information it needs. 
The attache's only caveat was, 'naturally I have not seen [this book], but there is no 
doubt in my mind whatever as to its existence'. 26 
These concerns were persistent. The War Department reported in mid-1918 
that the General Staff was quick to appreciate America's relative weakness when the 
country: 
24 Vincent to Secretary of War, 13 October 1896, NARA, RG 165, MI024, MIC639/ (file not 
further specified). 
25 For wartime references to Stieber and his legions of spies see, e.g.: Military Intelligence 
Branch, Executive Division, General Staff, Propaganda in its Military and Legal Aspects, p. 
6; "Memorandum for Captain Hunt", 16 January 1918, NARA RG 319, Entry 'CMH 
Background Papers', Box 52C, No folder name. Roger Welles, 'German Espionage System', 
August 1918, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, File U-I-J, 9919. 
26 US Military Attache, Paris to Adjutant General of the Army, 6 September 1901, NARA, 
RG 38, Entry 98, File E-6-A, 02/36. 
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found itself pitted against a nation that had developed military 
intelligence in all its branches to a degree far surpassing any other 
similar organization known to history. The capacity for patient 
painstaking effort, which the German has developed as his heritage, 
had served him well in this task. For two generations, with the 
determination of making wars for conquest, he had winnowed with 
minute care every grain of information concerning every possible 
enemy.27 
During 1917 and 1918, the default assumption was that there surely must be 
spies everywhere. All the major agencies agreed on the point. General Kuhn, the 
head of the War College Division, warned in the spring of 1917 that 'we know that 
[the Germans] have already established here a very complete and efficient espionage 
service .... Agents are found all over the country and in every walk of life of our 
population. They are also to be found in our military service, not only in the ranks of 
the Army, but in our offices, arsenals, and munition plants,.28 This view, though it 
evolved and eroded over time, remained substantially intact for the duration of the 
war. Hence, the head of ONI during the war thought that probably every factory in 
the US had 'at least one paid agent of the German Government who kept that 
Government informed of everything that was going on. There is no doubt that even in 
the departments at Washington, German agents were at work at all times' .29 'Every 
[Army] camp has its share of organized spies', advised an Army intelligence officer in 
1918.30 The 1919 authorized history of the quasi-official American Protective League 
(APL) put the number of German spies at 250,000 to 300,000.31 Given these apparent 
facts, it would have been astonishing ifupon America's entry into the war the 
services-regardless of the political views of their officers-had not insisted that a 
major effort be put into domestic counter-espionage. 
27 Draft of' Annual Report of the Military Intelligence Branch for the fiscal year ending 30 
June 1918', n.d., RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-111(1). 
28 Joseph E. Kuhn to the Chief of Staff, 15 June 1917, NARA RG 319, MI024, 639-154. 
29 Niblack, History and Aims, p. 16. 
30 Fisher, 'The Number One', 6 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-328/127. 
31 Emerson Hough, The Web, (Chicago, 1919), pp. 58, 89, 94-95. 
124 
Not only were the methods of war expanding, but the Germans were at the 
forefront of expanding the methods used by intelligence services in support of the war 
effort. The War Department found as the war went on that 'the Germans were 
practically the first people, apparently, to adjust their intelligence work so as to 
recognize the unity of the modem state and to employ, directly or indirectly, all sorts 
of commercial, political and economic organizations for governmental intelligence 
, 32 purposes. 
These ideas even penetrated the consciousness of President Woodrow Wilson 
who was by no means a military theorist. The idea of a broad form of warfare 
appeared in many of his most important speeches, including his speech in April 1917 
asking Congress for a declaration ofwar.33 In this speech, he complained that the 
Germans had planted spies throughout American communities and in the U.S. 
Government. He elaborated on this theme in his Flag Day speech of 1917, where he 
once again described the German transgressions that had forced the United States into 
war. In order, they were: the introduction of 'spies and conspirators' into the United 
States; the dissemination of seditious ideas and pro-German American propaganda to 
Americans, particularly by German diplomats; industrial sabotage and economic 
warfare; inciting Mexico and Japan to go war against the United States; and attacks on 
American shipping. He concluded the passage not with reference to the numerous 
Americans who had died at German hands, but by noting that 'many of our own 
people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with suspicion 
and to wonder whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not 
32 MID History, p. 1640. 
33 Ibid. 
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lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms?,34 In 
these various speeches, it is likely that he had in mind the case of an American 
journalist from New York who in late 1916 agreed to spy for the Germans against the 
British. George Bacon, was caught by the British and only saved from a firing squad 
in the Tower of London by American intervention. In exchange for a reduction in his 
sentence to life imprisonment, Bacon testified against his German handlers, by now 
arrested in the States, who were convicted and sentenced to two years hard labour. 
The court handed down the Germans' sentences a mere week before Wilson asked for 
the declaration of war. In its deliberations over war, the House of Representatives 
considered a report from the Foreign Affairs Committee that discussed German 
malfeasance in the United States, including revolutionary propaganda, instigation of 
strikes, passport fraud, and sabotage.35 
The U.S. Government was unaware of the travails of the German intelligence 
services, probably because of its own lack of experience in the field. This meant that 
American imaginations could run wild. The American Ambassador to Germany was 
so afraid of spies within his own embassy and the State Department itself that he 
34 Woodrow Wilson, President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses (New York, 1918), p. 
413. For similar themes in Wilson's speeches, see his state of the union address of December 
1915, pp. 150-152 and his speech to Congress in April 1917 asking for a declaration of war, 
pp.379-380. The Flag Day speech resonated broadly with the American public and the 
president's close adviser, Colonel House, predicted that Germany would 'be centuries freeing 
herself from the indictment', Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 3 
(Boston: 1928), pp. 137-138. An annotated version of the speech published at the behest of 
the Committee for Public Information was printed in numbers of some 6.8 million. George T. 
Blakey, Historians on the HomejYont: American Propagandists for the Great War 
(Lexington, 1970), pp. 43. For similar themes in Wilson's speeches, see his state of the union 
address of December 1915, pp. 150-152 and his speech to Congress in April 1917 asking for a 
declaration of war, pp. 379-380. 
35 MID History, p. 1640. Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized HistOlY of 
MI5, (New York, 2009), pp. 73-75. According to Andrew, Roslyn Whytock, another 
American journalist recruited at the same time as Bacon, volunteered to work as a double 
agent for the British and thus escaped serious consequences. Indeed, he eventually later 
became a captain and served the U.S. Government as the MID's port control officer in New 
York. For an additional brief mention ofWhytock's MID career, see Gene Fowler, Skyline: A 
Reporter's Reminiscence of the 1920s, (New York, 1961), p. 260. 
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communicated directly by courier to the President when a particularly sensitive 
diplomatic issue arose.36 In March 1917, Van Deman and Leland Harrison, the 
intelligence coordinator at the State Department, agreed that the Germans maintained 
a card file with an entry for every officer in the US Army, including an assessment as 
to whether the officer could be bribed. Through unspecified apparently clandestine 
measures Harrison actually acquired two of these cards, one of them with 
biographical data on Dennis Nolan, who would soon be named General Pershing's 
. 11' h' f 37 mte Igence c Ie . 
In practice, then, Americans considered espionage to be hostile activity 'other 
than by a military force' carried on outside the territory occupied by the enemy. This 
included the collection and transmission of information; 'the transmission of money, 
material and supplies'; propaganda or the encouragement of disloyalty or discontent; 
and sabotage or the 'immobilization of resources' .38 
When the World War broke out in the late summer of 1914, the Americans did 
not immediately come to the conclusion that a new kind of war had arrived.39 This 
realization arrived only slowly during the more than two and a half years that Europe 
was in flames and the United States stood aside. The United States, under the 
leadership of Wilson and his pacifist Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, kept 
the country out ofthe war arguing that it was Europe's business, not America's. 
However, in an economic sense, the war very much became America's business. The 
36 James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York, 1917), pp. 253. 
37 Correspondence between Van Deman and Harrison, March 1917, NARA RG 165, Entry 
65,9793-67,9793-75 and 9793-77. Van Deman, Final Memoranda (Wilmington, 1988), pp. 
42. 
38 Wrisley Brown, lecture delivered to the officers of the Military Intelligence Division, 
General Staff, 19 December 1919, NARA, RG 165 entry 65, 10560-328/111. 
39 Except as otherwise specifically noted, this discussion of the German espionage and 
sabotage campaign in the United States is drawn from Tracie L. Provost, The Great Game: 
Imperial German Sabotage and Espionage against the United States, (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Toledo), May, 2003; and Michael Warner, 'The Kaiser Sows 
Destruction', Studies in Intelligence, 46:1, (2002), pp. 3-9. 
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British naval blockade of Germany rapidly made trade with that country next to 
impossible even as trade with Britain and France remained feasible. These latter 
countries had voracious appetites for a variety of goods from America, not least 
military materiel such as munitions and horses, appetites that American businessmen 
were more than happy to feed. Wilson, though determined to maintain the country's 
neutrality, was personally pro-British, so he did not intervene. 
The burgeoning transatlantic trade was a serious problem for Germany. In this 
greatest ever industrial war, that country did not relish the prospect of struggling 
against the industrial might of three great western powers, even if it only faced two of 
their armies in the field. When diplomatic protests did not change America's 
behaviour, the Germans turned to other measures. However, prior to World War One, 
the German military had not clandestinely collected intelligence in the United States, 
though its attaches painted for the General Staff an 'excellent picture' of the 
American Army.40 Because they had not made an investment during peacetime, when 
combat broke out in Europe, the Germans had to improvise their operations in 
America, building off of their Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff; military attache 
Franz von Papen; naval attache, Karl Boy-Ed; and Heinrich Albert, the commercial 
attache in New York.41 Through them, the Germans-General Staff lIIb under 
Walther Nicolai, the General Staffs Political Department, and the Admiralty-
launched several spy rings, though the emphasis before the US entered the war was 
really on sabotage, rather than intelligence collection. However, coordination among 
these rings was minimal. 42 
W. Nicolai, The German Secret Service, (London, 1924), pp. 106-107. Pohlmann, 'German 
Intelligence', p. 28. 
41 Pohlmann, 'German Intelligence', p. 37. David Traxc1, Crusader Nation: The United 
States in Peace and War, 1898-1920, (New York: 2006), pp. 159-160. 
42 Pohlmann, 'German Intelligence', p. 37. 
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First, in late January 1915, Germany cabled an order to its diplomats in the 
United States to conduct sabotage against 'every kind of factory for supplying 
munitions of war'. Second, in February 1915 Germany ordered its submarines to sink 
any ships, even those flying the flags of neutral nations, found in an exclusion zone 
around the British Isles. This second order led a few months later to the sinking of the 
liner Lusitania, an act which more than any other poisoned American public opinion 
toward the Germans. In particular, it enraged President Wilson who ordered the US 
Secret Service to expand its functions from protecting him and hunting counterfeiters 
to watching German diplomats. The Secret Service soon managed to steal the 
briefcase of a German commercial officer and inside it they found documents 
describing the sabotage campaign which was getting underway. 
When Germany decided to mount its campaign against the United States, it 
had no intelligence infrastructure in place there aside from the routine presence of a 
military and naval attache.43 The January 1915 cable that launched the German 
sabotage campaign named three people who could help the German military attache 
find local helpers. These individuals, one each in Philadelphia, Chicago, and New 
York, were all Irishmen, who had been nominated by the self-styled Irish 
'ambassador' to Germany, Sir Roger Casement. The Germans also dispatched a 
number of additional officers to the US to conduct such business. The most famous 
and enterprising of these was Germany Navy Captain Franz von Rintelen, who 
arrived in the United States in April 1915, bearing a Swiss passport. Drawing on a 
few interned sailors of German citizenship, as well as Irish-Americans, German-
Americans and other Americans who, though not necessarily sympathetic to 
Germany, had a gripe with the United States, notably African-American dock 
43 The German military attache was Franz von Papen who later became Chancellor of 
Germany and who played an instrumental role in Hitler's rise to power. 
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workers, the German agents cobbled together an extensive if less than fully effective 
campaign of sabotage. By December 1915, President Wilson was complaining 
bitterly about naturalized Americans 'who have poured the poison of disloyalty into 
the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good 
name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries ... and to debase our 
politics to the uses of foreign intrigue'. He told Congress that these 'infinitely 
malignant ... creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed OUt'.44 
The most famous incident of sabotage was the dramatic explosion engineered 
by three German saboteurs in July, 1916 at 'Black Tom', a pier in New York City 
stacked high with munitions meant for France and Britain. One hundred people were 
injured, three killed, and the authorities estimated the damage at $20 million. In 
January, 1917 the Germans arranged to set fire to a shell-packing plant in New 
Jersey. Thousands of people fled their homes as shells flew through the air. In 1915 
and 1916 some 36 ships were the targets of bombings or other forms of sabotage or 
attempted sabotage at the behest of German agents. Many other smaller incidents 
also took place. The Germans undertook other less traditional measures as well, 
experimenting with infecting livestock bound for France with glanders and setting up 
dummy companies to tie up war materiel that might otherwise have gone to France 
. • 45 
or Bntam. 
The Germans faced problems beyond their inability to coordinate their efforts. 
Germany's disadvantageous geography and the prophylactic efforts undertaken by the 
Allies had a crippling effect on its intelligence collection efforts in the Western 
Hemisphere. In fact, gathering intelligence information in America 'presented 
44 Woodrow Wilson, President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses, pp. 150-151. 
45 The glanders incident is the subject of Robert L. Koenig, The Fourth Horseman: One 
Man's Secret Mission to Wage the Great War in America (New York, 2006). 
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extraordinary difficulties', in Nicolai's words, though it was possible to get some 
information out of the US, albeit with substantial time lags. 
The route to America was barred in the West by England, France, and 
Italy in the East by Russia and Japan. The seas of the world were 
controlled by England, which exercised an almost inescapable 
surveillance over traffic. It was all but impossible to send Germans for 
espionage to America. There remained the attempt to get information 
from South America. But even to send trustworthy persons there was 
almost impossible, and was a success only in a few isolated cases. 
Communication from America presented the same difficulties. In 
these circumstances an independent service was created by pro-
Germans living on the American continent; but this was not to be 
compared with an organized information service; it was, on the 
contrary, dangerous in itself, as the sources of information were 
unknown in Germany and their trustworthiness could scarcely be 
. d 46 estimate. 
Moreover, when the United States declared war, most German saboteurs and 
spies, not willing to face the wartime penalties for their acts, fled the country.47 This 
was precisely the time when Germany most needed timely intelligence out of the U.S. 
However, as Nicolai dolefully recounted: 
The obstacles to German espionage in America increased ... Traffic on 
the direct route between North America and the Continent became 
quite impossible for German agents. All news obtained over the route 
via South America was henceforth outstripped by events and therefore 
worthless. The circumstances led to an almost complete abandonment 
of the costly attempt to keep up a secret service in America itself. 
There remained nothing more than to watch the American military 
forces from the moment when they landed on European soi1.48 
The net result was that, according to Nicolai, 'of all the belligerents America was the 
least threatened on her own territory by German espionage' .49 
Nevertheless, the German sabotage campaign was a wake-up call to some 
American officers. They saw the broadening of warfare and realized that this meant 
that intelligence had to broaden itself, too. They simply failed to perceive that the 
46 Nicolai, The German Secret Service, pp. 107-108. 
47 See, e.g. MID History, p. 1643. 
48 Nicolai, The German Secret Service, pp. 108-109. 
49 Ibid, p. 109. 
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actual threat of clandestine and covert activities in the United States had plummeted 
when the United States finally went to war. 
Morale and propaganda-the latter 'an act and method of war', the 'cheapest' 
and 'most efficient' weapon ever devised, especially against a country' governed by 
public opinion'-became matters of intense intelligence interest, though the MID 
lamented that judges and non-military personnel tended to overlook 'its direct military 
importance' because 'organized attacks on the psychology of peoples is [sic] too new 
a weapon of war to have penetrated the judicial mind as yet'. Moreover, the 
weakness of the laws pertaining to propaganda and subversion frustrated American 
officialdom at least until mid-1918.50 Thus, efforts by pacifists, Lutherans, 
conscientious objectors and others to impede conscription or argue against the 
continuation of the war directly served German military interests, as the MID saw it. 
Anyone 'who prevented the enlistment of one soldier, impaired his loyalty, prevented 
or delayed his arrival in France, hampered the supplies he required, or in any other of 
a thousand ways canceled that one man's usefulness to this nation, did as much for the 
Kaiser as the German soldier who killed an American in battle' .51 The Germans 
purportedly played upon American pacifists to such an extent that they became 
'unwittingly recruited' agents of the German cause. The military services thought 
that whispered tales of military disasters, atrocities, or the immorality of Red Cross 
nurses, or publicly voiced scepticism about the value of Liberty Bonds, could all 
strengthen the hands of the pacifists and encourage draft resistance. Even when it was 
impossible to demonstrate that such stories originated with the German government, 
50 Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, General Staff, Propaganda in its Military 
and Legal Aspects, pp. 1-2, 6. 'Book I. Supplements of the Work and Activities of Military 
Intelligence Division Containing First Supplement for Week ending Aug 31, 1918', 
'Conference Matters, May 23,1918', No. 61, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,105650-717. 
Hough, The Web, p. 55-57. 
51 MID History, p. 9. 
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they were 'no less dangerous for being of American origin'. S2 Finally, of course, 
weak civilian morale could also undermine the determination of the Army itself. S3 
The military also investigated a great many cases in which women were told by 
telephone or by anonymous letter that their son had died in France when, in fact, no 
such thing had happened. The military likened these attacks on civilian morale to 'air 
raids on peaceful towns ... and the big gun bombardment ofParis,.s4 
When such rumours or anonymous letters were aimed at African-Americans, 
as often happened-doubtless, the authorities thought, from a 'directing source'-this 
played on an additional fear in the hearts of the white officer corps which was 
definitely rooted in racism but whose potential military import was also substantial. ss 
Not only would the Army be called upon to help restore order in the event of 
widespread rioting (and many African-Americans now had military training and 
access to weapons), but the labour-hungry Army and Navy both depended vitally on 
African-Americans even if they formed a relatively small proportion of actual 
combatants. Similarly, one week before the war ended, an intelligence officer 
lecturing to the MID in Washington discussed the 'Negro soldier of the south, a fertile 
field' for trouble. He described rumours that had circulated, 'doubtless emanating 
from Germany', about how African-Americans were being abused in the AEF. He 
added that, 'there have been riots ever since the beginning of the war. Germany knew 
that it was part of her business, she knew the sore spots, she went into the south and 
52 Ibid, pp. 12-14. 
53 Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, General Staff, Propaganda in its Military 
and Legal Aspects" p. 3. 
54 MID History, p. 1333. 
S5 For an instance of such rumors, see 'Weekly Report of the Work and Activities of [the] 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION for the Week Ending 19 September 1918', Army 
War College Curriculum Archives, Records Section, File 117 -3B/3, USAMHI. 
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played upon that prejudice which existed between the Negro and the white race ... We 
have never had any real riots in the Negro camps, but we have been fearful ofthem,.56 
In short, during World War I, intelligence officers saw themselves as 
defenders of a country engaged in a life and death struggle with an enemy that had 
demonstrated a ruthlessly amoral inclination and an impressive ability to further its 
military aims through the use of tools not previously found in the military kit-bag. 
Dramatic and unprecedented measures were necessary to thwart his efforts. 
To the armed services, it appeared that two things needed to be done. First, 
the United States needed to secure its actual armed forces against propaganda, 
subversion, espionage and other such threats. Secondly, given the whole-of-society 
nature of warfare, the United States needed to stamp out such things in the broader 
American public, as well, while supporting the public's morale. Propaganda, 
subversion, sabotage, and defeatism, all could be threats to the military effort whether 
or not they were actually sponsored by Germany, though, certainly, the military 
tended to see the Kaiser's hand even when it was not present.57 
The Navy, which, unlike the War Department, had not previously 
disestablished its intelligence office, acted first. It took its first step in 1916 spurred 
by the sinking of the Lusitania the previous year. Despite his pacifist leanings, the 
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, ordered the preparation of a mobilization 
plan and also ordered ONI to 'arrange for securing information abroad as to the 
strength and movement of enemy forces. Plan and prepare now for a complete system 
of secret service'. These instructions led not only to the invigoration of naval 
collection activities abroad, but also to the establishment of a domestic intelligence 
56 'Lecture by Capt. Wagner. In Re: The Work Done Among Troops by Negative 
Intelligence;, 4 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-328/122. For a similar 
claim see 'Lecture by LT. Shields - II: On the Handling of Cases of Propaganda' ,8 
November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-328/132. 
57 MID History, p. 1837. 
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system. The Director of Naval Intelligence set up 'Information Services' in all the 
Naval Defence Districts. Each service was run by an 'aide for information' who 
would work with the U.S. Secret Service to set up an intelligence system, including a 
network of local informants who could be activated in the case of war. Also in 1916, 
ONI started establishing undercover 'branch intelligence offices' in major cities, 
beginning with New York. These it manned with civilians who later received reserve 
commissions.58 Needless to say, the fact that these major cities sometimes also 
housed aids for information led to problems in coordination.59 
The War Department was the more important player, however. As 
mobilization proceeded, its forces grew much larger and it bore the brunt of the actual 
fighting. Eventually, the MID grew far larger than ONI. As soon as the United States 
entered the war, Britain and France prevailed upon their new ally to organize itself 
quickly for counterintelligence. Less than two weeks after the declaration of war, 
Brigadier General Kuhn, the head of the War College Division, memoed to the Chief 
of Staff that the British and French governments would not allow American troops on 
their soil unless the War Department had taken steps to purge its forces of spies. This, 
Kuhn advised, required the immediate establishment of an organization to do the 
work.60 Two days later he reported that the British had offered to dispatch officers to 
help with counterintelligence work within the US Army.61 
The War Department soon acted. On 3 May, it created a Military Intelligence 
Section within the War College Division and made it responsible for military 
intelligence, espionage, counter-espionage and coordination with allied intelligence 
S8 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, pp. 102-103, 110. Wyman H. Packard, A 
Century of us Naval Intelligence, (Washington, 1996), pp. 250, 271-274. 
S9 O. W. Fowler, Memorandum for DNI, 29 March 1918, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, E-9-a, 
10670. Chief, ONI Section A, 'Section 'A' Report and Recommendations', n.d. [1919?], 
NARA, RG 38 Entry 98, F-6-d, I 1466-A, 
60 Joseph E. Kuhn to the Chief of Staff, 17 April 1917, NARA RG 319, MI024, 639-143. 
61 Joseph E. Kuhn to the Chief of Staff, 19 April 1917, NARA RG 319, MI024, File 639-144. 
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services in the US and abroad, placing it under Major (soon to be Colonel) Ralph Van 
Deman.62 Van Deman had served in the MID during the run-up to the Spanish-
American War under Arthur Wagner, the author of the first serious American book 
about intelligence. Whereas Wagner emphasized 'positive intelligence', Van Deman 
was a born 'negative intelligence' officer. As a captain he found himself in the 
Philippines, a leading figure in the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI) there, 
which was responsible for tracking down insurgents. Van Deman was a mixed 
blessing for the Army in the Philippines. He was an innovative officer, who 
maintained liaison with the intelligence sections of the local police services and got 
the best out of his officers in the field. On the other hand, he also led the DMI to 
waste a good deal of its effort investigating Japanese agents and nebulous 
conspiracies rather than the all-too-real enemy guerrillas.63 During World War I, both 
American and foreign colleagues invariably found him an impressive 'secret service 
leader'. His successor, at the helm of War Department intelligence, Brigadier General 
Marlborough Churchill, was always deferential to Colonel Van Deman and thought 
that he had 'a most remarkable foresight and knowledge of human nature,.M 
The mandate of the new section was not broad enough to satisfy Kuhn and 
Van Deman, however. By mid-May, Kuhn was urging the Department to think more 
broadly. He again wrote to the Chief of Staff, maintaining that the Government must 
take comprehensive action to prevent espionage, subversion and sabotage by enemy 
agents.65 These could be discovered as they attempted to enter the United States, or 
they could be rooted out once they were already in the country. Such 'negative 
62 Talbert, Negative Intelligence, p. 9. 
63 Linn, 'Intelligence and Low Intensity Conflict', p. 100. 
64 Edward Bell, untitled memorandum, 1 May, 1919, NARA, RG 319, Entry 350, Box 5, File 
121. M. Churchill, 'The Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff, 4 
September 1919, Army War College Curriculum Archives, File 57-35, USAMHI. 
65 Joseph E. Kuhn to the Chief of Staff, 13 May 1917, NARA RG 319, MI024, File 639-150. 
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intelligence' work would have to be conducted within the armed forces themselves by 
uniformed personnel. However, there would be a need also for 'civilian counter-
espionage agents who should be under civil control'. It would also be necessary to 
prevent the transmission of military information abroad. This would require cable, 
telegraph, telephone, wireless and other types of censorship. This work could be done 
by civilian agents in close touch with military authorities. 
Fortunately, Kuhn went on, the War College Division 'is at present handling 
matters of this character and has been since the beginning of the trouble on our 
Mexican border'. It had already started collecting information on German activities 
in the US, Hawaii, Panama, Puerto Rico, Philippines and the Americas generally. 
This had involved cooperation with ONI, the Bureau of Investigation, the State 
d · 1· d 66 Department, an vanous po Ice epartments. 
The laws against espionage, sabotage and propaganda were at best weak, 
however. This gave the various security services little authority and few tools to work 
with. However, in June 1917, Congress passed and President Wilson signed the 
Espionage Act. Its sweeping language accorded with the new, expansive 
understanding of war and gave the Federal Government wide latitude to pursue enemy 
agents and those who acted like them. Of course, the Act made the transmission to 
foreign agents of information about the national defence a felony punishable during 
wartime by death. However, it also made attempts to obtain such information with 
intent or reason to believe that it would be used to the detriment of the United States a 
felony. In addition, it made a crime of the loss through negligence of national defence 
information by those lawfully entitled to hold it. Finally, it swept up vast amounts of 
speech into its maw, making the utterance of false statements intended to interfere 
66 Ibid. 
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with the war effort, the promotion of refusal of duty, insubordination or disloyalty, 
and the interference with conscription or enlistment punishable acts. 
In the conduct of counterintelligence and enforcement of the Espionage Act, 
many agencies would have roles to play alongside the War Department. Only the 
War Department and the Navy looked at both the armed forces and civil society. 
Other important players, though they never focused on the military forces themselves, 
included the Treasury Department, largely through its Secret Service; the Justice 
Department largely through its Bureau of Investigation; and the State Department, 
through its Chief Special Agent, who often borrowed the services of agents from the 
Secret Service or the Bureau oflnvestigation. The Justice Department, indeed, struck 
hard at the supposed German spy apparatus even before the passage of the Espionage 
Act. Acting on the authority given by portions of the notorious Alien and Sedition 
Acts of 1798, which were found to be still on the books, it detained most male 
German citizens in the United States shortly after the declaration ofwar.67 
With so many players, there was great potential for confusion and chaos. 
Kuhn had held that while it was not necessary to have centralized control of 
counterespionage, 'although, doubtless, that would be desirable', it was vital to pool 
counterespionage information. 'All that is necessary is to establish a central registry 
for the purpose of entering and carding the information sent in, with a group of 
limited size which can consider and collate the information'. It seemed 'beyond 
question' that this registry should be held and analyzed by the military. Kuhn had a 
rationale for urging this centralization of functions beyond merely the aggrandizement 
of the War Department. The British General Staff controlled that country's espionage 
and counter-espionage services and had urged him to see that the American 
67 MID History, p. 1643. 
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equivalents fell under the American General Staff so as to facilitate cooperation 
between the two militaries.68 Kuhn also noted that a similar condition obtained in 
France and that the French General Staff would certainly also cooperate. 
The goal that soon developed in the MID was to create, in effect, one massive 
surveillance bureaucracy.69 This was not to be, however. In fact, the War 
Department was never seriously in the game. By early 1918, in fact, the Department 
of Justice had won a bitter battle with the Treasury Department which had offered 
itself or State as the hub for domestic counterintelligence activities. For the next 
several decades, the Justice Department would be the pre-eminent player in domestic 
. 11' 70 counter-mte Igence. 
Despite the wrangling, almost immediately upon the declaration of war the 
various intelligence agencies began discussing how to cooperate. In Washington, 
cooperation among Justice, the MID and ONI was adequate if not always enthusiastic. 
There was a weekly meeting among the heads of the Bureau of Investigation, the MID 
and ONI, all joined by John O'Brian, the Special Assistant to the Attorney General for 
Wartime Statutes.7! The agencies also exchanged liaison officers. The Justice 
Department also sent to the MID a weekly report, compiled at the MID's request, on 
the 'industrial situations' in areas oflabour unrest. For a time there was a system 
under which the MID, ON I, and the BOI would bring lists of new suspects and their 
corresponding files to the liaison officers' spaces in the Justice building for 
68 This characterization of the subordination of the British services was at the time and is still 
disputed. However, the explanation given to Kuhn is a reasonable one. At this time, the 
domestic service (later MI-5) and the foreign service (later MI-6) were subordinated at least 
administratively to the War Office. See Philip H. J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of 
Svying, (London, 2004), p. 40. 
6~ Ibid. 
70 John F. Fox, Jr., 'Bureaucratic Wrangling over Counterintelligence', Studies in Intelligence, 
49: 1, (2005), https:l/www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligcnce/csi-
~ublications/csi-studies/studies/voI49no 1 Ihtml_ fileslburcaucratic _ wragling_ 2.html. 
I MID History, p. 1278. 
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coordination. This system worked fairly well in Washington (at least until ONI 
withdrew its officer) but the three agencies still at times worked 'in a spirit of 
competition, not cooperation,.72 There was a well-worn system by which the MID 
could request that the Justice Department arrest someone.73 
Coordination in the field was more problematic. However good the 
relationship among the three was in Washington, it was hard to stitch together three 
large bureaucracies spread across the length and breadth of the country and dealing in 
minutely detailed cases in very large numbers. Sometimes this could be helped by 
collocating BI, MID and ONI offices, as in Pittsburgh.74 The system of file sharing 
was also implemented in some of the larger cities, though New York, a whirling 
vortex of counterintelligence activity, was not among them and in February 1918 the 
MID and Justice agreed on a daily exchange of suspects names in local city offices 
throughout the country.75 Military intelligence officers around the country were 
trained to meet and develop good relations with their Justice counterparts.76 Often 
this worked, sometimes it did not. The problem was less local enmity (though that 
could occasionally be a problem) than a lack of coordination. The story even 
circulated that after months of investigation and cultivation an undercover agent of the 
Justice Department arrested an agent of ONI who had been investigating him. The 
Justice agent had posed as a German saboteur planning to blow up an oil plant in 
Mexico, the ONI agent as a retired German military officer. A similar tale involved 
72 Alexander B. Coxe, 'The Negative Branch', 17 December 1919, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 
10560-328/155. Raymond E. Hom to DNI, 31 January 1919, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, F-6-d, 
11466-D. 
73 'Military Intelligence Division General Staff Hand Book of Office Practice', July, 1918, 
NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-438. 
74 McCormick, Seeing Reds, p. 19. 
75 MID History, pp. 1278-1281. 
76 See e.g. 'Lieutenant Fielder', n.d., NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-328/111. This was a 
talk given to MID officers by a MID officer who apparently served in San Antonio. More 
generally, MID records, notably this record group and entry, are rife with admonitions to 
consult with agents ofthe Justice Department on civilian matters. 
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an ONI agent and a Justice agent selling each other secret documents as part of a pair 
of sting operations gone badly awry. 77 
Despite the fact that there never was one seamlessly integrated security 
system, the War Department established a vast security presence throughout the 
length and breadth of the country and its possessions. Even before the war broke out, 
the Department already had some infrastructure to build on which allowed it in short 
order to blanket the country with intelligence officers. In 1916, the Army, like the 
Navy, had established the position of Department Intelligence Officers (at this time 
the Army in the United States was organized into regional 'departments'). These 
Department lOs were under the command of the senior officer in their Department, 
but sent intelligence information up the chain to the MID in Washington. Their 
Department lOs did not initially focus on counterintelligence, but when 1917 came 
along, they quickly took on such tasks, though their precise work varied. The 
Southern Department, which included the border area with Mexico, was considered 
an especially sensitive point because it was a logical point of entry into the United 
States for spies and saboteurs. The Western Department had different problems, 
suffering from labour unrest, largely a result of the radical International Workers of 
the World (IWW). Accordingly, the War Department created an additional level of 
'District Intelligence Officers' in a long list of cities in the south and the west. These 
District Intelligence Officers reported to their respective Department Intelligence 
Officers, but all were eyes and ears for MID in Washington. MID itself also 
established its own offices that were actually directly under its command in the 
country's most 'strategic metropolitan points': New York; Philadelphia; Pittsburgh; 
77 Hunnewell, History and Anecdotes. 
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New Orleans; St. Louis; and San Juan, Puerto Rico.78 MID also put Port Control 
Officers put in strategic portS.79 Back in MID's headquarters in Washington, 
eventually two distinct branches developed to handle the bulk of the 
counterintelligence work: MI-3 and MI-4. The former was responsible for 
counterintelligence in the Army, the latter for counterintelligence among civilians. 
Domestic counterintelligence was not just a matter to be pursued within the 
United States proper, however. Following the lead of the British, all the agencies of 
the U.S. Government agreed that it was better to stop a spy from entering the United 
States than to have to track him down once he was in the country. The influx of spies 
appeared to be a very serious problem. Had not the Military Attache in Copenhagen 
cabled to the MID that 'according to my knowledge of German methods and 
observation here, [I am] convinced [that] practically all steamers carry German agents 
into United States,?80 
Hence, domestic counterintelligence had an important overseas 'component. In 
particular, Army and Navy intelligence personnel worked closely with State 
Department officers to keep spies from obtaining visas to travel to the United States. 
The arrangement in Paris was typical. Every day the U.S. Embassy would bring to 
the Naval and Military Attaches the list of that day's requests for visas, passport 
renewal, and permission to travel. The State Department would not act on these 
requests until it had received input from the two military departments. 81 
The attaches in France performed another counterintelligence function. The 
French authorities shared with them lists of deserters and also of suspects the French 
believed to be in the U.S. and the Americas. Put into a card file, these lists proved 
78 MID History, p. 88-89. 
79 Ibid. 
80 RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-U-8 Military Attache Copcnhagcn Undated cable [July 1917] 
evidently to MID using transparent cover terms. 
81 'History of Naval Attache, Paris', p. 109, FDRL. 
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useful in passport control and other counterespionage efforts. Not infrequently also 
the American authorities would detain suspects reported by the French. The French, 
of course, were happy to return the favour to the Americans.82 
The military viewed the fact that the United States attracted so many 
immigrants as a serious problem. Some ethnic minorities purportedly provided the 
Kaiser's agents with 'fruitful fields' for espionage and propaganda.83 A large 
proportion of the civilian population, hence of the draftees, spoke a foreign language 
as its first language. Many spoke no English at all. In fact, many were technically 
enemy aliens. A great number ofthem, the intelligence services believed, 'ifnot 
directly sympathetic with what they conceived to be the cause of the Central Powers, 
felt nothing but repugnance toward the prospect of themselves serving against 
Germany'. The 77th Division, for instance, being drafted largely from New York 
City, was, in the words of one intelligence officer, 'not altogether Anglo-Saxon' .84 In 
October, 1917, Camp Upton, which contained troops from that division, had 800 
enemy aliens in American uniforms, the bulk of them' Austrian' . 
Enemy aliens were not necessarily hostile to the United States, however. 
Many of the Czechs, for instance, opposed the Austro-Hungarian government with 
which the United States was at war and hoped for independence for their homeland.85 
Conversely, of course, a good number of the subjects of the British Empire who were 
in the United States, notably Irish and Indians, were hostile to British rule and also 
sought independence for their homelands. This put them in a potentially ambivalent 
position with regard to the United States' part in the allied war effort. The US 
82 Ibid, pp. 93-95, 105-106. 
83 See, e.g. MID History, p. 1608 for the views of the MID's office in Seattle on these 
questions. 
84 J. S. S. Richardson, 'Contre-Espionage in the AEF', 26 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, 
Entry 65,10560-328/162. 
85 MID History, pp. 10-11. 'Lecture by Capt. Wagner. In Re: The Work Done Among Troops 
by Negative Intelligence', 4 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-328/122. 
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Government, for its part, found itself in an awkward position, too. The British, of 
course, were very interested in tamping down Irish revolutionary activity. The Irish 
found the Great War an auspicious time for a resurgence in their independence efforts, 
even mounting the Easter Rising of 1916. Accordingly, British intelligence passed to 
American intelligence an endless stream of leads about Fenians operating in the 
United States. The American took these seriously, but declined ever to crack down 
seriously on such activities. Even when Nicholas Biddle, the influential head of 
MID's New York office, recommended in October 1918 to the First Assistant 
Secretary of State that there should be an intensive investigation of the issue in 
concert with the British, the US Government did not move, probably having in mind 
not only the large numbers ofIrish voters, but the Irish background of many 
American politicians. As the MID history put it, this was the decision 'presumably 
because the interests of the British and the Americans in such investigation were so 
1 d· . '1 ,86 clear y Isslml ar . 
It was not just non-citizens, of course, who were potential threats. Often the 
security services found themselves pursuing miscreants who turned out to be 
Americans. This was a problem because prosecuting Americans for crimes the 
evidence of which had been obtained through secret means, in a legal system 
characterized by often unsympathetic judges, numerous delays, technical loopholes, 
and the necessity of convincing twelve men chosen at random, was a tall order.87 In 
those cases, however, where the suspect was a naturalized citizen, the services found a 
simpler way. Courts could occasionally be persuaded to denaturalize a citizen if they 
determined that he had lied when he swore to the court that he would be loyal only to 
86 MID History, p. 1903. 
87 Ibid, p. 1323. 
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the United States. Again, however, the MID was often frustrated that excessively 
'out-spoken' people were allowed to retain their citizenship.88 
The all-encompassing conception of war made the behaviour and even beliefs 
of many Americans a matter of concern to the military. Bolsheviks, members of the 
IWW, and radical labour unionists notably came in for scrutiny. The leading historian 
of ON I has observed that during the war the line 'between legitimate security 
concerns and suppression of divergent opinions' had become' indistinct' .89 The point 
is well made. The MID claimed in a publicly disseminated report in 1918 that: 
It is certainly one of the most exquisite impudences of the Prussian 
strategy that some of the most active open allies of Germany and the 
most persistent opponents of all efforts to prevent her world conquest 
are zealots who uphold peace at any price, demand free speech while 
freedom itself is threatened, and fearlessly defend certain clauses of the 
Constitution against those who are trying to defend the very existence 
of the Constitution and the nation it constitutes.9o 
Defeatists, those people who spoke pessimistically about the war, might be 
operating at Germany's behest. Even when they operated instead from a basis of 
'narrow or perverted patriotism' they were helping the German war effort. The MID 
opened a file on the Hearst newspaper chain on such grounds.91 Pacifists came under 
similar suspicion and the MID found that some of the 'loudest' among them were 
German agents.92 ONI saw things similarly, for instance, investigating workers who 
did not buy war bonds or contribute to the Red CrosS.93 
Religious denominations and clergymen often came under suspicion if their 
utterances seemed too pacifistic. Sometimes these groups saw which way the wind 
88 Ibid, p. 1315,1323-24. 
89 Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, p. 118. 
90 Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, General Staff, Propaganda in its Military 
and Legal Aspects, (Washington, n.d. [1918]), p. 7. 
91 MID History, p. 1872-1875. 
92 Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, General Staff, Propaganda in its Military 
and Legal Aspects, (Washington, n.d. [1918]), p. 7. 
93 Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, p. 118. 
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was blowing and bent with it. The Seventh Day Adventists, for instance, agreed to 
withdraw from sale some 135,000 copies of 'objectionable books' and the publishers 
'volunteered to revise these books to meet the approval of MID and to change them 
from anti-war to pro-war documents' .94 
Lutherans, however, were a particular target, because their Church had many 
German followers and purportedly 'contained many elements of disloyalty and 
activity in behalf of the enemy'. 95 Ironically, widespread Lutheran pacifism stood in 
sharp contrast to the 'Prussian will to power and ... spirit of unscrupulous warfare' .96 
Nevertheless, this did not spare the Church from close scrutiny. Not surprisingly, the 
military's concern was greatest with regard to pastors preaching to servicemen at 
military camps, but clergymen in purely civilian life also were investigated. In one of 
many such cases, private citizens of Chambersburg Pennsylvania reported their 
pastor, the Reverend 1. C. Nicholas, to the MID on the grounds that he refused to 
include prayers for the success of the American Expeditionary Force in his Sunday 
service because he thought this would be dictating to God. It did not help that 
Nicholas had denounced Selective Service, had opposed contribution to the Belgian 
Relief Fund, and had only contributed one dollar to the Red Cross. The National 
Lutheran Commission subsequently appointed him as a camp pastor at the Newport 
94 'Supplement...for the week ending October 3, 1918', 'Book II. Supplement of the Work 
and Activities of Military Intelligence Division Containing Reports for week ending Sept. 7th 
to Week ending Nov. 21, 1918', NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-717. At least one of the 
titles in question appears to have been The World's Crisis in the Light of Prophecy which had 
1914,1915, and 1918 editions. A 1919 reference work indicates that the 1918 edition-from 
an in-house Seventh Day Adventist publisher, was 'revised and passed by the Chief Censor, 
Division of Military Intelligence, Washington'. Margaret Renton, ed., War-Time Agencies of 
the Churches: Directory and Handbook, (New York, 1919), p. 308. 
95 MID History, p. 529. 
96 Ibid, p. 1811. 
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News point of embarkation and the MID kept him under close observation, but could 
find no excuse to have him removed.97 
With regard to espionage, the MID was greatly concerned that the Lutheran 
church collected detailed information on a routine basis from its camp pastors about 
how many Lutheran soldiers were at their camp, how many were coming and going 
and where they were going to. This information could be used to develop a detailed 
order of battle of the Army and to discern when units were embarking for France.9!! 
The question, then, was whether this information was making its way to Germany. 
Ultimately, apparently after the war, MID concluded that though the church had 
gathered data 'that they did not need to possess' and which should have been held 
within the US Government, 'no satisfactory evidence' existed that the church's 
gathering of information was done at the behest of Germany or exploited by 
Germany, rather that the church had done this for its own pastoral purposes.99 This 
did not mean that Lutheran pastors had not violated the law. At least eight were 
interned or convicted under the Espionage Act. 100 
In late July, 1918, MI-4, which had been following Lutheran matters for some 
time, did a review of what it knew about the subject. They brought to bear three 
officers to investigate clergymen and camp pastors, another officer bringing in 
evidence gathered through censorship and another who studied the 'general motives 
of the church and its propaganda'. These officers 'set in order a mass of data that 
amply demonstrated the potential danger from German sympathizers in the Lutheran 
denomination and even cast some doubt upon the good faith of the church as an 
97 Ibid, pp. 548-549. 
98 Ibid, pp. 1821-1830. 
99 Ibid, p. 1835. 
100 Ibid, p. 1836. 
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organization,.IOI Word of this soon made its way to Congress and the Church itself. 
Neither was pleased and the impression grew that 'Military Intelligence was seeking 
to discredit the entire church', In fact, however, the views of the investigating 
officers were not shared by all of their superiors and the classified MID history 
recorded that the views of the investigating officers were not even fully shared even 
by their immediate superiors, and the 'MID had no united opinion that could warrant 
any drastic policy in an exceedingly delicate matter' ,102 
In fact, when in August 1918 the MID took a comprehensive look at the 
problem of Lutheran pastors it found that of some 9800 pastors, only about 200 
should be considered suspects and even that number was 'in need of further 
reduction', Furthermore, some of the evidence against even the 200 was 'exactly of 
the kind that has been exploded in previous instances', 103 In fact, the MID history 
concluded that while the 'full extent' of the 'pernicious influence' of Lutheran 
ministers on the population could not be computed, but it was now clear that 'the 
Lutheran clergy on the whole were not a fertile source of pro-German agitation' ,104 
After the war, MID admitted in its official history that the German-speaking 
communities were by-and-Iarge a 'happy disappointment' to the 'prophets of evil who 
had feared wholesale insurrections or insidious intrigues', Indeed, some of the most 
German areas, such as Milwaukee, 'made themselves almost amusingly conspicuous 
by an Americanism which, whether genuine or not in spirit, was satisfactory in its 
.~ . , 105 
outward manllestatlOns . 
10\ Ibid, p. 1808. 
102 Ibid, pp. 1808-1809. 
103 Ibid,p. 1815. 
104 Ibid, p. 1818. In the document, the handwritten word 'vigorous' was inserted before 'pro-
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Sometimes it seemed that every simpleton, conspiracy theorist, and scoundrel 
would report suspicious activities to the authorities. As a result of the involvement of 
the enormous and hyperenthusiastic APL and the relative inexperience of many of the 
governmental counterintelligence personnel, the services gave innumerable 
'frivolous' leads 'prolonged attention' .106 ONI's office in New York received a tip 
from Washington to investigate the establishment of a German spy nest, replete with 
suspicious telephones and wires. It turned out to be a branch office of the New York 
d . 107 Telephone Company un er constructIOn. 
The MID's official history confessed afterwards that 'transmission by signal-
lights and wireless was a method continually suspected and never clearly 
proved ... Across the Mexican border ... some hostile radio communication may have 
been attempted~ but the telephone was vastly simpler' .108 Sometimes these cases 
could be little short of comic. In July 1918, the MID enthusiastically ordered the 
investigation of a case of visual signalling from a hotel in Nuevo Laredo, reported by 
the State Department's vice consul at Laredo. 'This would seem an extremely good 
opportunity ... to finally convict Madame Learn [the wife of the hotel's proprietor] 
who has been under suspicion for a long time'. An unconfirmed report had indicated 
that she had had dealings with German agents in Mexico City. The MID's local 
investigator discovered that the signal light was actually a bare light bulb swaying 
from its cord on the back porch of the hotel. The indecipherable flashing was caused 
by the bulb's intermittent obscuration by trees and latticework. Further investigation 
turned up the fact that the Madam Learn had once reported the consular officer for 
bringing prostitutes into the United States from Mexico, leading to an investigation of 
106 Raymond E. Hom to ONI, 31 January 1919, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, F-6-d, 11466-0. 
107 Hunnewell, History and Anecdotes. Raymond E. Hom to ONI, 31 January 1919, NARA, 
RG 38, Entry 98, F-6-d, 11466-0. 
108 MID History, p. 1767. 
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his activities by the Department of Justice. The local MID office further reported that 
it had followed up the reports of Madame Learn's activities in Mexico City and found 
b . fi h 109 no corro oratIOn or tern. 
In the same vein, in January 1918, an Army radio unit in New York picked up 
an unusual coded signal. Once the code finally gave up its secrets, Army intelligence 
was alarmed to discover that one message read 'TUSCANIA SAILED HOBOKEN 
TWO THOUSAND TROOPS', the prototypical spy message. Ajoint Army-Navy 
effort to locate the transmitter ensued which even included the installation of a covert 
radio receiver in the lighted sign of a major New Yark City hotel. Eventually they 
tracked the transmitter to an office building in New York City. It turned out to be a 
secret experimental US Navy transmitter. I 10 Army security officers in 1918 
investigated and hounded an officer in Mississippi, an American citizen with the 
unfortunate name of Otto Holstein on the grounds that he owned a radio and was 
enthusiastic in learning about codes and ciphers and other intelligence matters. He 
was eventually exonerated after the war when it turned out he had been corresponding 
with the MID in Washington which had been encouraging his interests. I I I 
The Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Communications also spent 
substantial time trying to figure out how the German agents were communicating 
across the Atlantic. As early as July 1917, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer 
thought such communications 'without doubt' existed, so it formed a special working 
group to find them. First, it worked with the Navy, which was responsible for 
censorship, to ensure that censorship was working properly and all censors and cable 
operators had been properly vetted. Then, it arranged for the Signal Corps to intercept 
109 Sholes to Secretary of State, 24 June 1918; Mott to Chapman, 3 July 1918; both in NARA, 
RG 165 Entry 65,10531-377. 
110 MID History, p.1767. 
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all long-haul radio messages coming to or from North America and forwarded these 
signals to Yardley's MI-8 for decryption. It even investigated an intelligence report 
that: 
A cable had secretly been laid across the Atlantic by the enemy and 
that the American end of the cable terminated on the New England 
coast; that the European end of the cable terminated in a submerged 
buoy off the coast of a neutral country; that at frequent intervals 
connection was made at the buoy with a German submarine vessel 
equipped with cable sending and receiving apparatus; and that in this 
manner prompt and reliable communication was maintained between 
the United States and Germany. 
The military obtained the cooperation of experts from the phone companies and 
scoured the entire Atlantic coast from Canada to New York. It found nothing. 112 
Just months into the war, a few relatively sober-minded security personnel 
were starting to conclude that perhaps the actual German espionage threat had been 
overplayed. One officer noted that while Stieber may have planted thirty thousand 
spies in France years before the Franco-Prussian War, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the Germans had done no such thing in the United States, a country which 
Germany had never contemplated invading. Such conclusions-which were 
common, though certainly not universal in the intelligence business--did not lead to a 
reduction in the level of effort devoted to negative intelligence. For instance, instead 
of an enormous number of stationary spies, perhaps Germany was employing a small 
number of travelling spies. Such a circumstance called for the monitoring of people 
who travelled extensively around the country. I 13 In the event, relatively few spies 
were ever caught and convicted in the United States. The Attorney General made a 
112 United States War Department, Report of the Chief Signal Officer to the Secretary of War, 
1919, (Washington, 1919), pp. 138-139. 
113 'Memorandum for Captain Hunt', 16 January 1918, NARA RG 319, Entry "CMH 
Background Papers", Box 52C, No folder name. For further skepticism about the 
implementation of the Stieber system in the U.S., see 'Book I. Supplements of the Work and 
Activities of Military Intelligence Division Containing First Supplement for Week ending 
Aug31, 1918', 'TheGermanSpySystem',NARA,RG 165,Entry65, 10560-717. MID 
History, pp. 1268 and 1639. 
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joke of the matter in April 1918, writing to one of his U.S. Attorneys, 'there is quite a 
deal of hysteria in the country about German spies. If you will kindly box up and send 
me from one to a dozen I will pay you very handsomely for your trouble. We are 
looking for them constantly, but it is a little difficult to shoot them until they have 
been found'. I 14 
Certainly there were a few genuine spy cases. One 'Pablo Waberski', for 
instance, was arrested on the basis of a tip from a double agent when he crossed into 
Nogales, Arizona from Mexico. Yardley's MI-8 was able to read an encrypted 
document he was carrying which conveniently read in part, 'the bearer of this ... is a 
t ' 115 German secret agen . 
One of the few genuine spy cases that met the 'specifications for an 
international adventuress' to which the public had become accustomed in mystery 
novels, was one Madame de Victorica, the daughter of a German general, trained by 
German naval intelligence and dispatched in 1916 to the U.S. to encourage pacifism 
among Catholics, especially Irish, and to plant pro-German articles in the media. 
Meanwhile, an associate was to acquire military and naval information and engage in 
sabotage. However, Victorica was not only indiscreet but was also a morphine addict. 
Converging investigations by Justice and the MID led to her arrest in August 1918. 
Eight other people were also arrested as part of her ring. I 16 
There were also a number of puzzling cases that the MID never got to the 
bottom of that have the ring of genuine German operations. Between January and 
August, 1918, for instance, six men came to the United States from neutral countries 
in Europe, as well as Mexico, all bearing introductions from the U.S. Military 
114 Quoted in Fox, 'Bureaucratic Wrangling over Counterintelligence'. 
115 David Kahn, The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail (New Haven, 2004), p. 41-44. 
116 The Victorica case is summarized in the MID History, p. 1645-1661. 
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Attache, all claiming to be loyal Americans who had been approached by the German 
service, recruited as spies, asked to acquire military secrets, given money, secret ink, 
and codes and dispatched to the United States. 1I7 However, they all said, being 
actually loyal Americans, they wished to serve as double agents. A review of the files 
showed that another American with a similar story had arrived in 1917, but had been 
turned away by U.S. intelligence. After a time, the MID began to suspect that they 
had actually been dispatched as triple agents. After consultations between the Justice 
Department, which had always been sceptical of their bona fides, and the MID, most 
of them were arrested on 20 August 1918 in an effort to shake loose the truth. 
However, when the war ended there was still no proof of the 'perfidy' of any of the 
men individually, but with MID 'convinced that an attempt [had been] made to 
double-cross this Government'. What was indisputable was that these men had 
consumed vast amounts of the War Department's money and staff time. The official 
history noted that, though overseas the attaches made more extensive use of double 
agents, the MID back in Washington preferred not to, finding it 'always risky'. 
Given the pre-war problems with German-inspired sabotage, it is not 
surprising that one of the major intelligence functions of both services was plant 
protection. I IS ONI, for instance, worked to protect important naval industrial facilities 
both out of its central office and out of its branch offices around the country. Starting 
in November 1917, companies working for the Navy were obliged to report to ONI 
with a census of their workers, information on labour unrest at their facilities, and a 
resume of their measures to prevent fire and sabotage. They also had to agree to fire 
any employee that the Navy found undesirable. Some employers even cooperated 
117 These 'double agent' cases are summarized in MID History, p. 1662-1702. 
118 For a discussion of MID's rather baroque part in plant protection, see Bidwell, History of 
the Military Intelligence Division, pp. 206-208. 
153 
with the Navy in the arrest of suspicious employees, 96 of them, for example, at the 
Sperry Gyroscope Company in Brooklyn. I 19 
Over time, aNI's emphasis shifted from 'Plant Protection' to 'Plant 
Intelligence', which focused less on direct, close-in protection of the physical plant 
and progressively more and more on the discovery of pro-German, radical, pacifist, or 
other undesirable people either in the plants themselves or in the surrounding 
communities. 12o aNI came to recognize strikes and labour actions as the greatest 
threats to productivity in naval factories. The Bolsheviks and the IWW often seemed 
to be behind these actions, operating, or so ONI thought, at the German direction. 
Accordingly aNI representatives would deliver inspirational speeches in the plants, 
and sometimes met with labour leaders to avert strikes. 121 
During the nineteenth century, the War Department, and arguably much of the 
Federal Government, underwent a process or organizational modernization. This 
process entailed a move from a relatively decentralized, informal, relationship- and 
consensus-based system toward a more formalized, centralized, hierarchical processes 
intended to rest on a sound scientific basis and produce rational outcomes. 122 This 
manifested itself in how the Army and Navy decided to address a particular problem 
foisted upon them by modem war. The services decided that they had to protect not 
only those facets of America's economy and society which were important to the 
prosecution of the war, but also they had to protect their own ranks from penetration. 
This was a modem new problem. Before WWI, there was no perceived need for a 
formal process to check on the background and trustworthiness of military personnel. 
119 Dorwart, Office o/Naval Intelligence, pp. 117-118. 
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Informal expectations arising from notions of honour and duty and from personal 
relationships held sway. During the war, however, this changed. 
The task of policing the Army proved to be a big job. The military camps 
required monitoring, of course. In order to deal with the problem of penetration, the 
Army established an intelligence presence in all the camps and units as they sprouted 
up all over the country. Some of these unit intelligence officers reported directly to 
the MID, others reported through the Department intelligence officers, but the effect 
was the same.123 By the end of the war a doctrine developed under which the 
intelligence officers in each camp or unit would recruit a 'Number One' from among 
the officer corps who would in tum recruit a network of 'Number Twos' throughout 
the camp, who, ideally, would never know they were working for the intelligence 
officer and who might even recruit 'Number Threes' to report to them. 124 The 
intelligence officers also took care to maintain liaison with the YMCA which in each 
camp 'they have chosen a representative that is really their Intelligence Officer'. The 
MID knew that privates were likely to confide in the YMCA man when they had done 
h. 125 somet mg wrong. 
There were other problems in the officer corps. To begin with, there were 
many 'efficient ... thorough and seemingly conscientious' German officers in the 
Army and though 'some doubtless were loyal' some of them had 'high-level' relatives 
whom they might have visited, or with whom they stayed in contact. Such cases 
required investigation and many German-American officers were transferred to less 
123 MID History, p. 70. 
124 Captain Fisher, 'The Number One', 6 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-
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125 Lieutenant Smith, 'Special Problems in Camp Organizations', 6 November 1918, NARA, 
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sensitive positions.126 Indeed, with the increasing role of technology and 
industrialization in military affairs, the various staff corps became increasingly 
important to the Army. Unfortunately, MI-3 found itself investigating a 
disproportionate number of disloyalty cases in these corps. The problem, it thought, 
was that because Gennany had for years been the world leader in applied sciences, 
German-Americans and Americans trained in Gennany were disproportionately likely 
to fill these highly technical positions. 127 Other groups came in for special scrutiny 
because of the particularly sensitive infonnation to which they had access, or their 
greater opportunity for sabotage. These included Signal Corps personnel (both those 
members dealing with communications and with aviation), and the members of MI-
l O's radio intelligence service. 128 Herbert Yardley, desperate for men with 'cipher 
brains' was forced to pass on a likely candidate because he was not a U.S. citizen. 129 
Often these concerns went to extremes. ONI went so far as to investigate one officer 
because his housekeeper looked Gennan. 130 Even Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Franklin Roosevelt got in on the act as when in June, 1917 he sent the following note 
toONI: 
I have been told by a man just back from Florida, who knows parts of 
the Florida coast pretty well, that one Gus Muller has been taken into 
the Naval Coast Defense Reserve as a Lieutenant, and that while there 
is nothing definite against him he will bear watching. He was either 
born in Germany or here of German parents; also that a boat named 
JOYEUSE, last reported at Fernandina, will bear watching. 131 
126 'Lecture by Capt. Wagner. In Re: The Work Done Among Troops by Negative 
Intelligence', 4 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-328/122, 
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The Anny also detennined that it was necessary to vet people entering the 
service. It was alanned that civilians could gain access to the MID's secrets merely 
by passing the Civil Service Exam. Shortly before the war ended, the MID 
coordinated with Civil Service Commission to close that 100phole. 132 The most 
immediately visible problem, however, was vetting civilians who were being 
considered for officer commissions, but this was an immense task. Here, the Anny 
turned to outside organizations for help. They preferred to work with the Department 
of Justice, but it was overtaxed and overstretched too. A volunteer organization, the 
American Protective League (APL), stepped into the breach taking on many of these 
investigative duties. 133 This was a grass-roots organization that emerged initially in 
Chicago in early 1917 out of a chance conversation between a Justice Department 
official and a leading resident of the city, 'a seething center of alien activity'. Soon 
infonnal cooperation ensued and the 'best men of the city', 'reliable business men' 
flocked to the group. On 1 March, application was made to the Justice Department 
whose sanction was forthcoming on 22 March. Before the end of March branches 
opened in Milwaukee and St. Louis. Before long, war was declared and the 
organization spread like wildfire, eventually counting 250,000 members. It was not 
until November 1917, by which time the APL had thousands of members in every 
state, that it moved its headquarters to Washington, DC. Such a sprawling 
organization required structure and leadership, so Charles Daniel Frey of Chicago 
wrote an organizational plan and three National Directors (the number would later 
grow) were named, all of them from Chicago. One of them was Frey who obtained a 
132 Churchill to John A. McIlhenney, 29 October, 1918, NARA, RG 165 Entry 65,10560-
139/1. 
133 MID History, p. 1281. 
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captaincy in the Army and became the APL's liaison to the MID. The APL also 
maintained an office at MID which eventually grew to 36 people. 134 
Not only did the APL help the Army vet its prospective members, but it also 
vetted applicants for positions in certain volunteer organizations such as the overseas 
services of the Red Cross, YMCA, Jewish Welfare, and the Salvation Army. The 
APL also helped enforce conscription laws and reported to MID on harmful rumours 
that were current in the country.135 It also took on a wide variety of miscellaneous 
cases for the MID, such as investigating a man who showed particular interest in 
poison gas, and investigating a rash of war savings certificates by reputedly pro-
German inhabitants of Alma, Wisconsin. 136 It even occasionally gathered positive 
intelligence, for instance, from people who had travelled abroad to places of 
. 11' . t 137 mte Igence mteres . 
As time went on the relationship between the MID and the APL became 
progressively closer. The APL's office at the MID eventually grew to 36 people. \38 
In fact, in the end, though numerous other smaller organizations like the APL sprang 
up around the same time, the APL was the only private organization that did major 
amounts of investigative work at MID's behest. It handled some three million cases 
for the War Department before disbanding in February 1919. 139 This was deadly 
serious business, or so the APL thought. Its authorized history maintained that two 
million German-Americans were loyal in their hearts to the Kaiser and that only fear 
of punishment kept them in line. 'It wasfear that held our enemy population down-
fear and nothing else. It was the League's silent and mysterious errand to pile up 
134 Hough, The Web, pp. 29-39. 
135 Ibid, pp. 47-49. 
136 MID History, p. 1282. 
137 Hough, The Web, p. 50. 
138 Ibid, p. 45. 
139 Ibid, p. 34. 
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good reason for that fear' .140 In so doing, the APL saw itself as a non-uniformed 
adjunct to the country's fighting forces. In the words of its authorized history, the 
organization arose to 'to meet and absolutely to defeat, the vast and highly trained 
anny of the German espionage system ... It met that German Anny as ours met it at 
h· d' h A ,141 Chateau-T Jerry, an III t e rgonne. 
The APL was but one entity with whom MID's Negative Branch interacted. 
In January 1918, Van Deman sent a letter to the police chiefs of all cities of 
population 10,000 or greater asking them to report to MID any information they might 
come to acquire that potentially pointed to Gennan agents. MID also negotiated 
similar arrangements with the American Federation of Labor and other private 
organizations. However, they soon scaled back such arrangements. Liaison with 
local governments and private organizations entailed revealing MID's counter-
espionage activities to a greater extent than MID found comfortable. Also, many 
reports turned out to be impossible to follow up. Finally, a sense that the man-on-the-
street might resent the appearance of a vast governmental system investigating their 
private behaviour and bring countervailing pressure to bear through Congress argued 
for restraint. 142 Apparently, being surveilled by volunteer citizens' groups such as the 
APL was less disturbing to the public, even if those groups were tightly connected 
with the government. 
All in all, the domestic counterintelligence function was a necessary one in 
modem war, the officers of the MID and ONI thought. However, even while 
accepting that the military might have a domestic role in an emergency and while 
believing that any opposed military action required intelligence support, many 
140 Ibid, P 59. Emphasis in original. 
141 Ibid" p. 13. 
142 MID History, p. 1283-1284. 
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(though by no means all) intelligence officials had become uncomfortable with their 
domestic activities. By and large, as soon as the war ended the officer corps looked 
for ways to shed this duty. A mere nine days after the Armistice, Brigadier General 
Marlborough Churchill, the head of the MID, after consulting with the Army Chief of 
Staff sent out a circular letter to his subordinates across the country. It said that 'the 
emergency no longer exists that required investigations among the civil population'. 
Unfinished disloyalty and enemy activities cases were to be turned over to the Justice 
Department, and the MID's civilian investigators were to send their credentials back 
to Washington. 143 As we shall see, this was easier said than done. 
During World War I then, the U.S. military misjudged the real German 
espionage threat. Furthermore, in its naivete it endangered cherished American civil 
liberties not to mention the rules of fair play. This was a dangerous failure on the part 
of the military and, indeed, on the part of those civilian authorities who should have 
exercised control or checks and balances upon it. To its credit, however, most 
intelligence personnel, at least those who remained in the service after the war, 
displayed a healthy distaste for prying into the political lives of Americans. 
All that being said, the military's work during the war, misguided as much of 
it was, did lay the groundwork for a later style of warfare, or at least international 
struggle. They prematurely perceived a type of war that would one day exist, one in 
which espionage, sabotage, subversion, and propaganda would occupy central 
positions, and they designed the basic building blocks of an edifice that could 
withstand it. 
)43 Talbert, Negative Intelligence, pp. 135-137. 
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Chapter 4 
Human Intelligence: From Scouting to Stealing Secrets 
The question of retention of any system of secret service agents in time 
of peace requires consideration. It is believed that to continue the 
employment of secret service agents in time of peace would be to the 
prejudice of the official status of the Military Attache, and at the same 
time opposed to the democratic ideals and conception offoreign 
relations for which our Government stands. Of course, it is assumed 
that agents, to a limited and legitimate degree, for the protection of our 
own national interests will be employed at the discretion of the 
Military Attache. It is important, however, that each Military Attache 
be thoroughly familiar with the methods of obtaining, training and 
employing agents, and that he has af all times and up-fo-date working 
plan for the employment of such agents as a preparatory measure 
against the outbreak o/war. 
--Report from a conference of military attaches, July 19191 
Human intelligence or Humint, as the collection of intelligence through the 
agency of people is now known, comes in two varieties. The first is overt collection. 
In the military domain during the World War One period this was most often carried 
out by attaches accredited to foreign governments, though it could also be carried out 
by the observers who were often attached to foreign forces, as Pershing had been 
during the Russo-Japanese war, or travellers such as Emory Upton on his world tour. 
The second is espionage or clandestine collection, the realm of spies, sometimes 
carried out by attaches but more often done by others as attaches typically have felt 
obliged to maintain their diplomatic status. 
Though overt collection continued much as it had before, the total nature of 
World War I and the broadened requirements for intelligence information forced 
profound changes in the character and aims of American espionage. First, the war 
began the transition of human intelligence away from a 19th century model which 
1 'Conference of US Military Attaches at the Hague 16-19 July, 1919, inclusive. (Re. 
Organization and Administration of duties of Military Attache', RG 8, Accession 1991-372, 
XINA,NHC. 
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primarily involved observation-based means of collection. Before World War I, the 
U.S. government most commonly used spies for their ability to observe military 
forces or infrastructure; spies were reconnaissance assets. Indeed, during the Civil 
War, 'spy' and 'scout' were interchangeable terms.2 Seldom before the war did the 
armed services recruit spies as penetration agents to steal secrets from inside a 
government bureaucracy. When information had to be obtained from a foreign 
bureaucracy, this was accomplished, if at all, by politely asking for it. Put another 
way, the distinction between intelligence acquired in the form of observation of things 
and that acquired through 'access to human thought processes or meanings' had not 
yet become clear.3 During the war, however, the new modes of collection placed a 
much greater emphasis on acquiring information from inside bureaucracies. 
There was also a growing sense that the target was the important thing not the 
officer who got the information. Hence, government personnel started discussing 
more how they would cover a particular country or acquire an answer to a particular 
stream of questions. Previously an officer might have been rewarded for what could 
be called espionage piecework. Now there was an increasing emphasis on the 
management of espionage processes, what sort of system might service might 
establish to provide coverage of an area or a set of issues, what sort of tradecraft 
2 William B. Feis, Grant's Secret Service (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2002), p. 3. 
Arguably this identification had existed in English at least as long as the King James edition 
of the Bible: 'And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan', Numbers 13: 17. In an 
American context, Christine Bold dates this 'elision' in the United States to the dime spy 
novels of the nineteenth century in which hunters and woodsmen (scouts) 'infiltrate hostile 
Indian tribes and outlaw bands'. Christine Bold, 'Secret Negotiations: The Spy Figure in 
Nineteenth-century American Popular Fiction', Intelligence and National Security, 5:4, 
(October 1990), p. 25. 
3 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 82-83. 
David Kahn has made a similar argument with regard to what he called 'verbal intelligence', 
but he applied it primarily to signals intelligence. David Kahn, 'An Historical Theory of 
Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 16:3 (2001), pp. 81-84. 
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might they apply, and what sort of systematic support would they need from 
headquarters. 
This required a new form of critical judgment, a new understanding of 
geography, or at least one which was new to military officers. Before World War I, 
intelligence officers had always been required to examine the terrain with the eye of a 
general, knowing it from the perspective both of the friendly and enemy commanders. 
What pieces of the ground might hide enemy forces or could provide cover for 
friendly forces? What were the best positions in which to place observation posts? 
Where must reconnaissance be conducted and how might a reconnaissance force or a 
scout get there? 
These skills remained necessary in the new form of war. Now, however, faced 
with the requirement to acquire not merely military but also political, economic, 
'psychologic', and often counterintelligence information, the problem became more 
generalized. It was not a matter of finding an answer once, of a there and back 
mission. Now questions or requirements had to flow on a continuing basis from 
intelligence headquarters to the target area and answers or intelligence information 
had to flow in the opposite direction. All of this had to happen without the knowledge 
of the entity (typically a government) that was the target of the espionage. This more 
generalized problem allowed more flexibility of means. Now it was not always 
necessary to put intelligence personnel (government officials) in the target area. 
Officials of friendly governments might do. More often private citizens could meet 
the need. These might be people who were actually friendly or they might be those 
who had been persuaded, bought, seduced, or tricked into cooperating. 
Intelligence officers began to look at the terrain with new sets of eyes, those of 
diplomats, international businessmen or smugglers. Cartesian distances were not 
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always important. It might require Herculean efforts to gather information from a 
mere 20 miles away but be a trivial matter to discover what was happening thousands 
of miles away. Practical distances-access-became the critical variable. So, 
intelligence officers needed to know which countries had friendly diplomatic relations 
with which other countries. They needed to know which international businesses had 
branches in which other countries or where there was cross-border business or labour 
traffic. When crossing a hostile border, it became important to know the political 
sympathies of the population on the other side. It became important to know where 
emigre communities were, or where foreign students went to school because they 
might have connections back into the old country.4 In order to get information out, it 
also became important to know about the mail systems and the censorship systems in 
the various countries, where the telegraph cables ran, where friendly diplomatic 
couriers plied their routes, and where the battle lines were. 
The war also led to a relaxation of the ethical norms governing the human 
acquisition of information. Before the war, Americans had generally not been 
comfortable with espionage. Scholars ofliterature have generally argued that the spy 
novel, though an American invention with James Fenimore Cooper's 1821 novel The 
Spy, found generally infertile ground in a republican America proud of its openness 
and democracy. What American spy fiction there was during the nineteenth century 
did not derive its dramatic tension from the intricacies of the espionage business, but 
from questions ofloyalty, identity, and physical survival. Only the identification of 
espionage with pure, patriotic, and quintessentially American causes could counteract 
its negative qualities.5 
4 Churchill to Military Attache London for Van Deman, 14 September 1918, NARA, RG 165, 
Entry 65, 9944-60. 
S Bold, 'Secret Negotiations'. pp. 22-23,27. 
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Before the outbreak of World War I, the State Department's unease with 
espionage was palpable. John W. Foster, Secretary of State under President Benjamin 
Harrison and grandfather to Allen Dulles, addressed this issue in his 1906 book, The 
Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Foreign Relations of the United States. 
He wrote that in its early days the Republic's 'standard of diplomacy was very low. 
Even in time of peace it did not hesitate to make use of bribery, espionage, and 
deliberate deceit'. However, he continued, it is 'evidence of the progress of the 
nations that no self-respecting government today would countenance such practices in 
its foreign intercourse'. He told Americans that they could be proud of the role that 
their government and their representatives overseas had taken in 'purifying 
d· I ,6 Ip omacy . 
American military officers, for whom spying was not a matter of cheap 
entertainment or abstract ethics, but a genuine professional dilemma, were also quite 
concerned about the moral implications of espionage. They confined it mostly to 
wartime though even then officers tended to hold their nose at the topic and leave 
such grubby work to civilians. Examples abounded of American officers' disdain for 
espionage. America's leading pre-World War I thinker on intelligence, Colonel 
Arthur Wagner, thought that civilian spies richly deserved the 'obloquy so freely cast 
upon'them.7 In 1904, Lieutenant Commander Roy Smith, the Naval Attache to 
France and Russia, reported back to ONI that most European countries apparently had 
'secret service[s] for acquiring confidential information on military and naval 
subjects', but he found it 'not a very honorable or attractive occupation'. In the sort 
of terms that one might use with regard to prostitutes or contract killers, he sniffed 
6 John W. Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, (Boston, 1906), p. 381. John W. Foster was grandfather to Allen Dulles and 
John Foster Dulles. 
7 Wagner, Service of Security and Information, p. 181. 
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that 'there are always people to be found who are willing to take it Up,.8 Similarly, in 
1913 Lieutenant Commander William S. Pye at the Naval War College registered his 
concurrence with British Colonel George Armand Furse who in his 1895 book 
Information in War held that the notion of espionage excited a feeling of 'repugnance' 
and that the use of spies was 'unchivalrous'. 9 
Despite these feelings, many leading prewar thinkers recognized that 
espionage was necessary in wartime. Wagner was matter of fact about it: 'spies are 
indispensably necessary to a general; and, other things equal, that commander will be 
victorious who has the best secret service' .10 Smith granted that 'perhaps' espionage 
could be necessary 'in self-defense' .11 Pye, quoting Furse, came to a similar 
conclusion. 
In war spies are indispensable auxiliaries; and when we are precluded 
from obtaining information by any other means, we must discard all 
questions of morality ... Necessity knows no laws, and means which 
we would disdain to use in ordinary life must be employed in the field, 
simply because we have no other that we can tum to profitable 
account. Information has been sought through spies in all wars, and 
we can plead in our favor that the enemy will not scruple to employ 
them in his behalf. 12 
By the time World War One ended, however, these views had started to 
change certainly because of considerations of wartime expediency, but perhaps also 
because the responsibility for spying was now much more diffuse, spread across 
comparatively large bureaucracies. The growing, though by no means universal 
8 Roy C. Smith, Naval Attache Paris, No. 38, 6 May, 1904, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, File E-
I-a, 4941. 
9 William S. Pye, 'Intelligence Service in Peace and War', 1913, p. 11, RG 8, XING, 
Accession # 1913-186, NHC. See also George Armand Furse, Information in War: Its 
Acquisition and Transmission (London: 1895), pp. 240. 
10 Wagner, Service of Security and Information, p. 181. 
II Roy C. Smith, Naval Attache Paris, No. 38, 6 May, 1904, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, File E-
I-a, 4941 
12 Pye, 'Intelligence Service in Peace and War', p. 11. 
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feeling was that if asking for needed information was infeasible or ineffective, then 
the information could be-nay, should be-stolen. 
During World War I, the distinction-particularly linguistic, but also 
conceptual-between 'case officer' or 'handler' on the one hand and 'asset', 'source' 
or 'agent' was not yet fully clear. The influx into government services of great 
numbers of American civilians from all walks of life contributed to the imprecision. 
The various American clandestine intelligence collectors, whether responsive to the 
State Department or the War or Navy Departments, were not just established military 
officers or members of the Consular or Foreign Services. A great many private 
citizens became clandestine collectors for the government, sometimes hired as 
government employees, sometimes simply operating on a volunteer basis as sources. 
Sometimes these people were dispatched from the U.S., sometimes they were 
recruited by attaches from among the expatriate community. The military attache in 
Buenos Aires, for instance, made contact with the directors of some forty American 
companies in Argentina, as well as 'certain individuals', soliciting their help. The 
businessmen would report to him whenever any of their employees was planning a 
trip into the interior of the country and he would provide them with a questionnaire 
covering the intelligence topics he was concerned about. When investigations, 
particularly of a counterintelligence nature, were required, the attache would call for 
the 'assistance of those managers or directors whose business best covers the 
. I tt ,\3 partlcu ar rna er. 
The three Departments conducting clandestine collection overseas used a 
variety of different covers. Often the military services leaned on the State Department 
in this regard. State allowed ONI and MID to post some of their agents abroad as 
\3 RC [Military Attache Buenos Aires] to MID, 28 October 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 
9944-L-7. 
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Vice Consuls, a subordinate position in the already low-status Consular Service, 
which had yet to be merged with the more prestigious Foreign Service. However, 
most of the 'agents' that ONI dispatched overseas were provided with some form of 
commercial cover, not infrequently that of a newspaper. ONI was gratified that 
American companies typically responded positively and with 'alacrity' to requests to 
use their names and corporate infrastructure in this way. 
It soon became clear that many things could go wrong quite easily in 
clandestine operations, particularly when non-official cover was being used. ONI 
found that sooner or later most of its agents had their cover blown and they had to be 
withdrawn to the United States. In Latin America the covers of being in the mining, 
cattle, or timber business were used so frequently that they lost credibility and became 
the topic of knowing jokes. 14 Personnel operating under official cover could often use 
encrypted government communications or the diplomatic pouch which was (in theory) 
immune from search. Personnel operating under non-official cover had to rely on less 
secure means of communication such as the mail or plain language telegrams. In 
October 1918, the War Department was briefly stymied in its efforts clandestinely to 
transfer $1500 to a person in Mexico for intelligence purposes. The War Department 
had been using the good offices of the American Smelting and Refining Company of 
New York City which routinely transferred funds across the border. The company's 
cryptic phrasing of its telegram about the matter to its branch in Mexico aroused the 
suspicion of the U.S. Cable Censor which refused to allow the telegram onto the wires 
14 N. L. R. Edgar, to DNI, 17 December 1918, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98 F-6-d, 11466-H. 
Nolan to ChiefMIB, 17 August 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-R-44. Cable 
Christiana [Solbert] to MID, 30 July 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-V-70. Harris and 
Sadler, The Archaeologist Was a Spy, p. 182. 
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until the matter had been fully explained. A quiet phone call from the MID to the 
Censor's office ultimately straightened the matter out. IS 
Ethical relaxations, and the proliferation of modes of human intelligence 
collection aside, there were additional changes during World War One. Seldom 
before the war did civilian agencies acquire and disseminate military information. 
Seldom also did the armed services recruit spies to acquire economic, political, or 
social information. During the war, however, both of these happened on a routine 
basis. In fact, so broadly did the War Department spread its intelligence collection 
efforts that officers might reasonably start to find it 'logical that the MID should so 
develop that its system should gather all kinds of S[ ecret] S[ ervice] information for 
practically all branches of our government in foreign countries', as one attache 
recommended toward the end of the war.16 
'" '" '" 
The American military entered World War I with substantial experience with 
overt human collection and very little that it remembered with clandestine collection 
against targets abroad. It is true that an attache had once illicitly acquired the plans to 
a French fortress but he was promptly sent home, not by the French, but by the U.S. 
Ambassador.17 The Army and the Navy had also conducted a few operations in 
Europe to collect information about the nature and movements of Spanish forces 
during the Spanish-American War. Even during that war, however, the very concept 
of spying was still a little vague, as its application to Rowan's 'Message to Garcia' 
incident, which was in truth little more than a courier mission, showed. (See Chapter 
1.) The Army, Navy, and the Bureau of Investigation also engaged in scattered 
IS See documents filed under 9944-G-7, NARA RG 165, Entry 65. 
16 O. N. Solbert to Director, MID, 4 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-U-112. 
17 Vagts, The Military Attache, p. 223. 
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clandestine operations during the early 20th century, particularly operations aimed at 
Mexico. However, these operations were often undertaken at local initiative. In the 
case of the War Department, which at this time lacked a centralized intelligence 
structure, this meant that there was nobody to compile these experiences, learn from 
them, refine them, and promulgate them back out to others. The Navy's ONI did exist 
throughout, but it was very small and President Wilson and his Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels were reluctant to prepare for war or spend money on espionage. For 
its part, the Bureau of Investigation never tried to spread its wings any farther afield 
than Latin America. Its priorities were at home, and this was especially true once the 
United States declared war. IS 
Not surprisingly, then, when the United States entered the war, it immediately 
became obvious that espionage required a great deal more attention from both 
services. However, the United States faced a steep learning curve in the realm of 
clandestine collection, every bit as steep as it simultaneously faced in aerial 
reconnaissance and 'code and cipher work'. Despite the occasional setback or 
blunder, American espionage capability went from near nil at the beginning of 1917 
to respectable though-as with its signals intelligence capability-not a world leader 
by the end of the war. In the process, the State Department, Army and Navy began 
the transition from a conception of espionage as an almost purely observational 
activity to one which provided insight into the thinking of human beings of interest. 
To its credit, the Navy had managed to lay down some plans for wartime 
expansion of espionage. However, the Navy's wartime efforts were by far the least 
productive or sophisticated of the government agencies that devoted significant 
)8 For a useful discussion of the twentieth century pre-war American espionage scene, see 
Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, The Archaeologist Was a Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley 
and the Office o/Naval Intelligence (Albuquerque, 2003), pp. 1-16,24-25. 
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attention to espionage. To its credit, the Navy had been thinking in an organized 
fashion before the war about how it might conduct espionage operations. In June, 
1915 Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels approved a plan to expand the attache 
system. 19 Then, in May 1916 the Chief of Naval Operations directed ONI to: 
Select reliable agents at various points and ports in and near enemy 
country and in probable field of operations and keep the list of such 
dependable persons corrected to date; prepare a complete system of 
secret service and cipher codes to be used in communicating with such 
agents; and make such plans and arrangements now as will reduce 
paper work and other work ... to a minimum on the eve of and during 
20 
war. 
ONI was happy to comply, feeling that 'the work of selecting reliable agents 
in neutral countries is of such great importance that it should be undertaken 
immediately'. Otherwise it thought it would be forced to pay later either in delay or 
in poor performance. aNI recommended that agents be selected from among the ex-
patriate community in Lisbon, Copenhagen, the Azores, Port Said (Egypt) and 
Singapore and in China at Hong Kong, Amoy, and Shanghai. In order to preserve the 
diplomatic status of the naval attaches the selections should be made by retired 
officers or officers travelling apparently innocently on leave. With regard to 
implementing this plan, aNI gave priority to establishing a 'Naval Information 
Service' in China.21 In January 1917, the DNI assessed that aNI was making 'steady 
, . . fi 22 progress In prepanng or war. 
During the war, however, aNI's efforts were unimpressive. Even the post-
war head of aNI's counterintelligence section felt that the office had spent too much 
effort on counterespionage and that this had come at the expensive of its foreign 
19 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA (New York, 
1977), pp. 52. 
20 'ONI' to Chief of Naval Operations, 'Preparations necessary to insure a state of readiness 
for war', n.d., NARA, RG 38, Entry 86 Box 1 of 1, unlabelled folder. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage, p. 52. 
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intelligence efforts. There seems to be merit in this complaint.23 ONI's efforts in 
Europe were modest and marked primarily by amateurism. Roger Welles, the head of 
ONI during the war, allowed that 'our men are like babes of innocence in spite of 
their drinking and playing and profanity'. lie though they were 'not up to it in 
diplomacy and intrigue, nor indeed, in tact and wisdom'. The one arguable exception, 
Edward Breck, who had had some minor success in Spain during the Spanish-
American War, was posted by ONI to Lisbon, an intelligence backwater.24 
The Navy's main effort in human collection was through attaches, but during 
the war ONI also dispatched 'agents' to countries in which there was no Naval 
Attache.25 However, a post-war report on operations in Europe and South America 
found substantial shortcomings among these agents, as well. The report observed that 
the US lacked what Germany had: 'men with a knowledge of intelligence work and an 
understanding of secret service methods'. As a result, ONI simply looked for civilian 
volunteers who spoke the requisite languages and then, after an 'elementary and 
incomplete course of instruction' sent them abroad. Damning with faint praise, the 
report noted that 'the greater number of Agents thus selected was found to be fairly 
competent and some of them developed ability of a high order'. These agents largely 
depended on American citizens, primarily business men, to provide them intelligence 
. c. . • b k h 26 informatIOn lor transmIsSIOn ac orne. 
Every agent sent from this Office was provided with a cover, 
consisting usually of an appointment as travelling representative of 
American business houses or newspapers .. .It was found, however, by 
experience that in many cases the enemy, after the lapse of a more or 
less extended period, discovered their identity, and when this fact was 
ascertained beyond doubt, they were immediately recalled. By 
23 ChiefofONI Section A, 'Section "A" Report and Recommendations', n.d. [1919?], 
NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, F-6-d. 11466-A. Stills, The Crisis at Sea, p. 39. 
24 Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence (Annapolis, 1979), pp. 130. 
2S Admiral Sims' office in London, while it had a small intelligence office, did not conduct 
espionage. 
26 Edgar to DNI, 17 December 1918, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, F -6-d, 11466-H. 
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arrangement with the State Department, this Office was also given the 
privilege of appointing Agents under the title of Vice Consul. They 
were paid by this Office, but were accorded facilities in the Consulates 
and the privilege of using the diplomatic pouch. Wherever there were 
Naval Attaches, the Agents reported directly to them and not to this 
Office. Where, however, as in Switzerland, there was no Attache, the 
cover as Vice Consul was practically indispensable as being the only 
method by which the agent could correspond with this Office without 
exposing his mail to the danger of being tampered with. 27 
ONI's main effort before the war had been in Asia, but during the war, Latin 
America and Asia vied for pride of place. Its primary foreign intelligence effort was 
focused in the United States' backyard where the hostility of Mexico and Colombia 
and the 'favorable basing area for submarines furnished by the Caribbean and Gulf 
Sea and Gulf of Mexico demanded primary attention'. The hunt for radio stations 
also consumed a substantial share of ONI' s effort in Latin America.28 In 1917 ONI 
began hiring archaeologists and anthropologists as agents to conduct 'archaeological 
reconnaissance' in Mexico and Central America. As one might imagine, the Navy 
was not genuinely interested in Mayan ruins. It was, however, acutely interested in 
the possible presence of secret German submarine bases in Mexico and it wanted 
them found, if they existed.29 ONI also spent a great deal of effort investigating 
Japanese intrigues in the Pacific region, often lumping (nominal ally) Japan into the 
same files as enemy Germany and Austria-Hungary. Efforts against Japan were 
generally not successful. While it was easy to spy on Japanese pearl fishermen in 
Panama (and ONI did so extensively), conducting operations in Japan was another 
matter entirely. The Naval Attache in Tokyo tried to collect intelligence in that 
27 Ibid. 
28 'Office of Naval Intelligence, Division of Operations, Navy Department', 25 May 1918, 
NARA, RG 38 Entry 98 E-9-a, l0670-A. A typed notation at the top of the article says that it 
was deemed too sensitive to be used publicly. 
29 Harris and Sadler, The Archaeologist Was a Spy recounts in detail the experiences of one 
such archaeologist searching for German bases. 
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country, but beyond some successes in counting merchant ships, was unable to 
accomplish much. Japanese security was just too tight. 30 
Though the War Department had no intelligence office as such in the years 
immediately preceding World War I, it did maintain military attaches abroad. 
Perhaps more significantly, however, it had gained some modest but important 
experience in the Pershing-led 1916 Punitive Expedition to hunt down Pancho Villa in 
Mexico. Not only did the Punitive Expedition conduct rudimentary aerial 
reconnaissance and signals intelligence operations (See Chapter 2.) but it also 
conducted human intelligence operations and two of the key officers involved in this 
effort undertook similar endeavours in the AEF G-2. Most notably, the Expedition 
recruited a number of Japanese living in Mexico who had a variety of links to Villa, 
his wife, and his brother. The Japanese gained Villa's confidence and provided some 
excellent information on his strength and actions. Captain W.O. Reed, the head of the 
intelligence section, provided poison to two of the Japanese in order that they might 
poison Villa. (It seems likely that the Japanese were handled more routinely by an 
officer named Nicholas Campanole, a skilled Japanese linguist who had performed a 
number of unorthodox missions earlier in his career, and who was Reed's deputy and 
then succeeded him as chief intelligence officer.) In any event, Villa had long been 
wary of such a possibility and drank only a little of the poisened coffee and so did not 
die. When rum our of this operation reached the Attorney General, he brought it to the 
attention of the Secretary of War and a quiet investigation ensued. Some evidence 
even suggests there was a cover up. Be that as it may, the War Department cleared 
Pershing of any wrong-doing in February 1917. Van Deman, even before seeing the 
30 Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, pp. 137-138. The Military Attache found the security 
situation comparably bleak. 'No foreign spy can do much work in Japan without being 
caught [and] There are no Japanese I know of who can be trusted', he reported. Moreover, 
the Japanese government was constantly dispatching provocateurs to the embassy. Military 
Attache Tokyo to War College Division, 30 June 1917, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-H-1. 
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evidence, dismissed the whole matter: 'I am very sure that somebody is lying ... the 
story about poison is simply absurd' .31 
Two main avenues of American clandestine collection developed in the War 
Department. The first was through the offices of the attaches and the second was 
through the AEF itself. The prospective development of American military espionage 
caused some apprehension in French and British quarters. However, espionage 
conducted out of attaches' offices grew organically and while the British and the 
French were in no particular position to stop it, they certainly tried to shape it to their 
own ends. Early on, British intelligence officials gave mixed messages to the 
American Military Attache in London, William Lassiter. On the one hand, through 
him they encouraged the United States to quickly establish its own 'secret service 
bureau' modelled on the British one and they offered to lend three British officers to 
serve in it. They also said that the AEF should have an intelligence section like that 
of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and that American attaches should be 
allowed to 'establish confidential relations' with allied attaches. On the other hand, 
the British advised Lassiter that the Americans should not 'duplicate' existing allied 
efforts in Europe. Scandinavia, the British thought, might be an acceptable field for 
American espionage, but Latin America and the Far East would be even better. They 
recommended using people who were already in place such as bankers or 
representatives of Standard Oil rather than specially dispatched personnel. 
Remarkably, the British also sought Lassiter's help in getting an American vice-
consul who had been serving in Turkey a commission in the British Army so they 
31 Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler cover this whole incident in the chapter entitled 
'Termination with Extreme Prejudice: The United States Versus Pancho Villa', in The Border 
and the Revolution (Las Cruces, 1988), pp. 7-23. See also Katz, Life and Times of Pancho 
Villa (Stanford, 1998), pp. 608-611. 
176 
could send him to Syria for intelligence work. 32 Similarly, the British asked Nolan 
early on to encourage a particular American professor to work for British intelligence 
Russia. 33 The idea seems not to have occurred to the British that the Americans might 
use these people themselves. The Americans found themselves boxed out in another 
realm of espionage, as well. In the AEF, Dennis Nolan decided not to use female 
agents in large part because most of the good ones were taken. 'To have hired any of 
them would merely have deprived the French or British of their services by paying 
them more than our Allies could pay,.34 
In general, the British and the French displayed an ambivalence about 
welcoming new players onto the pitch (particularly from the AEF) that was in marked 
contrast to their firm insistence that the United States undertake vigorous counter-
espionage measures. In part, this was a function of the initial French and the British 
hope to use American troops as replacements to make good their own staggering 
losses and not as an autonomous national army in their own right. What need was 
there for an American intelligence staff in Europe if there was no American force for 
it to support? Hence, the head of the French 'secret service' was alarmed at the 
prospect that the AEF might establish a spy system behind German lines, potentially 
interfering with French and British efforts. He thought that if the Americans simply 
donated their men to the Allied armies, there would be no need for an inevitably 
slipshod American intelligence structure.35 Similarly, in June 1917 the British, 
including Admiral Hall, told the AEF 0-2, Dennis Nolan, that it would be dangerous 
32 Military Attache, London to WeD, 1 June 1917, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-A-9. 
Lassiter Diary, Vol. X, pp. 65 and 81, Lassiter Papers, USMA. Though Lassiter endorsed the 
idea, it is not clear whether the American got his British commission. 
33 Nolan, 'History', p. 184. 
34 Ibid, pp. 193-194. 
3S Nolan, 'Comments', pp. 43-44. See also Nolan, 'History', pp. 179-183. 
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to blunder around where the British, French, and Belgians were already operating. 
They offered instead to share the NID's take with him.36 
Such subordinate arrangements in the intelligence field might have been 
acceptable to the Army Chief of Staff, General Hugh Scott, whose initial inclination 
had been to let the Allies handle the whole intelligence business anyway, but Pershing 
and Nolan, his G-2, wanted none of it. They figured that if there were an intelligence 
failure and the AEF suffered a catastrophic attack, they did not want to have to tell the 
American public that they had left the job of protecting the American troops from 
. k r· 37 surpnse attac to lorelgners. 
Even into 1918 the Allies continued to try to mould the American espionage 
effort. In February, the Interallied Bureau, a venue created at the French Ministry of 
Defence for intelligence coordination among the allies, recommended that the United 
States should stay out of the areas right behind the German front lines, though if it 
wanted to send agents east of the Rhine it should feel free to do so. It encouraged 
American operations in Switzerland using 'influential personas of whom we have 
many versed in German politics and commerce ... such ... as Mr. Rockefeller', or 
through interviewing deserters and travellers, but urged the United States to eschew 
running 'small' agents because of the substantial overhead costs involved. The Allies 
also urged the Americans to become active in Sweden, Denmark and Russia 'stating 
that their own efforts in those countries had been a total failure', and they proposed 
specific American companies as platforms in those countries. They further 'pointed 
to Spain and South America as good recruiting ground for agents able to travel in 
36 Nolan, 'History', p. 179. The sort of concerns thc French and British had were latcr 
illustrated by British complaints that an Amcrican in Switzcrland had been driving up the 
price of intclligence by offering an exorbitant sum of money for the formula of a new German 
gas. The British also griped that an American in Holland had employed as a source someone 
who had been on the British 'suspect list' since the beginning of the war. Nolan, 'History', 
fP. 184-185. 
7 Van Deman, The Final Memoranda, p. 21. Nolan, 'Comments', pp. 43-44. 
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enemy countries with small danger of detection'. American Jews, Poles and Slavs 
could be sent to Russia on intelligence missions, 'while Spaniards and South 
Americans are able to enter Germany with comparative safety, either through 
Switzerland or Holland. Agents sent to Russia will encounter no difficulties reaching 
Switzerland by way of Bulgaria and Germany, or by Warsaw-Kiev to Switzerland'. 
The British even offered to support the cover of agents sent along the latter routes. 38 
In the event, MID did little itself in terms of directly dispatching undercover 
'agents', and as had been the case with ON I, such efforts as it did undertake were far 
from uniformly successful. For instance, in May 1918, the MID dispatched to Japan, 
China and Siberia one 'Donald Thompson, a moving picture operator', representing 
one or more of the major firms in the business. MID assured the Military Attache in 
Vladivostok that Thompson was 'discreet and trustworthy'. Instead, the American 
forces in Siberia found him 'neither discreet nor trustworthy-a moral degenerate and 
a liar of the first water. He could not be worse. His information are [sic] fabricated'. 
C • b 1··,39 We 'can't 10rglVe a ove qua Ittes . 
Despite such hiccups, however, MID kept casting about for ways to perfect its 
centralized collection system. In September 1918, elaborating upon suggestions made 
independently by the attache in Denmark and Ralph Van Deman from his perch in 
Europe, it implemented a far-flung plan to acquire information through American 
corporations which had offices abroad. The MID realized that local cooperation 
between businessmen and the attaches, though timely, might be risky both for the 
government and the company (which had not stopped some attaches from doing this 
on their own initiative) if the relationship should be found out. Thus, it decided to 
38 Nolan, 'History', pp. 182-184. Ralph Van Deman, in late 1918, also suggested using Latin 
America as a launching point for operations against Germany. Van Deman to Churchill, 20 
October 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-235/5. 
39 Dunn to Slaughter, 11 May 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-37. 
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approach the chief executives of major American firms such as United Fruit, 
Guaranty Trust, US Steel, National City Bank, Standard Oil of New Jersey and the 
Singer Sewing Machine Company. The executives agreed to forward questionnaires 
pertaining to 'economic, political and psychological' issues composed by the MID to 
their overseas office and send the results to the MID through a cut-out address in 
Pennsylvania. In theory, the corporate employees, be they American or foreign, 
would never know that they were providing information to the US Government. 
When peace intervened, the plan withered before producing anything more than 
40 
meagre results. 
The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) G-2 was an important part of the 
overall espionage effort, contributing in a variety of ways. The AEF ran its own 
clandestine operations, the most important of which centred on a Czech emigre named 
Emmanuel Victor Voska. In addition, the AEF augmented the attaches I offices in 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. Each of these received four or 
five officers trained in 'secret service' work either at the AEF or by the British or 
French. The AEF also provided money to support the operations of these officers, but 
it demanded no information from them as to precisely who they had recruited, a 
lesson Nolan had learned from the French. 
The experience of the war had shown that no one should have a 
complete list of the agents employed on espionage work, and that the 
agents should not know each other; the danger being that in case one 
agent was captured he could be forced to reveal the names of the others 
engaged in the work. This catastrophe had happened to the French 
system early in the war and had resulted in a large number of their 
agents being executed .... The French cautioned me especially in this 
respect and I duly warned our attaches, directing them to deal 
personally with only one or two people, and each of whom would deal 
40 Churchill to Van Deman, 18 October 1918, NARA, RG 165, 9944-U-I06. O. N. Solbert to 
Chief MID, 13 July 1918, 9944-U-73 RG 165, Entry 65. Van Deman to Churchill, 28 
September 1918, NARA RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-U-105. DMI to Military AttacbC 
Copenhagen, 19 March 1919, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-U-141. 
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with not more than four or five others who were unknown to each 
other. These in tum would deal with another group of agents who 
were also unknown to each other and known only to their immediate 
employer. In other words, neither the military attache nor his principal 
agents would have lists of the people who were operating in 
Germany.41 
Indeed, from the first day, the American attaches learned much from the 
Allies, both directly and through the men Nolan dispatched. Davis, attache in the 
Netherlands, recalled that 'none of these tasks which we undertook was new or 
original. They were old when we came into the War. So when we marched toward 
their solution we first 'caught step' with our Allies and got the benefit of their 
. d tu ,42 expenence an mom en m. 
The clandestine activities of the attaches in the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Scandinavia exemplified War Department clandestine practices and were undoubtedly 
the most important that the Department conducted through the offices of the attaches. 
The MID assessed that the Netherlands was the most important post not only because 
it was a neutral country bordering Germany-so too were Switzerland and 
Denmark-but because it also bordered occupied Belgium, where the civilian 
population was friendly to the Allied cause.43 This raised the wonderful prospect of 
relatively easy crossings into enemy-controlled territory. Instantly upon the American 
declaration of war, the attache (first Captain A. Poillon, later Lieutenant H. D. Rose 
and, from July 1918, Colonel Edward Davis) sent in a lengthy report on clandestine 
operations and how he thought they should be conducted in the country to which he 
was accredited. This report drew extensively on information that his new allies were 
41 Nolan, 'History', pp. 186-187. 
42 Edward Davis, 'Military Attache', p. 372, Edward Davis papers, box 1, USAMHI, 
Carlisle, PA. This is document is Davis' unpublished memoirs. Hereafter Davis, 
'Military Attache'. 
43 MID History, p. 416. 
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suddenly willing to share with him. Two matters loomed large in his report: 
counterespionage and train watching.44 
Once the attache's office in the Netherlands was fully active it identified its 
primary tasking as the gathering of 'facts'. This meant a broad array of data covering 
what intelligence officers charged with writing monographs or estimates for military 
leaders were already calling the 'combat', 'political', 'economic' and 'psychologic' 
[sic] factors. For Colonel Edward Davis, this meant the: 
enemy's plans for his military operations ... his battle losses and his 
gains in recruits; his production output of arms and munitions of every 
type; the number of troops he was moving from Russia to France, and 
vice versa, or north and south in Belgium; all his various activities 
behind his lines in France; new military devices and methods; his food 
and clothing production and its sufficiency or insufficiency; the health 
and the morale of his armies and his popUlation; the relations existing 
between the various countries that were combined against us; the 
condition of all their railways and rolling stock; the characteristics of 
the principal commanders in the enemy armies and of influential 
political leaders. 45 
Of course, not only was the enemy actively trying to deny access to this sort of 
information, but the types of people who might be able to provide it were often 
problematic, sources of uncertainty in their own right. Davis found that many spies 
were 'unstable and easily bought', others were 'over-tactful and prone to tell their 
Chief what they think he wishes to hear'. As a result, 'much worthless information is 
received along with each item of great value. The trick of the trade is quickly to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. This ability comes with actual comparisons and in 
h ,46 no ot erway . 
44 'HS' [Military Attache, Hague] 'On the Intelligence system Necessary in Case u.s. Troops 
are Ordered to the Continent', 15 April 1917, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-X-1. 
45 Davis, 'Military Attache', pp. 371-372. 
46 Ibid, p. 374. These sorts of problems were not, of course, confined to the War Department. 
For instance, a State Department intelligence officer was the victim of a blackmail attempt by 
a disgruntled source whom he had let go. Foglesong, America's Secret War, pp. 343-344. 
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Davis also found that he could not use American citizens to penetrate 
Germany because they would inevitably give themselves away with some small error. 
However, 'the Fatherland itself was not so difficult of penetration by agents as might 
seem because the necessities and incidents of trade between the two countries 
demanded a certain amount of travel back and forth'. Lots of people had the right 
papers and genuine reasons to cross the border.47 Given this, the attaches in the 
Netherlands could use the sort of chain system that Nolan had advised which allowed 
the office to reach into the target's territory, passing 'orders in one direction 
and ... information in the other' often without its ultimate source being aware that his 
material was going to the Americans. Davis had some seven or eight such 'systems' 
of spies, some networks operated in the Netherlands, some in Germany, some in 
B I · 48 e glUm. 
The Attache's office in The Hague ran an important ifnot particularly flashy 
case that provided information pursuant to many important issues. Someone had 
recruited a German newspaper official who was able to travel to The Hague and who 
passed along the German government's press guidance which provided information 
about what Berlin did not want reported, secret information in itself. This provided 
clues as to the German assessment of the military situation on the Western Front, 
German propaganda aims, strains among the Central Powers, and crop statistics and 
other important economic information, among other things.49 
The office ran several other important cases, too. For instance, in western 
Germany an 'old gentleman of some local rank and distinction' was an important 
'indirect source' on German military plans. This man had a friend who was a German 
47 Davis, 'Military Attache', pp. 378-379. 
48 Ibid, pp. 372-373. 
49 Ibid, pp. 376-378. 
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Colonel of Engineers who would confide in him. He would then share this 
information with his circle of friends where Davis' sources would pick it up. In this 
way Davis got information on the successive lines to which the German Army would 
withdraw when it began its collapse in the West. From a similarly indirect route the 
Attache's office was able to learn from a member of the German General Staff that 
the German army was going to withdraw from Belgium, though the Armistice came 
before such a withdrawal could be completed.50 
Davis' predecessor, Captain Poillon had reported from the Netherlands in the 
spring of 1917 that one of the primary tasks of allied intelligence personnel in the 
Netherlands was train watching: keeping track of German military train traffic in 
Germany and occupied Belgium. He noted that the Allies had a sophisticated 
cooperative system of reporting on these matters and that the information could 
provide a valuable tip-off of the timing and direction of impending German 
offensives.51 (By reaching more deeply and more persistently into enemy territory, 
train watching could provide warning farther in advance than could aerial 
reconnaissance, albeit with less precision and a greater time lag in reporting.) 
Doubtless to the relief of the Allies, the Attache's office in the Netherlands did little if 
anything in the realm of train watching, aside from report to MID on its theory and 
practice which it learned from the Allies. However, the attache in Denmark was able 
to put these ideas to work establishing train watching systems at Madgeburg, 
Cologne, and Frankfurt. At war's end they were also working on establishing such 
50 Ibid, p. 379; MID History, pp. 420-421. 
51 Ibid, pp. 380-381. The Allied train watching operations are well documented in a number 
of places. Christopher Andrew discusses train watching and its relationship to broader issues 
of British human intelligence operations on the Western Front in Her Majesty's Secret 
Service, chapter 4, starting at p. 141. For a discussion of the micro-level of the collection and 
analytic issues associated with train watching from a British officer, see I Jenry Landau, 
AI/'sFair: The Story of the British Secret Service, (New York, 1935), pp. 61, 65-69. 
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systems at Mainz, Mannheim, Karslruhe, and Strasbourg which was then part of 
52 Germany. 
The Military Attache in Copenhagen was also able to take advantage of the 
geographic position of Denmark to gather information about the state of the German 
army and navy. Following the practice of allied states, he established a system to find 
and interview German deserters who came across the border. This he accomplished 
bringing together the efforts of the State Department, local American businessmen, 
and paid Danish citizens, primarily farmers. He gained agreement from the State 
Department to establish four Vice Consular posts along the Danish-German border. 
One the State Department manned itself, the other three it allowed the Attache to man 
with energetic American businessmen that he recruited. The Attache then appointed a 
consular clerk to each of these posts to serve as chief agent. Each clerk, in tum, hired 
a sub-agent who was, in tum, responsible for recruiting farmers along the border to 
route deserters to the sub-agent. The farmers, who in theory, did not know for whom 
they were working, were paid for each deserter they found. 53 
The AEF itself also conducted important human collection operations. After 
Pershing and Nolan had made clear to the allies in 1917 that there would be a separate 
AEF intelligence shop, Pershing directed Nolan, apparently at Nolan's instigation, 'to 
make preparations to install a system of espionage which would cover the front our 
armies would occupy, and while cooperating cordially with the French and British 
always, would not be entirely dependent on their sources of information'. Clandestine 
work became the business ofG-2B under Lieutenant Colonel W. o. Reed, who had 
been Pershing'S intelligence chief during the Punitive Expedition and who had 
52 Military Attache Copenhagen to Military Section, Military Intelligence Division, 20 
November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-U-130/1. Military Attache Copenhagen, 
'German Train Watching System Carried on by this Office, n.d, 9944-U-130/2. 
53 Military Attache Copenhagen to Chief, MID, 20 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 
65,9944-U-125. 
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supplied the poison given to Pancho Villa. (Reed was replaced in the Spring of 1918 
by Nicholas Campanole who, in tum, was relieved in October 1918 by Colonel 
Alexander B. Coxe.) G-2B was made up of two subsections, one of which was for 
espionage under Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas W. Campanole, the Japanese linguist 
who for a time had been Reed's subordinate and then successor in Mexico. The other 
subsection did counter-espionage under the leadership of Major Aristides Moreno.54 
However, as time passed Nolan found clandestine intelligence less interesting 
and less useful in providing timely information than the work of the code and cipher 
men.55 Van Deman in Europe commented on this in a late October 1918 letter to 
Churchill, during that period when AEF intelligence was finally beginning to hit its 
stride. 
The situation has changed somewhat since I wrote you on the subject 
two or three months ago. At that time it seemed important to get 
agents over who would get back the usual sort of military information. 
Since then our front line Intelligence work-observation, examination 
of prisoners and deserters, airplane photos and observation, wireless 
and other interceptions, etc., -has improved very greatly and we feel 
that we can get much ofthe purely front line military information in 
that way that formerly we had to rely upon agents to receive. 
However, Van Deman wrote, one type of information obtainable through espionage 
'has vastly increased in importance from a military point of view' . 
That is the actual conditions in the interior of Germany-the financial 
situation, political conditions, particularly as affecting future 
developments connected with the German Government, the morale of 
that part of the population which will have a direct influence on the 
prosecution of the war, changes in the higher offices of the 
Government and of Military Naval Officials, etc. The ordinary agent 
cannot get this kind of stuff. 56 
54 Nolan, 'History', pp. 185-186. United States Army, Center of Military History, United 
States Army in World War 1,1917-1919, Volume 13, (Washington, 2001), p. 7. (Hereafter 
CMH, United States Army in World War I.) Campanole and Moreno had been on a list of 
officers whom Pershing had requested by name shortly after he deployed to Europe in 1917. 
Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, Vol. 1, (New York, 1931), pp. 103fn. 
55 Nolan, 'History', p. 118. 
56 Van Deman to Churchill, 20 October 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-235/5. 
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Despite Nolan's general lack of enthusiasm about espionage, the AEF was 
active in the espionage field. In late 1917 it inherited a network of Russian agents 
previously controlled by the Russian military. 57 G-2-B also mounted one of the 
bolder clandestine operations of the war, using a Czech emigre. However, it had to 
struggle to maintain control over him as he had an agenda which he pursued 
passionately-Czechoslovak independence from Austria-Hungary-that while not 
opposed to the AEF's interests was decidedly different from them. 
Emanuel Voska was a Czech-American, an immigrant from Austrian-
dominated Bohemia (as the Czech homeland was then most commonly known). He 
was an ardent supporter of Czechoslovak independence and was the American 
representative of Thomas Masaryk, who would eventually become the first President 
of an independent Czechoslovakia. In 1914, under orders from Masaryk to help the 
Allied cause, Voska formed an 84-person intelligence organization headquartered in 
New York, which thoroughly penetrated Austro-Hungarian and, to a lesser degree, 
German operations in the United States. When Voska's organization gathered 
information on espionage, sabotage, or economic warfare activities by the Central 
Powers it passed the information to British intelligence, first to the naval attache, later 
to MI-l (c) and the Providence Rhode Island Journal. Over time the organization 
began to pass some information to the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation 
and other newspapers, as well. The operations also involved occasional and small-
scale liaison with Russian intelligence. 
57Thomas M. Johnson, Our Secret War: True American Spy Stories 1917-1919, 
(Indianapolis, 1929), pp. 209-210. Despite the generally low quality of American post-WWI 
literature about intelligence, this book seems reasonably reliable and it is remarkably sober 
throughout. Much of this books content can be readily confirmed with other sources that 
were consulted in the preparation of this dissertation. Johnson, a journalist with the AEF 
during the war, confesses in his introduction that 'it was the steady day and night labor of the 
many, rather than the "stunts" of the few, that enable American Intelligence' to succeed 
during the war. He thanks 'many friends who ... fought in our secret war' and 'four Chiefs of 
American Military Intelligence' for helping him with the book. 
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The organization's sources were primarily ethnic Czechs, Slovaks, and 
occasionally 'South Slavs' (Yugoslavs), particularly independence-minded members 
of these ethnic groups who held official positions in the Austro-Hungarian 
government. Voska had four different penetrations into the office of the Austrian 
Consul General in New York including a man named Von Nuber who in his regular 
job served as a communications conduit for many covert and clandestine matters not 
only for the Austro-Hungarians, but also for the Germans. Voska's work required 
extensive communication with 'fellow revolutionists' in Austria-Hungary so he 
established a courier system, with help from British naval intelligence and the theft of 
blank Austrian passports by one of his sources. Soon Masaryk himself, by now in 
exile in London, was using these channels to communicate with his homeland. 58 
When the United States entered the war, Voska turned his domestic operations 
over to the US Government and offered his services to the State Department. State, 
believing his value to be greater to the military, vigorously urged the War Department 
to commission him. Van Deman thought this was a fine idea, but he had difficulties 
persuading Secretary of War Newton Baker. The Secretary's concern was that much 
of what Voska proposed to do in Europe was to cause disturbances and labour strikes 
in enemy territory. This, the Secretary noted, was precisely the sort of thing that 
President Wilson had castigated the Germans for trying to do in the United States. 
(Apparently the distinction that the United States had been neutral at the time while 
Austria-Hungary was a belligerent did not occur to the Secretary.) After a trip to 
France, however, Baker relented. Voska was made a captain and allowed to choose 
three subordinates, all from the Bohemian National Alliance, a political group in the 
United States, who could become lieutenants. Before departing for France, Voska 
58 Emanuel Victor Voska and Will Irwin, Spy and Counterspy, (New York, 1940), pp. 16-211 
passim. 
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consulted extensively with the State Department which 'charged him with certain 
things which they wish[ed] accomplished in Austria-Hungary'. He also met with the 
Committee on Public Information to discuss how could help them in propagandizing 
A . H 59 ustna- un gary. 
Voska arrived in France on 4 July 1918 and immediately proceeded to AEF 
headquarters at Chaumont where he was assigned to G-2B in the AEF. By 23 July, 
Nolan and Ralph Van Deman-now relieved from running the MID and assigned to 
Nolan as an adviser and roving inspector-had apparently approved Voska's plans 
essentially as he had laid them out all along. 6o Assigned to the G-2B Voska found 
himself in charge of a section collecting military, economic, and political intelligence 
from Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and the occupied parts of France and Italy. In 
conducting these operations, he worked out of four locations: the AEF headquarters in 
Chaumont, France; the Netherlands; Switzerland; and Padua, Italy. Voska drew into 
his organization a number of his colleagues from his New York intelligence 
operations. The MID combed the Army for German-speakers and sent several to him. 
Voska also recruited volunteers extensively from Czechs and Slovaks in France, 
Switzerland, and Italy. In the Netherlands, he joined forces with a former courier 
from his New York organization whom Masaryk had put in charge of an effort to 
collect information on the munitions factories in western Germany.61 As he recounted 
in his memoirs on the eve of World War II, in Switzerland, Voska was able to use a 
59 Voska, Spy and Counterspy, p. 212. Van Deman to Nolan 5 July 1918, NARA, RG 120, 
Entry 194, Box 6035, Folder "Secret Service Capt. E.V. Voska Reports". Van Deman, The 
Final Memoranda, p. 54-55. Van Deman clearly had access to a copy of his 5 July 1918 
memo when writing this passage in The Final Memoranda. Writing some 30 years later, he 
recollected that he was 'sure' the Secretary would come back from Europe viewing the 
question of covert action from a 'different angle'. Upon returning, the Secretary, did, in fact, 
approve the 'entire proposal' regarding Voska. 
60 Van Deman, Final Memoranda, p. 57. 
61 Voska, Spy and Counterspy, p. 259-262. Voska, 'Memorandum' possibly to Nolan, 23 July 
1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 194, Box 6035, Folder 'Secret Service Misc. Reports by LTS 
Ruditsky & Voska'. 
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small intelligence outfit set up by Masaryk and Eduard Benes in 1915 which had 
established a courier service to Prague.62 When inserting people into Germany, 
Voska's people typically got them across the border as vendors or labourers, as there 
was a thriving cross-border traffic of such people. Typically, they brought back 
information from agents operating deeper in the enemy interior.63 
Voska's most important activities were conducted out of Italy against the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, however. Even before he set up shop in Italy, Czech 
deserters had set up an intelligence effort with the help of the Italian Army using line 
crossers and bringing out military intelligence information from sympathetic units of 
the Austrian Army, as well as distributing propaganda leaflets in the opposing army 
and running a courier service to Vienna and Prague. The courier service consisted of 
Czech soldiers travelling on leave. When Voska arrived he took over running these 
efforts on behalf of the U.S. Army, but in close liaison with the Italian forces. He 
arranged to get his son, Lieutenant Arthur Voska, who had not worked with him in 
New York but had observed the work up close, transferred from an aviation to unit to 
work with him as second-in-command of the effort. The third-in-command was 
Lieutenant N.P. Ruditsky, an electrician in civilian life who had done audio 
surveillance work for Voska's group in New York.64 
The involvement of the armed services in espionage was to be expected. Not 
foreordained was the State Department's entry into the realm of clandestine 
collection. Perhaps the State Department's clandestine collection of military 
information was the most remarkable intelligence result of the new total war. During 
the period of American neutrality after the outbreak of war in 1914, State started 
62 Voska, Spy and Counterspy, p. 263. 
63 Ibid. p. 264. 
M Ibid pp. 271-278. 
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appointing 'special agents', using a few 'operatives' from the Bureau oflnvestigation 
and the Treasury's Secret Service to conduct 'investigations of a highly confidential 
nature'. Much of this work was focused on domestic counterintelligence though it did 
employ one agent on U.S. soil to collect information about Mexico.65 Before long, 
the Department was also employing 'agents' in other countries. As Secretary Lansing 
described it in his memoirs, this 'necessitated an office ... to issue instructions to 
[agents and operatives] and to digest and analyze their reports without their going 
through the regular channels of departmental correspondence'. Thus, one can perhaps 
date the beginning of State's formal role in clandestine intelligence to the designation 
of the secretive Leland Harrison in April, 1916 to run what became the 'Bureau of 
Secret Intelligence' (BSI) under the general supervision of Counsellor Frank Polk, the 
number two person in the Department and from May 1917 Polk's deputy, Gordon 
Auchincloss, the son-in-law of Colonel Edward House. 66 During World War I, the 
BSI dispatched a modest number of collectors abroad, perhaps fifteen or SO.67 More 
commonly, however, it served as a coordinator, clearing house and sometime 
champion for the clandestine efforts of other agencies. In March 1917, for instance, 
Counsellor Frank L. Polk, to whom Harrison reported, 'went to Congress re: money 
S . ,68 for Secret ervlce. 
As the war dragged on, there was an emerging sense of complementarity 
among the Army, Navy, and State Department collectors. A military man might be 
able to get what a naval man could not and vice versa and diplomats, in their tum, 
could acquire information not available to the services. All of these inputs were 
65 John F. Chalkley, Zach Lamar Cobb: EI Paso Collector of Customs and Intelligence 
During the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1918, (El Paso, 1998). 
66 Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State (Indianapolis, 1935), 
p.f' 318. Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage, p. 46. 
6 Harris and Sadler, Archaeologist, p. 21. 
68 Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage, p. 47. 
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necessary in order to form a sound understanding of the 'picture puzzle' that was the 
overall situation.69 Nevertheless, of the three Departments that took the lead in 
espionage, State was the most aggressive in its efforts to recruit penetrations agents in 
foreign organizations of interest, including the German military. By the time it was 
fully operational during the late months of the war, the Department had a small but 
vigorous clandestine capability that operated aggressively acquiring secret 
information, sometimes stealing it from inside enemy bureaucracies, other times 
acquiring it in chaotic lawless regions. As might be expected, much of the State 
Department's collection was on political matters that were of secondary interest to the 
armed services, but its collection of military information was to prove important and 
its direct assistance to the military services in their collection efforts was to prove 
equally so. 
The State Department focused most of its initial espionage efforts on Mexico 
and the ongoing tumult in that country, but after the United States entered the war the 
Department's intelligence horizons expanded greatly.70 Much as in the Army 
'spying' and 'scouting' were tightly linked and only began to be definitively teased 
apart during World War I, so, too, did the operations ofthe State Department in 
revolutionary Russia illustrate the close relationship between espionage and the 
normal activities of diplomats. Much of what the diplomats did in revolutionary 
Russia was simply travel about the country and observe more or less overtly what was 
happening, speaking to whatever members of the population they could find who 
could provide insight into the situation. Diplomats might sometimes refer to this as 
69 See also United States Congress, Army Reorganization: Hearings before the Committee on 
Military Affairs, Part 3, Sixty Sixth Congress, Statement of Marlborough Churchill, 25 
September 1919, (Washington, 1919), p. 304. 
70 See Chalkley, Zach Lamar Cobb for a discussion of the most prominent espionage 
operation against Mexico. Mexico was also the primary focus throughout the war of the 
MID's signals intelligence efforts. 
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'intelligence' work and, in a sense it was.?) However, the only real difference 
between this and regular diplomatic and consular work was a perception of risk; this 
'intelligence' work was done in the violent, hinterland of a country in chaos rather 
than in the staid capital of a country at peace. Nevertheless, the State Department also 
began to conduct operations that were less and less purely diplomatic and became 
more like espionage. Some of these operations were centred in Washington, or at 
least closely monitored by Leland Harrison in Washington. Others were undertaken 
at local initiative. 
In its efforts to identify anti-Bolshevik forces-an entirely legitimate 
diplomatic task-and to provide discrete (and ultimately extremely limited) support to 
those which supported continued resistance to the Germans, the State Department had 
occasion to form an 'information service' that began to take on more and more of the 
trappings of espionage.72 The requirements of the war led the U.S. Government and 
its Allies to become deeply interested in what was going on in Bolshevik-controlled 
areas of Russia. Accordingly, the Department went to great lengths to collect 
military, political, economic and social information from the country. These efforts 
became substantially more difficult, however, when in late February 1918 the advance 
of German troops forced the Department to evacuate Petro grad, the Russian capital. 
Meanwhile, anti-Bolshevik forces of various types sprang up all across the 
71 See DeWitt Clinton Poole's comment that his work in Rostov and Novocherkassk in 1917-
1918 was that of an 'intelligence officer', Foglesong, America's Secret War, p. 309. 
72 Foglesong, America's Secret War, pp. 311-319. It should be noted that Foglesong 
interprets the activities of the State Department in Russia as being focused primarily on the 
Bolsheviks not the Germans and the ongoing war. In his view, the Department's activities 
amounted to what today might be called covert action against the nascent regime. David 
Langbart places a greater emphasis on operations against the Germans. See, his '''Spare No 
Expense": The Department of State and the Search for Information about Bolshevik Russia, 
November 1917-September 1918', Intelligence and National Security. 4:2, (Apr. 1989), p. 
316-334. See also Langbart's 'Five Months in Petrograd 1918: Robert W. Imbrie and the US 
Search for Information in Russia' , Studies in Intelligence. 52: 1, (March. 2008), (Web 
Supplement, https:llwww.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
pub licationsl csi-studies/studies/vol-52 -no-l lindex.html). 
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unoccupied portions of the former empire. Amidst all this chaos, and with US 
diplomats only in spotty and slow communication with Washington, in about March 
1918 Xenophon Dmitrievich de Blumenthal Kalamatiano, an American businessman 
in Russia, who had been doing work for Maddin Summers, US Consul General in 
Moscow since the fall of 1917, volunteered to form an 'information service'. 
Summers accepted the offer and Kalamatiano became the 'Chief Observer'. 73 When 
Summers died in May 1918, this budding information service fell under Dewitt 
Clinton Poole, who ascended to the post of Consul General. 74 
Poole denied any nefarious intention for the 'information service' and even 
purportedly informed the Bolshevik Foreign Commissar about it. He explained this 
move to the Department by writing that 'I explained to him that it was quite innocent, 
that we were entitled to know what was going on and it was the only way we could 
find out'.75 Nevertheless, the essential feature of this service was clandestinity. Poole 
recalled that: 
The information we needed was simply the ordinary flow of news such 
as one would read in the newspapers in a normal situation, but in view 
of the Bolshevik totalitarian methods of government and their strict 
control of information, it was necessary to organize this on the well-
known secret service system of cut-outs-that is, only two or three 
men were to know and have any contact with Kalamatiano. Then each 
of these men had two or three men in contact with him, and so on 
down, with the least possible cross-contacting.76 
Kalamatiano put together a system of some thirty men and women who 
travelled about the country and reported their observations. He used these reports to 
73 Richard B. Spence, 'The Tragic Fate of Kalamatiano: America's Man in Moscow', 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 12:3, (Fall 1999), p. 350. 
74 Foglesong, America's Secret War, pp. 305-306, 320. Poole would serve during World War 
II as the head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the ass. During the early Cold War, he 
was the president of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), a CIA-funded 
organization that ran Radio Free Europe. For a useful discussion of the NCFE, see Hugh 
Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, 2008), Chapter 2. 
75 Foglesong, America's Secret War, p. 321. 
76 Ibid, p. 322. 
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produce 'bulletins' for the consulate which the consulate would put into telegrams to 
the embassy and to Washington.77 Early reports from the service tended to focus on 
economic matters, but Kalamatiano urged his agents to gather more information about 
the military situation and they soon began to respond.78 Many of the agents were 
Russians. Others were Latvians and Czechs. Some were officers in the Red Army. 
One worked in the military censor's office, another source worked in the mobilization 
staff of the Yaroslavl district. Kalamatiano was also in communication with the anti-
Bolshevik Boris Savinkov, who launched an unsuccessful uprising from Yaroslavl in 
July 1918. His best source was a Latvian who worked as a senior official in the 
military communications department of the People's Commissariat of War. 
Kalamatiano was also able to use the varied party affiliations of his non-governmental 
sources to good advantage in acquiring political and other types of information. 79 
Predictably, after Allied troops landed at Archangel and in Vladivostok, 
relations between the Bolshevik government and Allied governments soured. The US 
Consulate in Moscow downsized and Consul General Poole, came home. However, 
Kalamatiano volunteered to stay behind on the theory that the Bolsheviks had become 
de facto Allies of the Germans and therefore that the service he could render to his 
country by reporting on events there was comparable to the service rendered by 
someone reporting from enemy territory.80 On 25 August 1918 Poole hosted a 
meeting of Allied representatives at the US consulate. Besides Poole, Kalamatiano 
attended for the Americans; also in attendance were the soon-to-be infamous Sidney 
Reilly for the British, the French consul, inexplicably a French journalist, and Martial-
Marie-Henri de Verthamon, a French naval officer charged with carrying out sabotage 
77 Ibid, pp. 322-323. 
78 Ibid, pp. 323-325. 
79 Ibid, pp. 325-326. Spence, 'Tragic Fate', p. 351. 
80 Ibid, p. 329. 
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operations in Russia to prevent war materiel from falling into German hands. 81 The 
American report from this meeting blandly states that the representatives agreed to 
share their intelligence. The French journalist, whose loyalty was at best divided, 
reported to Feliks Dzerzhinsky that the meeting had laid plans for sabotage in support 
of an impending coup against Bolshevik power.82 Both stories are plausible, though 
Poole reported to the Department afterwards that he had heard tell of the coup in 
advance but had no knowledge of sabotage. 
What is clear, however, is that Kalamatiano had found himself in the outer 
rings of the 'Lockhart Plot', one of the most famous incidents in twentieth century 
intelligence history. This 'Lockhart Plot' was an embarrassing and unsuccessful 
British effort to overthrow the Bolshevik regime with the cooperation of purportedly 
disaffected Latvian troops. It was also a provocation, fully under the control of the 
Bolshevik authorities from the very beginning. When on 30 August a probably 
unrelated assassination attempt against Lenin failed, the Cheka used the opportunity 
to crack down and, among other actions, crush the Lockhart Plot. When the plot 
collapsed, Kalamatiano was arrested and much of his network rolled up. The 
Bolsheviks sentenced him to death but released him in 1921.83 
Petrograd remained a vital location, one on which it was important to gather 
information. Accordingly, in March, Maddin Summers, the Consul General in 
Moscow, ordered Vice Consul Robert Imbrie (who did not speak Russian) into 
Petro grad to report on events there. He arrived on 5 April. Though he had to 
continue doing consular duties, his priority was intelligence collection and by mid-
month he had established an 'Information Service' in the area, the primary purpose of 
81 Note that Foglesong identifies the French officer as 'Colonel Henri de V ertement', but this 
is incorrect. Foglesong, America's Secret War, p. 332, Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Iron Ma=e: 
The Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks (London, 1998), pp. 43-45, 87-88. 
82 Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze, pp. 105-107. Foglesong, America 's Secret War, pp. 352-4. 
83 Foglesong, America's Secret War, pp. 335-342. Spence, 'Tragic Fate', pp. 353-356. 
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which was to collect intelligence on German military movements and other German 
activities. So much reporting resulted that it was necessary to set up a regular courier 
service between Petrograd, the U.S. Embassy which had been relocated to Vologda, 
and the U.S. Consulate in Moscow. 
The Consul General had dispatched Imbrie for the express purpose of 
recruiting agents to collect military information on the Germans as well as political 
information on the general situation, which was to say Russia. He also collected 
information on the Russian Baltic Fleet. To accomplish these tasks, he sought out 
men of 'energy' and military expertise, soon choosing a group mostly made up of 
Russians, though it also included one Finn and one Swede. The group numbered 
about a dozen men, as well as two women who 'were employed because of their 
intimacy with certain of the Bolshevik leaders'. The men were mostly officers, two of 
them former 'professional spies' for the Czarist government. After seeing that they 
had a detailed military briefing and training in the recognition of German insignia, 
Imbrie dispatched them to the field. When they returned, he would not forward any 
of their reports to Vologda or Moscow until another of his agents, unbeknownst to the 
first, had double-checked it. Most agents did not even know for whom they were 
working, merely reporting to a 'Head Agent' who reported to Imbrie. Imbrie reported 
afterwards that 'on repeated occasions our Agents penetrated the enemy's lines, 
passing through to the other side and, returning, bringing exact information 
unobtained by any other similar service of the Allies, winning the commendation 
from the Allied Military Missions in Moscow who informed the Consulate General 
that our reports were the most valuable turned in'. 84 
84 Langbart, 'Five Months in Petrograd'. 
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The fact that Imbrie was also collecting against the Bolsheviks turned out to 
be fortuitous. 2 August 1918, the United States broke off diplomatic relationship with 
Russia. Four days later, one of his sources provided him with a copy of a purloined 
Bolshevik telegram ordering his arrest. At the end of the month with the help of 
Norwegian diplomats he escaped the city.85 Some evidence suggests that Imbrie used 
British officer Paul Dukes, who passed through Helsingfors (Helsinki) at this time on 
his way back into Russia for secret intelligence work for Britain's MI-l(c), to 
communicate with one of his agents, a Russian naval officer in Vyborg.86 
Another State Department clandestine operation aiming largely at military 
information which involved much less derring-do, but which (apparently) reached 
deep into an enemy's bureaucracy, was that run by James McNally. This operation, 
however, unlike the operations in isolated Bolshevik Russia, was subjected to close 
monitoring from Washington. This case also opened for the first time the difficult 
security questions that can arise when an intelligence officer purposely consorts with 
the enemy in the course of his efforts to steal secrets. McNally, a consular officer 
whose son-in-law was a German naval officer, was posted to Switzerland during the 
war, whence he produced a great volume of reporting primarily on naval topics from 
contacts with German officers. Though Britain's Naval Intelligence did not think 
much of McNaUy's reporting, and despite the fact that McNally was, to put it 
charitably, hard to work with, much of his reporting went to President Woodrow 
Wilson, as well as senior military leaders.87 The U.S. Naval Attache in France 
85 Ibid. 
86 Paul Dukes, Red Dusk and the Morrow: Adventures and Investigations in Red Russia (New 
York, 1922), p. 11. MI-l(c) later became the 'Secret Intelligence Service', popularly known 
as MI-6. 
87 Klaus Schwabe, 'U.S. Secret War Diplomacy and the Coming of the German Revolution in 
1918: The Role of Vice Consul James NcNally', Diplomatic History, 16:2, (Spring 1992), pp. 
175-200. L[anier] L. W[inslow] to Leland Harrison, 5 April, 1919, Leland Harrison Papers, 
Box 105, Folder 'McNally, 1. C.', LOC. 
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described McNally's work as of 'great value', providing 'excellent information', 
adding that he had confidence that McNally 'would be able to obtain all important 
information concerning German Naval affairs that was valuable,.88 
McNally had been in the Consular Service since 1898, getting consistently 
unenthusiastic appraisals from his superiors in his various postings in Europe and 
Latin America. In 1907, the Department appointed him Consul in Nanking where an 
American businessman accused him of embezzlement in 1909, a charge that dogged 
him for years before he was formally exonerated in 1913. By that time, he had been 
transferred to Tsingtau, a German colony, where he became friendly and popular with 
the Germans and his daughter married a German naval officer named Friedrich 
Mensing. However, after a time, poor health forced McNally to resign his position. 
As his health recovered, the Department, under the influence of McNally's important 
friends who included the President's secretary, Joseph Tumulty, nominated him to be 
Consul in Nuremberg, Germany. However, this position required Senate 
confirmation and this was not forthcoming because of his earlier alleged impropriety. 
The Department was obliged to appoint McNally to lower ranking positions 
which did not require Senate confirmation: Vice-Consul at Kehl (opposite Strasbourg) 
and later Hamburg. During this time, McNally developed contacts in the German 
Navy, purportedly because his son-in-Iaw's father was an admiral and a friend of the 
Kaiser. McNally passed the information he gathered through these contacts to the 
U.S. Naval Attache in Berlin, Walter Gherardi, who made them the basis of many of 
his own reports and who assessed McNally's work as 'invaluable'. In late February 
1917, he sought a personal meeting with Secretary Lansing and delivered to him a 
briefing on the 'submarine situation' in Germany which apparently made such a big 
88 R. H. Jackson to Director of Naval Intelligence, n.d., NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, E-9-a, 
l0670-C. 
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impact that the Department tried again to get him confirmed as a Consul and then, 
when that failed, assigned him to Zurich, whence he was able to maintain his German 
contacts after the United States declared war. In mid-April 1917, McNally reported to 
Washington about the details of a December 1916 memorandum from Chief of the 
Admiralty Staff Admiral II enning von 1I0ltzendorffto llindenburg urging 
unrestricted submarine warfare, which memo led to the German announcement on 9 
January 1917 of unrestricted submarine warfare.89 
McNally knew that the information he gathered was highly valued in 
Washington, so he was disgruntled that his rank did not correspond with his ' 
contribution to national security. In August 1917 he boasted that 'no country has ever 
entered a war with such a detailed knowledge of an enemy's fighting branch as does 
ours, due to my work'. President Wilson was sympathetic and urged action on 
Secretary Lansing who arranged a pay raise, but not a formal promotion. This led 
McNally to complain to Frank Polk, the number two official in the State Department, 
that the Senate's refusal was costing the country 'thousands of lives and millions of 
do llars ' .90 
The intelligence that McNally reported was remarkably rich and nuanced, 
appearing to answer many of America's intelligence needs. Some of his information 
was high level and political in nature. Not only had McNally reported on the genesis 
of the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign, but in February, 1918 he reported 
that German Chancellor Hertling had expressed the willingness to restore Belgium for 
the sake of peace. Much of McNally's information was more fine-grained, however. 
On 25 August 1917 he submitted a lengthy report on the food and supply situation in 
89 McNally to Lansing, 16 April 1917; Harrison to Polk, 17 April 1917, both NARA, RG 59, 
Entry 344 Box 2, Folder 'File 48 Wirth and McNally'. 
90 McNally to Polk, 5 October 1917, NARA, RG 59, Entry 344 Box 2, Folder 'File 48 Wirth 
and McNally'. 
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Gennany and a variety of military tidbits such as a detailed account of the sinking of 
the Lusitania; the news of the fonnation of a new squadron of submarines, three of 
which he named; and Gennan estimates of the amount of allied tonnage sunk per 
month.91 On 10 June 1918, he reported that nine submarines had left Kiel bound for 
the American coast. He also reported on the repartee at a 2 June dinner party of 
Gennan submarine captains, whom he named.92 
McNally's ego and somewhat erratic ways did not endear him to those around 
him and soon doubts began to arise about his loyalty. The phenomenon of an 
American officer in direct personal contact with the country's avowed enemies was a 
novel experience for the United States. Not surprisingly, McNally made numerous 
enemies among the Americans, among them the attache and diplomatic figures with 
whom he had to live. A future head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, who served in 
Switzerland at the same time, never did figure out if McNally was a 'crook' or a good 
American. Other American officials were far less ambivalent in their views. McNally 
openly associated with his Gennan officer son-in-law and purportedly made anti-
Allied statements. He also started to make enemies among the Allies who observed 
that his closest friends in Zurich were pro-Gennan. 
These tensions came to the boil in March 1918 when the French requested and 
received pennission from the State Department to detain McNally as he tried to cross 
the Spanish-French border. He was only allowed free to report to the U.S. Embassy 
in Paris. When he arrived in Paris, General Nolan, the AEF G-2 was delighted and 
sent Major Nicholas Campanole, by now the AEF's chief of espionage, to meet with 
91 Blind memo from McNally, 25 August 1917, NARA, RG 59, Entry 344 Box 2, Folder 'File 
48 Wirth and McNally'. 
92 'Paraphrase of Cable 3623 from Berne to Washington'. 10 June [1918], NARA, RG 59, 
Entry 344 Box 2, Folder 'File 48 Wirth and McNally'. 
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him to discuss how they might augment his efforts.93 Other American officials, allies 
of McNally's enemies in Switzerland, had other ideas. They informed him that he 
was under investigation for treason and interrogated him for a month. During this 
time, the U.S. Minister to Switzerland Pleasant Stovall, strongly supported by his 
Second Secretary F. R. Dolbeare and the Military Attache Colonel Godson, advised 
the Department to bring McNally home in the interest of maintaining relations with 
the Allies. In London Admiral Sims' staff received a memo from the Admiralty 
urging McNally's immediate recall and accusing him of having made various 
comments indicative of disloyalty to the Allied cause. The American had, for 
instance, reportedly told the French Vice-Consul about a naval engagement during 
which two British destroyers had purportedly been put to flight. He had also told 
several people that he thought France was 'bled white' and might be obliged to give 
up the fight. The British also offered the unsubstantiated opinion that McNally's son-
in-law was feeding him disinformation.94 
McNally had friends in high places, however. The Department suspected that 
Stovall was suffering from professional jealousy of a subordinate who was able and 
even encouraged to communicate directly to the highest levels of the Department and 
the government. Furthermore, Lansing assured the American authorities in Paris that 
McNally was not authorized to pass any information to his son-in-law. Leland 
Harrison wrote to Hugh Wilson at the Legation in Berne on 18 April 1918: 
We have lately been very interested in the McNally case and I must 
say that from the information so far received, it would seem that the 
Legation is perhaps unnecessarily exercised about him. Admitting that 
his son-in-law and other German agents with whom he may come in 
contact are allowed to see him for the particular purpose of getting 
93 Morgan Taylor to Wilbur Carr, Chief of the Consular Service, 31 May 1918, RG 59, Entry 
344 Box 2, Folder 'File 48 Wirth and McNally'. 
94 Bell to McNally, 11 April 1918. RG 59, Entry 344 Box 2, Folder 'File 48 Wirth and 
McNally'. For a similar account of the incident, but one which downplays the drama, see 
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information, I must say I cannot see how they can get anything from 
McNally that they can not get from anybody else in Zurich. He gets no 
information from the Department ... On the other hand, he has from 
time to time sent very good stuff to the Department. 95 
Harrison concluded by admitting that the reliability of McNally's naval 
information had been falling off of late but that nevertheless, and notwithstanding the 
views of the military attache and of the British and French, both the MID and ONI 
wanted McNally returned to Zurich to continue his work. 96 In the end, Wilson 
demanded that his man be allowed to return to Zurich, believing that McNally could 
deliver information about expected German offensives.97 McNally was promptly 
cleared and returned to work. 
Back in Switzerland McNally still had enemies. Foreign Service Officer Allen 
Dulles wrote on 27 May to his 'Uncle Bert', the Secretary of State, urging him to 
recall McNally because of his 'indiscretions' and the danger he posed 'to the cause 
and our work here in co-operation with our Allies'. Dolbeare and Godson also 
continued to intrigue against McNally, or at least that is the way McNally described it 
in a 22 June cable to the Secretary. The Director of the Consular Service allowed to 
the Secretary that McNally was 'very indiscreet; in many ways a very poor consular 
officer; not intelligent; [and] his loyalty may even be open to question' but that his 
was work of great value and he should be maintained at his post, no matter how his 
colleagues felt about him. All of these materials were sent to President Wilson who 
responded tartly in a short memo to Lansing on 26 June: 
95 Harrison to Wilson, 18 April 1918, NARA, RG 59, Entry 344 Box 2, Folder 'File 48 Wirth 
and McNally'. 
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INTELLIGENCE-FRANCE, n.d. [1918 or 1919?], NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, E-9-a, 10670-
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I am sorry that the Legation should feel as they do about McNally, but 
I think that they should abide loyally by our decision [to keep him in 
Switzerland.] We see more of the elements involved than they do. I 
do not know who Dolbeare is, but, whoever he is he ought to be told 
very emphatically to mind his own business or come home. 98 
McNally stayed in place until January 1919 at which time, his utility largely 
ended, his exasperating qualities became too much for the Department and he was 
abruptly relieved.99 
* * * 
It is fair to say that clandestine operations were a vigorous and occasionally 
significant part of America's conduct of World War I. Nevertheless, the vast 
bureaucracies that would conduct espionage during later wars were still in their 
infancy and espionage was still to some degree influenced by nineteenth century 
moral attitudes. At the same time, technical means of collection were truly flowering. 
Nolan thought that perhaps only 15%, 'a very minor part', of the AEF's intelligence 
.. ,100 D ' hi' f came from 'secret servIce espIOnage. espIte t e mora reservatIons 0 many, 
espionage persisted beyond the signing of the Armistice, as we shall see. A certain 
romanticism was starting to attach itself to the business and rogues (lovable and 
otherwise) seemed to flock disproportionately to it. As one popular writer put it, 
espionage brought 'secret romance and adventure' which 'provide[d] the color to the 
sadness and gray monotony of the war' .101 
98 Dulles to Lansing, 27 May 1918; McNally to Lansing 22 June 1918; Carr to Lansing, 21 
June 1918; Wilson to Lansing, 26 June 1918 all in NARA, RG 59, Entry 344 Box 2, Folder 
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Chapter 5 
Intelligence Support for Commanders 
If General Nivelle could have been removedfrom the thickfog of 
theoretical strategic and tactical teachings stemmingfrom the 
Napoleonic Wars and made to understand the possibilities of 
innovation capable of transcending past military procedures, he would 
have given more receptive attention to the reports of his Military 
Intelligence Section as essential to the successful pursuit of modern 
waifare. 
--AEF intelligence officer Thomas Curtis Van Clevel02 
During World War One, the concept of 'war' became so broad that the unity 
of command became more than a little frayed. Of course, under the Constitution, 
President Wilson was the 'Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and as the head 
of the Executive Branch he could issue orders to the Department of State, the 
Department of Justice, and the other organs of the Federal Government which were 
involved in the war effort. Nevertheless, many factors limited the degree to which he 
could involve himself in the micro-level details of the execution of the war. These 
included his own personal expertise and proclivities, the immense volume of data to 
be digested and decisions to be made, and the difficulties of trans-oceanic 
communication. It would be decades before the White House had both the ability to 
and interest in controlling tactical operations in real-time. 
Pershing was the closest that the United States came to a single commander 
and he tasked his G-2 to keep him informed about military, political, and other events 
far removed from western Europe because he realized that they could influence the 
situation he faced in France. In reality, of course, Pershing was far from the sole 
commander under President Wilson. Certainly Admiral Sims, ensconced in London, 
was not under Pershing's command. Nor yet, were the military or naval attaches who 
102 Thomas Curtis Van Cleve, Observations and Experiences ofa Military Intelligence Officer 
in Two World Wars, (Maine[?], Potts Point Books, 2005), p. 29. 
205 
followed the direction of MID and ONI, respectively. Finally, of course, the State 
Department's diplomats and intelligence agents were even farther removed from 
Pershing's control. However, all ofthese agencies conducted operations which were 
intended to (and sometimes did) influence the situation which Pershing faced on the 
f 103 battlefields 0 France. 
During the World War, the primary stateside function of the War Department 
was to send forces overseas for use by General Pershing in his American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF). The AEF itself performed virtually every other function 
with regard to the War Department's effort. 104 The members of the MID knew where 
the action was and it was not in Washington. Indeed, Marlborough Churchill, the 
head of the MID, argued in September 1918 for a rotation of personnel between the 
MID and the AEF G-2 on the grounds that 'M.lD. morale is almost entirely 
dependent upon every physically fit officer having before him some hope of foreign 
service.' \05 In particular, the AEF supplied nearly all its own intelligence and 
conducted most of its own intelligence operations, albeit often supported with various 
degrees of coordination by the military and naval attaches and occasionally, quite 
indirectly, by State Department personnel. 
In so doing, the AEF developed an intelligence system nearly as sophisticated 
as that of the French or the British and of comparable though not yet equal quality. 
Several factors made it possible to rapidly expand the size of the AEF's intelligence 
effort while steadily improving its quality. The French and the British, having already 
gone through their own stumbling learning phase in the early months of the war, were 
able to dispense sound advice and followed their own enlightened self-interest by 
103 Not least, of course, the War Department, at Pershing's request, directed the attaches in 
Europe to forward war-relevant information directly to the AEF. Nolan, 'History', p. 188. 
104 United States Army in World War I, Volume 13, p. 5. 
lOS Churchill, 'Memorandum A "Intelligence Personnel"', accompanying letter to Van 
Deman dated 16/18 September 1918. RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-235/1, 
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being quite willing to do so. They welcomed American visitors to their units and 
offices, they took American students into their training schools, they shared their 
doctrinal publications, they shared their substantive intelligence reporting, and they 
eventually came to treat the Americans as colleagues, not students. On the American 
side, Dennis Nolan, the G-2, was willing to be receptive. There is no indication that 
he came in with an idee fixe about how intelligence work was to be done. With this 
attitude Nolan stood in sharp contrast to Pershing, who had crossed the Atlantic 
determined that the doughboys must reject French and British practice and get out of 
the trenches and fight open warfare, an idea to which he stuck with dogged 
determination. Finally, Nolan established personnel policies that were focused on 
quality not merely on filling vacancies. He and his subordinates were not shy about 
rejecting or relieving men who were not up to the peculiar demands of intelligence 
work. 
There were several reasons for the AEF's near total autonomy in intelligence 
matters. Pershing's strong personality had something to do with it. In addition, at 
least with regard to signals intelligence, neither the MID nor the AEF's staff made 
great efforts to stay in effective contact through visits or officer exchanges. 106 The 
poor state of communications between Europe and Washington also played its part. 
Though many military officers thought that the World War was a new type of war, 
one fought throughout the depth of all belligerent nations, the fact remained that the 
physical battlefield was where things could go most wrong most quickly and 
conversely where the most decisive successes might be most quickly gained. 
Therefore, slow staff processes could be fatal. The British Forces could readily 
communicate with London and the French forces with Paris. The picture was quite 
106 Frank Moonnan, 'Lecture delivered to the Officers of the Military Intelligence Division, 
General Staff, 13 February 1920, NARA, RG457, Entry 9032, Box 1, Document 17. 
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different for the Americans. Transatlantic written communications were slow and 
uncertain. Long-haul radio was still in its infancy and while cable communications 
were faster and able to carry more data, trans-Atlantic bandwidth was inadequate. 107 
In February 1918, a British study shared with the US Army and Navy estimated that 
assuming significant repairs to the existing set of cables, the AEF should be able to 
send 600,000 words per week for all purposes back to the United States. 109 To make 
matters worse, shortly thereafter the German Navy launched a major albeit only 
partially successful effort to cut every trans-Atlantic cable. 109 Moreover, every trans-
Atlantic electronic communication was subject to enemy interception and possible 
decryption. This was obviously the case with radio messages, but even telegraphs 
sent by cable could potentially be intercepted, as the US Navy proved in March, 1918 
when it successfully tapped an American submarine cable and read the messages 
passing through it without the cable operators being any the wiser. llo 
Given these considerations, General Pershing's American Expeditionary 
Forces grew a substantial intelligence staff, the AEF G-2, which eventually numbered 
approximately 300 people. I I I In so doing, it called upon the experiences of both the 
British and the French. After an extensive study of information about the French and 
British intelligence systems available in the War College's files, querying of liaison 
officers, and visits to allied units, they decided that the AEF's intelligence structure 
would imitate the British system not only at the AEF level, but down through the 
echelons. The AEF also adapted its first Intelligence Regulations from those of the 
107 Winkler, Wiring the World, pp. 152,160-61,168. 
108 Navy Department, Office of the Chief Censor to 1. H. Whitehead, US Army Signal Corps, 
2 April 1918. Covers a memo from the British General Post Office, 'Atlantic Cable 
Communications', 7 February 1918. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 24, Folder 'British 
Memorandum on Atlantic Cable Communications'. 
109 Winkler, Wiring the World, pp. 169-175 
110 Ibid, pp. 194-197. See also Yardley, American Black Chamber, p. 16. 
111 Beach, 'Origins of the special intelligence relationship?" p. 236. 
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British Second Army. Pershing insisted on reviewing these personally, paragraph by 
paragraph, with General Charteris, the intelligence chief of the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF).112 The AEF applied the moniker 'G-2' in imitation of the French 
Deuxieme Bureau. British and French instructors taught American intelligence 
personnel in many places and many of the field manuals and pamphlets on 
intelligence topics that the AEF disseminated to the troops were translations of French 
bl ' . 113 pu lcatlOns. 
Intelligence provided Pershing and the other commanding officers of the AEF 
a variety of potentially useful tools aside from simply producing information about 
the enemy's actions. Some of these tools were offensive: this war saw America's first 
serious experiments with a variety of forms of what is today called covert action as 
well as some fumbling attempts at deception. Other tools were defensive: intelligence 
sections tracked down enemy spies, and prevented the inadvertent leakage of 
information that could be useful to the enemy. Finally, the intelligence sections 
provided technical information, largely in the form of maps. 
The Navy's forces deployed to Europe fell under Admiral William Sims, the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. Their functions amounted largely 
to anti-submarine warfare and escort duty.114 Sims and his staff were in a constant 
state of feuding with ONI, among many other things over control of the naval 
Il2 Dennis E. Nolan, 'Lecture Delivered to the Officers of the Military Intelligence Division, 
General Staff, 20 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-328/159,. 
113 Many of these manuals can be found in the 'World War I Pamphlet Collection' at CARL. 
This approach was not limited to the AEF intelligence staff. Speaking with regard to counter-
espionage and security functions in France, the US Naval Attache found that it was best to 
study the 'French System' and then 'reinforce' it. R. H. Jackson, to Director of Naval 
Intelligence, n.d. NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, E-9-a, 10670-C. See also Van Cleve, 
Observations and Experiences, pp. 13-46. 
\14 For a brief account of American naval operations in the broad context of the naval war, see 
Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History o/World War I, (Annapolis: 1994). For a voluminous 
American-centric account, see William N. Still, Jr., Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in 
European Waters in World War I, (Gainesville: 2006). 
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attaches. Just as Pershing had his G-2 staff, Sims established a 14 man intelligence 
cell under John Babcock in his American Naval Planning Section in London. Sims' 
staff worked cooperatively with British Admiral Hall's Naval Intelligence Division-
though they were never as deep into Hall's confidence as was the State Department. 
The Navy also did significant amounts of negative intelligence work in France, 
primarily under the auspices of the Naval Attache in Paris. I IS 
• • * 
AEF G-2 came under Dennis Nolan who started the war as a major and ended 
it as a brigadier general. Nolan, who looked every inch the professor, had been an 
outstanding graduate of West Point, and had served under Pershing in the Philippines. 
He had also taught history at West Point before serving in the Intelligence Section on 
the first War Department General Staff, from 1903 to 1906. This stint gave him what 
was by American standards extensive intelligence experience - as much as Van 
Deman. 116 Under him, the intelligence staff at General Headquarters (GHQ) soon 
grew to comprise four sections. G-2A was responsible for analysis as well as certain 
technical collection activities, notably signals intelligence and, in a more attenuated 
fashion, a great deal of aerial reconnaissance (see Chapter 2.) G-2B had 
responsibility for espionage and counterespionage and some covert action. G-2C had 
charge of topography and mapmaking and G-2D was in charge of censorship, press 
affairs and propaganda. Each section provided General Pershing and his subordinate 
commanders with capabilities that were important for the prosecution of the war and 
the defeat of Germany, some new, some old but now understood to fall within the 
realm of intelligence. This was a hard working lot. While the GHQ staffs office 
\IS Dorwart, The Office o/Naval Intelligence, pp. 123-126. Still, Crisis at Sea, p. 40. 
\16 James 1. Cooke, Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF, (Westport, 
1997), pp. 92-93. 
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hours were 9AM to 12:30PM and then 2PM to 7PM, the intelligence section worked 
these hours and then returned again to the office after dinner, staying until II PM, in 
h d '1 . d 117 part to prepare teal y summanes an reports. 
Pershing was not a captive of grandiose visions of intelligence and his 
memoirs of World War One scarcely mention the topic, though in part that may be 
because of the secrecy surrounding the field. However, during the Punitive 
Expedition he had allowed a great deal of intelligence innovation to flourish, in aerial 
reconnaissance, signals intelligence, clandestine collection, and even in lethal covert 
action. He brought this same sensibility to the AEF. Though Nolan was never part of 
Pershing's inner circle, the commander paid attention to him, and he never threw up 
artificial roadblocks to innovation in intelligence. Pershing, his first chief of staff, 
General James Harbord, and Nolan shared a considerable past acquaintance and there 
was a great deal of mutual respect among them. Nolan had been Pershing's adjutant 
general in the Philippines and had also served under Harbord in the Philippines. It 
was Harbord who had pressed Pershing to put Nolan on the original AEF staff and 
specifically to make him the chief of intelligence. I IS 
Pershing eschewed big staff meetings and preferred to meet with his senior 
staff officers individually. Every morning at the GHQ, Harbord would chair a thirty 
to sixty minute staff meeting. Nolan typically spoke first at these meetings, providing 
a ten minute intelligence briefing. After the meeting was over, Nolan would meet 
personally with Pershing, and brief him on the most important intelligence highlights. 
Nolan would also leave highlighted copies of the G-2's daily intelligence summary 
and its press review for Pershing'S perusal later. Furthermore, Harbord established 
117 Van Deman, The Final Memoranda, p. 47. 
118 Cooke, Pershing and His Generals, pp. 92-93. 
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the rule that Nolan, unusually among staff officers, could have immediate access to 
Pershing whenever he felt that the situation demanded.119 
At the lower levels, of course, intelligence staffs were smaller and they had 
less access to and need for large amounts of detailed technical data. Nonetheless, 
information, at least in theory, flowed not only uphill to GHQ G-2, but also downhill 
to subordinate units. In order to make this happen, the AEF's intelligence structure 
penetrated virtually every level of the force. The combat units below OHQ (the 
armies, corps, divisions, regiments, and battalions, as well as their aviation 
equivalents), each had an intelligence component. 120 The 'Service of Supply', as 
Pershing called the organization in charge of the rear area, also had a 0-2 office 
which reported to Nolan. The 0-2 SOS focused chiefly on security and 
counterespionage. 
When they came into existence, the army and corps level 0-2 sections were 
still substantial bureaucracies. Though smaller and less high-technology-oriented 
than the OHQ's 0-2, they were substantially removed from the battle. At the division 
level and below, however, the intelligence personnel found themselves very much 
caught up in combat. (Nevertheless, even here modem science was brought into play. 
The Psychology Committee of the National Research Council formed a group during 
the war to help military intelligence develop 'methods of selecting and training scouts 
and observers'. Two of its members received commissions and were assigned to 
intelligence schoolhouses.)121 This was dangerous work, scarcely different in its risks 
and day to day nature from that of an infantryman. Intelligence personnel might find 
themselves guiding infantry into battle, marking lanes through the enemy's barbed 
119 Ibid, p. 95. 
120 See Chapter 2 for a discussion ofthe system of 'Branch Intelligence Officers' in aviation 
units. 
121 Robert M. Yerkes, 'Report of the Psychology Committee of the National Research 
Council', Psychology Review, 26:2, (March 1919), pp. 85 and l38-14l. 
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wire or sitting for hours or days in dangerously exposed observation posts. 122 For 
instance, 26 men served in the G-2 of the 79th Division. The division spent 47 days in 
action. During that time, twelve of the 26 men were wounded and three won the 
Distinguished Service Cross, two of them for staying in a chateau that they were using 
as an observation post even when the chateau itself was being struck by artillery fire. 
On 4 November 1918, the division G-2 section came under a gas attack which 
incapacitated all the officers present and many of the men. 123 Similarly, Marine 
Lieutenant William A. Eddy, the intelligence officer of the )'d Battalion, 6th Marine 
Regiment (attached to an Army division) was wounded in the foot at Belleau Wood. 
Only a few days before Eddy had won a Navy Cross, a Distinguished Service Cross, 
and a Silver Star for his heroic reconnaissance forays into the WOOd. 124 
In the division and below, everything had to be done quickly, despite the fact 
that information was always fragmentary and confused. The AEF's Intelligence 
Summary provided the daily big picture and often had useful information about 
German equipment or a new tactic to watch for. Sometimes information would come 
from the corps level or from artillery observation posts or even from aviation but the 
divisional G-2 could merely expect 'crumbs' from these sources. Most of the 
information he would use had to come from those below but even this was no simple 
matter to 'establish or enforce'. The 'man in the front line who is being subjected to 
heavy fire and all the intensely wearying pressure of active combat has small patience 
122 Frederick Louis Huidekoper, The History of the 33rd Division A.E.F., (Springfield: Illinois 
State Historical Library, 1921), pp. 148, 183. 
123 'G2 in PC and OP, Intelligence Section, Seventy Ninth Division 1918-1919', n.d. [1919], 
Joseph E. Kuhn Papers, Box 5, no folder, USMA 
124 Thomas W. Lippman, Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American 
Power in the Middle East, (Vista, 2008), pp. 20, 26. During World War II, Eddy served in the 
OSS where he played a critical role in collecting the intelligence necessary to support 
Operation TORCH, the 1942 Allied landings in North Africa. He later scrved as the first 
American minister to Saudi Arabia and as head of the State Department's intelligence 
organization under Secretary George C. Marshall. 
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with a demand from higher authority that he concern himself with' reporting 
apparently mundane information up the chain. The divisions also played a critical 
role in gathering intelligence from prisoners. Within the 42nd Division, for instance, 
capturing units were to get prisoners to the divisional prisoner collecting station 
within two hours. There, officers, specialists, and a randomly chosen sixty percent of 
all NCOs and enlisted men were segregated off from the others who were deemed of 
little intelligence value. The officers and others were quickly dispatched to Corps for 
interrogation. Division-level 0-2 personnel confiscated documents from all the 
prisoners and read them before sending them on to Corps, as well. At the division 
level, soldiers' letters were often published in 0-2 summaries to illustrate the enemy's 
morale along with other small pieces of information. 125 
The Brigade S-2's were the key players in ensuring that reporting actually 
flowed up to the Division 0-2. The concept was that they should: 
be used as the coercive element in the collection system. They 
should be the ones to furnish the impetus and constant pressure 
required to keep up the search for information uninterrupted and 
insure its prompt transmission rearwards. Information is not 
received automatically and the very best of men quickly lose 
interest and initiative under the pressure of hardship and weariness. 
It is the overcoming of this natural battle attrition that is the 
primary duty of the Brigade Intelligence Officer. 126 
Once the information was wrung out of every possible source, the division 0-
2 had very little time to figure out what it all meant, typically only hours. 'There is no 
room for tentative hypotheses and we must have no doubts-for if we have them we 
"awake the drumming guns that have no doubts'" .127 Therefore, he had to have an 
125 C. H. Mason, 'Divisional Intelligence in Action', 6 February 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 
65, 10560-328/165. James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919, 
(Westport, 1994), pp. 82-84. 
126 C. H. Mason, 'Divisional Intelligence in Action', 6 February 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 
65 10560-328/165. 
127'A reference to Rudyard Kipling's poem 'An American' which contains the lines, 'Till, 
dazed by many doubts he wakes/the drumming guns that-have no doubts'. C. H. Mason, 
214 
'exceedingly rapid method whereby if an item of information is obtained it is 
checked, fitted into the Intelligence mosaic, and the attention of all concerned called 
to it' in a timely fashion. This last step was critical. Intelligence, after all, was not 
analyzed for its own sake: 
In the division, Intelligence has but one purpose-that of smashing the 
enemy and after he is smashed of tramping on him until he is utterly 
ground into the earth and disappears therein. There is nothing pretty or 
amiable about the process. 128 
At the lower levels, infantry regiments and battalions, the intelligence function 
was largely one of reconnaissance, including manning observation posts. Another 
important function at this level was the conduct of combat patrols, the primary 
purpose of which was to capture prisoners who could be interrogated, though they 
would also acquire documents and unit insignia from dead enemy soldiers. 
Tactical intelligence, even intelligence of use to Army commanders, was a 
highly perishable commodity and so it was important that intelligence data be 
transmitted as rapidly as possible to the commanders who could use it. The fact that 
the Germans used modem telecommunications means to transmit orders from 
commanders to subordinates meant that the Americans had to use comparably fast 
means to transmit their intelligence findings from collectors and analysts up to 
commanders, lest they fall behind the pace of developments. 129 Thus, Major Joseph 
Stilwell, the N Corps G-2, ordered before the St. Mihiel Offensive that a direct cable 
line connect his corps G-2 office with airfields so that important information from 
aerial observers could get to him and his staff without delay. If an observation aircraft 
observed something so urgent that it could not wait until landing, the observer could 
'Divisional Intelligence in Action', 6 February 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-
328/165. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Sweeney, Military intelligence, p. 45. 
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write the information down and then drop it in a special 'dropping ground' close to 
the G-2 office. Stilwell also decreed, that 'at the Aviation Field, preliminary 
interpretation of photos will be done by the B.LO .... Anything very important in the 
interpretation will be phoned at once [to the G-2]' .130 For their part, during active 
operations army and corps G-2s were responsible for keeping BIOs informed on a 
daily or hourly basis as to what information was required. Anything urgent from the 
corps G-2 would be cabled to the Army G-2 and also lateralled, as necessary to other 
corps. 131 
In theory, this web of intelligence personnel provided unprecedented 
assistance to tactical commanders and not just General Pershing, or so the intelligence 
officers wanted to believe. When the MID interviewed several regimental 
commanders about the intelligence support they had received, one opined that the 
intelligence officer was the most important member of his staff. The MID happily 
disseminated his remarks. This officer said that he viewed the regimental intelligence 
officer as being in 'command' of the enemy forces and once the intelligence officer 
told him about the enemy's strength, dispositions, and actions, 'it is a simple matter to 
make the proper disposition to meet every requirement of the situation'. The 
intelligence officer had, he thought, taken over the reconnaissance role of the cavalry 
and the security role of outposts. He was able to provide the commander with a sound 
estimate of the situation without which the commander 'will inevitably wear out his 
command in useless vigils and exertions and fail in readiness at the critical 
t ' 132 momen . 
130 IV Corps G-2 to Chief of Staff, 7 September 1918, Joseph Stilwell Papers, Box 8, Folder 
5, HlA. 
131 Second Section, G.S. GHQ AEF, 'Intelligence and its Relation to the Air Service', 1 June 
1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-529/58. 
J32 United States War Department, Military Intelligence Division, 'An Appreciation of 
Regimental Intelligence Service', Information Bulletin, Washington, DC, No.4, 15 
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In fact, however, there was a good deal of befuddlement among less savvy 
commanders and staff officers as to what the 'intelligence officer' was really for. One 
officer recalled receiving his assignment from his commander as follows: 'Young 
man, you are "Regimental Intelligence Officer", whatever the hell that is,.133 Not 
surprisingly, then, too many commanding officers were slow to recognize that their 
intelligence officers had any value at all. When the US First Army was established, it 
soon became clear that this problem existed within its corps and divisions. Pershing 
himself acted to get the problem under control, sending Colonel Arthur Conger, 
Nolan's right-hand man, to inspect the corps and division G-2s that would take part in 
the St. Mihiel offensive. Conger found: 
a lack of...co-ordination of the second and third sections of the General 
Staff and the lack of utilization by a number of the divisions and corps 
commanders and the chiefs of staffs of the information and facilities 
for obtaining information afforded them by their Intelligence Sections. 
These defects were remedied in some cases by suggestions to the 
officers concerned and in other cases by changes in personnel, so that 
upon the conclusion of hostilities the general staff sections were 
generally working efficiently and in harmony. 134 
To field officers, intelligence personnel were a highly secretive lot who often 
seemed to be working only for the benefit of their own organization or else were some 
sort of exotic creature and certainly not proper military types. Just as the MID came 
to be regarded in some circles as 'a sort of militarized Sherlock Holmes', intelligence 
officers in the field found themselves mistaken for military policemen, assigned to 
investigate robbery, murder, rape, and other criminal doings. Alternately, intelligence 
November 1918, USAMHI. Note the same idea enunciated by Arthur Wagner years before: 
Wagner, The Service of Security and Information, p. 16. 
133 Shipley Thomas, S-2 in Action, (Harrisburg, 1940), p. 1. 
134 ChiefO-2-A to AC ofS 0-2, OHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA, RO 120, Entry 74,Box 
6199, Folder 'Report ofO.2-A', 
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personnel were often mistaken for morals police, or else simply used for 'liaison', i.e. 
• 135 
message passmg. 
Though a few intelligence officers did succumb to the temptation to play 
Sherlock Holmes, by and large they knew why they existed. Indeed, if anything, 
intelligence officers at the higher levels sometimes had an inflated sense of their own 
importance and of the possibilities of intelligence, perhaps a remnant from the days 
when intelligence personnel were key players in the development of war plans. 
Following in the footsteps of those aviation advocates who had thought that aerial 
reconnaissance would lay open the battlefield for inspection, making self-evident the 
proper next move, some intelligence officers chafed at the short shrift that 
commanders often gave their reports. They were chagrined when their careful 
analytic conclusions were outweighed by the commander's hunch which so often 
proved disastrous. 136 As Walter Sweeney, a veteran of the AEF 0-2 and also the 
former chief of staff of the 28th Division wrote shortly after the war: 'the Intelligence 
officer does not fulfil his mission if he is content merely to gather the information, go 
to the work of evaluating it, and then leave it to the 0-3 to accept, reject, or ignore as 
he pleases.' In Sweeney's view, either the 0-3 should listen to the 0-2 of his own 
\3S G-2 S.O.S., 'History & Critical Analysis of Functions and Operations ofG-2 S.O.S.', 15 
May 1919, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6200, Folder 'Final Report ofG-2, S.O.S.'. 
Sweeney, Military Intelligence, pp. 5-7, 138-139. United States War Department, Military 
Intelligence Division, 'Notes on Divisional Intelligence in the Attack (By a Divisional 
Intelligence Officer), , Information Bulletin, Washington, DC, No.2, 16 September 1918, p. 
23, USAMHI. Thomas, S-2 in Action, p. 1. MID History, pp. 483-486. Sweeney, Military 
Intelligence, pp. 5-6. C. H. Mason, 'The Collection and Use of Military Information', 20 July 
1920, p. 9, RG 8, XING, Accession 19201125, NHC. Marlborough Churchill, 'The Military 
Intelligence Division General Staff, Journal of the United States Artillery, 52:4, (April 
1920), p. 294. John R. Kelly, 'Military Intelligence', n.d. [1919?], Leroy Yarborough Papers, 
Box 2, Folder 'Lectures on Military Intelligence to the Leavenworth Schools, 1919-1921 and 
to War College Students 1919,1924-25, and to AEF France, 1918', USAMHI. 
A. Moreno, 'G-2-B in the A.E.F.', 23 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-
328/161. 'Manual of Law and Procedure for Divisional Counter Espionage Officers', 
December 1917, War College Curricular Archives, Records Section, File 117-13, USAMHI. 
136 Van Cleve, Observations and Experiences, pp. 22, 41. 
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accord, or he should be forced by regulations to do so. In any event, the intelligence 
officer had 'the duty of protecting the commander against the issuance of combat 
orders based on wrong deductions'. If necessary, the 0-2 must take the matter up 
with the commander's chief of staff. \37 Similarly, the 0-2 pamphlet 'Intelligence and 
Its Relation to the Air Service' of June 1918 maintained that it should be a 'basic rule 
that no order should be issued for active operations until the chief intelligence 
office ... has been acquainted with it' .138 It was, after all, frustrating for 0-2 to know 
precisely which targets should be bombed, such as a particular railway junction, and 
be unable to get anyone to actually do it.139 Nor was the purported utility of 
intelligence to the commander understood simply in terms of the ability to report 
accurate information. One intelligence officer who specialized in offensive 
propaganda recalled after the war that 'entire eastern sectors were officially reported 
ld b d I '" 140 as "he y propagan a a one . 
Not all operations officers were stupid and not all intelligence personnel were 
overreaching. In fact, Nolan himself admitted that intelligence personnel deserved 
more than a little of the blame for this sort of problem as they often 'prided 
themselves on not knowing anything about their own Army and everything about the 
enemy' .141 The solution was to reach out and educate the rest of the staff. A student 
137 Sweeney, Military Intelligence, pp. 134-137. For similar viewpoint, including the idea that 
operations officers should be 'forced' to pay attention to the G-2, see General Headquarters, 
AEF[ Major J. D. Galloway, Engineers], 'EXPLANATION AND COMMENT On Work in 
Subsection A-3, A-2, and in Studies of Bombing Objectives', 1 December 1918, NARA, RG 
120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report ofG-2-A-3 [Enemy Works] G-2, GHQ AEF'. 
138 Second Section, G.S. GHQ AEF, 'Intelligence and its Relation to the Air Service', 1 June 
1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-529/58. 
139 General Headquarters, AEF[ Major J. D. Galloway], 'EXPLANATION AND COMMENT 
On Work in Subsection A-3, A-2, and in Studies of Bombing Objectives', 1 December 1918, 
NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report ofG-2-A-3 [EncmyWorks] G-2, GHQ 
AEF'. 
140 Heber Blankenhorn, 'The War of Morale: How America "Shelled" the German Lines with 
Paper', Harper's Magazine, September 1919, pp. 510-512. 
141 Nolan, 'History', pp. 333-334. 
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at the intelligence school wrote in his notebook that 'the first duty of the [Regimental 
Intelligence Officer] is education propaganda. He must educate the others into 
knowing what intelligence is' ,142 One document, probably written by Joseph Stilwell, 
complained that G-2 ranked lowest among the staff sections and was often given 
inappropriate tasks which the relatively junior officers assigned to the section were in 
no position to refuse. It urged intelligence officers to take every opportunity to 
educate their commanders and peers about their proper function: 
It sometimes happens that the other G sections, the chief of staff, and 
the commanding general have an erroneous idea of just what 
intelligence is. You must take advantage of every opportunity to set 
them right on this. Once they understand that the Intelligence concerns 
itself only with the enemy, your section will be saved all kinds of work 
I b I . 143 that does not proper y e ong to It. 
* * * 
Despite the air of novelty that surrounded much of what the G-2 did, many of 
its functions were very traditional. Nowhere was this more true than in G-2-C, the 
Topography sub-division, led by Colonel Roger Alexander. This group was 
responsible for supervising and coordinating topographic surveying; preparing, 
producing and distributing maps; printing intelligence reports; preparing artillery 
firing data; and overseeing sound and flash ranging. 144 So wide-ranging were General 
Pershing's strategic interests that G-2-C not only had to maintain a stock of maps of 
France, but of many other countries, as well, so that 'military operations on widely 
142 Undated notebook entry, Robert 1. Fischer Papers, Box 1, Folder 1 'Fischer Notebook and 
Pad', ML. Emphasis in original. 
143 Blind memorandum, 'What is the Matter with G-2?, , n.d., Joseph Stilwell Papers, Box 15, 
Folder 2, HIA. See also in the same collection blind memorandum, 'Notes on Practical 
Operation of Division G-2 Section', n.d. Box 8, Folder 6. Stilwell, later renowned as 
'Vinegar Joe', rose to four star rank and during World War II served as the American 
commander in the China-India-Burma theatre and then as Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander South East Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten. 
144 Sweeney, Military Intelligence, p. 115. 
220 
scattered fronts or incidents of political significance' could be properly represented. 145 
All of this work required the establishment of industrial-scale printing plants, not to 
mention mobile printing plants carried on tracks that could move with armies and 
COrpS.146 
The French heavily influenced the development of G-2-C and its mapmaking. 
The Americans decided to use the metric system and the French coordinate system 
and to make maps of the same type and scale as the French, this before the Allies as a 
whole decided to adopt the French system. The Americans also acquired many maps 
directly from the French Geographic Service. In fact, the American demand on this 
service grew so great that the AEF was obliged to provide one officer and 36 soldiers 
to work at the French service. Nevertheless, the British were not without their 
influence; the AEF bought some maps from the British and it used British sound 
. . t 11147 rangmg equtpmen , as we . 
When the AEF started to put divisions and then later corps and armies into the 
line, G-2-C provided training for the topographic sections attached to their various 
headquarters. 148 Later, G-2-C became particularly important in preparing for the 
major offensives. In advance of the St. Mihiel Offensive, for instance, G-2-C had to 
oversee the production and distribution of some fifteen tons of maps (500,000 maps 
printed, 350,000 distributed) as well as some 2300 oblique aerial photographs. 
During the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, it was difficult to keep map production 
running ahead of the advance of the troops. G-2-C also played a role in preparing for 
possible German action, at one point helping the French map their rear area against 
145 United States Army in World War I, Vol. 13, p. 52. 
146 Sweeney, Military Intelligence, p. 115. 
147 United States Army in World War I, Vol. 13, pp. 51-54. 
148 Ibid, pp. 53-54. 
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the expectation of a forthcoming German offensive that might force the loss of that 
d 149 groun . 
Despite the long heritage of many ofG-2-C's fundamental tasks, advanced 
technology played a substantial role in the work. The section's official report 
observed at the end of the war that, 'as airplanes have revolutionized warfare, so the 
airplane photograph has revolutionized map making'. 150 But this was not high 
technology's only contribution. G-2-C undertook an early study of the novel arts of 
flash and sound ranging, the determining of the location of an artillery piece by 
triangulating on the flash or the sound it made when firing. Seven engineering 
soldiers were sent to the French school that taught this arcane art. Two graduated. A 
young American physicist also received a commission and came to France to work on 
the topic. Eventually flash and sound ranging became critical tools for the AEF in its 
counter-artillery efforts. 151 Though G-2-C was responsible for the organization, 
administration and technical supervision of flash and sound ranging troops, the actual 
tactical employment of these troops was under the control of the artillery units. 152 
The sub-division drew heavily on personnel from the Army Engineers and other men 
with particular technical expertise. Especially important to G-2-C was Major, later 
Colonel, Glenn S. Smith an Army reservist who had made his career in the U.S. 
Geological Survey. Smith used his connections to bring in the right men with the 
. I b·l·· 153 right techmca capa 1 ltIes. 
149 Ibid, pp. 55-56, 78. 
150 Ibid, p. 65. 
* * * 
151 Ibid, pp. 50-51. For a more dctailed account of the birth of flash and sound ranging within 
G-2-C, see Danicl J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in 
Modern America, (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 126-130. 
152 Sweeney, Military Intelligence, p. 116. 
153 United States Army in World War I, Vol. 13, pp. 50-51. 
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Certain parts ofG-2-D's work were also longstanding endeavours for 
European and American militaries. Other parts were quite new. G-2-D, the formal 
organization of which began on 1 September 1917, was responsible for directing the 
censorship of the postal, telegraphic and telephonic systems on which the AEF 
communicated. It also accredited journalists and censored their work; published the 
AEF's newspaper, The Stars and Stripes; oversaw the work of official photographers 
and artists; and conducted propaganda operations behind German lines. 154 
Ever since the time of Arthur Wagner the U.S. military had understood the 
importance of controlling what the press reported both to prevent dangerous 
information from being made available to the enemy and also, on occasion, to provide 
misleading or otherwise helpful information to the enemy. Nevertheless, 
Marlborough Churchill, back in Washington, advised Nolan at one point to limit the 
zeal of his press censors. 'America', he wrote, 
will support the war only if she knows about it .... A good 
correspondent who gets his stuff home quickly is worth a division to 
the morale over here. The usual military attitude toward these men 
doesn't help win the war .... Censorship is the work of a well-informed, 
broad-minded man who knows a military secret when he sees it and 
who knows that the same thing which is a military secret to-day may 
be safely given out tomorrow. The value of the morale of the people 
over here cannot be overestimated ... .l advise sending your gress censor 
man back here for a tour of duty to 'rediscover America,.1 5 
154 Ibid, p. 81. 
155 Churchill to Nolan, 16 Sept 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-235/3. For a similar 
sentiment expressed by a well-known journalist of the day, see Heywood Broun, The A.E.F.: 
with General Pershing and the American Forces, (New York, 1918), pp. 122-123. It is 
interesting that Churchill was in quiet agreement with Broun who was known for his 
obstreperous behaviour toward the censors. The censors tried to make Broun rewrite his very 
first story that reported that the first American soldier to arrive in France reached the end of 
the gangplank and immediately asked 'do they allow enlisted men in the saloons in this 
town'? See Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-
Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 138-
139. 
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In organizing its mail censorship, G-2-D drew heavily on advice and 
assistance 'most willingly and generously offered by British authorities' ,156 G-2-D's 
postal censorship efforts found, as the official report at the end of the war admitted, 
'relatively few attempts at conveying military information for use of the enemy ... but 
many attempts on the part of soldiers to convey forbidden information ... [to] their 
friends and relatives at home." Often the soldier attempted to convey this information 
in some sort of 'easily detected code'. On 11 July, G-2-D went so far as to establish a 
chemical laboratory to examine mail for secret writing, duplicating in theatre one of 
the functions of Yardley's MI-8 back in Washington. Between late September 1918 
and early February 1919 when the practice was stopped, the lab examined 53,658 
letters for secret writing. Only two were found actually to contain such writing and 
those were from an Army private writing to his family in allied Italy.IS7 
Rather more novel was G-2D's publication of an Army newspaper. This was 
a function of the new perception of war, in which the morale of the friendly forces 
was a vital factor and one which was subject to influence by informational means. 
This perception led to the creation of Stars and Stripes, a military newspaper which 
still exists today, Harold Ross, the founder of The New Yorker, and famed writer 
Alexander Woollcott were among the men who served as journalists for Pershing's 
dS ' 158 Stars an trlpes. 
* * 
156 United States Army in World War I, Volume 13, p. 109. 
157 Ibid, pp. 111-112. 
* 
158 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War and the Remaking of America, pp. 77-78. 
For accounts of The Stars and Stripes during WWI, see Alfred E. Cornebise, The Stars and 
Stripes: Doughboy Journalism in World War I, (Westport: 1984) and Harry Lewis Katz, A 
History of The Stars and Stripes, Official Newspaper of the American Expeditionary Forces 
in France,from February 8, 1918, to June 13, 1919, (Washington: Columbia Publishing, 
1921). Regarding Woolcott's entry into the propaganda business, see Campanole to Sweney, 
'Private Alexander H. Woolcott, M.E.R.C., Base Hospital #8',29 January 1918, NARA, RG 
120, Entry 177, Box 5972, Folder 7. 
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There are two routes by which intelligence organizations, whose core duties 
are to observe, understand, and communicate, can find themselves driving or even 
conducting policy or operations. The first is by dint of greater access to the 
information that fuels policy and operations. Hence, before the creation of the general 
staffs in the War and Navy Departments, MID and ONI had played significant, often 
leading roles in such matters as war planning and the conduct of mobilization simply 
because they had the necessary data. Later, the flourishing of aerial photography 
seemed for a time to betoken the merging within modem armies of the command and 
intelligence functions, as the entire battlefield and the forces upon were to be made 
visible to the overhead eye. 
The second route by which intelligence organizations can move into policy or 
military or even diplomatic operations is by having greater access to mechanisms that 
themselves can affect change. In this regard, the ability to conduct clandestine 
espionage operations, whose clandestinity entailed obscuring the fact that anything 
had happened, contributed to an important operational capability. First, it provided 
new opportunities for the conduct of clandestine diplomacy. Secondly, the 
predisposition toward secretiveness which was only enhanced by the intrinsic nature 
of clandestine operations and the ability of intelligence services to combat espionage, 
sabotage, and subversion made them logical tools to carry out other government 
functions. Furthermore, the inclination and ability to measure the enemy's morale, 
gave intelligence officers a comparative advantage in conducting propaganda 
operations. Thus, the war saw the first stirrings of a capability for the United States to 
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conduct covert action or covert influence campaigns, increasingly important offensive 
methods in the new type of warfare that had emerged. 159 
With its responsibility for propaganda, G-2-D was perceived to wield a major 
weapon. Before the US got into combat in a big way, 'it was known that the British 
and the French were beginning to make extensive military use of propaganda, and 
most of all it was known what terrific damage had been accomplished by German 
GQG propaganda among Russian soldiers and later among Italians at Caporetto'. 160 
The United States hesitated somewhat in conducting active propaganda against the 
enemy. Some officers felt that the fact that the Germans were engaged in propaganda 
meant that the U.S. should not engage in an activity 'thus dishonored'. On the other 
hand, professional psychologists, operating under the rubric of the Psychology 
Committee of the National Research Council, leapt into action, forming a 'Committee 
on "Propaganda Behind the German Lines'" in December 1917, specifically to help 
161 the War Department. 
Initially the civilian-run Committee on Public Information (CPI), under 
George Creel, had responsibility for propaganda 'over the lines' from Washington. 
However, for nine months the CPI did nothing as the AEF steadily built up its 
159 Mark Cornwall has made this argument with reference to the British and French. It is 
equally applicable to the Americans. See his The Undermining of Austria-Hungary - The 
Battlefor Hearts and Minds, (London, 2000), p. 5. 
160 Heber Blankenhorn to A. L. James, Jr., 'Report on Propaganda Against the Enemy', 14 
November 1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report on Propaganda against 
the enemy (G-2-D). Pershing was also very concerned with the threat of propaganda given 
what he thought had happened at Caporetto. In approximately November 1917, he cabled to 
the War Department that MID and the Department of Justice should work together, 
'supplemented by counterpropaganda through pulpit and press', should prevent 
propagandizing of American troops who were stateside. Pershing, My Experiences, Vol. 1, p. 
221. 
161 This committee produced little useful on this subject but did do some work on the 
maintenance of American morale that led to a number of psychologists being commissioned 
into the War Department General Staff. Robert M. Yerkes, 'Report of the Psychology 
Committee of the National Research Council', Psychology Review, 26:2 (March 1919), pp. 
85, 131-133. 
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strength and the War Department's disgruntlement grew. In February 1918, Major 
Charles H. Mason, the head ofMI-2, the 'Foreign Intelligence' or monograph section 
of MID, recommended the 'utilization of the psychologic factor of the strategic 
situation' and directed Captain Heber Blankenhorn to organize a 'Psychologic 
subsection' in MID.162 This subsection established liaison with the State Department, 
the CPI, and the Inquiry, an ad hoc policy planning apparatus that President Wilson 
established in 1917. Eventually, on 19 June, 1918 the Army succeeded in wresting 
responsibility for propaganda against German soldiers away from the CPI so that it 
could be placed under Pershing. The next day Secretary of War Newton Baker laid 
down the principle that AEF propaganda must be absolutely truthful. A month later, 
seven officers sailed for France to get the work under way. They went under the 
leadership of Captain Heber Blankenhorn who had been the MID's liaison officer to 
the CPI. 163 (A Psychologic Subsection of MID's MI-2 remained behind, but it focused 
on writing analyses of foreign government propaganda efforts and 'psychologic 
estimates' of various countries.)I64 
Among the officers sent to France with Blankenhorn was one Captain Walter 
Lippmann who later became one of the most influential American journalists and 
political commentators of the 20th Century .165 The young Lippmann was already a 
prominent person and had served for some months as the Secretary of 'The Inquiry', 
162 During World War II, William Donovan appointed Blankenhorn to lead the OSS' 
propaganda campaign against the Germans in North Africa, though he only held the position 
briefly. Jw-gen Heideking and ChristofMauch, eds., American Intelligence and the German 
Resistance to Hitler: A Documentary History, (Boulder, 1996), p. 25fn. 
163 Heber Blankenhorn to A. L. Jamcs, Jr., 'Report on Propaganda Against the Encmy', 14 
November 1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report on Propaganda against 
the enemy (G-2-D). 
164 MID HistOlY, pp. 255,258-261. 
165 Lippmann twice won the Pulitzer Prize and is credited with having popularized the term 
'Cold War'. 
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in which capacity he reported directly to Colonel House. 166 In fact Nolan's 
unpublished memoirs read as if Lippmann had been the leader of the propaganda 
effort, not Blankenhorn. An occasional adviser to President Wilson, Lippmann liked 
to tell people that he was the personal representative of Secretary of War Newton 
Baker and of Colonel Edward House, the President's right hand man. 167 Also serving 
in the small G-2-D shop were future luminaries such as Arthur W. Page, already a 
vice president of Doubleday when he joined the service, and Charles Merz. 168 
Arriving in France, Blankenhorn and his group reported to Dennis Nolan who 
assigned them to G-2-D where they began their propaganda work in August, 1918. 169 
The assignment of propaganda to G-2-D made a good deal of sense. The intelligence 
services were used to dealing in the ephemeral commodity of information and they 
were most in tune with the enemies' forces and how they might be demoralized, not 
least because they took the lead in assessing captured documents and interrogating 
prisoners and deserters. As was the norm for Americans, Blankenhorn and his men 
studied the French and British propaganda system before establishing their own. The 
French, they found, fought for tactical advantage, producing a great many different 
166 In this capacity, Lippmann wrote the first draft of nine of Wilson's famous 'Fourteen 
Points'. Lippmann was recommended for his commission in the MID by Colonel House, 
Herbert Hoover, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury F. H. Rowe. Matthew A. 
Wasniewski, 'Walter Lippmann, Strategic Internationalism, the Cold War and Vietnam, 
1943-1967', (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland), 2004, pp. 54-55. 
167 Churchill blind memorandum to accompany letter to Van Deman, 'Memorandum C 
"Propaganda: In Hostile Countries"', 16/18 September 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 
10560-235/1. Nolan, 'History', pp. 245-246. 
168 Arthur W. Page, a highly successful businessman, is widely renowned as the father of 
public relations in the United States. His father was the Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
during much of World War One. Arthur in December 1941 also did an unspecified one 
month assignment for William Donovan, then the head of the Office of the Coordinator of 
Information which was soon reorganized as the Office of Strategic Services. In 1949, he 
became a member of the board of directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, a 
CIA front organization that, among other things, ran Radio Free Europe. See Noel L. Griese, 
Arthur W Page: Publisher, Public Relations Pioneer, Patriot, (Tucker, 2001), pp. 60-63, 257, 
355. Charles Merz later became the editor of the New York Times editorial page. 
169 Heber Blankenhorn, 'The War of Morale: How America "Shelled" the German Lines with 
Paper', Harper's Magazine, September 1919, pp. 510-512. 
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leaflets of varying types and degrees of 'unscrupulousness'. They were even known 
to distribute Bolshevik literature. The British, by contrast, played the long game. 
Having decided that the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire was the weak partner in 
the Central Powers, they had determined to knock it out of the war by inciting ethnic 
separatism within it. Working closely with the Italians, they then played back in 
leaflet form to the troops the results of their incitement. The Americans took a middle 
path, remaining strictly truthful but aiming at tactical objectives, specifically inducing 
the men of particular German units to surrender at the specific request of American 
tactical commanders. 170 In accordance with that tactical focus, Blankenhorn wrote 
later that 'the A.E.F. fought the German in two-fisted fashion: --in one hand, weapons 
to shatter his armies, soldiers, equipment and organization; in the other, paper 
weapons to assail his fighting spirit'. This entailed printing some 5 million leaflets 
and actually delivering 3 million of them. 171 
Though some American officers were suspicious of propaganda as being 'the 
resort of the failing' or 'tinged red, tainted with radicalism', 172 Blankenhorn came to 
France with grandiose visions of mounting a 'slow pervasive influence' campaign on 
political themes that would demoralize the German Army or even the Central Powers 
as an entirety. As he put it, 'what makes the good German soldier wobble is doubts 
about the war being worthwhile,.173 However, he and his men arrived as the AEF was 
preparing for the St. Mihiel Offensive, the AEF's first big push. So, at the direction 
of senior commanders, he found himself forced to craft efforts to destroy specific 
170 Heber Blankenhorn to A. L. James, Jr., 14 November 1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, 
Box 6199, Folder 'Report on Propaganda against the enemy (G-2-D)'. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Blankenhorn, 'The War of Morale,' p. 511. 
173 Quoted in Clayton D. Laurie, '''The Chanting of Crusaders": Captain Heber Blankenhorn 
and AEF Combat Propaganda in World War 1', Journal of Military History, 59:3 (July, 1995), 
p.470. 
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enemy units. 174 In these efforts Blankenhorn insisted that the leaflets be strictly 
truthful. At the same time, he realized that the content of the leaflets must be 
calibrated to the direct interests of enemy soldiers. Accordingly, he assigned 
Lippmann to interview POWs to find out what made them tick. Most importantly, 
Lippmann found that the typical German soldier was 'so tired and harassed that his 
mind .. .is unreceptive to ideas that involve complicated action rather than immediate 
personal relief.' With this information in hand, G-2-D produced a series of leaflets 
between late August and November 1918 appealing directly to enemy soldiers by the 
f . I h 175 use 0 tactJca t emes. 
An early customer was Major Stilwell of the IV Corps. He was unconcerned 
about the theoretical left-wing resonances of propaganda and was focused, instead, on 
a more practical problem. He was upset that because of rumours that the Americans 
did not take prisoners, few German soldiers were surrendering. Prisoners of war were 
among the most important sources of tactical intelligence and if enemy troops would 
not surrender, then it was necessary to resort to extremely dangerous trench raids to 
snatch them, precisely the sort of operation that got intelligence personnel killed. In 
late August, Stillwell came to G-2-D seeking a solution to his problem. Blankenhorn 
recalled that the 'shop wasn't open yet' but that nevertheless, he soon began to sell 
'propaganda over the counter like so much meat'. Blankenhorn offered a leaflet 
which reproduced part of AEF General Order 106 which outlined the proper treatment 
of prisoners. On the reverse side was a description of the daily ration that prisoners 
could expect to receive while in American custody. Two thousand copies of this 
leaflet were thrown into enemy trenches by patrols or dropped from aircraft. Stillwell 
found the results to be outstanding and wrote to Nolan to express his thanks. He 
174 Ibid, p. 467. 
175 Ibid, pp. 468-469. 
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remained an enthusiastic fan of the AEF's propaganda capability. Unfortunately for 
him, however, the word of this success spread and the AEF on 6 September ordered 
the First Anny to 'utilize all means ... to distribute propaganda leaflets widely'. 
Demand increased, temporarily swamping G-2-D's ability to respond. 176 
During the waning weeks of the war, as the Gennan positions began to 
collapse in November and as Gennany itself sank into political chaos, Blankenhorn 
finally got his wish to try to subvert Gennany itself. By late October, he found that he 
was simply 'publish[ing] to the Boche what the President says; he writes all our 
leaflets now.' G-2-D also started to focus on particular minority groups within the 
Central Powers' annies: trying to fan nationalist sentiments among Bavarians and 
d L . 177 natives of Alsace an orrame. 
The Americans found that leaflets could be most cheaply and accurately 
delivered by artillery shell for areas up to ten miles behind the front line. Patrols 
could also carry leaflets with them. For targets at greater distance, they put balloons 
and aeroplanes into service, though this was done over the objection of Billy Mitchell, 
the commander of the 1 SI Anny Air Service. Despite Mitchell's hostility, 
Blankenhorn persisted, appealing directly to Mitchell's pilots, a move which led 
Mitchell to threaten him with court martial. 178 Back in Washington, the MID funded 
research into the best means of dispersing leaflets from balloons and at one point 
proposed to the Chief of Staff of the Anny that 6500 balloons be procured to 
disseminate propaganda. 179 The Military Attache in the Netherlands even used its 
176 Ibid, pp. 466-467. 
177 Heber Blankenhorn, Adventures in Propaganda: Letters from an Intelligence Officer in 
France, (Boston, 1919), p. 122. Laurie, 'The Chanting of Crusaders', p. 470. 
178 Laurie, 'The Chanting of Crusaders', p. 475. 
179 Blankenhorn, 'The War of Morale', p. 513. MID History, pp. 262-264. For a brief 
discussion of the specifics of this research, see Robert A. Millikan, 'Some Scientific Aspects 
of the Meteorological Work of the United States Anny', in Robert Mearns Yerkes, ed., The 
New World a/Science: Its Development During the War, (New York: The Century Company, 
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'lines' of clandestine agents reaching into Germany to disseminate leaflets which 
. 11 d· W h· 180 were speCIa y prepare m as mgton. 
G-2-D also tried to gauge the success of its propaganda efforts. This of 
course, was difficult to do. Unfazed, Blankenhorn framed the problem with 
comparison to the combat arms: 
Who will venture, at this date, to calculate the part played in winning 
the war by a specified battery? Who will give the percentages of 
victory due to any arm of the service, the air service, for example, or 
the tanks ... How much more difficult is it, then, to weigh 
imponderables, states of army morale, and the ideas which influenced 
them. As between the effects of leaflets and shells it must be noted 
that shell-fire worked in plainer view. It will be hard indeed to put a 
yardstick to results produced by leaflets picked up unobserved, 
pondered unobserved, and, even if acted on, probably denied by the 
German who surrendered. lsl 
Though his colleague Arthur Page was sceptical, Blankenhorn noted that a 
remarkable 4% of leaflets dropped came back carried by deserters or prisoners. 182 In 
addition, he recalled after the war that' Allied Intelligence reports were filled with 
letters written by German soldiers before capture or by their home-folks, whose 
expressions often paralleled the statements in our leaflets; often the letters referred 
directly to the [U.S.-produced] Flugblaetter as the authoritative source of 
information' .183 Despite the inability to draw scientific conclusions, Blankenhorn and 
1920), pp. 55-58. Thc air delivery of Icaflets into denied areas latcr becamc a staple of Cold 
War intelligcnce opcrations. See, for instance, Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Operations and 
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Routledge, 2007), pp. 51, 79, 100-10 I; and Johanna Granville, '''Caught with Jam on Our 
Fingers": Radio Free Europe and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,' Diplomatic History, 
29:5 (November 2005), pp. 815,818-819. 
180 MID History, p. 264. 
181 Blankenhorn, 'The War of Morale', p. 523. For a similar assessment of the valuc of 
propaganda, comparing it to the value of artillery, see 'Confercnce of US Military Attaches at 
the Hague 16-19 July, 1919, inclusive. (Re. Organization and Administration of dutics of 
Military Attache', RG 8, Accession 1991-372, File XINA, NHC. 
182 On Page's skepticism, see Griese, Arthur W. Page, p. 62. 
183 Laurie, 'The Chanting of Crusaders', p. 476. Blankenhorn, 'The War of Moralc', p. 523. 
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his associates interviewed many German POWs to get some sense of the effects of the 
propaganda and they tried to apply a scientific method in doing so. 
The attitude taken by all these [American officers interviewing the 
prisoners] was not one of hopefully looking for decisive propaganda 
effects, but rather one of scepticism, especially over various prisoners' 
statements that they surrendered because of the leaflets, but such 
testimony was considered of secondary value compared with the 
testimony of prisoners who admitted they had read the leaflets, denied 
that the leaflets had anything to do with their surrender, but in giving 
their reasons for surrender dwelt heavily on the identical things the 
leaflets told. The Section's interrogators primarily concerned 
themselves with analysing the increasing demoralization evident in the 
German Army and only secondarily with proving the relation of these 
cases to the leaflets sent over. The leaflets were never the first topic of 
these interrogations, they came in incidentally." 184 
In any event, Blankenhorn felt sure that he and his men had made a useful 
contribution to the total war effort and at the end of the war he reported to his 
superiors that 'In sum, the evidence ... justifies this statement: The A.E.F. leaflets 
contributed to that atmosphere of defeat which pervading the German Army and 
nation, brought the foe to book on Nov. 11 th,. It was with a great sense of personal 
accomplishment that on 9 November 1918, with armistice negotiations already 
underway and revolution afoot in Germany, Blankenhorn wrote to the chief of G-2-D, 
to recommend that the propaganda campaign be stopped immediately: 'It has been too 
fut ' 185 success . 
'" '" '" 
G-2-B, responsible as it was for what was then called 'secret service work', an 
amalgamation of espionage and counter-intelligence ( especially counter-espionage) 
work, had to overcome some distinctly unfavourable opinions held by other American 
military personnel. Dennis Nolan, though not disdainful of such work, found that G-
184 Heber Blankenhorn to A. L. James, Jr., 14 November 1918, NARA, RO 120, Entry 74, 
BoX 6199, Folder 'Report on Propaganda against the enemy (0-2-D)'. 
185 Blankenhorn to Chief, 0-2-D. 9 November 1918, reproduced in ibid. 
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2-B was 'but a minor part' of the AEF's intelligence work. 186 The views of some 
other officers were more pointed. Joseph Stilwell, the G-2 of the IV Corps, alluded to 
these views when he welcomed a class of new battalion and regimental officers by 
admitting that the 'average general impression' held of intelligence officers was still 
based on outdated pre-war stereotypes. 
Another stage our intelligence service passed though was the gumshoe 
period, when the intelligence officer was visualized as a person who 
said 'Hush' and went around in civilian clothes and false whiskers. 
The net result of investigations was usually that there were some 
Mexicans playing Monte at La Paloma, or that war with Japan would 
break out the second Monday after Lent. Occasionally he would 
recommend the dragging of Manila Bay for mines. 187 
The responsibility for counterintelligence fell primarily to G-2-B, though it 
found important partners in this work in G-2 S.O.S. and in the office of the Naval 
Attache in Paris. Another useful source of counter-intelligence information was the 
Inter-Allied Bureau in Paris. This was a liaison office, open to all the Allies. The 
AEF G-2 sent Captain Royall Tyler to be its representative there. Though political, 
economic, and other data was passed through the Bureau, it was most useful as a 
clearing house for counterintelligence information. Tyler would pass on counter-
intelligence information and in return, received information on enemy intelligence 
personnel, methods, and organizations, not to mention information from French postal 
and telegraphic censorship. Perhaps most importantly, the Inter-Allied Bureau 
maintained a combined 'suspect list' .188 Unhelpfully, the US Naval Attache in Paris 
was denied membership in the Inter-Allied Bureau on the grounds that it was a strictly 
'military' i.e. non-naval body. Nevertheless, the attache received full cooperation 
from Royall Tyler whenever he requested information available at the Bureau and the 
186 Nolan, 'History', p. 178. 
187 Untitled, unsigned, undated lecture for new battalion and regimental intelligence officers, 
Stilwell Papers, Box 15, Folder 2, HIA. 
188 Nolan, 'History', p. 202. 
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Attache's office made great use of the suspect list in checking up on crew members of 
h· .., F 189 SipS arnvmg m ranee. 
The counterespionage system within the AEF was considered very secret, just 
as counterespionage efforts in the units had been back in the United States. 
Originally, it had been intended that at the division level and below counterespionage 
personnel would not be witting of counterespionage elements above them except for 
the person to whom they reported. However, this proved impracticable. Many of the 
people engaged in counter-espionage work were not intelligence personnel in a formal 
sense. Rather, they were ordinary soldiers with other functions who had been co-
opted without compensation to conduct this additional duty. There was, roughly 
speaking, one co-opted soldier for each platoon, perhaps some 40-50,000 overall. 190 
Inevitably, some of these agents would die in combat, so a division's counter-
espionage organization would always have to be overhauled when the unit came out 
f h 1· 191 o t e me. 
This secrecy that surrounded the AEF's counter-espionage system may have 
held down the number of arrests and convictions. One officer recalled after the war 
that despite the mythology that there were no 'arrests [of AEF personnel] for 
treasonous acts', this was not true: 
There were a few arrests and, so far as I have been able to learn, 
just one conviction. However, there should have been more arrests 
and trials than we really did have. The fact is, we seldom could 
produce evidence sufficient to convict without revealing the 
existence of the Contre-Espionage System. Such revelation would 
h d · d' 192 ave prove ItS un omg. 
189 'History of Naval Attache, Paris', pp. 90-91, FDRL. 
A. Moreno, 'G-2-B in the A.E.F.', 23 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-
3281161. 
190 Johnson, Our Secret War, pp. 93-94. 
191 J. S. S. Richardson, 'Contre-Espionage in the AEF', 26 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, 
Entry 65 10560-328/162. 
192 Ibid. 
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In truth, none of these American organizations, like their counterparts in the 
United States, actually caught many spies but they saw 'contre-espionage' as 
fundamentally deterrent in nature, 'prophylactic as a tooth brush', so they did not 
deem this a failure. The official history of the Naval Attache's office in Paris noted 
that 'the mere fact that one does not..actually succeed in arresting spies, and having 
them convicted and shot, must not be regarded in the slightest degree as 
discouraging'. The German spy service was very active, the Naval Attache thought, 
so the 'greatest importance [of counter-espionage] lay in its negative 
, 193 
consequences . 
The American Army in France was an expeditionary force operating far from 
home in a foreign country. This fact conditioned the counter-intelligence problems 
facing the Americans in the rear area. Firstly, the ships bringing American troops and 
supplies to France had to be protected from the German navy. Of course, much of 
this burden fell on the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy which were responsible for 
protecting transport ships from German U-boats. This involved much more than 
intelligence, notably the organization of a convoy system, and the provision of 
escorts. However, the Allies, which is to say the British, had a secret weapon that it 
used to great effect in the anti-submarine campaign. Twenty years before, the US 
Navy, trying to track Admiral Cervera's fleet, had been forced to rely on land-bound 
'spies' and a two yachts rented by two enterprising ensigns who unsuccessfully tried 
to shadow the Spanish ships. Now, however, primarily through the courtesy of their 
British ally, the US Navy was able to bring to bear a potent mix of human and also 
193 'The 10 in a Division: Lecture by Capt. Fisher', 5 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, 
Entry 65,10560-328/127. MID History, p. 1639. 'History of Naval Attache, Paris', p. 84, 
FDRL. 
For a similar view about counterintelligence from the British perspective of this time, see 
Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI-5, (New York, 2009), 
pp.76-77. 
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technical resources to provide intelligence of a precision that would have been 
incomprehensible during the Spanish-American War. Typically German submarines 
would communicate daily by radio with their headquarters. Though these 
communications were encrypted and the British NID might or might not be able to 
read their content, the British could locate each submarine quite accurately by means 
of 'direction-finding' using a sophisticated system of radio receivers. Though the 
NID would supplement the information from direction-finding with other less 
comprehensive and less reliable sources such as agent reports, it was able to locate the 
.. fG b· t d 194 maJonty 0 erman su mannes a sea every ay. 
Counter-intelligence also played a role in helping ships get safely across the 
Atlantic. The intelligence authorities deemed it urgently important to prevent spies on 
the European side of the ocean from learning the sailing dates of ships. Back in 
Washington, ONI and the MID agreed that naval authorities would conduct all 
overseas work connected in any way with the sea and the Army would do the rest, so 
this function fell largely to the Navy, specifically the Naval Attache's office in 
Paris.195 Formally this office reported, of course, to ONI back in Washington, but it 
also reported de/acto to Admiral Henry Wilson, the US Navy's senior commander in 
France, and Admiral Sims, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 
whose headquarters was in London. Secondly, the rear area within France itself, with 
its long lines of rail and road communication, had to be secured against spies. This 
was primarily the work of the 0-2 of the AEF's Service of Supply (S.O.S.). Where 
they came in proximity to each other, namely at the major French ports on the Bay of 
Biscay, the two services worked together admirably, in one city even working out of 
194 John Langdon Leighton, Simsadus: London: The American Navy in Europe, (New York, 
1920), pp. 102-108. 
195 'History of Naval Attache, Paris', p. 15, FDRL. 
237 
the same building. 196 Then, for counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the 
forward forces themselves, G-2B had primacy, overseeing a web of officers and 
informants reaching all the way down into the tactical units. 
The office of the U.S. Naval Attache in Paris was responsible for maritime-
related security issues in and to the rear of France. Its responsibilities included 'the 
protection of the transports corning overseas, enquiries into the naval activities ofthe 
enemy, submarines, shipbuilding, [and] docks'. They also included the 'inspection 
and surveillance of persons leaving France for America, and persons arriving from 
America in France naturally involved the thorough inspection of crew lists'. Finally, 
there was 'the surveillance of the west coast of France with a view to preventing 
communications between spies and enemy submarines.' This meant the 
establishment of intelligence posts at ports and maritime areas all over France and two 
major offices at Nantes and Bordeaux. 197 
The Navy employed a wide variety of personnel, ranging from uniformed 
officers to unpaid civilians, to do its counterintelligence work. Thus, in the spring of 
1918, the attache's office dispatched an unpaid civilian volunteer to Biarritz to help 
secure the west coast of France against the espionage threat. Another Navy civilian 
soon was sent to join him. These men found the situation alarming, with control of 
the nearby Spanish border (land and sea) so lax that spies could easily corne and go, 
so they recommended the establishment of a naval intelligence office there. This was 
subsequently done and a lieutenant assigned there; however, he reported that as a 
singleton he could do little. Besides, the French asserted that they had authority over 
all people corning and going other than Allied servicemen. 198 
196 Ibid, pp. 128-137. 
197 Ibid, p. 137. 
198 Ibid, pp. 80-81. 
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The possibility that spies in France might be communicating with German 
submarines just off the coast of Brittany was a matter of particular concern to the U.S. 
Navy. On 13 December 1917 Admiral Sims reported that the last five convoys bound 
west had been attacked at approximately the same location in the ocean. 'It [was] 
believed possible that enemy agents used Belle Isle as a signal station to advise their 
submarines'. The telegram concluded, 'can you make secret investigation or will the 
F h d ·t' 199 rene 01. 
This particular request led to the dispatching of further personnel from the 
u.S. to be dedicated to the problem. Among other measures, the attache established 
an office at Nantes to handle the matter. This office, under a man referred to in the 
official history as 'Z', employed three retired French detectives and was housed in the 
same building as a local French service so that the two organizations could work 'as 
closely as possible' together. The office even supplemented the budget of that French 
office for the first three months of 1918. 'Z' soon determined that two methods of 
communication were possible: radio and fishermen. The French were alive to the 
dangers of radio, but were doing little to deal with the problem of fishermen. 'Z', 
therefore, began to employ French fishermen as well as Argentine fisherman who 
operated off the French coast. In the end, his network (not just Argentines) included 
34 leading fishermen who went to sea and 5 "supervisors who remained on shore." 
The fishermen operated out of 21 different ports and reported weekly on what they 
had seen during the course of their normal work. The supervisors were 'selected 
mostly from retired French Naval petty officers and pilots living on the coast'. They 
wrote reports when the fisherman were too uneducated to do so. 'z' also 
199 Ibid, p. 133. 'Blindfolding the Hun by a Lieutenant U.S.N.R.F', n.d., NARA, RG 38, 
Entry 98, File E-5-c, 10848. A handwritten annotation on the cover of this pamphlet indicates 
that the author was named 'Munn'. 
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experimented with various systems by which the fishermen could communicate with 
shore or patrol craft when they had information that should be reported immediately, 
for example when they had sighted a submarine. Alongside his network of fishermen, 
'Z' employed two detectives whom he recruited from the Police Judiciares in Paris. 
These men investigated all reports that came from anywhere in the French 11 th Army 
region within which Nantes fell. He also shared them with the Bureau Centrale de 
Renseignement (BCR), the office of the French internal service that covered the 11 th 
Army Region, which was constrained by law from employing such agents for its own 
d. 200 Irect use. 
Despite its close cooperation with the French authorities, the Navy did not let 
them in on everything. As early as the summer of 1917 the Naval Attache created a 
'bureau' to investigate suspects. William Astor Chanler, a member of the famous and 
wealthy Astor family, took charge of this 'bureau', the existence of which was 
disclosed to no-one. The work ofChanler's bureau seems to have entailed a great 
deal of contact with hotel managers and employees, but none of Chanler' s 'agents', 
let alone their sources of information, were told that they were ultimately working for 
the U.S. Naval Attache.201 The Naval Attache also created a unilateral contre-
espionage service in particularly important coastal areas run by several civilians who 
were referred to in the official history only as 'R', 'S', 'T', and 'U'. These personnel 
reported on conditions at the coast. For instance, at one point 'U' reported that 'loose 
talk' about convoys departing from Brest seemed to be getting to German ears. 
. I' d h l' 202 Secunty personne soon zippe t ose IpS. 
200 'History of Naval Attache, Paris', pp. 142-148, FDRL. 
201 Ibid, pp. 92-93. It is not clear what story the sources were told, but this sounds like an 
early American use of a recruitment technique known as the 'false flag', whereby a source is 
led to believe that he is spying for one entity when, in fact, he is spying for someone else. 
202 'History of Naval Attache, Paris', pp. 138-139, FDRL. 
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Within the Army context, overall responsibility for the rear area, which 
primarily meant for supply, logistics, and counter-intelligence, fell to the AEF's 
Service of Supply (S.O.S.). In December 1917 the G-2, S.O.S., was created, 
subordinate to General Nolan the AEF GHQ G-2 but residing within the S.O.S. The 
duties of G-2 S.O.S were 'contre-espionage' and the maintenance of a registry of all 
Americans in France. The G-2 S.O.S. himself, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) 
Cabot Ward, viewed the organization as a 'protective screen' for the forces in 
France.203 This meant finding spies and propagandists and investigating the 
background of every civilian whom the AEF proposed to employ. Also G-2 S.O.S. 
was to 'control' the movement of civilians in the rear area so as to keep them from 
moving about too freely and collecting sensitive information along the AEF's lines of 
communication. This meant checking papers on roads, establishing controls at 
railroad stations and ports, and censoring soldiers' letters and telegrams. Eventually, 
the G-2 SOS found it possible to keep a watch over all suspicious persons or 
undesirables who tried to circulate within areas of concern to US forces. The 
organization also placed secret agents at S.O.S. headquarters in Tours, in aviation 
centres, and other important units and organizations. From these vantage points they 
guarded against sabotage, and kept a close watch over morale and over foreign born 
American servicemen, some of whom it arranged to have sent home for intemment.204 
It also maintained a presence on the Swiss border at Pontarlier and Bellegarde, not to 
mention stations in London, Southampton, Glasgow and Liverpool and one jointly 
203 G-2 S.O.S., 'History & Critical Analysis of Functions and Operations of G-2 S.O.S.', 15 
May 1919, p. 5, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6200, Folder 'Final Report ofG-2, S.O.S.'. 
204 Ibid. See also Van Deman, The Final Memoranda, pp. 51-52. 
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with the French, British, and Belgians at Evian-Ies-Bains.205 In its operations, 0-2 
s.o.s. often worked, usually cooperatively, with the Naval authorities. 
Both the Anny's and the Navy's work entailed very close dealings with the 
allied intelligence personnel. The 0-2 S.O.S. described the benefit of learning from 
the British as 'impossible to overestimate', but, as a practical matter, cooperation was 
much closer with the French simply by virtue of geography. 0-2 S.O.S.' dealings 
with the French security services after much work became 'close and cordial'. The 
Naval Attache was even known to assign personnel to French intelligence 
organizations and supplement French intelligence budgets. The Navy also employed 
some French detectives. That said, both the 0-2 S.O.S. and the Naval Attache's 
office complained after the war about their French partners. The Anny found the 
French inefficient whereas the Navy found the French all too often corrupt and 
politicized.206 0-2 S.O.S. also found continuous contact with the civilian population 
to be very helpful, not only for gauging the general mood on the street but also 
because it occasionally provided useful counterespionage tips.207 
From time to time the work did tum up spies or other malefactors. For 
instance, 0-2 S.O.S. found that three Spaniards who were constructing a hospital 
camp at Beaune were also conducting a campaign of defeatist propaganda. The AEF 
succeeded in inserting one of its' intelligence police' into their midst. Apparently the 
205 A. Moreno, 'G-2-B in the A.E.F.', 23 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-
328/161. 
206 'History of Naval Attache, Paris', pp. 37, 128. FORL. G-2 S.O.S., 'History & Critical 
Analysis of Functions and Operations ofG-2 S.O.S.', 15 May 1919, pp. 38-40, 96, NARA, 
RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6200, Folder 'Final Report ofG-2, S.O.S.'. 
207 G-2 S.O.S., 'History & Critical Analysis of Functions and Operations ofG-2 S.O.S.', 15 
May 1919, pp. 38-40, 96, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6200, Folder 'Final Report of G-2, 
S.O.S.'. 
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Spaniards enlisted their undercover compadre to convey 'important military 
. 'b k h· . S . 208 infonnatlOn ac to t elf masters m pam. 
Then there was G-2-B itself, which set counterintelligence policy for all of the 
AEF. This division of Pershing's staff performed counter-intelligence functions 
directly and also oversaw a web of counter-intelligence personnel reaching down into 
the tactical units. G-2-B indexed suspects or undesirables, disseminated counter-
intelligence infonnation, obstructed the return of refugees into areas near the front 
where they might hamper the troops, prevented leakage of information by interrupting 
'civilian [traffic] circulation near the front during periods of great military activity', 
carried out some counter-espionage related censorship, ran the Corps of Intelligence 
Police, dealt with passes, worked with the State Department on passport control, and 
examined the bona fides of clerical assistants and labourers 'employed by the 
·f"r d ' 209 dl lerent epartments. 
G-2-B also published a 'G-2-B Bulletin' which was considered a sensitive 
document, but which nonetheless was written in a 'semi-humorous vein' in order to 
ensure that it would be read. Sometimes the Bulletin would include editorials in 
which the intelligence officers obliquely published 'hints' as to what types of 
'corrective measures' might be useful to deal with this problem or that. G-2-B also 
connected directly with the counter-intelligence personnel in the annies, corps, and 
divisions. Each division and separate unit sent weekly reports about morale up to G-
2-B which scrutinized them carefully for any signs of an unexplained 'lapse' in 
morale. From these reports, G-2-B prepared a digest for General Pershing. This, too, 
often included recommendations for remedial action. Pershing apparently read it 
208 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
209 A. Moreno, 'G-2-B in the A.E.F.', 23 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-
328/161. 
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diligently, and the G-2-B personnel felt that he was responsive in following at least 
.. , d· 210 their 'Important recommen attons. 
In a fascinating reflection of the tensions that existed between 'the American 
way' and the security needs of a modem nation at war, one counter-intelligence 
officer told his MID colleagues after the war that: 
It is a fact not generally known that the secret of the conceded military 
efficiency of the Bolshevik Anny today lies in the operation within its 
ranks of a Contre-Espionage System almost identical with the system 
which we had [in the AEF]. The only difference is that in the Soviets' 
system is vested an enonnous measure of authority. The testimony of 
a Commissar, as the Contre-Espionage echelon heads are called, before 
a mobile and all-powerful court known as the 'Flying tribunal', 
requires no corroboration. Of course such extravagance of vested 
authority is only in keeping with the Bolshevik theory of utilizing all 
means possible to bend the masses to the fanatic will of the 
dictatorship .... The success which has greeted the Russian anns I think 
demonstrates that the mechanism of the Contre-Espionage system is 
sound.211 
Within the infantry divisions themselves, the division G-2 handled counter-
espionage, using much the same system in France as was employed in the camps back 
in the United States.212 The security issues within the divisions did not always involv 
enemy activity. For instance, Colonel Aristide Moreno, the G-2-B chief, recalled 
after the war that: 
It was through this divisional organization that discovery was made of 
the movement among negro troops to organize for the purpose of 
establishing equality between the negro and white races in the United 
States. This infonnation hastened the return of negro troops and was 
immediately transmitted to MID, thus enabling the authorities at home 
to prepare for race riots which broke out later in Washington and 
Chicago.213 
210 J. S. S. Richardson, 'Contre-Espionage in the AEF', 26 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, 
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After the war the function of G-2-B evolved. No longer was the maintenance 
of the secrecy of military plans and operations the priority. Now it was imperative to 
keep in touch with the morale and political leanings of the American troops to keep 
down the possibility for disturbances. Previously German artillery bombardment had 
kept the soldiers distracted, but now things like the weather and inadequate 
accommodation could cause unhappiness. Even more important was the need to 
'combat the spread of Bolshevistic doctrine' and the influence of the IWW.214 The G-
2-B Bulletin of 16 November 1918, the first after the Armistice, set the tone: 
With the close of actual hostilities another phase of military activity 
commences, one in which the C[ounter].E[spionage]. officer must face 
new problems and new conditions no less difficult than those already 
met and overcome. The splendid morale of the American Army, 
which has been worthy of the nation and the flag, must be maintained 
and it is peculiarly the province of the Intelligence Service to keep its 
finger on the pulse of the Army in this regard and by reporting 
promptly on dangerous tendencies, make it possible to meet them in 
time .... The definition of 'Suspect, Enemy Agent or Sympathizer' does 
not change with the suspension or cessation of hostilities. The only 
change wrought is in the source of enemy activity which becomes 
broadened .... German militarism has capitulated, but German 
Bolshevism has gained many allies ... .It is the avowed intention of the 
fanatic leader of Bolshevism to contaminate the troops of the 
Allies .... The madness which destroyed Russia and spreads rapidly 
Westward may constitute a serious menace to our own forces during 
the trying period of occupation and the no less trying period of 
demobilization. C.E. officers everywhere must realize this danger and 
h · I d· I 215 lay t elr pans accor mg y. 
In this immediate post-war period, G-2-B paid attention to French and German 
public opinions about the Armistice, helped arrested residual German agents in 
214 Ibid. 
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France, and even penetrated the Spartacus League in Dusseldorf, in order to thwart its 
efforts to spread Bolshevism among the troops occupying Germany.216 
* * * 
The core of the AEF G-2 was to be found in G-2-A and G-2-B where most of 
the AEF's intelligence collection and analysis took place. One veteran likened these 
to 'services of supply' such as the Quartermaster and the Ordnance Services. This 
officer elaborated the analogy further, noting that some services of supply received 
their commodity 'already manufactured and ready for issue' while others, such as the 
Ordnance and Chemical Services, acquired their own raw materials and constructed 
(or at least oversaw the construction of) the commodity themselves. The G-2 was 
more like these latter two services, but with one crucial difference that made its work 
particularly difficult. Whereas these other services could acquire their raw materials 
in the safe rear areas, typically in the United States itself, the G-2 had to acquire its 
raw materials from the enemy who, of course, was busily trying to thwart such 
efforts.217 
Modem realities of war required a systematic approach to intelligence, both 
collection and analysis. The sheer volume of increasingly technical information 
available required large staffs.2lS It also led to the accumulation of numerous and 
sizeable card files. The AEF G-2 used card files for many purposes, including cross 
indexing things such as translated foreign documents; French and British periodicals; 
German symbols, proper names and place names appearing in intercepts; as well as to 
store data on German airfields; prominent German pilots; and Bolsheviks. 
216 A. Moreno, 'G-2-B in the A.E.F.', 23 January 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-
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As the existence of these card files suggested, an understanding of the 
enemy's situation and intentions could most often be acquired through the careful 
study of many small facts, not the acquisition of a few large and dramatic facts. 
Finally, modem means of communication made it possible to have this information in 
the hand of commanders in a timely fashion, much faster than a messenger could have 
d h· h . I' . 219 run or gall ope IS orse In ear ler hmes. 
Reflecting these ideas, Nolan thought G-2A not only the largest but also the 
'most important of our divisions' in G_2?20 He placed it in the hands of Colonel 
Arthur Conger. Conger had originally been assigned to the operations section, but the 
G-3 found him such a difficult personality that he was more than happy to give him 
up to Nolan, who saw great promise in this former instructor at Fort Leavenworth 
who had studied in Berlin-even attending lectures by the great military historian 
Hans Delbruck-and done intelligence work during the Philippines War.221 Under 
Conger, G-2A was that section of G-2 that most immediately and directly served the 
needs of Pershing and his subordinate Army, Corps, Division and even regimental and 
battalion commanders. 
The AEF's G-2-A was the central point at which the masses of information 
from G-2s and S-2s at the lower tactical levels, the espionage information from G-2-
B, and the information acquired by G-2-A's own collection means, (particularly 
signals intelligence from G-2-A-6 and imagery intelligence from G-2-A-7), all came 
together.222 Here analysts did battle with the forces of uncertainty. As Robert 
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Fischer, a student at the intelligence school at Langres, scribbled in his notebook, 
"Absolute definite info is always lacking'. However, 'you don't need it'. There were 
little bits of data lying all about, particularly in 'open warfare', that could allow one to 
deduce the enemy's intentions. 
Don't forget that in open warfare everything he does means something; 
in open warfare everybody is tired, nobody does anything unless 
ordered & then there is always a good reason; then from his activity 
you can deduce what his intentions are. Therefore when you get info 
on enemy activity ask immediately why WHY WHY. Think from 
standpoint of commander of that oppos[ingJ Division.223 
It was not only helpful to consider why an opposing commander would have 
ordered such an action, but also to bring to bear multiple sources of information upon 
the question. An official AEF manual on intelligence and the Air Service phrased it 
this way: 
The details seen by a single observer may seem insignificant, but when 
considered in connection with the information from other intelligence 
sources may assume great importance. Evidence from more than one 
source is necessary in order to prove a conclusion, and upon correct 
conclusions rests lives and the success of armies.224 
Doing this sort of work required bringing together many sources of 
information, ranging from the high technology of aerial photography and signals 
intelligence to the time-honoured methods of prisoner interrogation. One officer 
described the flood of information as a 'terrific jumble ... concerning so many different 
subjects and objects, and ... some sections of it are always contradictory'. Figuring out 
what it all meant (if anything) involved 'brain-wearing' labour.225 
Of course, good intelligence officers realized that technical expertise could 
overcome this challenge. Nolan thought that the people responsible for 'sifting' facts 
223 Undated notebook entry, Robert 1. Fischer Papers, Box 1, Folder 1 'Fischer Notebook and 
Pad', ML. Emphasis in original. 
224 Second Section, G.S. GHQ AEF, 'Intelligence and its Relation to the Air Service', 1 June 
1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-529/58. 
225 porter, Aerial Observation, p. 39. 
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from 'the mass of rumors, statements of prisoners, captured documents, broken codes, 
misleading propaganda, false reports sent by the enemy intelligence to mislead, etc., 
and so forth' should be 'the most skeptical in the army, accepting nothing without 
proof. A gullible mind has no place whatever in an Intelligence system and should be 
eliminated at once'. In particular, he thought that 'military men trained in historical 
research, newspaper men of long training who can spot propaganda, and generally the 
skeptically minded group, have good preliminary training for this work.,,226 Others 
agreed that technical expertise was required. 
Such a large part of the information gathered is unreliable, inaccurate, 
trivial and unimportant, or without meaning until it has been compared 
with other known and determined facts, that it is necessary that experts 
and specialists qualified for the duty shall examine, test, and sift out all 
information received so as to be certain that the important and 
significant facts relating to the strength, location and movements of the 
enemy are duly classified and recorded.227 
These specialists could be relied upon to provide the commander with insights into 
the enemy's strength and intentions such as no commander had had before. 
This war has been responsible for the development to a hitherto 
unknown degree of the science of military intelligence. Whereas 
previous generals have been content to learn of large enemy 
movements with questionable accuracy from their spies, and of a 
number of minor unrelated details from the occasional capture of 
prisoners or documents, it has become possible through the careful 
exploitation of all sources of information for Commanders in the 
present war to reconstruct the major part of the enemy's organization 
and intentions with dependable completeness.228 
Not only was there an unprecedented amount of data to process, but an 
unprecedentedly wide range of questions needed to be answered with it. Certainly, 
positive intelligence personnel continued to answer such questions as 'where are the 
enemy forces?' and 'in what direction are they moving and in what strength?' But 
226 Nolan, 'Comments', p. 136. 
227 Sweeney, Military Intelligence. p. 127. 
228 Gorrell History, Series M, Volume 2, Alfred R. Bellinger, 'Relations of the Air Service 
with G-2', n.d. 
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they now found themselves having to answer a whole range of additional questions 
that arose as a result of the broadened nature of war. One of the first substantive 
assignments that General Pershing gave to his intelligence officer, Brigadier General 
Dennis Nolan, was to estimate the French coal supply and determine whether a 
shortage of coal might force the French to sue for peace.229 The difficulty answering 
this question led Nolan to the realization that 'previous to the World War. .. no 
General Staff had given sufficient attention to the economic and political factors 
involved in a correct estimate of the ability of a country to wage war'. 230 In the AEF 
bureaucracies arose studying economics and politics and developments on military 
fronts far from Europe and innumerable other topics. It was immediately clear that it 
was necessary to have this sort of information not just on the enemy but also on the 
Allies, especially on France 'the situation and future of which was so vitally 
connected with the success of our own army'. An early G-2 step was to establish a 
press section to study the French and British press. This information could then be 
augmented through 'personal investigations, interviews with well informed persons', 
and trips to the libraries and archives ofParis.231 By the time the war was over, it 
sometimes seemed that there were few topics that were not of interest to the military. 
Again following the British example, Nolan established G-2-A. The 
Americans found that it evolved in much the same way as its equivalent in the BEF, 
even when the two groups did not explicitly consult on organizational changes. 
Conger recalled that it was no easy matter for an officer to get into G-2-A. 
In the early days of the section it was the general rule that all officers 
upon joining were given a two weeks course on Intelligence and on the 
general work of the intelligence section at GHQ and in subordinate 
229 Nolan, 'History', pp. 97-98. 
230 D. E. Nolan, 'Intelligence Course', 7 September 1920, Army War College Curriculum 
Archives, File 183-29, USAMHI. 
231 ChiefG-2-A to AC ofS G-2, GHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 
6199, Folder 'Report ofG.2-A'. 
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units. This was followed by practical work in one or more of the sub-
sections in which the officer's capacity was tried out and his fitness 
determined for his future work either at GHQ or in a subordinate unit. 
Officers found to be not up to the high standard required were not 
unloaded on other staffs at lower units, but summarily relieved from 
. 11' k 232 mte Igence wor . 
G-2-A divided itself into eight sections in an organizational scheme that in its 
disorder reflected the fact that these functions were not only new but evolving at a 
dizzying pace. Two sections had some role in technical collection. G-2-A-6 was 
oriented primarily on the oversight of signals intelligence collection and the technical 
processing of the resultant product while G-2-A-7 involved itself both in overseeing 
the collection of aerial imagery at the same time that it tackled analytic tasks 
pertaining to aviation. Finally, five sections focused almost exclusively on finished 
analysis. 
G-2-A-6 performed most of the AEF's signals intelligence work. 233 Receiving 
intercepted German communications from Signal Corps units, it deciphered what it 
could to read their content. It also performed traffic analysis to determine the 
structure of the German forces, as well as working cooperatively with the Allies on 
cryptologic matters and exchanging substantive signals intelligence with them. All of 
this information G-2-A-6 shared with commanders and other elements of G-2-A. 
Communications intelligence played an important role in helping tactical commanders 
in France to understand their adversaries' intentions and force dispositions. Some 
staff officers outside the G-2 came to value SIGINT material above all others.234 
The investment in G-2-A-6 paid off, of course. The Germans liked using 
radio and it proved a valuable source of intelligence. Communications intelligence 
232 Ibid. 
233 See Chapter 3. 
234 For one such testimonial, see Lee West Sellers, untitled typescript, J. Rives Childs 
Collection, Box 'WWI Papers V. 1 " RMC. 
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played an important role in helping tactical commanders in France to understand their 
adversary's intentions and force dispositions. Goniometry or direction-finding was 
similarly helpful, providing direct information on force dispositions and sometimes 
inferential information on intentions. At low tactical levels, the Germans primarily 
used codes and decryptions of these provided warning of raids, impending barrages, 
and other useful information. The few breaks that the Allies got into the difficult 
ADFGX cipher, which the Germans used to communicate between corps and their 
subordinate divisions, helped provide valuable intelligence about the Second Battle of 
the Marne. Decrypts of high-level ciphers also occasionally provided strategic 
information about military developments outside the Western Front.235 
Of course, G-2-A-6 knew that if it were able to acquire useful intelligence 
from German communications, so, too, must the Germans be able to acquire such 
intelligence from them. Accordingly, G-2-A-6 also served commanders by 
monitoring American communications, letting commanders know when their 
subordinate units were inadvertently leaking information to the enemy that could 
endanger American forces or operations, though commanders often found themselves 
railing in vain against the transgressions of careless subordinates. 
The Air Intelligence Section, G-2-A-7 had several functions. 236 First, it 
oversaw the training and work of the Branch Intelligence Officers (BIOs) whom it 
began sending out to the observation and bombing squadrons in May, 1918. In 
addition, every observation and bombing squadron got a BIO as did, eventually, the 
G-2 in every Army and Corps and their Army and Corps 'Observation Groups'. The 
information that the BIOs wrested from the Germans went up to G-2-A-7 where 
analysts combined it with data from other sources such as technical information 
235 See Chapter 2. 
236 See chapter 2 for a fuller exposition. 
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obtained through the examination of crashed German aircraft, the interrogation of 
German pilots, and data provided by British and French air intelligence. G-2-A-7 was 
further responsible for estimating German aircraft production and understanding its 
aircraft. Its various findings it published in the daily 'Summary of Air Information', 
which reported on friendly and enemy air activity, enemy air order of battle and force 
dispositions, enemy airfields and technical information.237 G-2-A-7 also played an 
important role in bombing, developing maps to and photographs of bombing targets 
(which also were selected in the GHQ and Army-level G-2s.) These were then passed 
238 to the bomber squadrons. 
Four sections, G-2-A-I, -2, -3, and -5 performed more purely analytic 
functions. G-2-A-I, the 'Battle Order' section appeared not only at AEF GHQ but 
was also mirrored at every headquarters below it down to through the division level. 
Each published daily maps and contributed information to weekly situation reports. 
The ideal for these sub-sections was to know the proper designation and location of 
every enemy combat unit. The First Army's Order of Battle shop claimed that: 
The complete list of all enemy units which were in existence was 
known at all times to nearly 100 per cent accuracy. The present 
location of every one of these units was known at all times on an 
average of 90 per cent accuracy. At times this percentage dropped, but 
the very fact that it did drop was highly significant. It dropped to 75 
per cent in the weeks preceding the German offensive of March 31, 
1918, when the Germans were training and concentrating their very 
best divisions. On the day of the armistice the location of German 
combat units was known to practically 100 per cent accuracy.239 
237 'Report of Air Order of Battle Section Office of Air Intelligcnce, GHQ Amcrican E. F., 
Suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligence Work for Air Scrvice Rcport', n.d., NARA, RG 120 
Entry 113 Box 5772, Folder 'Suggestion Chaptcr on Air Intclligcncc Work for Air Scrvice 
Report'. Gorrell History, Series M, Volume 2, Alfred R. Bellingcr, 'Relations ofthc Air 
Service with G-2', n.d. 
238 'Report of Air Ordcr of Battle Section Office of Air Intelligcnce, GHQ Amcrican E. F., 
Suggestion Chapter on Air Intelligcnce Work for Air Service Rcport' ,n.d., NARA, RG 120 
Entry 113 Box 5772, Folder 'Suggestion Chapter on Air Intclligence Work for Air Scrvice 
Report'. 
239 William H. Dearden, 'Ordcr of Battle' ,11 Feb 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-
328/167. 
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In principle, during peacetime information would have been gathered to 
provide a baseline for wartime analysis. The necessary peacetime information 
included information on military organizations, unit strengths and subordination, and 
the number of men available for military service while taking into account the needs 
of industry and the economy. Then it was critical to calculate how these ideal figures 
actually manifested themselves during mobilization and wartime. This entailed 
considering 'the relations between [sic] rifle, combat and ration strength' as well as 
the number of men necessary for rear services, all taking into account losses, 
replacements and the ineffable quality of morale. Obviously this latter set of data 
could change rapidly during combat and so regular updates were necessary. If the 
peacetime data was sound and well-researched, then the wartime estimates could be 
made with reasonable certainty, though that degree of certainty would inevitably 
erode over time. Hence, it was critically important, the members ofG-2-A-l found, 
that the laborious spadework be done during peacetime. Fortunately for them, it had 
been-by the Allies.240 Of course, the Army could make no such comforting 
assumptions about the next war. 
During hostilities a great deal of effort went into maintaining the currency of 
the order of battle estimates. First, every Allied Army whether in France or 
elsewhere, exchanged a daily telegram of all unit identifications. Second, the AEF 
did a great deal of work of its own, collecting and analyzing 'more or less 
disassociated items' of information to deal with this problem. Of course, order of 
battle data during wartime would always be fragmentary. Moreover, a high 
proportion of all reports were erroneous, particularly those from spies. Hence, it was 
240 ChiefG-2-A to G-2, GHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, 
Folder 'Report ofG.2-A'. 
254 
critical that every bit of data be checked in every possible way. The whole analytic 
edifice must be made to lean in on itself. Enemy pay books and letters were 
particularly useful sources of order of battle data. So, too, were prisoners and 
deserters. Clandestine reports could also be useful but they were highly variable in 
their value. The analysts found that 'in general they are more useful regarding morale 
and the broader aspects of man-power, such as the 'combing' of certain industries, the 
calling of certain classes, etc., than they are as to the specific strengths of certain 
classes'. That said, a certain type of human intelligence proved particularly important 
and generally reliable: reports from the train-watchers in Germany and occupied 
France. Their reports could give a sense of what parts of the front were being 
reinforced and some sense of the magnitude of that reinforcement. This information, 
then, could cue more detailed forms ofOB analysis. Signals intelligence could help 
determine the subordination of these new units and the enemy's overall command 
structure. Signals intelligence was also an unparalleled source for determining the 
.• . 241 
enemy's precise mtentlOns. 
The French also provided a useful templated method of estimating enemy 
losses in the absence of specific data. The French had found that, 
by assuming a loss of 3,000 for each enemy division taken out of the 
line after or during active operations, a very dependable result was 
reached. Therefore, by multiplying the number of divisions withdrawn 
from line in any month by 3,000, and by allowing a normal wastage of 
11 men per day for each division in quiet sectors of the line, they 
arrived at the gross enemy losses for the month.242 
241 William H. Dearden, 'Order of Battle', 11 Feb 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-
3281167. United States, War Department, Histories of Two Hundred Fifty One Divisions of 
the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914-1918), (Washington, 1920), p. 7. 
ChiefG-2-A to G-2, GHQ, AEF, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report of 
G.2-A'. 
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The French had also developed methods for taking into account the number of 
enemy prisoners taken, and estimating the ratio of dead to wounded and sick. The use 
of this method contributed to the French prediction in advance of the German 
offensive of March 1918, as well as the calling up of the class of 1920 and the 
German dissolution of its divisions which began in August 1918.243 
G-2-A-2, which eventually became known as the 'Enemy Resources Section', 
did rather different work. It assessed enemy industrial and economic capacity, 
preparing reports such as 'Food Conditions in Enemy Countries', 'The Iron Ore 
Resources of Germany and of France, with particular reference to the Briey Basin', 
'The Leather Shortage in Germany and Austria-Hungary', and 'The Allied Blockade 
and the German Army,.244 
Captain Ogden Mills, the chief of G-2-A2, had a sophisticated understanding 
of the importance of economic intelligence in modem warfare.245 He realized that 
because modem warfare required the mobilization of the state's entire adult 
population and all of its economic resources, general staffs require more information 
about their adversaries than merely strictly military information. Such things as the 
size of the enemy's force and his military intentions were 'themselves dependent upon 
a series of basic conditions, in the main economic'. For instance: 
243 Ibid. 
The number of men called to the colors will be limited by the need of 
maintaining economic life at home; the huge quantity of guns and 
munitions can only be furnished and maintained by a country rich in 
raw materials and equipped with up-to-date industrial establishments, 
unless, of course, it has access to foreign markets; the all important 
question of supply and the strategic transfer of troops demands a 
244 Ogden L. Mills, 'History of Section G-2 A-2d, Enemy Resources', 1 December 1 
1918,NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report of G-2-A-2, G-2, GHQ AEF'. 
245 Ibid. Mills was a Harvard-educated lawyer from a wealthy business family. After the war 
he went on to serve in Congress and later become the Secretary of the Treasury under 
President Herbert Hoover. His first wife, whom he divorced in 1920, subsequently married 
Sir Paul Dukes, the British intelligence officer renowned for his exploits in revolutionary 
Russia. 
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highly organized and efficiently maintained system of railways; and 
the morale of the civilian population which is so intimately connected 
with its physical well being, is a factor of military importance which 
I d 246 cannot be neg ecte . 
To Mills, the Allied victory was: 
probably as much a civil and economic collapse as a military one; and 
its date and finality could certainly not have been foreseen by any 
General Staff which neglected the economic factors ofthe situation 
and the resulting effect on civilian and military morale as well as on 
necessary military supplies. ' 
Unfortunately, Mills lamented after the war that G-2-A-2 'cannot be 
considered to have been successful....If it has justified its existence it has only just 
done so'. Though, in fact, a good number of the section's reports were short, well-
constructed and easy for consumers to digest, Mills lamented that many reports were 
started only to be abandoned.247 Its problems were many: it had trouble finding 
qualified personnel and then keeping them. Mills tartly observed that 'contrary to a 
belief which has only been too prevalent in our country, any man cannot do any job, 
and willingness and adaptability are not, in the realm of serious and technical studies, 
substitutes for experience and knowledge'. G-2-A-2 also had trouble finding the 
necessary statistical data. Much of the pre-war baseline data it needed was available 
in any serious library in Paris, but that city was sufficiently distant that it was 
impractical to travel there from Chaumont, where GHQ G-2 was located.248 
From this sorry wartime experience, Mills concluded that 'the history of the 
present section illustrates the difficulty of improvising an organization for war unless 
some preparatory foundation has been laid in times of peace' . Furthermore, 'one of 
246 Ibid. 
247 For examples of well-constructed reports, see G-2-A-2d, GHQ AEF, 'Mineral Resources 
ofthe Central Powers', 27 April 1918 and AEF G-2 'The Copper Supply of the Central 
powers: A Brief Review of Their Copper Production', 27 February 1918, both in NARA, RG 
120, Entry 89, Box 5256, Folder 31, 'Mineral Supply and Resources of the Central Powers'. 
248 Ogden L. Mills, 'History of Section G-2 A-2d, Enemy Resources', I December 1 
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the most important of the functions of an Intelligence Section of the General Staff 
must be to make a comprehensive and continuous survey of the resources of the 
enemy'. In addition to receiving economic reporting from military attaches, the 
General Staff should, he recommended, receive inputs, but ultimately, only military 
personnel would be competent to assess the military implications of economic 
facts. 249 
G-2-A-3 was known as 'Enemy Works'. This group studied the physical 
geography of and military engineering efforts within the German-held area. This 
included keeping files on towns, roads, bridges, and waterways and ponds. It also 
meant tracking the development of German trench and fortification systems, 
particularly through the study of aerial photographs. The sub-section suffered from 
many problems. One of the key problems was the difficulty of finding and retaining 
men with the necessary specialized expertise in civil or military engineering. A post-
war study suggested that much of the work mapping German trenches could more 
usefully be done at lower echelons. The subsection also suffered from the fact that 
most of its data other than the aerial photographs, carne from the Allies and that was 
often late and seldom in a useful format. The section also faced serious problems 
disseminating its material to the American units who needed it and the latter often did 
not know that G-2-A had such reference materials available. For instance, the forces 
labouring to push through areas liberated in the course of the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive might have benefited from a study which was already on the shelf about the 
249 Ibid. J. D. Galloway, 'EXPLANATION AND COMMENT On Work in Subsection A-3, 
A-2, and in Studies of Bombing Objectives', 1 December 1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, 
Box 6199, Folder 'Report ofG-2-A-3 G-2, GHQ AEF'. 
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road network in that area. Finally, G-2-A-3's work often overlapped that ofG-2-A-2 
and G-2-A-7 when it came to developing bombing targets. 250 
G-2-A-5 studied and filed information concerning the enemy's artillery and 
published information on the topic that might be useful to friendly troops, such as 
changes in enemy artillery tactics, shortages of materiel, etc. This was the cause of 
the first of two controversies over the division oflabor within G-2-A. G-2-A-I, the 
Order of Battle subsection, already concerned itself with the German heavy artillery. 
At the same time, both subsections tended to draw on the same sources of information 
regarding artillery. Moreover, Conger could never find a proper artillery expert to 
take charge ofG-2-A-5. He eventually folded the section into G_2_A_1.251 
A more complicated problem, if only because it involved more sections, was 
the issue of bombing targets. Ogden Mills, the chief ofG-2-A-2, thought that there 
were a number of ways of efficiently and effectively inflicting militarily crippling 
economic harm upon the enemy. He could be deprived of 'certain prime necessities'. 
If these resources came from abroad, then the careful application of a blockade and 
other trade restrictions could be effective. If these were domestic products or 
resources, the territory which produced them could be captured. Alternatively: 
if the raw materials or their sources cannot be captured, the production 
of the finished articles may be impeded and interrupted. The best 
known example of this is the bombardment of factories and mines by 
aeroplane. To be effective the bombardment must be systematic and 
aimed at vital points. It is not sufficient to know that a factory exists at 
a certain place. We must know what it produces, whether the article is 
a necessity to the enemy and if so what relation the production of that 
factory bears to the total enemy production. To illustrate, if a given 
factory within the bombing radius produces but 3% of the total 
production, and the balance is turned out by factories without the 
250 Ray S. Owen, 'G-2. A-3 G.H.Q. A.E.F. GENERAL REPORT', n.d., NARA, RG 120, 
Entry 74, Box 6199. J. D. Galloway, 'EXPLANATION AND COMMENT On Work in 
Subsection A-3, A-2, and in Studies of Bombing Objectives', 1 December 1918, NARA, RG 
120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report ofG-2-A-3 G-2, GHQ AEF'. 
251 United States Army in World War I, Volume 13, p. 42. ChiefG-2-A to AC ofS G-2, 
GHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 'Report ofG.2-A'. 
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bombing radius, it is a waste of lives and effort to seek its 
destruction.252 
On the other hand, if a particular Germany factory made an intermediate part 
of an important finished article, the destruction of that factory might greatly affect the 
total production of the article in question. In such cases, Mills thought, 'we are 
justified in making a very great effort indeed' to bring about the destruction of that 
factory. Making these sorts of determinations was, he concluded, a matter for study 
by intelligence specialists who have been given access to the necessary data. 253 
AEF G-2A did belatedly attempt to operationalize Mills' thinking about 
German industrial vulnerabilities. In roughly August, 1918 it was discovered that G-
2-A-2, G-2-A-3, and G-2-A-7 were performing overlapping work. This led to the 
detachment of one Major lD. Galloway, a military engineer, to study bombing 
objectives. After doing some work on the most efficient ways of inhibiting German 
reinforcements should major combat ensue in various sectors, he turned his attention 
to the best ways of crippling German industry. This, he determined, in line with 
Mills' thinking need not entail destroying all German industry, but rather selecting the 
proper small percentage of it that could bring the rest to its knees. Eventually, he was 
assigned to G-2-A-2 in late October, where he was labouring to sort out the problem 
1·, h h A . . 254 and its imp lcatlOns w en t e rmlstlce came. 
The two remaining sections performed mostly support functions. G-2-A-4, the 
publications Section, was mostly though not entirely in a support role. It put out most 
of the finished publications ofG-2A and many of the publications from the rest ofG-
2, as well. Its flagship products were the Summary of Information and the Press 
252 Ogden L. Mills, 'History of Section G-2 A-2d, Enemy Resources', 1 December 1 
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Review. The former was a daily product distributed every morning, which included 
translated documents of potential interest to the troops, order of battle updates, and 
various communiques. The information was acquired from other offices of G-2-A, 
notably G-2-A-I and G-2-A-3, situation reports from the various American armies, 
corps, and division, and similar inputs from the Allies. The Press Review was also a 
daily which summarized and explained the 'journalistic opinion' of Allied, enemy, 
and neutral nations. 'It attempted to furnish data ... necessary for the proper estimation 
of political conditions and developments'. This included military, economic, social, 
and political data. However, the Press Review 'was not a mere patchwork clipped 
from editorial articles; it was on the contrary in the nature of a cold-blooded analysis'. 
Indeed, after the war, G-2-A-4 recommended that officers charged with preparing 
press reviews in the future should have language skills, and post-graduate training in 
law, history, or political science.255 G-2-A-4 also produced a variety of other 
publications, including a Summary of Air Information which reported work done by 
G-2-A-7; and a range of other works, such as area handbooks, and 'water supply 
books' prepared by other parts ofG_2_A.256 Finally, G-2-A-8, maintaining a registry, 
disseminating finished products and did other similar tasks . 
• • • 
The existence of an intelligence staff and its understanding of how the enemy 
conducted intelligence allowed the development of more sophisticated, intricate types 
of deception operations than had been previously possible. Particularly important was 
the fact that the enemy would use many different collection means and look for many 
255 United States Army in World War I, Volume 13, p. 41. 
256 Ibid, pp. 38-39. 
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different indications in their efforts to understand American intentions.257 That said, 
deception was not a major part of the American war effort.258 
The Americans engaged in their first real experiment with deception during 
the run-up to the St. Mihiel Offensive. The deception had its genesis in French alarm 
that American plans for a major offensive in September were common knowledge in 
Paris, raising the grim possibility that the Germans had caught wind of them. General 
Henri Philippe Petain took matters into his own hands and wrote personally to 
Pershing urging him to do something to throw the Germans off the scent and offering 
French assistance. Pershing responded on 23 August that he would be glad to accept 
French help and that he would get to work immediately on a deception plan that he 
would coordinate with his AlIy.259 
Together with his chiefofstaffMajor General James W. McAndrew, G-3 Fox 
Conner, and Colonel Arthur Conger, the head of G-2-A, Pershing worked up a 
scheme to make the Germans fear an American offensive through the Belfort Gap, the 
area separating the Vosges and Jura Mountains. If the effort was successful, it would 
focus German attention about 125 miles away from where the Americans would 
'k 260 actually stn e. 
In order to carry off this deception against the Germans, Pershing inflicted one 
upon some of his own officers. He turned to Major General Omar Bundy, an old-
style general whom he had found unable to adapt to modem day realities. He had 
relieved Bundy of command of the 2nd Division earlier in the year and given him 
257 Nolan, 'Comments', p. 444. 
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command of the VI Corps, which handled reception and training, safely far away 
from combat. Now, in late August, Fox Conner ordered Bundy to Belfort with orders 
to prepare plans for an attack towards Mulhousen (today Mulhouse, France) and 
thence on to the Rhine. Bundy was instructed to send frequent telegraphic updates to 
higher authorities. On D-Day (which was planned to coincide with the real D-Day of 
the St. Mihiel offensive of which Bundy was unaware) the assault would supposedly 
be personally commanded by Pershing. Bundy was told that he should plan on an 
assault force of seven divisions and that Arthur Conger would soon arrive from GlIQ 
to help with the planning.261 A captain from First Army's 0-2 also arrived at Belfort 
. h d· t· 262 to help WIth t e eceptIOn prepara Ions. 
Bundy's staff officers were impossible to hide in Belfort and they set to 
working investigating road and rail capacities, inspecting hospitals, and the like. In 
addition, Conger, operating through intelligence channels laid on numerous 
reconnaissance flights over the German lines in the area. Meanwhile, borrowed 
French tanks laid tracks that would be readily visible from above and seemed to 
indicate armoured forces hiding in wooded areas. GlIQ arranged for signal units to 
be made available and they, too, soon arrived, erecting radio antennas, making 
numerous telephone calls, and flooding the local telegraph stations with traffic. In 
addition, the Americans stepped up patrolling activity.263 For his part, Nolan 
dispatched the chief of his press office to Belfort to arrange for journalists to visit to 
notice the leasing of buildings and the rush of business at the telegraph office.264 
Conger himself undertook one decidedly nineteenth century measure in support of the 
deception: in the hotel room where he was billeted, he typed up a description of the 
261 Ibid. 
262 William H. Dearden, 'Order of Battle', 11 Feb 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-
3281167. 
263 Nolan, • Comments' , pp. 441-442. 
264 Ibid, p. 446. 
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impending (phony) offensive and then purposely left the carbon paper he had used in 
the wastebasket for the domestic staff to find and hopefully pass to German 
. II' 265 mte Igence. 
Nolan later speculated that the Americans may have been helped 'by the fact 
that a new army like ours would not be expected to know how to put over a thing of 
this kind and the German intelligence would have a right to feel that our revelations 
were entirely accidental and due to a new army and an imperfectly trained staff. 266 
Though there is some evidence that the Germans evacuated some records from 
Mulhouse and made plans for broader evacuations, it is not clear that the deception 
induced the German Army to do anything that made the St. Mihiel Offensive any 
easier. Nevertheless, Pershing thought that three German divisions had been drawn 
out ofposition.267 Nolan, in private comments delivered to Pershing on the latter's 
. f: t' 1 268 C fi h' h . . draft memOIrs, was ar more scep Ica . onger, or IS part, was never ent uSlastJc 
about the operation, perhaps embarrassed by Allied ridicule at his crude attempt to 
G . 11' 269 plant a fake document on erman mte Igence. 
Whatever Conger thought of this operation, it seemed a sufficient success that 
he was given similar roles in subsequent deceptions.27o Nolan recalled another 
deception launched in the waning days of the Meuse-Argonne offensive: 
I found the First Army working this on its own by establishing a 
wireless station that used a leaky code, the wireless station sending 
being that of a new army going in on the right of our First Army in the 
Meuse-Argonne battle. The young man in charge of the enemy radio 
section of the First Army was working it and the Germans could get 
about everything from that station in the line of orders to an army in 
265 Pershing, My Experiences, Volume 2, pp. 238-239. Rod Paschall, 'World War I: The 
Belfort Ruse'. 
266 Nolan, 'Comments', pp. 445-446. 
267 Pershing, My Experiences, Vol. 2, p. 239. 
268 Nolan 'Comments', pp. 442-443. 
269 Rod Paschall, 'World War I: The Be1fort Ruse'. 
270 ChiefG-2-A to AC ofS G-2, GHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA, RG 120, Entry 74, Box 
6199, Folder 'Report of G.2-A'. 
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this leaky code. After it had been working four or five days, I found 
this wireless section at Suilly very much depressed one morning when 
I came in and asking the reason for it, I was told the German turned 
their artillery on it the night before and succeeded in destroying our 
sending apparatus at this point completely and they were afraid that 
Army X would have to go out of business. 271 
Another capability which owed its existence to the intelligence services was 
covert action, though that term had yet to come into the parlance. In fact, there was 
little if any organized thinking about covert operations during this period. Ilowever, a 
number of American intelligence organizations seem to have engaged in it. One 
historian has concluded that Dmitri Kalamatiano, one of the State Department's 
agents, may have been involved in some sabotage operations in Bolshevik Russia.272 
MID, operating through the military attache in Denmark, also dipped its oar in the 
water. A member of a revolutionary party in Germany had volunteered his services to 
the attache. The asset was able to provide information about the operations of and 
conditions in the German navy. For his part, the attache provided funding and 
unspecified organization help to the asset's party. After the war, the attache assessed 
that his efforts had helped to bring about the Kiel and Wilhelmshaven naval mutinies 
of October and November 1918 as well as other incidents of unrest in Germany. The 
attache was probably deluded about the degree to which this caused the mutinies.273 
However, the best documented and most far-reaching covert actions were 
conducted by the AEF G-2 through Emmanuel Victor Voska.274 Voska urged a 
variety of sabotage and subversion operations on the American authorities. Secretary 
of War Newton Baker was initially reluctant, but eventually he relented and allowed 
Voska to go to work. He carried out a wide variety of covert actions and sought and 
271 Nolan, 'Comments', pp. 445-446. 
272 Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze, pp. 87-88. 
273 MID History, pp. 451-452. 
274 See Chapter 4 for additional infonnation on Voska. 
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appears to have received permission to provide financial support for selected 
revolutionaries.275 In his 12 July 1918 'Report No.1' to the G-2, Voska noted that 'it 
is very urgent to start immediate minor revolutionary acts throughout Turkey, 
Roumania [which had surrendered to the Central Powers], Hungary and Austria'. By 
stirring up national revolutions, Voska told his superiors, the Allies could impede the 
ability of the Central Powers to move troops from east to west or vice versa. They 
could also create an increased requirement for enemy troops in southern Europe, thus 
spreading the enemy's forces even thinner. He further thought it might be possible to 
block the Danube and sabotage defence industrial facilities on enemy soil. lIe also 
recommended Allied naval operations to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Navy which 
was largely manned by Slavs and to put increased Allied ground forces into Dalmatia, 
Albania, Salonika and Mesopotamia, all of which measures, he thought could 
encourage revolution. He concluded his report by noting that it was important to 
know the 'exact month' that the national revolutions would start-apparently so that 
Allied actions could be arranged to best exploit and support them-and that if the 
nationalities had not agreed on a month, they should be helped to do so. He said that 
he would try to gather this information as soon as he could.276 In September, Nolan 
forwarded to Voska for his comments a proposal that had come over the transom from 
a concerned citizen, suggesting a campaign of sabotage in Roumania. Voska 
responded that he had already been preparing such a plan. It is not clear whether he 
ever actually launched this effort.277 
275 Voska to Nolan [?], 23 July 1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 194, Box 6035, Folder 'Secret 
Service Misc. Reports by LTS Ruditsky & Voska'. Van Deman, Final Memoranda, pp. 55, 
57. 
276 'Report No. 1', 12 July 1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 194, Box 6035, Folder 'Secret 
Service Misc. Reports by L TS Ruditsky & Voska'. 
277 Arthur E. Voska, to AC of S, G-2 AEF, 26 September 1918, also Nolan to Voska, 17 
September 1918 both in NARA, RG 120, Entry 194, Box 6035, Folder 'Secret Service LT. A. 
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Voska intended one of his major efforts to be the use of propaganda to 
encourage nationalist uprisings against Austro-Hungarian authorities. In fact, much 
of the information he sought from behind enemy lines was intended to identify 
leverage points for Allied propaganda. The Austrian Army was rife with 
revolutionaries: Czechs, Slovaks, South Slavs, Poles, and others. Furthermore, its 
army was organized into ethnically based units, so entire units were potentially 
vulnerable to revolutionary feelings. Voska soon found that there was no further need 
to distribute propaganda in the Austrian Army as it was rife with disloyal units, many 
of which freely allowed agents to cross the lines in their sector from the Italian side.278 
His group also helped the Italian Army to raise an ultimately corps-sized Czech 
Legion to operate as part of the Italian Army.279 
In October 1918, Austria-Hungary started to come apart as its Emperor Karl 
appealed in vain to the Allies for a separate peace. A nationalist coup in Prague failed 
on 14 October, but on 16 October the Emperor, trying to contain the explosive 
centrifugal forces at work, issued an ambiguous decree that could be read as 
dissolving the empire. The result was that many Austrian soldiers started to leave the 
front-lines. On the 21 st, the Czechs and Slovaks declared their independence anyway 
and a 'Yugoslav National Council' quickly followed suit. Nationalist governments 
started to form in Prague, Cracow, Ljubljana, Zagreb and even Vienna. On 22 
278 Voska, Spy and Counterspy, pp. 271-278. 
279 Ibid, pp. 271-2 and 283-284. For additional background on the Czech Legion in Italy, see 
Rowan A. Williams, 'The Czech Legion in Italy During World War 1', in Samuel R. 
Williamson, Jr., and Peter Pastor, eds., Essays on World War I: Origin and Prisoners of War, 
East European Monograph 136, (New York, 1983), pp. 199-214. Williams makes clear that 
this corps was not Voska's idea as Voska's memoirs might allow one to believe. Rather, it 
was a long-standing project of Edvard Bene~ and Toma~ Masaryk. The Italians immediately 
recognized the potential of the Czech Legion for intelligence collection and special 
operations. See p. 204. 
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October, Hungary declared its independence and many Hungarian soldiers began to 
280 filter home. 
Clearly, tectonic forces were at work. In this context it was relatively easy for 
Voska to do his subversive work. He later claimed that by early October 1918 his 
organization in Italy had concluded that 'the Czechs and Slovaks in the Austrian ranks 
were almost all with us. The Slovenes had caught the infection. The Croats had held 
out longer; but now they were sizzling with revolution'. Officers among these 
revolutionary Slavs, probably after consultation with Voska's people, had arranged to 
get Czech, Slovak and Slovene officers 'of apparent loyalty' assigned to some 
Austrian and Hungarian regiments where they intended to start issuing orders to 
retreat or surrender as soon as the Italians launched a major offensive. In October 
also, Voska's organization managed to bring out an Austrian staff officer, sympathetic 
to the Slavic revolutionary cause, bearing the Austrian Anny's battle plans. Voska 
took this infonnation straight to the Italian Anny and urged an offensive. The Italian 
commander Annando Diaz probably took Voska's information merely as 
confirmation of what he already knew: that the time had arrived to deal the death-
blow to the Austro-Hungarian Army. On 24 October, the Italians, supported by 
various Allied forces, included on Czechoslovak division, launched an offensive. 
Almost immediately, Austro-Hungarian units of all nationalities began to collapse and 
desert, though the better led ones held together for a time.281 
* * * 
The AEF never had a golden source of intelligence that laid bare the enemy's 
intentions and secrets. No legendary agents were recruited. Though propaganda 
280 John R. Schindler, Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice a/the Great War, (Westport: Praegcr, 
2001), pp. 298-299. 
281 Voska, Spy and Counterspy, pp. 286-287. Schindler, !sanzo, pp. 300-301. 
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appears to have had some albeit unmeasurable effect, covert action (which did not 
even have that name yet) and deception were still in their infancy. Finally, though the 
Gennan espionage threat was certainly not zero, neither does it appear to have been as 
robust as it seemed at the time, so American counterespionage efforts were ultimately 
of only modest utility. 
That said, by dint of the careful, gradual accumulation of information and 
education of commanding officers, the intelligence efforts of the AEF, aided in no 
small part by the Allies, did in fact, make Pershing and his subordinate commanders 
by far the best infonned commanders in American military history to that time. 
Given that the French and British forces and, for that matter, the Gennan forces, were 
comparably well-infonned, it is hard to imagine how the AEF could have contributed 
to the war effort to anything like the extent it did without this giant intelligence effort. 
It would have been an enormous force blundering about the battlefield-a reprise of 
Wagner's 'blind giant'-<loing little damage to the enemy and suffering greater losses 
itself.282 Moreover, the AEF would have been effectively under the control of the 
British and French through their services. Though there is no reason to think that 
Pershing gave the issue much thought at the time, the lack of an intelligence 
component to the AEF would have rendered moot his firm insistence on a fully 
autonomous American anny. 
282 Arthur L. Wagner, Report a/the Santiago Campaign, pp. 140-141. 
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Conclusion 
American intelligence did not spring full grown from the brow of World War 
I, though it may appear that way. In fact, it had been gestating since the late 1870s 
when Emory Upton issued his call for the War Department to have an intelligence 
organization. It was born not long thereafter when the Navy and then the War 
Department took his advice. ONI and the MID, and their respective services then 
entered a lengthy period of learning by doing and by studying from afar what the 
great powers of Europe were doing in the realm of intelligence. The foreign 
influences were predominantly German, British, and French. The German influence 
eame in two ways. First, of course, was the nineteenth century influence as 
Americans read military journals and began haltingly to emulate Germany's 
development of military staffs. Sometimes this was by reading articles from Germany 
or Austria. Other times this was by reading British or French articles which were 
themselves influenced by the Germans. This reading set the stage for the 
development of specialists, trained in the handling of large amounts of technical 
information that could be used to enable military planning and operations. 
There was another, less obvious, way in which the Germans--or more 
correctly, the American image of the Germans-influenced the development of 
American intelligence. It was an article of faith that the Germans, with their 'Prussian 
efficiency', were in a league of their own when it came to intelligence. In particular, 
the Americans, who appear to have read too many stories about Wilhelm Stieber, 
assumed the Germans to have spies everywhere and an unquestioned ability to 
assimilate the data they collected. These beliefs, albeit conditioned by the very real 
German espionage and sabotage campaign during the period of American neutrality, 
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would greatly influence the nature and extent of American counterintelligence when 
the United States entered the war. 
World War I saw the first steps toward the inculcation oftechnophilia into the 
United State's practice of intelligence. The invention of aerial photography and the 
flourishing of the previously highly esoteric field of cryptology allowed military 
commanders from Pershing on down to have a greater understanding of what was 
happening on the battlefield than had ever before been possible. This understanding 
only grew when these technological sources were combined with information from 
other more traditional sources: reports from spies, interrogations of prisoners, etc. 
However, this advance came at a cost. Large numbers of experts were necessary to 
interpret the raw information acquired through these technological wonders. 
Additional resources were required to protect these important sources: code makers, 
fighter aircraft, and a counterespionage apparatus. 
However, the forte of Ralph Van Deman, known as the father of American 
military intelligence (a moniker he should share with Arthur Wagner) was in domestic 
surveillance and 'secret service' work generally, a mission the military would keep 
returning to for many decades. In this new type of war, a highly ideological clash of 
whole nations and peoples, the opinions and actions of every American was of interest 
to the government. At the same time, there was great fear of German espionage. The 
War and Navy Departments, helped by other government agencies and vast swaths of 
the public, organized itself to deal with these issues. Though the extent of the actual 
threat was overblown to put it charitably, this period saw such forward-looking 
developments as background investigations of officers, special investigations of 
personnel holding particularly sensitive jobs, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
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recognition of counter-intelligence and counter-espionage as serious and regular types 
of intelligence work. 
Counter-espionage was often known as 'secret service'. Also falling under 
this rubric was espionage conducted by or for the United States. Americans had 
always seen espionage as morally problematic, justified if at all only by the dire 
necessities of wartime. The War and Navy Departments and the State Department all 
conducted espionage operations abroad during World War I. While these 
operations-aside from the train watching efforts, and here the British and French did 
the bulk of the work-did little to help Pershing, they did gather some information 
about the German Navy and the situation in Russia that might have been useful to 
other American leaders. Perhaps more importantly, however, these wartime 
espionage activities were a training ground allowing experiments in such fields as 
personnel selection, cover, and agent-handling. The period also saw a redefinition of 
'spying', one which allowed it to shed its connotation of scouting and moved it 
toward the stealing of secrets. 
In the end, then, American intelligence underwent a growth spurt during the 
World War I period. Furthermore, it stretched itself to cover every issue that seemed 
germane to the conduct of the war. These included securing the home front; gathering 
and analyzing military, political, economic, and 'psychologic' information for 
military and political leaders; conducting propaganda operations and covert actions; 
and throwing a nearly seamless protective blanket over American forces all the way 
from the trenches through the rear area, across the Atlantic Ocean and back into the 
United States. Intelligence had truly changed to accord with the war being fought. 
Another way in which intelligence adapted to the new circumstances was in 
the cooperation with foreign countries. The United States fought World War I as a 
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member-a sometimes resentful but decidedly junior member-of a coalition. (The 
country's post-Revolutionary experience with coalition warfare was limited to the 
struggle against the Barbary Pirates and the Boxer Rebellion.) As a result, for the first 
time American intelligence had to learn to operate alongside foreign intelligence 
agencies. Though the Allies tried to influence American intelligence activities, the 
U.S. retained ultimate national control over its own intelligence affairs. The greatest 
American autonomy, of course, was in domestic affairs where, for instance, the 
British could not force the Americans to investigate Irish revolutionary activities. The 
British and French did bring rather more pressure to bear on the Americans in trying 
to shape where and how American espionage would be conducted. Here too, 
however, the Americans ultimately did what they wanted. When it came to battlefield 
intelligence and naval intelligence the cooperation was quite intimate, albeit more so 
on the battlefield than in the naval realm. In fact, the Royal Navy's NID came out of 
the war with the sense that not much was to be gained from cooperation with aNI, not 
surprising given aNI's concentration on the collection of human intelligence 
compared with NID's across-the-board collection efforts, and the fact that Admiral 
Sims-the main point of connection between the US Navy and the Royal Navy-
himself thought little of ON!.) 
In other areas, intelligence cooperation was significant. The Interallied Bureau 
served as a venue, albeit a quite formal one, for sharing some intelligence, notably 
counterintelligence. More often sharing and cooperation depended on personal 
relationships. In Berne, the military attache found that he got better cooperation from 
the British and the French than the representatives of those countries got from each 
1 Phyllis Soybel, p. 14. 
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other.2 In some places, relations were so good and interests so aligned as to approach 
a local merger. For example, in Buenos Aires the Allies created the' F ABI agency' 
('Franco-American-British Italian') combining the US military and naval attaches and 
representatives from the other nations. F ABI's chief investigator was an Argentinean, 
the retired head of that country's investigative agency, who came recommcnded by 
the Italians. Something similar existed in Geneva where the Allies established a 
combined counterespionage center called the 'Geneva Inter-Allied Service' and late in 
the war an agreement was reached among the Americans, British, French, and 
Belgians to 'combine and cooperate in intelligence work' in the Netherlands. 3 
MI-l(c) (later to be known as MI-6) came to have sufficient respect for the 
United States' espionage capabilities that he saw merit in post-war cooperation. In 
1919, Edward Bell reported that its head, Mansfield Smith-Cumming, had told him: 
that he hoped in a general way it might be possible to come to some 
understanding with our Secret Service in regard to cooperation after 
the war .... He said frankly that if our interests clashed in anyone 
particular country both Governments could maintain complete services 
there and 'cut each other's throats' quite happily, but that he thought in 
a good many countries some working arrangement could be made.4 
Cooperation between the AEF's intelligence staff and its British and French 
counterparts was particularly intimate. The AEF's files fun of British and French 
intelligence reports and the Americans sent students to British and French schools 
while accepting instructors from those nations in their own schoolhouses. In addition, 
however, there is an easy familiarity to be found in the surviving correspondence 
2 Van Deman to Nolan AEF G-2, Subject, "Report on office and activities of military attache 
at Berne," 12 August 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 9944-R-44. 
3 Godson to Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, 15 October 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 
9944-R-56. ,Slocum (Van Deman) to MID, 2 September 1918, 9944-54. Churchill to 
Military Attache, London, 4 September 1918,9944-55. RC [Military Attache, Buenos Aires] 
to MID, No 1318, Aug 21, 1918, 9944-L-4. 
4 Edward Bell L[eland] H[arrison], 1 May, 1919, NARA, RG 319, Entry 350, Box 5, File 121 
'Secret Service'. 
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between American intelligence officers and their British and French counterparts on 
the other. The British and French would share with the Americans their most intimate 
signals intelligence secrets, not just the substantive information derived from signals 
intelligence, but the cryptologic methods behind that information. The sides would 
correspond back and forth on how to solve new German cipher systems, the security 
of new American systems, and other matters. One scholar has even suggested that 
this may be the genesis of the famous Anglo-American 'special relationship' in 
intelligence lies in the cooperation between the intelligence components of the two 
countries' respective armies in France.5 
What was the actual impact of America's intelligence operations during the 
war? There are five basic ways in which intelligence can contribute to the 
prosecution of a war or other form of struggle. Four of these relate to information. 
First, an intelligence service may provide specific detailed warning of an enemy 
action. Second, it may sensitize leaders to an increased possibility of enemy action. 
Third, it may provide leaders with information about a positive opportunity for 
friendly action. Fourth, it may simply educate leaders about the general situation, in 
the hope that the overall quality of the leaders' decisions can thereby be increased. 
The fifth way in which an intelligence service may contribute is by directly affecting 
the enemy's situation itself by subverting the enemy; thwarting his spies; or 
conducting sabotage against his forces, infrastructure, or economy. 
With regard to the first three of these, as already mentioned, it is usually 
extremely difficult to draw a direct line between intelligence information and tangible, 
specific leadership or command decisions. Nevertheless, intelligence sometimes had 
a demonstrable effect. At the tactical level, signals intelligence sometimes could 
S Jim Beach, 'Origins of the Special Intelligence Relationship? Anglo-American Intelligence 
Cooperation', Intelligence and National Security, 22:2, (2007), p. 245. 
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provide timely and direct information about impending German raids and attacks. G-
2-A-6 certainly liked to tell such stories. For example, on the afternoon of24 April 
1918, the Americans intercepted a German message stating that weather had forced 
the postponement of a planned raid in the St. Mihiel sector. Subsequent messages that 
afternoon indicated that the attack would still come sometime soon. The Americans 
were thus ready to receive the raid which came that night. Similarly at 9:05 PM on 28 
April, the Americans intercepted a German signal. G-2-A-6 was able to decrypt it and 
they discovered that it ordered an attack to take place at 1 AM. Warning of this attack 
reached the affected American unit thirty minutes before the attack took place.6 
At the strategic level, the train-watching system by itself was able to ensure 
that no significant transfer of forces from the east to the west could take place without 
the allied commanders being aware ofit.7 When train-watching, aerial 
reconnaissance, signals intelligence, and painstaking order of battle work all came 
together it was usually clear when a German offensive was in the offing, though 
sometimes the allies would differ among themselves on precisely where the blow 
would fall. s Intelligence, in particular goniometry, played a role in the launching of 
the St. Mihiel offensive. As the hour approached, there were increasing indications 
that the Germans had abandoned their positions and the U.S. First Army seriously 
considered launching the offensive without an artillery preparation. G-2-A-6 was able 
to show, however, that the entire German command and control system remained in 
place in the salient and so the artillery preparation was not cancelled.9 
With regard to the fifth way in which intelligence can help a commander, by 
directly harming the enemy's cause, there is reason for some skepticism about the 
6 'Final Report, RIS', p. 20. 
7 Nolan, 'History', p. 188. 
8 Noland, 'History', pp. 225-227. 
9 'RlS Final Report', p. 20. William A. Morgan, 'Invasion on the Ether: Radio Intelligence at 
the Battle ofSt. Mihiel, September 1918', Military Affairs, Vol. 51, No.2 (Apr., 1987), p. 59. 
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contribution of American intelligence during the war. Certainly, commanders 
believed in subversion and propaganda as evidenced not only by their willingness to 
use it but their fears about the enemy's capabilities. Ilowever, the efficacy, let alone 
import, of American offensive propaganda, subversion, and sabotage efforts is far 
from clear. Blankenhorn was enthusiastic about the contributions which his 
propaganda made to the war effort by means of inducing German soldiers to 
surrender. However, even he was forced to admit that it was impossible to firn1ly 
demonstrate that the jlugblatter had done their job; it was simply a matter of faith. 
Voska's subversion behind the Austro-Hungarian lines is similarly difficult to assess. 
However, even if they were fully as effective as Voska believed, it would be folly to 
attribute the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to him. Much more powerful 
political forces were at work than those which Voska could bring to bear. 
The greatest contribution of American intelligence to the war effort might 
have come within the United States itself, but it did not. Certainly, the greatest 
number of intelligence personnel operated on the home front. These included not 
only the formal employees of MID, ONI, and the Bureau of Investigation, but also the 
quarter million strong American Protective League, and an army of unpaid co-optees 
inside the military camps. In retrospect, these organizations were remarkably 
inefficient and yet stunningly effective in monitoring the population for the first sign 
of activities or beliefs that could aid the Germans, whether these were undertaken at 
Berlin's behest or not. It is unclear how much credit the intelligence services should 
receive for this, however. Walter Nicolai claimed in his inter-war memoirs that 
German intelligence was largely unable to operate in the United States after April, 
1917 and the tiny number of actual 'spies' that the MID claimed to have found seems 
to bear out his contention. It may be that the stifling blanket of surveillance and 
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security that the intelligence services threw over the country prevented widespread 
outbreaks of espionage, subversion, and pro-German propaganda by German-
Americans or the Lutheran Church but there is scant evidence to support such 
speculation. 
It may have been in the fourth endeavor-the unglamorous, continuous 
informing and educating of commanding officers-that the greatest operational 
significance of American intelligence may be found. Not only were commanders 
better able to understand the war around them, but American intelligence provided a 
vital underpinning for the policy of Pershing and Wilson that the United States must 
have its own independent army in France. Occasionally, the immediate benefits of 
intelligence were evident. For instance, Pershing did not have to take special 
measures to deal with the consequences of a French collapse brought about by a lack 
of coal because his intelligence officers were able to assure him that France had 
enough coal to carry on the fight. More commonly, however, the everyday education 
of commanders by their intelligence staffs did not go commented upon, but this docs 
not mean it was not important. An army that never interrogated prisoners, which did 
not translate captured documents, which did not use aircraft to see what the enemy 
was doing beyond the range of ground-based eyeballs, which did not use signals 
intelligence to pull the enemy's secrets out of the ether, which did not protect its own 
communications, and which did not try to understand the structure, tactics, and 
weapons ofthe forces it faced would have been an incompetent army. In fact, such 
an army would never have existed. Having gained three years of brutal experience, 
the allies would have recognized such an American army as a potentially fatal 
liability, a German breakout waiting to happen, and for their own protection would 
have provided intelligence and counterintelligence for it-thereby, strongly 
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influencing Pershing's decisionmaking and undercutting his autonomy--or would 
refused to have allowed the AEF into the line as an independent force. 
Military commanders may have found intelligence useful, but they were not 
alone in this. President Wilson, though he never rid himself of his distaste for 
espionage came to value it, as well. As we have seen, he intervened to keep the 
embattled James McNally at his post in Switzerland. At the urging of Colonelliouse, 
he also established The Inquiry, a group of academics, to develop materials to support 
him in post-war negotiations. This group drew heavily on the data from the Military 
Intelligence Division in preparing their reports.! 0 
In assessing the significance of the development of American intelligence 
during World War I, we are also aided by its immediate post-war history. The first 
and most salient fact here is that the nation's civilian leaders saw value in it so 
American intelligence actually had a post-war history. Throughout American history 
intelligence has developed in a discontinuous fashion and the country's greatest 
struggles have figured prominently in its development of intelligence. By the same 
token, interwar periods have often seen stagnation or retrogression in intelligence. 
General George Washington was an enthusiastic and capable practitioner of 
intelligence during the revolutionary period, but very little of this continued, none of 
it institutionalized in a bureaucracy or agency. Certainly also some of the military 
commanders fighting for the United States and the Confederate States thought 
seriously about intelligence and developed capabilities in this direction during the 
Civil War (1861-1865). However, these concepts and the ad hoc structures that 
instantiated them evaporated with the radical demobilization that followed the 
surrender at Appomattox. Similarly, the Philippine War saw important innovations in 
10 For a history of The Inquiry, see Lawrence Gelfand, The Inquiry; American Preparations 
Jor Peace, 1917-1919, (New Haven, 1963). 
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intelligence, but those lessons were never institutionalized, in fact, the Anny appears 
to have tried to forget them. I I 
World War I was different. Though the United States military once again 
underwent a radical post-war demobilization, the intelligence function continued. 
There were several reasons for this remarkable development. First, by now 
intelligence was not just a matter for the military. The State and Justice Departments 
perfonned intelligence functions that were not justified merely by the fact of a 
shooting war. Second, almost every serious intelligence practitioner and many 
leaders and commanders had come to the conclusion that intelligence was 
indispensable in modem war. Furthennore, the intelligence professionals (for such 
they were now) had also realized that extensive peacetime preparation was a 
necessary precondition for effective wartime intelligence. This time the British and 
French had done a great deal of the wartime preparation for the Americans. They had 
written the intelligence regulations that the Americans had copied. They had prepared 
the baseline orders of battle that the Americans then kept up to date for their sectors. 
They had opened schools that welcomed American students. They had geared up 
their industry to produce the observation aircraft that the Americans flew. Who could 
say if such a situation would obtain in the future? Third, from the point of view of the 
intelligence personnel on the home front (and to some degree in the attaches' offices) 
there had been no cessation of war. True, the Gennans had been defeated, but the 
Bolshevists were still threatening America with some of the same weapons the 
Germans had (allegedly) employed. 
Accordingly, America's intelligence efforts did not simply come to a grinding 
halt with the signing of an Annistice as had happened after the Civil War and the 
II See Chapter 1. 
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Revolutionary War. The two new technological endeavors, signals intelligence and 
aerial photography, continued, albeit somewhat handicapped by the fact that there was 
no longer a definable enemy against which to collect. With regard to signals 
intelligence, the danger ofunreadiness, particularly in terms of training, was the 'one 
big lesson' that impressed itself on the members of G-2_A_6. 12 No longer, they 
thought, could the United States make up for any disadvantage after the war started. 
The nature of the intelligence business had become so technical that Army 
intelligence must now be in permanent readiness, accepting the cost of peacetime 
expenditures as a necessary evil. Furthermore, given that the code and cipher 
business had become so complex and enemy codes were in service for so short a 
period of time 'the furnishing of an inadequate force to decode enemy messages is a 
I t ' 13 tota was e . 
Training and preparedness were difficult in the world of signals intelligence, 
however. Only the rare person was suitable for the work and he or she was hard to 
find particularly given the secrecy surrounding the field; few potential candidates 
would ever became aware of the possibility of a career in the field. Moorman had 
some dramatic ideas for handling this problem. On 27 November 1918, he wrote to 
Nolan that 'the more publicity is given this work now the better position we will be in 
to handle the situation in the next war'. Accordingly, he recommended that officers 
be allowed to take home confidential documents pertaining to G-2-A-6-presumably 
with which to impress their friends and colleagues-and suggested the publication of 
a work on 'the general methods of handling codes and ciphers developed during the 
war' for use 'in military colleges and schools'. Nolan approved these measures 
12 Chief G-2-A to AC of S G-2, GHQ, AEF, 8 June 1919, NARA RG 120, Entry 74, Box 
6199, Folder 'Report ofG.2-A'. 
\3 Moorman to Chief, G-2-A, 2 January 1919, NARA RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 
'Report ofG.2-A.' 
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provided that the information be kept 'confidential'. 14 Moorman also requested 
permission from the British to use a secret pamphlet they had written, 'Enemy Codes 
and Their Solution', by as a textbook in Army service schools. This request caused 
some alarm in Britain and the British prevailed upon Nolan to forbid it. 15 
Further reflecting on the challenges of finding the right people, Moorman 
wrote in the G-2-A-6 final report that the officers, especially, in the section attacking 
enemy codes must be able to exercise 'independent thought' to a 'high degree' and 
that in future the code and cipher component of the War Department should be 
responsible for weeding out unsuitable candidates, erring on the side of rejection. 16 
Moorman and his boss, Arthur Conger recommended that the Army maintain a radio 
intelligence unit 'which would serve as a training school for officers and men and 
permit of experiment for improvement of this service'. 17 
Similar considerations were at play back in Washington. During the war, 
Herbert Yardley's MI-8, the War Department's main signals intelligence service, had 
served not only the War Department but also the Navy and the State Department. It 
had proved sufficiently useful that long before the Armistice discussions were 
underway among senior officials on how to make the capability permanent. By late 
1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing was promising to help fund such an entity. 
The War Department needed no persuasion. Shortly after the war, Yardley urged that 
the staff should consist of well-paid civilians because it was difficult to find people 
with the right skills within the Army. Even the head of this organization, it was 
14 Moorman to Nolan, November 27,1918, NARA, RG 120, Entry 105, Box 5767, File 520-
97 
15 E. S. Clive to General Nolan, 5 December 1918 NARA, RG 120, Entry 105, Box 5761, 
Folder 'Enemy codes and Their Solutions (British Document)'. Also Nolan to Clive, Chief of 
Intelligence, BEF, 30 December 1918, Box 5767, File 520-193. Further, see various 
documents in Box 5763, Folder 'Sellers Data'. 
16 Final Report RIS, p. 13. 
17 Frank Moorman to Chief, G-2-A, 2 January 1919, NARA RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, 
Folder 'Report of G.2-A.' In fact, the Army did not establish such a unit until 1933. 
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thought, should be a civilian. As one State Department official observed, 'it does not 
seem feasible to have a lot of civilians working under a [regular officer] who would 
know nothing about the work. No one who is any good or wants to make a reputation 
for himself would act as a figurehead, and anyone who really tried to run the job 
would put it on the blink'. Soon, the 'American Black Chamber', was running in 
New York along these lines with Yardley at its head, jointly funded by State and War 
but under War Department administration. For its part, the Navy, in mid-1919 still 
unable to get its own SIGINT effort going, agreed that American Black Chamber was 
the right place to consolidate the function. ls This lasted until 1923 by which time 
Navy was growing frustrated with what it was getting from Yardley. The next year it 
established its own signals intelligence organization under the Director of Naval 
Communications, the famous OP-20-G .19 
In the realm of communications security, intelligence personnel in the know 
realized that the Army had flirted with disaster. One needed only look at the Russian 
catastrophes early in the war to see what a well-prepared enemy could do to nai'fs. 
The Anny should never run that risk again.20 Establishing a system for encouraging 
interest in cryptology and training people to do it would help, but Moorman observed 
in the pages of Infantry Journal in 1920 that it had been very difficult to teach even a 
'few simple rules' to those responsible for coding messages. Against these ordinary 
men, Moonnan warned, the enemy arrayed 'some of the best men in their country' to 
18 Kahn, Reader of Gentlemen's Mail, pp. 50-53. 
19 Laurence Safford, 'A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States' , 
National Security Agency, SRH-149, 1952, http://fas.org/irp/nsalsafford.pdf. Frederick 
Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924-1941, 
National Security Agency, 1994, http://www.history.navy.millbooks/comint/index.html. 
Dorwart, Naval Dilemma, p. 11. 
20 Nolan, 'History', pp. 120, 130. See also Nolan 'Comments', p. 68. Compare Nolan's 
opinion of Tannenberg with that found in Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, 
General Staff, Propaganda in its Military and Legal Aspects. The latter views the Russian 
disaster as resulting from German subversive activities in St. Petersburg. 
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do code and cipher work. Unless the Anny could do better next time, 'carelessness' 
would 'certainly mean loss oflife and may detennine the result of battles or of the 
war. ,21 In any event, the G-2-A-6 veterans felt, the Anny should also regularly and 
frequently change its codes, as the AEF had done during the war.22 
The Navy placed a great emphasis on communications security, as well. 
Though during the war the Navy's Code and Cipher Section had ceded the 
cryptanalytic field to Yardley's MI-8, they stayed in the cryptography business. 
During the war, lieutenant commander Russell Willson, the head of the Code and 
Cipher Section, designed a revolutionary new cipher machine, the 'Naval Cipher Box' 
or NCB Mark 1 which was followed soon thereafter by the NCB Mark 2. This was 
the most sophisticated cipher system in the world at the time and the Navy promptly 
deployed it to the wartime fleet. It also accompanied President Wilson to Versailles 
where naval personnel used it to encrypt the President's messages back to 
Washington. The NCB Mark 2 remained in service for some two decades.23 
If Herbert O. Yardley played a central role in the post-war continuation of 
signals intelligence, Lieutenant George Goddard played a similar role in aerial 
reconnaissance. Unlike Yardley, who had been in an important intelligence position 
during the war, Goddard was very junior during the war but he rose to prominence 
immediately thereafter. In December 1917, he joined the Aviation Section of the 
Signal Corps as an enlisted man and after three months of training he became an 
instructor in photographic interpretation. Commissioned a lieutenant in August 1918, 
he was charged with organizing three new photographic sections. After the war 
21 Frank Moorman, 'Code and Cipher in France', IJ, 16:12, (June, 1920), pp. 1039-1044. 
22 Moorman to Chief, G-2-A, 2 January 1919, NARA RG 120, Entry 74, Box 6199, Folder 
'Report ofG.2-A.' 
23 John Schindler, 'Securing the Airwaves at Sea: U.S. Navy Communications Security, 1917-
1945', paper presented at 'Naval Networks: The Dominance of Communications in Maritime 
Operations', 2007 King-Hall Naval History Conference, Canberra, Australia, 26 July 2007. 
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ended, he trained as a pilot, but in mid-1919 he was then put in charge of aerial 
photography for the War Department, from which position he developed a number of 
new techniques for doing aerial photography and pioneered the use of aerial 
photography for mapping.24 The surviving postwar observation squadrons busied 
themselves not only working worth Army ground units, but also doing photography in 
support of mapping efforts, helped in combating forest fires, and patrolling the U.S.-
Mexican border.25 
After the war, Army officers perceived the actual and potential value of 
airplanes to be so great that some air enthusiasts argued for the establishment of an 
independent air force with a corresponding cabinet-level department which they 
thought would be a bureaucratic and command environment that would allow the full 
potential of aircraft to flourish. Most of the supporters of such a course of action were 
looking to future combat roles for aircraft, others, including Pershing, most ground 
officers, and many aviators, thought that the value to the ground forces of the 
reconnaissance function was so great that the air forces should remain an integral part 
26 
of the army. 
In any event, there was broad agreement that observation aircraft had been 
quite valuable, though their payoff came nowhere near some of the fanciful pre-war 
predictions. Even Billy Mitchell, the leading proponent of an independent air force 
and the combat use of aircraft, immediately after the war labeled air superiority and 
observation (in essence, counter-intelligence and intelligence) as the top two 
24 'Brigadier General George William Goddard', 
http://www.af.millinformationibioslbio.asp?bioID=5563 Goddard's career stretched all the 
way into the Cold War when as a Brigadier General he reported to NATO in 1952 where he 
served as Director of Reconnaissance under Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. 
25 91 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron History Notes, http://www.rb-
29.netlHTMLl91 stSRSHistory/02.0 1.91 sthist.htm. 
26 An accessible account of this debate is found in Robert P. White, Mason Patrick and the 
Fight/or Air Service Independence, (Washington, 2001). Though the terms of this debate 
would change over time, it would not end until 1947 with the formation of the US Air Force. 
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achievements of the AEF's Air Service.27 Some prominent observers even argued 
that aviation had lengthened the war by making surprise attack impossible and thus 
strengthening the defence.28 In any event, aviation had moved into the void left in 
tactical and strategic reconnaissance when the static front prevented cavalry from 
operating. Nevertheless, the debate about the relationship between aviation and the 
cavalry continued. The subtext of this debate, of course, was the future of horse 
cavalry. Some officers, while conceding that technological advances had changed the 
role of cavalry, still insisted that it could augment aerial reconnaissance and verify 
information from the aircraft, particularly negative information.29 A few cavalry 
officers fought a rearguard action, promulgating views that are hard to distinguish 
from those of the pre-war period. A common rhetorical tactic was to find those rare 
campaigns of the Great War in which cavalry had been important, for instance 
Allenby's campaigns in Palestine. For such officers, the importance of cavalry was 
'as great now as it has ever been'. 30 Others had even more grandiose visions. One 
officer maintained that if one could equip both aircraft and cavalry with radios, 
aviation would be a great aid to the cavalry, not the other way around. 31 Russian 
emigre general and military analyst N. N. Golovine wrote in Cavalry Journal in 1922 
that the cavalry must now strengthen its combat power. Certainly aircraft and 
27 White, Mason Patrick, p. 31. 
28 porter, Aerial Observation, pp. 105-106. White, Mason Patrick, pp. 33-34. 
29 United States Anny, General Staff School, Cavalry Studies: The Cavaby Division, (Fort 
Leavenworth, 1921-1922), pp. 3, 17, CARL. 
30 W. D. Forsyth, Cavalry, 'A Cavalry Study of the Palestine Campaign,' Monographs [on 
the} World War [by the} Class [oE 1921, Command and General Staff School, pp. 14-15, 
CARL. In the same volume, see also B. B. Hyer, 'Cavalry on the Western Front during the 
Operations Preceding the Battle of the Marne 1914'. Americans looked at Allenby' s use of 
cavalry in the deserts of the Middle East and saw, in their mind's eye, the Mexican border. 
Matthew Darlington Morton, Men on 'Iron Ponies.' The Death and Rebirth of the Modern 
U.S. Cavalry, (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Florida State University), 2004, pp. 8, 29. 
See also Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War, (Cambridge, 
2007), p. 135. 
31 A. J. Tittinger, 'The Future of Cavalry', Cl, Volume 29, No. 119 (April, 1920), pp. 68. 
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sometimes signals intelligence could help determine the direction in which the cavalry 
must 'feel the contour' of the enemy's forces, but that work must inevitably be done 
by 'rifle and gun'. Furthermore, technology could not bring in prisoners. Given the 
increased lethality of the modem battlefield, the only solution, Golovine thought, was 
for cavalry to abandon stealth and operate in sufficient force to defeat enemy cavalry 
screens and then survive the encounter with the enemy's main force. 32 
Air enthusiasts made their own enthusiastic counterclaims. One leading 
proponent of airpower held in 1921 that 'virtually the only use' for cavalry was 
protecting the flanks of an army, and' charging against troops already exhausted'. 33 
He even thought that having seen the enemy's strong and weak points, the Air Service 
could practically' dictate' the plan of attack and even its timing.34 
In a few short months, aerial reconnaissance had become such a valuable 
capability that it stimulated intellectual ferment about the future of the most 
prestigious branch of the Army and made ground officers ready to fight to maintain 
control over control of something they had never before had: a gods' -eye view of the 
enemy. 
Many espionage operations just lapped over into peacetime, as well. 
Perceived necessity certainly played its part here. However, one cannot escape the 
suspicion that certain officers found espionage work fun and therefore created a 
constituency for its continuation. Foreign Service Officer Allen Dulles, who served in 
an intelligence capacity in Switzerland during the war, certainly enjoyed his war. It 
had given him the opportunity to be in the know and engage in the cut and thrust of 
32 N. N. Golovine, 'Cavalry Reconnaissance', CJ, Vol. 31, No. 127 (April, 1922), pp. 184-
191,passim. 
33 Harold E. Porter, Aerial Observation, (New York, 1921), p. 24. 
34 Harold E. Porter, 'The Unobserved Observer', U.S. Air Service, Vol. 1, No.1, Feb, 1919, p. 
10. 
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intelligence operations.35 By the same token, the State Department's intelligence 
liaison officer at the Embassy in London wrote about an assistant military attache 
there: 
The only fault I have to find with Dennis is that like a great many 
amateurs he gets a little excited when dealing with what such people 
are apt to call 'Sherlock Holmes stuff. But this of course is a fault 
from which many excellent people suffer, and comes perhaps from 
36 
over-keenness. 
The Dulles brothers, Allen and John Foster, both of whom served in 
intelligence during the war, illustrate certain moral aspects of the new business of 
espionage. They came from a famously Catholic family but their sister later observed 
that Allen seemed to be a believer largely because it allowed him to experience such a 
delicious sense of sin each time he broke a Commandment. By contrast, John Foster 
was an unwavering, ardent Catholic his entire life.37 It is probably no coincidence 
that Allen gravitated overseas toward the world of espionage while John Foster's 
intelligence service was in the MID's office in Washington where he headed a team of 
economic analysts. 
Leland Harrison's intelligence service remained in place at the State 
Department, from 1919 under the name 'U-l', reflecting the fact that it reported to the 
Undersecretary of State, a position created immediately after the war.38 ONI 
reorganized and downsized but kept an espionage function. Furthermore, the 
difficulties of setting up clandestine operations from scratch and on short notice 
convinced at least some in ONI that if there had to be a wide-scale demobilization of 
35 James Srodes, Allen Dulles: Master of Spies (Washington, 1999), p. 73. See also Leonard 
Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and the Family 
Network (New York, 1978), pp. 39-40. Allen Dulles would spend the next world war as an 
intelligence officer in Switzerland, too, this time as part of the Office of Strategic Services. 
36 Bell to Harrison, 9 April, 1919, Leland Harrison Papers, Box 102, Folder 'Dennis, Captain 
A. L. P.', LOC. 
37 Mosley, Dulles, p. 40-41. 
38 No satisfactory history ofU-l has been written though Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones devotes a 
chapter to it in his Cloak and Dol/ar, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 60-80. 
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the Navy's human intelligence apparatus, then both attaches and former 'agents' 
should be kept on some sort of inactive reserve status, ready to be recalled as soon as 
they were needed. Better, would be to keep at least modest clandestine efforts going 
in such places as London, Paris, Holland, Switzerland, and Latin America all 
coordinated by an ONI 'Central Intelligence Section', perhaps even divorced from the 
attache section as many attaches disliked being associated with 'secret service 
work,.39 
The MID also faced massive budget cuts and reorganized itself, but kept the 
espionage function. The MID kept on collecting not just 'combat' but also political, 
economic and 'psychologic' intelligence. Germany continued to be of great interest, 
and the USSR and Bolshevism generally were also particular targets. At a conference 
of military attaches in 1919 to discuss lessons learned during the war and make 
recommendations for the conduct of intelligence during the post-war era, the 
assembled officers agreed that their need for paid agents would be less in peacetime 
but 'that agents, to a limited and legitimate degree, for the protection of our national 
interests will be employed' .40 
In fact, clandestine collection continued to playa significant role in MID's 
efforts to satisfy its varied intelligence requirements. This was not just an era in 
which old operations continued. It was also a time in which new operations were 
launched. The Military Attache in Copenhagen, for instance, ran a series of 
operations and proposed even more. As of May 1919, the Attache had as sources 
'AD 46', one Colonel Witt, 'the head ofa centrum in Scandinavia for collecting 
information on Bolshevism' and 'AD 47', a man named Romanovitch, a 'paid agent', 
39 N. L. R. Edgar, to DNI, 17 December 1918, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98 F-6-d, 11466-H, 
40 'Conference of US Military Attaches at the Hague 16-19 July, 1919, inclusive. (Re. 
Organization and Administration of duties of Military Attache)', RG 8, Accession 1991-372, 
XINA, NHC. 
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head of '[a] system for obtaining information on political, military, and economic 
conditions in Germany and Russia,.41 Back at the MID, though the elaborate plan of 
1918 for exploiting the overseas presence of American companies had come to 
naught, something like it soon re-emerged. By 1920, MID's attache office was 
secretly corresponding on 'commercial intelligence' with 46 American corporations 
as well as 44 other individuals.42 
Marguerite Harrison was another example of the continuation of War 
Department espionage operations. During most of the war Ilarrison worked for the 
Baltimore Sun and the Committee on Public Information. Feeling that she could do 
more, she volunteered and received a commission as an Army captain in September 
1918. The day after the Armistice was signed, she learned that MID would send her 
to Germany to collect political, social and cultural information under the credible 
cover (because it was real) of being a reporter and socialite. While in Germany, she 
did write newspaper columns and books about her experiences. In February 1920, the 
MID reassigned her to Bolshevik Russia under cover as an Associated Press reporter. 
There she got an interview with Feliks Dzerzhinskiy (whom she compared to 
Robespierre) and accosted Trotsky on the street, although she was unable to get him 
to answer any questions about the Red Army. She even used her connections to sneak 
into the 1920 annual meeting of the Communist Party. Harrison's career in 
intelligence ended when the Bolsheviks imprisoned her in the Lubyanka. 43 
There were even higher priority espionage efforts underway. Immediately 
after the war, espionage had friends at extremely high levels of the U.S. Government. 
41 Military Attache Copenhagen to Director fo Military Intelligence, 31 May 1919, RG 165, 
Entry 65, 9944-U-143,. 
42 Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, p. 264. 
43 Catherine M. Griggs, Beyond Boundaries: The Adventurous Life of Marguerite Harrison, 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Washington University), 19 May 1996. Chapters 
2 and 3 are largely devoted to Harrison's career in espionage. 
290 
When, during the last few days of combat, the idea was put forward to deploy a far-
flung network of American 'secret agents' throughout central and eastern Europe and 
into the now-fractured Russian empire, it met with surprisingly little resistance, and 
the active endorsement of the Army and some officials within the State Department. 
Though President Wilson longed for a world free from espionage, three days before 
the armistice, Colonel Edward House, President Wilson's alter ego, cabled the 
president and Secretary of State Robert Lansing that there was no shortage of 
information about conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, but that virtually all of it 
was coming from the French, British and Italians, each of whom were, doubtless, 
shading it in an effort to serve their own ends. With peace talks likely to start in the 
immediate future, this was an unacceptable situation. House suggested that as an 
'urgent' matter the United States should send 'agents' to the various countries to 
gather 'unbiased' information on which to base American policy. He even 
volunteered to get the project underway.44 Wilson and Lansing agreed in principle. 
House suggested using Army and Navy personnel, as well as civilians. All were to be 
subordinate to a political intelligence section in the American delegation to the Paris 
Peace Conference. There would also be an administrative and communications 
center, perhaps in Bucharest.45 Colonel Ralph Van Deman promptly offered a 
considerable number of military officers for this purpose and the MID offered 
Voska's services to collect information on the 'political, economic and military 
conditions in Poland, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Hungary, Russia, and through Italy 
into Servia and Jugo-Slav[ia]'.46 However, Secretary Lansing absolutely drew the 
line at using Foreign Service Officers in such a capacity. Herbert Hoover, who was in 
44 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United States: 1919, The Paris Peace 
Conference, Vol. I, (Washington: GPO, 1942), 194. (Hereafter FRUS.) 
45 FRUS, 194-195. 
46 Churchill to Military Attache Berne, 15 November 1918, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,9944-
79. 
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charge of coordinating American relief efforts in Europe, was another critical player. 
His relief missions seemed the obvious vehicles in which to embed intelligence 
collectors, along with their code clerks, stenographers, and interpreters. Iloover, like 
Lansing, balked at the moral implications, but reluctantly agreed when informed that 
'd d' d 47 Lansing and the presl ent wante It one. 
The realm of domestic intelligence was more contentious. Operations did 
continue after World War I, though massively scaled back. Some scholars have long 
since drawn a direct connection between the domestic surveillance of the World War I 
period and that of World War II and even the Cold War.48 It is important to note, 
however, that the record is replete with signs that intelligence personnel were 
uncomfortable with the mission. In early 1920 for instance, Brigadier General 
Marlborough Churchill, the head of the MID, wrote in the Journal of the United 
States Artillery: 
Secret service methods carried on by military agencies can not be 
justified in time of peace. MID has done none of this work since the 
armistice; and a very sincere effort is being made to comply with the 
spirit and letter of our laws as fully as is possible during the period of 
great industrial unrest which must necessarily be a source of concern to 
b'd' 49 all law-a I mg men. 
This was not just a question of publicly talking a good line. Such scepticism 
shows up repeatedly in the private records. When, in October 1919, a colonel 
recommended that MI-2 encourage the Census Bureau to include a question on party 
affiliation in the 1920 national census, the response from the chief of MI-2 was a curt 
47 FRUS, 195-206. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of AI/en Dulles, (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 39-41. 
48 See, for instance, Talbert, Negative Intelligence, Jensen, Army Surveillance. Sec also 
Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States. Te Philippines. adn the 
Rise of the Surveillance State, (Madison, 2009), chapter 9. 
49 Marlborough Churchill, 'The Military Intelligence Division General Staff, Journal of the 
United States Artillery. 52:4, (April 1920), p. 295. 
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'No,.50 In the spring of 1920, requesting recruiting officers around the country to 
report to him on the strength of radicalism in their areas, the Director of Military 
Intelligence carefully instructed that they would acquire this information 'in an open 
and legal manner. .. you are not authorized to conduct investigations'. It concluded by 
suggesting a visit to the local Justice Department agent or chief of police. 51 
At the same time a massive demobilization of the Army and the Navy was 
beginning, a demobilization in which aNI and the MID fully participated. aNI 
closed its branch offices around the country in December 1918.52 On 1 May 1919, a 
new DNI, Rear Admiral Alfred Niblack, took over ONI. He greatly preferred the pre-
war, more innocent, style of intelligence and worked hard to get ONI out of domestic 
operations, espionage and anything that smacked of illegality or 'gumshoe' 
methods.53 In fact, an enduring condition of aNI during the interwar years, what one 
historian has called the 'naval dilemma', was that despite a substantial desire to focus 
on foreign navies, ships, and technologies, the office kept getting dragged into 
domestic and political collection and analysis. Sometimes this was because a 
President directed them to act. Other times it was because military logic suggested 
that people within the borders ofthe United States could pose tangible threats to the 
h I 54 Navy or the country as a woe. 
Even aside from Niblack, there was a general sense in ONI, as well, that the 
office had overreached during the war. They had done this with the best of intentions 
and largely due to inexperience, but they had overreached nonetheless, wasting their 
time on 'frivolous' cases and filling out-and worse yet, disseminating around the 
50 Wm. B. Graham to Chief, Positive Branch, 15 October 1919, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-
303/9. 
51 A. B. Coxe, to recruiting officers, Apri11920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-305/DN. 
52 Talbert, Negative Intelligence. pp. 135-137. Dorwart, Office o/Naval Intelligence, p. 139. 
53 Dorwart, Office o/Naval Intelligence, p. 140. Dorwart, Conflict o/Duty, pp. 11-13. 
54 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, pp. ix-x, 3-8, and passim. 
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country-too many suspect cards based on vague or anonymous information. All too 
often the result was 'ill-advised action' by ONI officials in the field, a euphemism for 
the destruction of a person's reputation. No, they thought, ONI continued to have a 
role to play in domestic affairs, but only with regard to investigating issues that 
unambiguously fell into the Navy's domain.55 
If the domestic surveillance program was primarily intended to oppress 
minorities, the working class, and political minorities, these words and actions make 
little sense. There were no fewer Jews, African-Americans, or labour union members 
in December 1918 than there had been a month earlier; by that standard continued 
operations should have been in order. The fact was that, though the officer corps was 
no less anti-Semitic, racist, or elitist after the war ended than it had been before, most 
officers did not connect these matters in their mind with their military duty, which 
was to be able to fight and win the nation's wars. 
While Niblack's opposition to domestic operations may have been a result of 
his generally old-fashioned tendencies, Churchill's were rooted more firmly in 
principle. He told the officers of the MID in a September 1919 lecture that pure 
military logic required the military services to be in charge of domestic 
counterintelligence. However, this logic must give way in the face of the 
requirements of democracy, not just in peacetime, but also in war. 56 When, during 
the Red Scare that came in 1919 and 1920, the MID's abandonment of domestic 
operations came in for political criticism, Churchill defended his decision. He said 
that his Anny men were enthusiastic, energetic people who needed to be restrained 
55 Raymond E. Hom to ONI, 31 January 1919, NARA, RG 38, Entry 98, F-6-d, 11466-0. 
56 Marlborough Churchill, 'The Military Intelligence Division War Department, General 
Staff,4 September 1919, NARA RG 165, Entry 65,10560-328/110. 
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lest their application of 'police methods' violate the law, and create a 'scandal and a 
menace to our form of government' .57 
Certainly there were a few overenthusiastic officers who continued either 
performing or urging domestic operations in the immediate aftermath of the war. In 
large part, this was because of a concern about the Bolsheviks which had continued 
and even accelerated after the Armistice, spurred on by (among other things) the 
unsuccessful Spartacist putsch in Germany, and the short-lived Communist rule of 
Bela Kun in Hungary. ONI demonstrated the continued potency of wartime fears 
when in December 1919 it disseminated an analysis warning of a nationwide terrorist 
campaign led by anarchists, but also involving German and Russian Jews, Mexican 
bandits, a Japanese intelligence officer, and members of the IWW.58 Needless to say 
no terrorist attack ensued. 
The MID may have been slightly less sensationalistic, but it perceived 
fundamentally similar threats and, more to the point, perceived them as within its 
orbit of responsibility. In the fall of 1919, MID chief Churchill warned his opposite 
number in the War Plans Division that a Bolshevik revolution might start as early as I 
November with a coal miners' strike. This warning set in motion extensive planning 
and intelligence collection efforts not to mention other preparations across much of 
the U.S. Government. In 1920, therefore, the War Department drafted 'War Plan 
White' for handling such contingencies. It is true that this was just one of numerous 
war plans in the 'Rainbow' family of the 1920s and 1930s. That said, it was one of 
the better tended such documents; the Army considered a domestic uprising a 
57 Talbert, Negative Intelligence, pp. 137-l38. 
58 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, pp. 12-13. 
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genuine, not a hypothetical threat. 59 Still, the domestic intelligence capabilities of the 
armed services were not what they had been just twelve or eighteen months before. In 
fact, in February, 1920, a senior official in MID expressed the fear that the art of 
being a 'city intelligence officer' would soon become a 'lost art'. 60 
This brief scare notwithstanding, both in their public and private statements 
the MID's officers sought to squelch most of their domestic activities and deny all of 
them. For instance, on 9 March 1920 the MID sent out an additional order abolishing 
its internal counter-espionage system and ordering the return to Washington of the 
counter-espionage manuals. The important task of keeping the ranks free of radicals 
would now informally fall on the shoulders of the vigilant non-commissioned officer, 
not on the desk of the intelligence officer. When that same year an officer in New 
York reported that he had heard a rumour that the MID was reporting to the President 
about domestic politics, the MID not only denied it but showed him copies of the 
materials it actually sent to the President in order to prove its case.61 In the spring of 
1920 a debate emerged in the MID. All agreed that the division should pay attention 
to domestic subversive movements which might threaten insurrection. Furthermore, 
there was a feeling that these questions should be approached with 'exactly the same 
scientific detachment as if the officer concerned were considering the domestic 
situation in England' and that agents provocateurs were not suitable peacetime tools. 
However, some officer believed that assessing the subversive threat required 
investigating individual agitators while others disagreed. Churchill's personal view 
was that the Department of Justice should investigate individuals and share with the 
S9 Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic 
Disorders. 1877-1945 (Washington, 1997), pp. 327-331. Talbert, Negative Intelligence. p. 
138-143. See also Steven T. Ross, American War Plans. 1890-1939 (London, 2002), pp. 122-
126. 
60 RG Unsigned letter [Churchill?], to 'Nick' [Nicholas Biddle] 20 February 1920, NARA, 
RG 165, Entry 65, 10560-328/68, 
61 See correspondence filed under 10560-391 in RG 165, Entry 65. 
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War Department such general knowledge as emerged.62 In any event, the suspicion 
that the military was spying on civilians was hard to eradicate. In 1929, the War 
Department G-2 told students of the Army War College that his office was still trying 
to 'live down the evil name' that had attached to it as a result of its domestic activities 
d · h 63 unng t e war. 
• • • 
The American intelligence effort during World War I was a significant 
accomplishment but upon closer examination, it goes from astounding to merely 
remarkable. The War and Navy Departments showed commendable flexibility in 
allowing novel functions and methods to intrude upon their otherwise conservative 
institutions. They showed even more commendable flexibility in allowing in a great 
many people who can only be described as quirky. Of course, the alternative was 
institutional shame, human tragedy, and national defeat. At the individual level the 
accomplishment is less surprising. Many people were brought into the intelligence 
services to perform functions that may have been novel to the military but which were 
not particularly novel to them. Scientists, engineers, businessmen, journalists, 
photographers, classicists, policemen, all found their natural places. In many cases, 
these men could then handpick their staffs. In the AEF, there was 'no excuse ... for 
not having the cream of the newspaper men, the scientists, the engineers, such as you 
needed, in a great number, for organization in actual operation of the Intelligence' .64 
62 Gardner L. Harding to Churchill, 13 March 1920, NARA, RG 165, Entry 65,10560-70517. 
(commenting on 705/3). Wrisley Brown to McCain, 25 March 1920, 10560-705/2; W.W. 
Hicks to Colonel McCain, 16 March 1920, 10560-705/3. Churchill to McCain head of 
Negative Branch, possibly 11 April 1920, 10560-705/3. 
63 'Discussion following Lecture by Colonel Ford"', 29 November 1929, NARA, RG 165, 
Entry 65,10560-81717 (attachment). 
64 'Dictation', 3 February 1936, Dennis Nolan Papers, Box 2, Folder 'Dictations, ca. 1936, on 
W orId War 1', USAMHI. 
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Because there has been so little written about American intelligence during 
World War I, the rapidity and breadth of the American accomplishment has gone 
largely unremarked. Intelligence disciplines such as aerial photography, cryptanalysis, and 
goniometry that had either not existed before or had existed only in the most primordial form 
were now vigorous sub-communities in their own right. Intelligence personnel investigated 
political and economic topics nearly as much as military topics and they spent a great deal of 
effort combating undesirable ideologies both at home and abroad. 
Is the American intelligence achievement during World War I a testament to a 
uniquely American emphasis on meritocracy and "can do spirit"? The answer must 
be no. The intelligence services of the British, French, and Germans were more 
sophisticated in 1914 than were those of the United States in 1917, but viewed 
retrospectively, the difference was not large. At the end of the war, the European 
services were still ahead of the Americans but again not by much. 65 The United 
States was In other words, the British, French, and German services advanced about 
the same distance as the Americans in a somewhat longer time period. llowever, they 
did not have the advantage that the Americans had of wiser, more experienced 
partners helping them along. Ultimately, then, the American achievement must be 
seen as a testament to the motivating power of war. 
65 For a summary of the state of British intelligence in 1914, see the first parts of chapters 24 
in Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence 
Community, (New York, 1987). For the French, see Douglas Porch, The French Secret 
Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War, (New York, 1995), chapter 4. For the 
Germans, see Markus Pohlmann, 'German Intelligence at War, 1914-1918', Journal of 
Intelligence History, 5:2 (2005), pp. 24-54. 
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